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AFRICA. No. 4 (1896).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

OPERATIONS AGAINST SLAVE-TRADERS

IN

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA.

[In continuation of "Africa No. 2 (1896)."]

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
April 1896.*

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Correspondence respecting Operations against Slave-traders in British Central Africa.

[In continuation of "Africa No. 2 (1896)."]

No. 1.

Commissioner Johnston to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 26.)

My Lord,

The Residency, Zomba, January 3, 1896.

IN my despatch of the 15th November, 1895,* I apprised your Lordship of the reasons which compelled me to undertake the campaign against the North Nyasa Arabs.

This campaign, I am happy to state, resulted in the most complete and almost unqualified success, as already reported by me to your Lordship in a telegram dated Karonga, the 6th December, 1895.

I have the honour to inclose a Report, by Major C. A. Edwards, who commanded the expedition. This Report is so full and circumstantial that I need add no words of my own in description of the military operations.

During the fighting Kopa-Kopa and three other Arabs whose identity is not very certain were killed in a sortie from Mlozi's stockade. Mlozi himself was taken prisoner on the evening of the 3rd December when his fortified town was captured. During a short truce which occurred on the morning of the 3rd December, when Mlozi had come out of the town and asked me to state my terms if he surrendered, I informed him that if the town was then given up, and his men laid down their arms, and he himself and Kopa-Kopa surrendered themselves to the British, I would promise them their lives—nothing more. He rejected these terms, however, and, of course, in taking the stockade an inevitable loss of life occurred, for which I told Mlozi I should hold him responsible. Even when imprisoned in his house and told that no harm would be done to him if he surrendered himself quietly, he ordered a few men who were with him to fire on the Sikh sentries, by which action several of them were severely wounded. When he was finally captured by Sergeant-Major Bandawe, of the Atonga regulars, I had him brought to the main camp, and on the 4th December I assembled the native Chiefs of the country, who were all present, and Mlozi being a native of British Central Africa, though of Arab parentage, I had him tried by this native Court. There were endless accusations against him for murder, but I preferred to take up one count, viz., the raiding of the villages of Kameme and Soche, which was in some respects the cause of the war. A number of witnesses came forward to show that these villages had been raided by the express order of Mlozi, and that Mlozi himself had murdered or caused to be murdered in his stockade some of the men of these villages captured in these raids by the Awemba and handed over to Mlozi.

Mlozi had nothing to say for his defence; he merely reiterated at intervals that "these men (the Wankonde Chiefs) want my death; what is the good of my saying anything?"

The Chiefs decided that Mlozi should die, and asked leave to execute him in the native fashion, by spearing; but to this I would not consent, and before confirming the death sentence I sought the opinion of all the Europeans present, who were unanimous in condemning Mlozi. Accordingly, I sanctioned the death sentence, but told the Chiefs that it would be carried out on their behalf in a decent manner by Europeans. Mlozi, therefore, was hanged at 1 P.M. on the 4th December, in the presence of all the Wankonde Chiefs, and of the 569 slaves whom we had found cooped up in his stockade, and who were mostly people taken from the two villages referred to, and whose evidence had condemned Mlozi.

* "Africa No. 2 (1896)."

I had intended at one time to hold the trial of Mlozi at Karonga, but I received information on the early morning of the 4th December that Kapandansaru, together with Mlozi's son, were advancing from Senga to his assistance, and I deemed it, therefore, better to get the matter over as quickly as possible, in case an attempt at rescue should be made.

Five hundred and sixty-nine slaves were found cooped up in Mlozi's stockade; almost all the women and children of the Arabs had been sent away by them to Senga before the war commenced. These slaves were mostly women and children who belonged, with very few exceptions, to the Wankonde villages, and were returned by me to their people. The few amongst them who came from distant parts, and whom it was not possible to send back to their homes, were placed at Mr. Yule's station at Songwe, to remain there (if they chose to do so), or to be returned to their homes by any chance that subsequently offered.

I might mention that amongst the slaves set free were several men and women to whom I had given papers of freedom in 1889, and had then released from the Arabs as one of the conditions of the Treaty of Peace then concluded. Subsequently these same people had been impudently recaptured by Mlozi, and amongst Mlozi's papers was found one of the freedom papers I had issued at that time. I inclose this, as it may be of some interest.

A few prisoners were taken, including two Arabs. These men have been sentenced to various terms of hard labour, and are being sent down to the Shiré Highlands to work them out on the roads.

No loot was taken in the stockade, with the exception of a small quantity of cloth and four small and valueless tusks of ivory, but all Mlozi's cattle were captured, numbering about ninety-eight, together with a large flock of sheep and goats. I distributed some of these cattle amongst the Wankonde Chiefs, partly as a reward for their loyal and hearty assistance, and partly as a recompense for the cattle recently stolen from them by Mlozi's men. The remainder I have dealt with according to the Regulations laid down for the distribution of things of this description captured in warfare, that is to say, half of the cattle are taken over by the Administration of the Protectorate, the remaining half were given to the soldiers, not, however, to be sold, but to be used for the general benefit of the armed forces.

A number of muzzle-loading guns and a few Remington rifles were captured, together with Remington cartridges. - These have been handed over to the Commandant of the armed forces.

In conclusion, I have the pleasure to fully indorse the recommendations given at the end of Major Edwards' Report, and in addition to express my very strong appreciation of the ability with which Major Edwards conducted this last campaign, together with the earnest hope that his services in this respect may not escape the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

I also wish to lay stress on the ability and bravery displayed by Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith during the period when, owing to Major Edwards' sickness, he was obliged to take command at a very critical period of the campaign.

Great praise is also due to Commander Cullen, R.N.R., and the officers and petty-officers* of the Lake Nyasa gun-boats for their share in the operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. H. JOHNSTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Major Edwards to Commissioner Johnston.

Sir,

The Camp, Zomba, January 1, 1896.

IN accordance with your instructions contained in your letter dated Fort Johnston, 5th November, 1895, in which you state that you regard a campaign against the Arabs in the North Nyasa District as unavoidable, and require that the campaign must be undertaken not later than the beginning of December, and must be rapidly brought to a conclusion, and every effort must be made to make the conclusion a completely satisfactory one, and in which you further authorize me to make what arrangements I think fit for the transport of the necessary force to Karonga, I have the honour to report that immediately on my return

* The petty officers are men from the Royal Navy.—H. H. J.

to Fort Johnston, on the 10th November, immediately after the campaign against Mponda was concluded, I arranged for the necessary supply of Sikh rations, munitions of war, and medical stores to be forwarded down to Fort Johnston from Blantyre and Zomba, and also arranged for the chartering of the German Imperial steamer "Hermann von Wissmann."

I then informed Commander Cullen, R.N.R., Senior Naval Officer British Central Africa Administration, of the details of the expedition and of the amount of stores, guns, and ammunition that would be required to be transported to Karonga in the gun-boats "Adventure" and "Pioneer," and in the hired transport steam-ships "Domira" and "Hermann von Wissmann," and where the various details and stores would require to be embarked, and requested him to draw up a scheme for the transport of the same in the various vessels, and to arrange dates of sailing so that the steam-ship "Domira" should arrive at Karonga on the 30th November, and the remaining vessels on the morning of the 1st December.

The latter was necessary for the following reasons:—

1. It was essential that the Arabs should be taken by surprise, in order to allow them no time to make preparations for a prolonged defence by getting in extra supplies of ammunition and extra fighting men from the Arabs in the interior and supplies of food from the surrounding villages.

2. As the landing at Karonga is a difficult operation owing to the surf, it would take a long time to disembark all the troops and stores if all the vessels arrived together, but the "Domira," which would carry nearly half the force, would be unloaded on the day of her arrival, thereby leaving her boats available to assist in the disembarkation of the other vessels.

3. As the steam-ship "Domira" would only carry native troops and a few officers, their presence at Karonga would not cause the Arabs to think that active operations were in progress against them, and it would also give the officer in command one extra day to engage the necessary porters required for the expedition.

I further requested Commander Cullen to detail an officer as Transport Officer of the expedition, and also to detail one officer and two petty officers for duty with the artillery, and to arrange that two naval 7-lb. guns and two machine-guns should accompany the expedition.

All these matters being satisfactorily concluded, I left Fort Johnston on the 14th November for the Makaujira expedition, returning to Fort Johnston on the 20th November.

I found all the stores, &c., had arrived, and so at once commenced loading-up the various vessels.

Her Majesty's Commissioner arrived on the 21st November.

The steam-ship "Domira" and the gun-boat "Pioneer" sailed on the 23rd November; the gun-boat "Adventure," with Her Majesty's Commissioner on board, sailed on the 24th November; and the steam-ship "Hermann von Wissmann" sailed on the 25th November.

On the 1st December all the troops, stores, and munitions of war were disembarked at Karonga by 4:30 P.M., although a heavy surf was breaking all the morning.

The following are the details of the troops present at Karonga on the 1st December:—

Major C. A. Edwards, 35th Sikhs, Commandant (sick).
 Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith, 11th Bengal Lancers.
 Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, 45th Sikhs, Adjutant.
 Lieutenant E. G. Alston.
 Commander Cullen, R.N.R., C.O. Artillery.
 Lieutenant-Commander W. P. Phillips, R.N.R., Transport officer.
 Dr. Wordsworth Poole.
 Mr. Walter Gordon-Cumming, volunteer officer.
 Major L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs (sick), volunteer officer.
 Major F. Trollope (late Grenadier Guards), volunteer officer.
 Sergeant-Major P. Devoy.
 Mr. R. F. Brighton, petty officer, R.N.
 Mr. F. D. Savage, petty officer, R.N.
 Hospital assistant, Firoz Khan.
 107 Sikhs.
 78 Makua regulars.
 204 Atonga "
 35 Yao "
 10 Swahili gunners from gun-boats.

Total .. 434 rifles, including gunners.

Our artillery consisted of:—

- 2 9-pr. field guns.
 - 3 7-pr. mountain guns (150 lbs.).
 - 2 7-pr. naval guns (200 lbs.).
 - 2 5-barrel Nordenfelts (one gun out of gear).
- (All the guns were fitted with drag-ropes).

To work these guns we had the following trained men:—

- Commander Cullen, R.N.R., Commanding.
- Sergeant-Major P. Devoy, late Royal Artillery.
- Mr. Brighton, petty officer, R.N.
- Mr. Savage, petty officer, R.N.
- 8 Sikh gunners from Indian mountain batteries.
- 9 Maku gunners locally trained.
- 9 Atonga gunners locally trained.
- 10 Swahili gunners from gun-boats

—
Total .. 36 gunners.

Our ammunition for the artillery was as follows:—

- 120 rounds of all kinds for 9-prs.
- 350 " " " 7-prs.
- 10,000 " " for machine guns.

In addition to the above we had:—

- 50 lbs. gun-cotton for demolition.
- 40 war rockets.
- 12 signal rockets.

Our small-arm ammunition consisted of:—

- 54,200 rounds of Snider ammunition.
- 1,800 rounds of Winchester ammunition.

All the men were armed with Sniders, with the exception of the gunners, who carried Winchester carbines slung on their backs.

We took no tents with us; each man had a blanket and great coat; the latter was carried by the soldier and their blankets were carried by porters. No other kit was taken.

We had six weeks' supply of rations with us for the whole force, and a fair supply of entrenching tools.

The hospital arrangements were under the control of Dr. Poole, and consisted of one section field hospital with 8 hammocks slung on poles. He had to assist him, Hospital Assistant Firoz Khan and one native dresser.

As soon as I was landed I submitted my plan of action to Her Majesty's Commissioner, which, being approved of, was at once put into operation. It was as follows:—

One party of men under Lieutenant Coape-Smith, and consisting of four sections, viz.:—

| | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------|-----|----|--------|----------|-------|---------------------|--------------|
| 20 | Sikhs | and | 60 | native | regulars | under | Major | Trollope, |
| 20 | " | " | 60 | " | " | " | Lieutenant | Alston, |
| 10 | " | " | 60 | " | " | " | Mr. Gordon-Cumming, | |
| 20 | " | " | 50 | " | " | " | Lieutenant | Coape-Smith, |

were to proceed as soon as it was dark along the path to the north of Karonga as far as the Rukuru River, which had to be crossed; then striking in through the jungle in a westerly direction and avoiding villages, to make for the ridge-shaped hill just east of Mlozi's town. If Lieutenant Coape-Smith found the hill unoccupied by the enemy he was to leave Major Trollope there with his men and proceed on past Mlozi's and leave a party on the ford over the Rukuru River, in the most advantageous position, to prevent the egress of Mlozi's men. Mr. Gordon-Cumming's section he was to place between Lieutenant Alston's party on the Rukuru and the hill to the south to watch the road between Mlozi's and Senga. This being finished, he was to return with his seventy men by the same route he had previously traversed and take up a position on the north side of the Rukuru River, opposite Kopa-Kopa's and Msalemu's towns, in order to assist in the assault or to intercept fugitives after the bombardment of those places.

If, however, Lieutenant Coape-Smith found the hill occupied by the enemy he was to assault it, and having taken it, carry out the remainder of the programme as far as he was able.

The officers commanding the various sections were to be instructed to keep their men well under shelter and not to commence hostilities before it was absolutely necessary, but they were to intercept any men endeavouring to leave the town or to enter it.

The second force, under Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, consisting of ninety-three rifles, and the gun detachment under command of Commander Cullen, R.N.R., and accompanied by Her Majesty's Commissioner, were to leave Karonga at 5 A.M. on the 2nd December, and keeping to the Tanganyika Road were to proceed until they reached the baobab tree marked on the map. Here the battery was to halt and come into action against Msalemu's stockade, as soon as Lieutenant Smith had managed to take up an advantageous position of the left flank.

After Kopa-Kopa's and Msalemu's positions had been carried, the second column, reinforced by Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith's section, was to proceed against Mlozi's and commence bombarding it.

By these measures I hoped that Mlozi and his men would be confined to their fortified town and not be able to render any assistance to Kopa-Kopa and Msalemu by issuing out and attacking our forces, besieging these places on the flank, and further, if no assistance came from Mlozi's then, with the artillery at our disposal, Kopa-Kopa's and Msalemu's stockades could be quickly reduced, thereby opening up a safe road from Karonga to Mlozi's for the conveyance of our rations, stores, &c., required for our troops, as we should want every man we had to invest Mlozi's town, consequently leaving us no men for convoy duty.

During the afternoon of the 1st December several heavy showers of rain fell which delayed our arrangements, and, moreover, the African Lakes' Corporation were only able to supply us with 130 carriers; but Her Majesty's Commissioner through the Wakonde Chiefs of the neighbourhood, who were only too glad to see that operations were being undertaken to punish their old enemy the Arabs, was able to supply us with many more. He also supplied us with two guides, Kitambala and Kifunguru, who knew the country well, having been in the employ of the African Lakes' Company in their war with the Arabs, 1887-89.

All being ready for a start, I handed over command to Lieutenant Coape-Smith as I was still too weak after an attack of black-water fever, to proceed to the front, and at 8.15 P.M. the 1st December, he left the station of Karonga with his column, composed as previously mentioned, together with the two guides and seventy porters, carrying officers' loads, Sikh blankets, spare ammunition, and entrenching tools.

This column had a most trying and difficult march, as after crossing the Rukuru River at the Kambwe Lagoon, they had to strike across country covered with bush and scrub, and in addition to this rain fell heavily, with slight intermissions, all through the night, so that the men were all wet through. It was also a very dark night, yet notwithstanding these difficulties, Lieutenant Coape-Smith managed to arrive, with the assistance of his guides at the ridge-shaped hill between Kopa-Kopa's boma and Mlozi's at 2 A.M.

Finding the hill unoccupied by the enemy, he left Major Trollope with his men there, and proceeded along the left bank of the Rukuru until he was well past Mlozi's town. He then crossed the Rukuru with the remainder of his force and found a good position for Lieutenant Alston and his men in a nullah, running north and south quite close to the town, but well sheltered from fire, with their left resting on the Rukuru.

He then proceeded and posted Mr. Gordon-Cumming's picket and sentries with their left in touch with Lieutenant Alston's and their right resting on the precipitous hills to the south-west of the town. Having thus hemmed Mlozi in, he retraced his steps with his section of seventy men.

The second column left Karonga just after 5 A.M. on the 2nd December in the midst of pouring rain, but were only able to take with them two 7-pr. guns and one machine-gun, owing to the lack of porters then present. The ground was very bad for travelling and transport owing to the heavy rain, and there were several ugly ditches and ravines to cross, but by 7.30 A.M. they managed to arrive at the baobab tree, and within effective range of Kopa-Kopa's stockade and Msalemu's fortified village. The two 7-prs. opened fire at Msalemu's at a distance of 900 yards, and after about twenty rounds had been fired the enemy was seen running out of the stockade. Lieutenant Smith and his men then immediately advanced under cover of the Nordenfelt and meeting with no great opposition, fell upon the fugitives and drove them across the

Rukuru River, where they fell into the hands of Lieutenant Coape-Smith and his men who had just arrived on the scene of action. Their discomforture was complete. Commander Cullen had in the meanwhile turned his attention to Kopa-Kopa's with the five 7-prs. (three more having in the interval been brought up by Lieutenant Phillips from Karonga). The enemy at once fled, one party making for Mlozi's and another retreating in a north-easterly direction. After a general rendezvous and short rest at Kopa-Kopa's, the second column proceeded along the road towards Mlozi's, Lieutenant Phillips being sent back to Karonga to bring up the two field guns and their ammunition. A small guard was left behind at Kopa-Kopa's and Msalemu's.

The second column debouched from the pass on the right of which Major Trollope was posted about 1 P.M., and at once positions were selected for shelling the town from. These positions were respectively 1,100 and 1,300 yards distant. After some thirty rounds had been expended, the town was on fire in several places. The battery was then advanced to a village on the right at 800 yards distance, and the fire continued. In the meanwhile Lieutenant Coape-Smith had moved Major Trollope's party from the top of the hill to a position in a nullah, or rather under a steep bank between the town and the Rukuru. This prevented any of the besieged getting any of the water from the river. At 4:30 P.M. Lieutenant Phillips brought up the two 9-prs., which were at once brought into action on the right. Several explosions quickly took place in the town, a quantity of Mlozi's powder that was in store having apparently been blown up. Just before dusk the machine-guns moved up in front of the gate on the south-east side to guard this exit and all the pickets and sentries were further strengthened. All this time the enemy has been keeping up a brisk fire from the loop-holes at any men who exposed themselves, and from time to time our men replied. About dusk the fire slackened on both sides.

At 10 P.M. firing recommenced from Mlozi's, and Commander Cullen took one of the 7-prs. round to the left, opposite the door on the south-east side, and was just in time to help in repelling a sortie by firing case-shot into them. Everything again being quiet, he withdrew the 7-pr., but about 1:30 another sortie was attempted, but was repelled by Mr. Brighton with a machine-gun. Rifle firing went on pretty constantly during the remainder of the night.

At daylight on the 3rd December the battery was rearranged, two 7-prs. and one 9-pr. being moved to a village to the south of the town, and fire was opened at 250 yards and 375 yards with these guns. The cross fire by this new arrangement seemed to produce some result, as shortly afterwards a white flag was hoisted in the town, and the "cease fire" having been sounded, messengers arrived from Mlozi for Her Majesty's Commissioner. After some delay Mlozi himself came outside the town and saw Her Majesty's Commissioner, but, not accepting the terms offered him, the white flags were lowered, and the bombardment recommenced.

During this truce Lieutenant Alston was nearly shot. Hearing the "cease fire," and finding that the white flags were up, he left the nullah, and was walking along the bank about 30 yards from the town, when several shots were fired at him from the loop-holes.

The fire of the guns was now concentrated on the gateway on the south-east flank. The gate was soon demolished, but the shells had no effect on the walls, passing right through them without any apparent damage.

At 3 P.M. I arrived at the front with Major Bradshaw, and assumed command.

I found that although nearly all the houses in the town had been destroyed, yet the walls of the town remained intact, except that in several places large holes in the mud had been made, and that, as we had expended over 230 shells on the bombardment, with no material result as far as we could see, as fire was steadily kept up by the enemy on any of our exposed positions, to carry the place by assault was the only thing to be done. Moreover, nearly all the men had been on the alert since 6 A.M. on the morning of the 1st December, viz., fifty-seven hours, at a stretch, and during that time they had been out in the pelting rain continuously, with no covering of any kind over them, and their food was sodden and uneatable. We were unable to provide any reliefs, as all the men were required to guard the extensive line of outposts. The officers and men were very cheerful, but tired out, and the strain could not have been kept up much longer. Further, if through any weakening of the outposts in order to supply reliefs the enemy could have managed to fight his way out, we should have had a prolonged campaign in the wet season of the year, as the Arabs would certainly have raided all the stations in the North Nyasa district, and have closed the road between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. I accordingly determined, with Her Majesty's Commissioner's permission, to assault the next morning at daybreak, and was preparing for the same when Commander Cullen told

me that Her Majesty's Commissioner had pointed out to him where Mlozi's house was, and from information that he had received from a deserter he believed that Mlozi and several Headmen were inside, and accordingly ordered Sergeant-Major Devoy to fire some shells into it from the 9-pr. The first shot hit the house just below the roof; the next, a shrapnel, hit the centre of the house a little lower down, and the effect was instantaneous. At 5.15 P.M., under a heavy fire from the walls, a large number of men streamed out from the gate on the east side, just opposite Mlozi's house. They were met almost immediately by Lieutenants Coape-Smith and G. de H. Smith and thirty men whom I had sent round to inspect the outposts, and a more or less hand-to-hand combat took place. The enemy made several stands, but were driven towards the Rukuru and across it. Here they came under the fire of Major Trollope's men, and several rapid volleys caused them to flee in all directions, the pursuit being taken up by our Wankonde allies (spearmen).

At the same time another body of men issued out of the gate leading to Senga. Here they were met by Mr. Gordon-Cumming and his men, and managed after some fighting to break through the line. Mr. Gordon-Cumming, though, pursued in a most vigorous manner. During these sorties, however, the enemy had been keeping up a very heavy fire from the walls, and many women left the town and sought our protection. These were, by Her Majesty's Commissioner's direction, taken to our head-quarter camp.

During the pursuit of the enemy Lieutenants Smith and Coape-Smith had got separated. The latter crossed the Rukuru, and then recrossed it near where Lieutenant Alston was posted, called to Lieutenant Alston to come on with his men inside the town. Running on they met Mr. Gordon-Cumming. On entering the south-west gate Lieutenant Smith told Lieutenant Alston to go round with his men to the left, and Mr. Gordon-Cumming he sent round to the right, while Lieutenant Smith himself, with some men, clambered on to the roof, and, running round on the roof of the gallery, firing down upon the enemy within the town, eventually got round to the north, where he found a lot of firing going on between Lieutenant Alston's party and the enemy. Here he met Lieutenant Coape-Smith and Major Trollope, who had just clambered on to the roof. Seeing a number of the enemy run into a house under their feet, Lieutenants G. de H. Smith and Coape-Smith jumped down into the town. Lieutenant Smith was immediately shot in the arm, and Lieutenant Coape-Smith took him out of fire round a corner of the wall, where they met Mr. Gordon-Cumming, who bandaged up the wound, and, putting him on a native bed, sent him to the hospital.

By this time all the rest of the officers were inside the town with the rest of their men, and after about half-an-hour's desultory fighting, viz., by 6.30 P.M., the town was ours.

I found 569 slaves cooped up inside the town. These I had sent under safe escort to the camp.

Some of the women slaves informed me that Mlozi had been shot by the last shot fired, which caused the panic, and that he and many of his men had remained behind, and that he was then lying wounded in his house. I went with Mr. Gordon-Cumming and some Atonga to search for him, but could not find him. As it was now dark, except for the glow of the burning houses, I left a strong guard over Mlozi's houses, and also a strong guard at each gate, and then returned to camp.

Shortly after reaching there Bandawe, the Sergeant-Major of Atonga regulars, brought in Mlozi. He had found him in a subterranean room in his house, which was carefully concealed. He had a hand-to-hand fight with Mlozi's Headman, who was with Mlozi, but had bayoneted him.

Our total losses were :—

Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, severely wounded.
Hospital assistant Firoz Khan, slightly wounded.
1 Sikh killed.
3 Sikhs severely wounded.
2 Sikhs slightly wounded.
3 Atonga killed.
2 Atonga wounded.
2 Yaos severely wounded.

The losses on Mlozi's side, as far as I know, were as follows :—

151 killed outside the town and between the river and the hills,
including Kopa-Kopa and three other Arabs.
65 inside the town.

Total .. 216

But in addition to these, many more must have been killed by the infuriated Wankonde, who had many years of oppression to avenge, and who pursued the enemy far and wide.

We captured :—

98 cattle.
172 sheep and goats.
4 small tusks of ivory, and
512 yards of calico.

From native reports it appears that Mlozi had about 500 Wanyamwezi (Ruga Ruga) in his town, besides several hundred Ahenga, all fighting men; that Kopa-Kopa had about 200 men of the same kind; that the Arabs had about 200 rifles, Snider and Remington, but not much ammunition for them; that Mlozi had great stores of gunpowder in his town, but that this was blown up by some shells at the commencement of the bombardment, and that consequently at the time of the sortie he had not much powder left; that Mlozi had for some time past been preparing for a fight with the British, but had only just recently made the rifle-pits and subterranean chambers inside his houses; that it had been arranged among the Arabs that the great stand was to have been made at Mlozi's; in consequence, all the gunpowder was stored in his town; that Kopa-Kopa had left his town before dawn on the morning of the 2nd December; that immediately news reached Mlozi that Her Majesty's Commissioner had arrived with Sikhs and big guns at Karonga he sent off messengers to Kapandansaru and the other Senga Arabs to come at once to his assistance; that Msalemu was away at Tanganyika.

On the 4th December Mlozi was tried before a native Court, condemned to death, and executed, with the approval of Her Majesty's Commissioner.

On the 5th December, leaving Lieutenant Coape-Smith and Mr. Gordon-Cumming and 150 men behind to demolish the fortifications of Mlozi, Kopa-Kopa, and Msalemu's towns, the main body returned to Karonga, where huts were obtained for the accommodation of the troops.

Having made arrangements for Lieutenant Coape-Smith to proceed with Mr. Vice-Consul Crawshay, Mr. Gordon-Cumming, and 190 rifles, and one 7-pr. mountain gun to the frontier on the Tanganyika road, and build a fort there to overawe the Awemba, and also arranged for the transport of the remaining troops from Karonga, I left Karonga on the 7th December in the gun-boat "Adventure" for Zomba.

During the whole of the operations the Sikhs behaved splendidly, notwithstanding the hardships they had to undergo. They were always cheerful and alert, and in the assault thoroughly upheld their good name.

I must testify to the great assistance rendered us by Mr. Walter Gordon-Cumming. As a volunteer officer he took his share of the hard work, and never shirked any disagreeable duty. On the contrary, he was the first to volunteer for it. His men liked and followed him, and he was always in the thick of the fight.

My thanks are also due to Dr. Wordsworth Poole for the assiduous care he took of the sick and wounded both during the operations and afterwards, and in these thanks I am sure I express those of all the officers and men of the expedition.

Before closing this Report I must bring to your notice the names of the following officers and men who have specially distinguished themselves :—

Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith, 11th Bengal Lancers, is an officer of exceptional ability, and has several times distinguished himself since he came out to this country, not only by his untiring energy and devotion to duty, and his personal bravery in the presence of the enemy, but also by his ability in grasping the situation, and acting on his own responsibility. In this expedition he posted the outposts most judiciously, and thoroughly carried out the plan of operations while he was commanding the force. Again, when Lieutenant Smith was wounded, he at great personal risk carried Lieutenant G. de H. Smith out of danger. I most strongly recommend this officer.

Lieutenant G. de H. Smith has been Adjutant of the Armed Forces since the 1st April, and it is mainly due to him that the Makua and Atonga have been so quickly and efficiently trained. He is a keen soldier, and always to the fore where the danger is greatest. In the assault he was the first man inside the town. He was severely wounded when leading his men to attack a house in which some of the enemy had taken shelter. I most strongly recommend this officer.

Commander Cullen, R.N.R., was in charge of the transport of the expedition to Karonga. This he carried out in a most satisfactory manner. During the operations he was in charge of the artillery, and to the able manner in which he managed his battery is greatly due the celerity with which the expedition has been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. I strongly recommend this officer.

The officer commanding the artillery has brought the following to my special notice, and with his remarks I cordially agree:—

Sergeant-Major P. Devoy.
No. 203 Lance Naick Nand Singh.
No. 204 Gunner Kala Singh.
No. 209 Gunner Kushal Singh

I attach herewith:—

1. A description of Mlozi's town.
2. A Report of Officer commanding artillery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. A. EDWARDS, Major,
Commanding Armed Forces in British Central Africa.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Description of Mlozi's and Kopa-Kopa's Fortified Towns, and Msalemu's Stockade.

MLOZI'S town was situated about 300 yards to the south of the Rukuru River on a high bank formed by the river having changed its course. The ground between this bank and the river was very marshy. On the west of the town, and at about 30 yards from it, a nullah ran north and south. This nullah was deep enough to afford excellent cover from fire from the loop-holes. To the south the ground was more or less open, but here and there the ground was broken, and afforded sufficient protection for men lying down. On the east side the town was overlooked by a hill some 1,300 yards distant. The town comprised an area of just over 20 acres, and was surrounded by walls, in which there were five gateways. The walls were built tembé fashion, *i.e.*, there was an outer wall 8 feet high made of logs planted firmly in the ground, and almost touching, and wattled with strong twigs, and plastered both inside and outside with mud until the total thickness of the wall was about 2 feet. Parallel with the outer wall, and at about 12 feet distant, there was another similar wall, but only 7 feet high.

The space between these walls formed a gallery, which was roofed over and further divided into partitions by wattle and mud walls every 12 feet. The roof was made of two layers of logs laid carefully, on which grass was spread, and then 2 feet or so of mud well beaten down.

Both the inner and outer walls were loop-holed with two rows of loop-holes, one at 4 feet, and the other at 18 inches, from the ground.

In the partition walls of the rooms were small doorways, and every third or fourth room had, in addition, another door leading into the town.

In each room of the gallery were two shelter trenches about 3 feet deep made close to each wall, and the earth taken from them was piled up in the centre of the room.

There were in the walls about 260 of these rooms, in which the fighting men of Mlozi's lived. The total circuit of the walls was 1,160 yards.

The gateways were simply doors cut in one of the rooms, and the gateway was closed by heavy logs of wood fastened by upright posts. To pass from one door of the gateway to the other it was necessary to cross a room, the partition walls of which was loop-holed.

Besides the ordinary native huts inside the town, there were several large houses with thick mud walls and roofs, and all loop-holed.

There was no water in the town; all the water was taken from the Rukuru River.

Kopa-Kopa's town was built in the same manner as Mlozi's, except that there were no lower loop-holes in the walls, and no shelter-pits dug in the rooms. Further, the mud on the walls and on the roof was not nearly so thick. The area of Kopa-Kopa's town was about 7 acres.

Msalemu's was a native village surrounded by a strong stockade with three gates. It was about 3 acres in area.

(Signed) C. A. EDWARDS, Major,
Commanding Armed Forces in British Central Africa.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Commander Cullen to Commissioner Johnston.

Sir,

"Adventure," at Kambwe, December 6, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to hand you herewith my report on the operations against Msalemu, Kopa-Kopa, and Mlozi, so far as the artillery under my command was concerned. Marching from Karonga at 5.10 A.M. on the 2nd December; the battery consisted of one naval service and one land service 7-pr. and one .45 machine-gun. The road was very heavy, and in many places cut up by ditches with steep and crumbly banks.

We arrived in sight of Msalemu's and Kopa-Kopa's at 7.20 A.M., and taking up a position 900 yards from Msalemu's and 1,500 from Kopa-Kopa's, commenced fire. After about twenty rounds the people were seen running from Msalemu's, and Lieutenant Smith advanced under cover of the machine-gun, whilst the 7-pr. shelled Kopa-Kopa's to prevent him rendering any assistance.

Lieutenant Smith having entered Msalemu's without any opposition, I advanced the guns, the battery having now been strengthened by three more 7-prs., brought up by Lieutenant Phillips, R.N.R. Finding that Kopa-Kopa had also fled, the whole force advanced, and halted outside the stockade for breakfast. I must inform you that on preparing to advance from our first position I found the bulk of the carriers had run away, and only succeeded in bringing on the guns and ammunition by the aid of the Wankonde irregulars, who after this did all the transport.

Resuming the march, we arrived in sight of Mlozi's fortified town at 3 P.M., and opened fire from two positions, 1,300 and 1,100 yards distant. After some thirty rounds the town was fired in several places, and the battery was advanced to a village on the right, and 800 yards distant, and the fire continued. At 4.30 P.M. Lieutenant Phillips arrived with the two 9-prs. These I immediately brought into action a little more to the right; as the towns burnt, several explosions took place, showing that a considerable amount of powder must have been in store.

The machine-gun was now moved off to the left, and took up a position which guarded one of the gates, Mr. F. R. Brighton being left in charge of the position.

After dark I slackened fire from the guns, only firing an occasional round, but about 10 P.M. I took one 7-pr. round to the left, and was just in time to assist in repelling a sortie. After everything was quiet I took the 7-pr. back. Mr. Brighton, however, was again attacked at 1.30 A.M., but drove the enemy off with the machine-gun. At daylight I moved two 7-prs. and one 9-pr. round to the left village, and opened fire at 375 yards for the 9-pr., and 250 yards for the 7-pr.

About 8 A.M. a white flag was hoisted from the town, and the "cease fire" was sounded, and messengers arrived from Mlozi, who after some interval came a short way outside the walls of his town, but would not advance to our position.

After some time had been spent in sending and receiving messages, Her Majesty's Commissioner expressed to Mlozi his ultimatum, which Mlozi not agreeing to, the white flags were lowered, and the bombardment continued.

I now concentrated the fire on the gateway, and soon demolished the gate, the walls, however, offering little or no resistance; the shells simply passed through them, bursting inside.

At 3 P.M. I took one 7-pr. further round to the position occupied by Mr. Gordon-Cumming, and planted several shells well in, as I afterwards discovered one blew out the back of Mlozi's house. On returning Her Majesty's Commissioner informed me that Mlozi's house had been pointed out by an escaped slave, and I therefore directed Sergeant-Major Devoy to fire a few rounds from a 9-pr. These were most successful; the first shell blew in the gate, the second took off the top of the wall, and the third struck the front of Mlozi's house and wounded Mlozi. This apparently decided the enemy in their resolve to break out, as shortly after this, under cover of a hot fire from the walls, they broke out from all gates.

The whole force closing in, I advanced a 7-pr. to the walls, and hewed a way through with axes, but on getting in I found that the place was occupied by our own people. I therefore retired the gun to its old position, stored the ammunition for the night, and leaving Mr. Brighton in charge, returned to head-quarters camp and reported.

Lieutenant Phillips did his duties of transporting the guns and stores from the base very well, making two journeys, one from Karonga to Kopa-Kopa, back to Karonga, and then out to Mlozi's with the 9-prs. in time for me to bring them into action the first day.

Lieutenant Rhoades arrived the second day in time to assist in the final assault.

Sergeant-Major Devoy I wish to specially mention for the excellent services he rendered.

Messrs. Brighton and Savage also did very good work, Mr. Brighton being in charge of the position opposite the south-east gate during the night of the 2nd December, and successfully prevented the enemy from escaping from that quarter.

The Sikh gunners whose names I give behaved entirely to my satisfaction, and showed themselves to be proficient in their work, laying and training the gun well and carefully, especially those whose names I have marked with an asterisk :—

*Nand Singh, Lance Naik.
 Kala Singh, Gunner.
 Mastan Singh, „
 *Kala Singh, „
 Gurdit Singh, „
 *Kashal Singh, „
 Amr Singh, „
 Hazara Singh, „

I have, &c.
 (Signed) PERCY CULLEN.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Freedom Paper given a Freed Slave in 1889 by Commissioner Johnston.

I HEREBY certify that Kivitendo, formerly called Yatosya, a native of Nyasa and wife to Bwanga, a servant of the African Lakes' Company, is a free woman, and under British protection.

(Signed) H. H. JOHNSTON,
Her Majesty's Consul.

*Karonga, North-west Coast of Lake Nyasa,
 October 26, 1889.*

No. 2.

Commissioner Sir H. Johnston to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 26.)

(Extract.)

The Residency, Zomba, January 6, 1896.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a Report by Major Edwards on the campaigns against the Yao slave-traders in the autumn of 1895.

Your Lordship will see that we have been successful in either capturing or expelling from the territory of the Protectorate those Yao slave-trading Chiefs who have so long harassed our eastern borders.

In regard to the Chief Kawinga, I may mention that he is paying a war indemnity in ivory, and it is possible that I may allow him to settle once more in British territory, on the shores of Lake Chilwa. I think it better to do this than to allow him to remain an outlaw on Portuguese territory, where he is not under any control. The bulk of his people have already left him, and have been settled in various parts of the Chilwa Plain, and are now cultivating the land and paying taxes. I think, therefore, that we have nothing to lose and perhaps a good deal to gain by permitting Kawinga to return.

In regard to the Chiefs Zarafi and Makanjira, and one or two others, however, the situation is very different. Makanjira has been frequently defeated for years past, and driven from place to place, but he invariably retires to a safe distance in Portuguese territory, purchases more powder at the coast with the slaves that he captures in his raids, and renews his incursions into British territory. Zarafi now threatens to follow the same policy. Both these Chiefs, with some of their minor adherents, are being protected by the powerful Yao Chiefs Mataka and Mtarika, who live on or near the River Lujenda, in Portuguese East Africa. The towns of Mataka and Mtarika are great slave-trading centres. These Chiefs appear to be able to obtain unlimited supplies of gunpowder from the coast, and their men raid the Portuguese shores of Lake Nyasa, mainly inhabited by Anyanja people, to such an extent that they have become almost uninhabited.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Major Edwards to Commissioner Johnston.

Sir,

Zomba, December 27, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a Report on the military operations of the force under my command against the following slave-raiding Chiefs in the British Central Africa Protectorate during the autumn of 1895 :—

Matipwiri, Zarafi, Mponda, Makanjira.

I am pleased to inform you that all the wounded in the above campaigns are progressing most satisfactorily under the careful treatment of Dr. Wordsworth Poole.

Captain the Honourable W. E. Cavendish has built a strong fort on the site of Zarafi's town, and has been able with the small force of troops at his disposal to repel several raids made by men of Zarafi's on the villages that have sprung up around the fort. He has also succeeded in recovering the carriage of the 7-pr., which he has forwarded to Fort Johnston. The 7-pr. mountain-gun that was captured by Zarafi in 1892 is now mounted and in working order at Fort Johnston.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. A. EDWARDS, Major,
Commanding Armed Forces in British Central Africa.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Report of the Military Operations of the Armed Forces of the British Central Africa Protectorate against the Chiefs Matipwiri, Zarafi, Mponda, and Makanjira, in the Suppression of the Slave Trade, during the months of September, October, and November 1895.

ON the 12th September at Zomba I received an urgent message from Mr. G. Stevenson, Collector of Mlanje district, that some of his police had been attacked in the village of Mtimanyama by some of Matipwiri's men; that some of his police had been wounded; and that, from reliable information, he apprehended an attack on Fort Lister and the scattered European settlements by the Chiefs Matipwiri and Mtiramanja, and requesting me to send over reinforcements at once. I immediately dispatched 100 rifles under Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, and wrote to Her Majesty's Commissioner regarding this matter. I received orders to concentrate as many as were necessary at Fort Lister to successfully cope with the Chiefs Matipwiri and Mtiramanja as soon as possible.

On the 23rd instant I had collected there, in addition to the garrison, the following troops :—

Major C. A. Edwards, commanding.
Captain the Hon. W. E. Cavendish.
Lieutenant H. Coape Smith.
Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, Adjutant.
Sergeant-Major P. Devoy, commanding gun detachment.
Dr. Wordsworth Poole.
Mr. Walter Gordon Cumming, volunteer officer.

68 Sikhs (including nine gunners).
84 Makua regulars.
200 Atonga „
40 Yao „

Total .. 392

Her Majesty's Commissioner having decided to attack Matipwiri at once, he authorized me to carry out the operations.

My plan of action was as follows :—

1. To send round a party of men under Mr. Gordon-Cumming to Fort Anderson to protect the south-west of Mlanje from bands of raiders, as in that part of Mlanje district there are several European coffee plantations, and if he found that everything was quiet he was to advance upon Tundu from Fort Anderson.

2. The main body divided into three parts, each part complete with their own baggage, spare ammunition, &c., should advance direct as one column over the Mlanje Pass, and then, skirting the base of Mlanje, and avoiding villages, should march straight on to Bisa (Mtiramanja's town) by night and attack early in the morning, the main column breaking up into three columns, the advance guard going to the right of the town, and the rear guard to the left.

Her Majesty's Commissioner having approved of this plan, Mr. Walter Gordon-Cumming left Fort Lister on the morning of the 22nd September for Fort Anderson. His force consisted of:—

Mr. H. Bloomfield Bradshaw, volunteer officer.

| |
|--------------------|
| 6 Sikhs. |
| 10 Makua regulars. |
| 50 Atonga " |
| — |
| 66 rifles. |

The main body, accompanied by Her Majesty's Commissioner and Mr. G. Stevenson, left Fort Lister at 3 P.M. on the 23rd September.

It was composed as follows:—

1st Column.—Advance Guard—

Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith.

| |
|------------|
| 10 Sikhs. |
| 29 Makua. |
| 71 Atonga. |
| — |

110 rifles.

9 porters.

2nd Column.—Main Body—

Major C. A. Edwards, commanding.

Lieutenant G. de H. Smith.

Dr. Poole.

Sergeant-Major P. Devoy.

| |
|--------------------------------|
| 51 Sikhs, including 7 gunners. |
| 47 Makua, " 9 " |
| 97 Atonga, " 9 " |
| — |

195 rifles, " 25 "

131 porters.

Her Majesty's Commissioner and Mr. Stevenson accompanied this party.

3rd Column.—Rear Guard—

Captain Hon. W. E. Cavendish.

| |
|------------|
| 7 Sikhs. |
| 8 Makua. |
| 32 Atonga. |
| 40 Yaos. |
| — |

87 rifles.

11 porters.

One 7-pr. mountain gun accompanied the main body.

After marching for three hours the column reached the Chireni River, at the base of the eastern slopes of Mlanje, and fire was opened upon the advance guard by a picket of Matipwiri's. One of the enemy was shot. It being now dusk, and there being no water for several miles I halted here till 1 A.M. on the morning of the 24th. We then resumed our march, travelling very slowly, as the night was dark, and several halts had to be made for closing up. Just before dawn our guides informed us that we were quite close to Bisa, and a reconnoitring party was sent out, which brought back the information that there was only a long deserted village anywhere near. We had been delayed by this over an hour. We then advanced, and, marching through thick forest by a very little used path, came upon the outskirts of Bisa by about 8:30 A.M. I immediately sent Lieutenant Coape-Smith round to the right, and Captain Cavendish to the left, and then formed up the main

body. Just then we heard some shots on our right, and presently a regular fusillade. I at once gave the order to advance, and at the double we cleared village after village with but slight opposition, and pursued to the river. I then saw that Lieutenant Coape-Smith had with his party wheeled round to the left, and was driving the enemy before him towards Captain Cavendish. So I halted the main body, and sent off the Atonga of the main body under Sergeant-Major Bandawe to assist Captain Cavendish and his men. Presently a brisk fire was heard from Tundu Hill, and we saw the smoke of burning huts. Captain Cavendish had arrived at the base of Tundu in time to intercept the fugitives from Lieutenant Coape-Smith's force. The enemy, finding themselves cornered, made a fight of it, and kept up a very brisk fire over our men, but, being reinforced by Bandawe and his Atonga, Captain Cavendish rushed the hill, which was strewn with large boulders, and very steep, driving the enemy before him.

It being now dusk, the forces returned to camp, which was formed in a portion of Mtiramanja's town.

The following day Captain Cavendish, with 80 rifles, was sent to attack Tundu Hill; Lieutenant Smith, with 72 rifles, was sent round the north of Tundu to join with Captain Cavendish on the far side, and then to attack the villages on that side, while Sergeant-Major Devoy and 85 rifles were sent round the south of Tundu Hill. None of these parties met with any opposition, only very few of the enemy being seen, but Captain Cavendish found near the top of Tundu a lot of ivory and cloth, and 400 lbs. of powder that the enemy in their flight had thrown away. Mr. Gordon-Cumming arrived, having met with none of the enemy on the road. The two following days were employed in sending out small parties in all directions, and in building a fort.

On the 28th September, leaving a strong garrison behind under the command of Lieutenant Coape-Smith, the main body, under Captain Cavendish, set out *en route* for Zomba viâ the north of Matipwiri country and Lake Chilwa, and Her Majesty's Commissioner and myself returned direct to Zomba.

Our casualties were:—

1 Atonga killed.
1 „ missing.

The enemy lost nineteen men killed, and after the departure of the main body Lieutenant Coape-Smith harassed the enemy so constantly that on the 3rd October the Chiefs Matipwiri and Mtiramanja surrendered themselves up unconditionally. They were sent under escort to Zomba. The people then came in under the headmen, gave up their guns, and were allowed to settle down again.

Zarafi Expedition.

On the 30th June, 1895, I received a letter from Her Majesty's Commissioner, stating that it would be necessary to undertake an expedition against Zarafi and the allied Yao Chiefs in the South Nyasa district as soon as possible, and that he would like the expedition to start about the 1st October.

I informed the Commissioner that the expedition would be ready to start in October, and that the attack on Zarafi should take place on the 28th of that month. My reasons for delaying the departure of the main expedition were as follows:—

1. It was necessary to complete the building of stores, barracks for Sikhs and native troops, and officers' houses at Zomba before starting on the expedition, as by the time the expedition would be over the rains would be on and no building could be done.

2. It was necessary to get up a large supply of rations and ammunition from Chikwawa and Blantyre to Zomba and Fort Johnston, as after starting on the expedition no porters would be available for transport, all being required for carrying the loads of the expedition.

3. As the majority of our Atonga Regulars were only enlisted in June or July, I wanted an extra month to train them, more especially in fire discipline and shooting.

As the topography of the country between Mangoche and Chikala was unknown, on the 18th August I dispatched Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Coape-Smith with sixty-one rifles (including twenty-one Sikhs) to make a reconnaissance of the country to the south-east of Mangoche. This party returned to Chikala on the 26th August, having made a most useful reconnaissance. They reached Ulimbo Hill, 18 miles to the south-east of Mangoche Hill, and found water on the road. They had been attacked by Nyambi's people (a Sub-Chief of Zarafi) on the 22nd in the Unangu Hills, and had taken and destroyed Manolo, Nyambi's town, with the loss of one man wounded on our side. They

then pushed on rapidly to Ulimbo, and took and burned the village of Batamira and Nkumba's villages before Zarafi had time to concentrate his men. From Ulimbo a good view was obtained of the surrounding country.

On the 3rd September Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Coape-Smith made a further reconnaissance to the west of their former line of advance, and reached the hill Sakalu which they found held by Zarafi's men.

On the 7th September Lieutenant Hamilton, with twenty-eight rifles, made a reconnaissance of Zarafi's country to the east of Fort Johnston, and on the 12th September he made another reconnaissance to the south-east of Fort Johnston.

From all the information I could obtain, I gathered that there were four roads leading up to Mangoche (Zarafi's town) :—

1. One leading from Fort Johnston direct (this was the road Messrs. King and Watson took in 1892).

2. One leading from Malombe Lake by the side of the Lingardzi stream to Zarafi's.

3. One passing by Sakalu direct to Zarafi's.

4. One by Ulimbo to Zarafi's.

Nos. 1 and 2 were bad roads, very steep. No. 4 was the best, but exposed the attacking force to be taken in flank.

I therefore determined on the following plan of operations :—

A force consisting of 150 rifles under Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Hamilton, with 1-7-pr. under an officer from the gun-boats, should proceed to the Lingardzi stream, and make a fortified camp there and reconnoitre on ahead towards Zarafi, 15 miles distant.

The main body should leave Zomba, and marching direct to Sakalu should attack from that side, Captain Stewart's party joining in the assault from the west.

A third party, consisting of Commander Cullen, R.N.R., and as many of the garrison of Fort Maguire as could be spared, should proceed by the first road and intercept fugitives, and to advance as far as possible in the direction of Zarafi's. I adopted these plans for the following reasons :—

1. Zarafi, on the return of Captain Stewart's reconnaissance party, would probably think that we had found that road impracticable, and so would not guard it very effectively.

2. Captain Stewart's force, which would start ten days before the main body to make a fortified post on the Lingardzi, would probably cause Zarafi to think that this was the direction of the main attack, and he would possibly try and attack the post, in which case he would exhaust a great quantity of his ammunition and lose a lot of men, which would dishearten his people.

Her Majesty's Commissioner having approved of these plans, on the 13th October I dispatched Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Hamilton with 150 rifles, including twenty-five Sikhs and 1-7-pr. to Likoro.

His instructions were to build a stockade at Likoro's, and to reconnoitre the ground to the north-east, *i.e.*, the road to Zarafi, to capture all villages of Mkata's (a brother of Zarafi) in the neighbourhood. On the 25th Lieutenant-Commander Phillips was to join his command and to take command of the gun detachment. On the 27th he was to proceed himself, or send Lieutenant Hamilton or a non-commissioned officer, with a strong escort to Sonji Hill, and meet me there in order to receive final instructions regarding the assault, which would be on the morning of the 28th October.

On the 23rd at 8 A.M. the main body, consisting of the following officers and men left Zomba for Zarafi's :—

Major C. A. Edwards, commanding.
 Captain Hon. W. E. Cavendish.
 Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith.
 Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, Adjutant.
 Sergeant-Major P. Devoy, in charge of artillery.
 Dr. Wordsworth Poole.
 Major L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, volunteer officer.
 Mr. W. Gordon-Cumming, volunteer officer.

74 Sikhs.
 66 Makua.
 120 Atonga.
 45 Yaos.

305 rifles, including gunners.

This force was accompanied by Her Majesty's Commissioner and his Secretary Mr. J. F. Cunningham.

350 porters accompanied this expedition, divided as follows :—

| | | | | | | Porters. |
|--------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----------|
| 7-prs. and ammunition | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 64 |
| Reserve ammunition | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 30 |
| Intrenching tools | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20 |
| Officers' baggage | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 48 |
| Rations | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 67 |
| Hospital and doolies | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 46 |
| | | | | | | 275 |
| Spare porters | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 15 |
| | | | | | | 290 |
| Armed force porters | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 60 |
| Her Majesty's Commissioner and staff | | | | | | 60 |
| | | | | | | 350 |
| Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |

We took with us ten days' supply of rations for Sikhs and five days' supply for native troops and porters. The Sikhs took with them only blankets and great coats, the former being carried for them.

No tents were taken.

The 7-pr. mountain gun was carried by porters.

As it would be necessary to advance in single file through the forest and thick grass lands as well as when ascending the lower ranges of hills of the Mangoche range of mountains, our column would be a very long one (about a mile in length), and therefore very vulnerable for attack by the enemy, I divided up the fighting force into small parties, and placed these parties between groups of porters, keeping a strong force of rifles (seventy Sikhs) at the head of the column and twenty Sikhs as a rear guard; these parties under their officers were, when possible to advance as a flanking guard, on either side of the path and at a distance from it of 100 yards or so, so as to put up any of the enemy lying in ambush or creeping up after the advance-guard had passed by. If they could not (owing to the thickness of the jungle) leave the path then on shots being fired, the porters were to lie down and the bodies of armed men between them were to fire volleys and then to pursue as far as 400 yards, the porters closing up as soon as the soldiers started in pursuit.

All the various bodies of porters marched under distinctive flags.

Major Bradshaw was in charge of the transport, assisted by Mr. Cunningham, and they had under their command :—

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----------|
| Makua | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 55 |
| Atonga | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 40 |
| | | | | | | | | 95 rifles |

Sergeant-Major Bandawe to see if there was any water further on. He sent back word to say that he had found water and a good camping-ground, and had also come across an outlying picket of Zarafi's; that he had attacked them, killing two men. We marched on at 7:30 P.M. by moonlight, and reached the camp about 10:30 P.M. March, 20 miles.

The camp was in a clearing near an outlying village of Zarafi, and at the base of the first rise of the hills.

October 27.—About 2 A.M. a party of Atonga arrived from Captain Stewart, but as it was too late then to get back word in time to Captain Stewart before the date of the assault, I kept the twenty Atonga with me. Marched out of camp at 5:15 A.M. The road led us round the base of the high hill where Zarafi's scouts had been killed yesterday. We then crossed a stream, and proceeded through some extensive clearings. About 9 o'clock, when marching along a winding path at the base of a steep, high hill, covered with boulders and trees, the enemy opened fire on our column, and one of our Atonga was wounded. Major Bradshaw at once dashed up the hill with his Makua, followed by Captain Cavendish and his Atonga. The enemy was driven from the heights with some loss, and the march was resumed. About twenty minutes afterwards the advance guard came into contact with the enemy, and Lieutenant Coape-Smith and his men at once advanced straight upon them at the double, and to support him I sent Lieutenant G. de H. Smith with some of the main body up the side of the hill, which he cleared in grand style, and meeting Lieutenant Coape-Smith on the far side of the hill, managed to intercept and kill a large number of the enemy who were on their way to join the advance party in defence of the pass. In the meanwhile the column was moving steadily on, and on turning a spur of the hills I noticed straight in front of me a strong isolated hillock rising out of a small plateau. This hillock was covered with immense boulders, and the path passed over it. The hill was held by a strong force of the enemy, so I extended for attack, and, after some volleys, pushed on to the assault. The enemy did not stand, owing to Lieutenant Coape-Smith and Lieutenant G. de H. Smith having got right round to their left and rear, and they were probably afraid of being surrounded. I found the position a very strong one, and admirably adapted for defence, so I halted the advance guard, which, under Lieutenant Coape-Smith, held a ridge about 800 yards distant from the hill to the front, and then formed a camp there. Having got the porters all safely in and posted pickets on the surrounding high boulders, I made arrangements for dispatching a strong reconnoitring party on ahead.

While halted here we noticed some 100 armed men advance across our right flank at a distance of some 1,200 yards. The officers in camp immediately brought their Lee-Metford rifles to bear on them, and managed, after killing several of them, to turn the remainder back the way they had come. After halting half an hour, I set out with a reconnoitring party consisting of Major Bradshaw, Mr. Gordon-Cumming, Sergeant-Major Devoy, 50 Sikhs, 80 native troops, leaving the camp in charge of Captain Cavendish, with 145 rifles. As soon as we reached the ridge occupied by the advance, we formed up our column, now consisting of—

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------------|
| Sikhs | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 50 |
| Native troops | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 110 |
| | | | | | | | | | 160 rifles. |

Lieutenant Coape-Smith, with the advance guard of thirty rifles, went on ahead, the main body following.

Shortly after leaving the ridge, and while getting round a spur, we were subjected to a very brisk fire from the enemy on our left flank, who were concealed behind boulders on the slope above us. I immediately gave orders for Lieutenant G. de H. Smith and Major Bradshaw to clear the hill, and this they did in most gallant style, losing one Yao killed and one Sikh wounded. Lieutenant Coape-Smith pushed on, and advanced obliquely up the hill, in order to cover the main body, and had to fight his way from boulder to boulder.

Being shortly afterwards attacked from our right flank, I dispatched Sergeant-Major Devoy, with eighteen rifles, across the stream below us on our right, with orders to clear a low hill on the far side of it. This he did in capital style, with no losses, although the fire was heavy and the enemy numerous. Major Bradshaw had in the meanwhile, on arrival at the top of the hill, left a picket there, and had then descended the far side of the hill, while Lieutenant Smith had followed the ridge that trended to the left, keeping up a brisk fire on the retreating enemy.

After proceeding about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from camp, we crossed a good stream and reached a hillock, which the enemy evacuated on seeing the approach of Lieutenant G. de H. Smith above them on their right, and Sergeant-Major Devoy on their left.

This hill had a hollow in the centre, with great boulders surrounding it, which thereby afforded excellent cover from the surrounding heights. I determined to bring up the camp here, as this hillock was at the base of the last steep ascent to Mangoche, and this ascent was very strongly held by the enemy, so to assault it I should require all our available forces and the 7-pr.

I accordingly left Major Bradshaw in charge of the hillock, and halted Lieutenant G. de H. Smith in the position he had captured, and sent Mr. Gordon-Cumming with his Yaos to relieve Sergeant-Major Devoy and his gunners whose ammunition was all expended, and with twenty rifles proceeded to bring up the remainder of the men and the porters.

This was accomplished without mishap. In the meanwhile Lieutenant G. de H. Smith's party had been subjected to a very heavy fire from the enemy above him, several of whom had rifles, and Havildar Major Nihal Singh had been mortally wounded, and two Sepoys and one Atonga wounded severely. So he sent down asking for doolies and reinforcements to be sent him by LcNaick Purtap Singh, who ran the gauntlet of a heavy fire all the way into camp. I therefore determined to withdraw this force, and sent Lieutenant Coape-Smith with a party of men up with doolies to his assistance. Lieutenant Coape-Smith managed in a most skilful manner by taking advantage of the ground to ascend a ravine and get in rear of the force that was attacking Lieutenant Smith. Immediately he arrived on the scene Lieutenant Smith advanced, and the enemy being between two fires fled with heavy loss. The two parties then returned to camp. As the enemy kept up a steady fire on our position during the latter part of the afternoon and wounded one Atonga, I determined to shell the hill up above where most of the enemy seemed to be collected. Sergeant-Major Devoy with the 7-pr. mountain-gun and 9-pr. war rockets made some excellent practice, and after that the fire slackened.

Having arranged to attack the hill at daybreak the following morning, at daybreak I divided my force into three parties.

Captain Cavendish with sixty Atonga was to proceed up a spur on the right, Lieutenant Coape-Smith with sixty rifles, including twenty-five Sikhs, was to proceed up the spur on the left where Lieutenant G. de H. Smith had been, and the main body under myself, divided into two parties under Lieutenant G. de H. Smith and Major Bradshaw, with reserve under Mr. Gordon-Cumming with gun detachment and hospital. The porters were to remain in camp under Her Majesty's Commissioner and Mr. J. F. Cunningham. No firing took place during the night.

At 4:45 on the 28th October Lieutenant Coape-Smith left camp, followed at 5 A.M. by Captain Cavendish, and at 5:20 A.M. I started with the main body.

Having ascended some way Major Bradshaw came into contact with the enemy, but pushed on rapidly, driving them before him.

We heard a lot of firing on our right. It appears that Captain Cavendish's party came across a picket of the enemy, which they surprised, and were thus able to get right amongst the enemy, whom they put to flight and drove right over the crest of the hill without any loss to themselves, although the enemy lost heavily.

Lieutenant Coape-Smith met with but little opposition. It seemed as if the enemy had withdrawn most of their forces who had been present on the hill the day before. Having cleared the crest of the plateau of Mangoche, we all met on the far side and found that Zarafi's town was still eight miles distant.

I sent Major Bradshaw with fifty men along the crest of Mangoche Mountain, supported by Lieutenant Coape-Smith's party. I took the centre, and sent off Captain Cavendish down by the road in the plains to the right.

After proceeding 2 miles or so we cleared the crest of a ridge and saw Zarafi's town below us in the distance. It was full of men, who were taking up positions behind boulders on the outskirts of the town, while women and children with loads on their heads were streaming away towards the north-east. At the next spur we noticed that the men had evacuated their town, which we entered without opposition about noon. Her Majesty's Commissioner arrived about 1 P.M. with the porters and baggage guard. They had had some shots fired at them by isolated parties of men. The 29th was employed in following up our success by sending out parties in all directions, burning the other towns of the enemy.

On the 30th October Lieutenant Hamilton arrived with sixty men from Captain Stewart, so I sent off Sergeant-Major Bandawe with 200 native troops in pursuit of Zarafi, who, it was reported, had retreated towards Lake Chiuta.

The following morning, the 31st October, I left Mangoche for Lisiete Hill, about 30 miles from Mangoche, to attack Chindamba (Makandanji), who was the father-in-law of Zarafi, and had assisted him in his fight with us. It was reported that a great number

of Zarafi's people had retreated there under Kadawire, Zarafi's son, the column consisting of six officers and 193 rifles and a 7-pr.

After descending Mangoche the road led us along a high plateau covered with thick forest devoid of water, until we reached a small stream after 7 hours marching. We met water again after marching 25 miles. As we were then quite close to Lisiete Hill I halted the column and went with Lieutenant G. de H. Smith and four men to reconnoitre. We proceeded on and on without meeting any signs of cultivation or villages until we reached the base of the hill where we saw open fields. The guide told us that Chidamba's towns were on the hill behind the spur we were then on. So, as it was getting dark, I returned, reaching camp at 8 P.M.

We broke up camp at 2 A.M., and reached the base of the hill at 4 A.M. I had already detached Captain Cavendish with forty rifles to hold the road to Makanjira, as I was informed by the guides that would be the road by which the enemy would flee. The advance up the hill was very slow, as we momentarily expected to come upon the villages round each spur and rise, and again the hill was very steep in places (over 45°). We reached the top of the hill, some 2,300 feet above the top of the plateau, at 6 A.M., and a sentry of the enemy was surprised and shot, but not before he had sufficient time to give the alarm. The ground over the other side of the hill was a gentle slope covered with villages. By noon we had taken all the villages and also destroyed them. Captain Cavendish had managed to intercept and release a number of fugitive slaves. Having halted for two hours, we retraced our steps and halted for the night at 9-30 P.M. after a 35-mile march by the side of a good stream.

We reached Mangoche at 12-30 P.M. on the 2nd November.

Sergeant-Major Bandawe's party arrived at Mangoche shortly after the Chindamba expedition returned. He had not been able to overtake Zarafi, who, with a few men, had fled for Mtereka's on the Lujenda River in Portuguese territory.

Our casualties in the Zarafi expedition were :—

1 Sikh mortally wounded (died same day).
 1 „ severely wounded.
 1 „ wounded.
 1 Yao killed.
 5 Atonga wounded.
 —
 9 killed and wounded.

The enemy lost about sixty men killed, but many more must have been wounded, only the Yaos always carry their wounded off the field, therefore it is impossible to estimate the losses of the enemy accurately.

On the 29th October Major Bradshaw, when on the top of Mangoche Mountain with his men, found the 7-lb. mountain-gun which had been captured by Zarafi in 1892, hidden away in the jungle, covered over with leaves, &c. It was in excellent order.

Leaving Captain Cavendish behind at Mangoche, with forty rifles, to build a fort there and to quiet the country, the remainder of the force left Mangoche on the 3rd November for Fort Johnston, arriving at the latter place the same evening at 7 P.M., after a march of 27 miles. On arrival there I found that Captain Stewart had received news that Major F. Trollope (a volunteer officer), with some twenty-seven Atonga irregulars and his own boys, had managed to intercept about 500 of Zarafi's people who were trying to cross the Shiré at Mvera, and had disarmed all the men, and that he was expecting another lot of 600 fugitives down, and requesting that assistance might be sent him. Accordingly Captain Stewart, with twenty-two rifles, had started for Mvera in the gun-boat "Dove," with Commander Cullen, R.N.R.

On the 4th November we halted at Fort Johnston. Her Majesty's Commissioner informed me that it would be necessary to attack Mponda at once and to drive him out of Mauni, and to capture him and his slave-raiding Chiefs, Chingara, Kasanka, Liganga, &c. I therefore determined to cross the River Shiré as soon as it was dark, at the bar, and march straight on to Mauni.

I divided my force into three columns :—

The main body, under my command, consisting of—

| | | | | | | | | |
|----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Officers | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 |
| Sikhs | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 75 |
| Makua | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 78 |
| Atonga | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 56 |

203 rifles.

With 1—7-pr. and 25 gunners under Sergeant-Major Devoy.

The right column, under Lieutenant-Commander Rhoades, consisting of—

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|
| Officers .. | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | 2 |
| Rifles .. | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | 107 |

The left column, under Mr. Gordon-Cumming, consisting of—

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Officer .. | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | 1 |
| Rifles .. | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | :: | 94 |

The main body was to march straight on Mauni and attack it, while the columns on the right and left were to circle round and to intercept fugitives, or to make flank attacks if the main body was hard pressed.

We left Fort Johnston on the 5th November at 6.30 P.M., and reached the bar about 8 P.M. It took us nearly one and a-half hours crossing the river, although it was very shallow. We then marched on, and reached Mauni without opposition about 7 A.M. on the 6th November. The place was deserted just before our arrival. I immediately sent out parties in all directions, and a great number of slaves were found hiding in the neighbourhood. Mr. Gordon-Cumming and Lieutenant-Commander Rhoades also brought in several, together with some Headmen and sub-Chiefs captured. We captured a number of guns, gunpowder (200 lbs.), goats, and cattle.

On the 7th instant I sent off a party of men under Lieutenants Hamilton, G. de H. Smith, and Mr. Gordon-Cumming, with 158 rifles, to attack Liganga's and Zimba's villages, on the lake shore, and then to proceed against Kasanka's and Kampande's villages, near Livingstonia.

I returned to Fort Johnston on the 10th November, having burnt all the villages on the top and at the base of Mauni.

Immediately on my arrival at Fort Johnston I dispatched a party of men (fifty rifles) to arrest Chingara and Namputu.

The following day Lieutenant Hamilton arrived with his force. He had succeeded in surprising Zimba's and Liganga's villages, and making prisoners Liganga, Nkwechi, and Ndula, besides several other men, all of whom were conveyed to Fort Johnston for trial. He also sent and brought in a great number of women and children, many of whom were subsequently found to be slaves who had been raided or purchased quite recently. He had also dispatched a party of Makua to Kasanka to burn his village. This they did not do, but they managed to arrest and convey to Fort Johnston Kasanka. Chingara and Namputa were also brought in to Fort Johnston on the 12th, having been arrested by the party of men I sent for them.

Although there was no fighting in the Mponda expedition, yet the effect was none the less crushing to the Slave Trade in British Central Africa; 379 slaves were released, and taken to Fort Johnston, where they now form a free settlement. Most of these slaves have been raided or purchased during the last three years, and several only quite recently.

One hundred and twelve guns and 270 lbs. of gunpowder were captured, and in addition to the Chief Mponda having surrendered himself unconditionally to Her Majesty's Commissioner, there were eleven Headmen of Mponda and seventy-four other Yaos of position captured, all of whom have been actively engaged in the Slave Trade, and have since been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by Her Majesty's Commissioner.

As I had received instructions from Her Majesty's Commissioner before he left Fort Johnston for Zomba to proceed against the Yao Chiefs of south-east Nyasa, as soon as the expedition against Mponda was finished, on the 13th November I dispatched a column under Lieutenant Coape-Smith to ascend the mountains by the road leading to Zarafi's, and as soon as the plateau was reached to wheel round to their left and to march on Namaziui (beneath which hill Makanjira had built his new town), where they were to ambush till the morning of the 17th November, when they would descend on Makanjira's town, while I, with the main body, would assault it from the west side.

The force under his command consisted of Lieutenant Smith, Mr. Gordon-Cumming, 180 rifles, including 40 Sikhs.

I also dispatched forty rifles in the gun-boats "Adventurer" and "Pioneer" to Fort Maguire, and sent instructions to Lieutenant Alston to advance to Ngombe's from the north, and to join me there on the 16th November with as many men of the Fort Maguire garrison as he could with safety take, in addition to the men I sent him.

On the 14th I left Fort Johnston with the main body, consisting of Captain Stewart, Lieutenant A. S. Hamilton, Dr. Wordsworth Poole, 180 rifles, including 48 Sikhs.

Having marched about 12 miles along the lake shore, we saw Makumba's villages on

the high hills above us, about 3 miles inland. I at once changed direction and marched straight for the hills, keeping under cover as much as possible. At about $\frac{1}{2}$ a-mile from the first village I halted the porters, and left them with a guard in a secure position, and extended for attack, Captain Stewart taking the right and Lieutenant Hamilton the left, while I took the centre.

After some fighting we managed to capture the villages and destroy them. Makumba, his brothers, and three of his Headmen were taken prisoners, and sent back under escort to Fort Johnston. We then halted for the night, and proceeded on our way the following morning, marching along the lake shore. Towards evening the column was fired upon by a few men while traversing the thick jungle. We extended and skirmished through the bush, but with no result. Bivouacked for the night in an open plain. On the 16th November, about 9:30 A.M., we reached Kadango's village, which was deserted. We halted here, and then proceeded on to Ngombe's village, some 3 miles further on. The roads between these towns were covered with very thick jungle, and intercepted with deep nullahs. After proceeding about a mile I heard some shots, and, proceeding to the front, found that Lieutenant Hamilton had been shot in the arm, and a Yao soldier in the knee. I sent them to the doctor, and then extended the whole of the main body and skirmished through the bush; only two more shots were fired at us. About 11:30 A.M. we reached Ngombe, where I found Lieutenant Hamilton, who, as soon as his wound was dressed, had collected some men, and, taking a direct road, had got on ahead of us.

Halted here the whole day.

Lieutenant Alston arrived at 9 P.M., with sixty-six rifles and several men with cap guns from Fort Maguire, having marched 63 miles in two days, a great part of which was along the sandy beach of the lake shore.

On the 17th, at 5 A.M., I left Ngombe for Namazini, dividing my force into three columns. The right, under Captain Stewart, with eighty-two rifles, was to ascend the hills and work around the crest, while I, with eighty-four rifles and the friendly Yaos of Kazembe, went through the pass by the main road, followed by Lieutenant Alston, with seventy rifles, whom I could detach, if necessary, to make a flank attack.

Lieutenant Hamilton was left in charge of the baggage guard at Ngombe, with Dr. Poole and the wounded.

After marching three hours, and meeting with no opposition, we reached the top of the hills that separated the undulating valley occupied by Makanjira from the lake, and saw in the far distance burning villages on the steep slopes of Namazini. I knew at once that Lieutenant Coape-Smith's party had arrived, so I pushed on at once to Makanjira's chief town, and met Lieutenant Coape-Smith. His column had made a most brilliant march, covering over 120 miles in four days, through trackless forests and over several mountain ranges. They had been very short of water, and for two days had nothing to drink except the water they found in holes made by the feet of elephants in marshy soil.

On the night of the 15th November it appears that they halted just above Makanjira's on the top of the Namazini range, but the guide did not recognize the place, and told them the hill overlooking Makanjira's was some 20 miles further on. So the following day they marched on, and about noon crossed a broad caravan track. This the guide recognized as leading from Makanjira's to Mtaka's, and so on to the coast. They at once retraced their steps, and proceeding along this caravan route, meeting with very recent evidences of the Slave Trade in the shape of hundreds of gori-sticks lying by the side of the road and barracoons at intervals. While walking along the road they met with a large number of fugitives. These they made prisoners, and hearing that Makanjira was aware of the approach of the three columns, and had decided to flee to Mtaka's, Lieutenant Coape-Smith pushed on with all speed.

On reaching Makanjira's town he saw a large number of men going up the steep slopes of Namazini, and sent Lieutenant G. de H. Smith after them with the advance guard.

Lieutenant G. de H. Smith soon got up with them, and had a very sharp rear-guard action, the enemy disputing every inch of ground. He made the enemy throw away two large tusks of ivory, eleven bales of calico, and thirteen loads of gunpowder, and managed to kill many of them. They also captured a number of slaves that the enemy were trying to take away with them. Being thoroughly tired out, he returned to the main body, which had in the meanwhile been employed in overcoming the small resistance that was offered them by the enemy who had not had time to get away.

Lieutenant Coape-Smith, hearing that Makanjira himself was with the main body of the enemy with whose rear guard Lieutenant Smith had had a fight, at once dispatched 103 rifles (native regulars) in pursuit.

The valley in which Makanjira was settled was about 12 miles long by 8 broad, and

contained about 8,000 huts, divided amongst many villages. Many of the houses were built in the coast style, and there was evidence everywhere of the existence of a large Arab and coast population. A great many slave sticks were found in the villages, several of them covered with blood.

The population could not have been less than 25,000, and probably much more.

The 17th and 18th were employed in destroying all the huts.

On the 18th the sub-Chiefs Lipongo, Namalaka, Ngombe, and Kadango came in and submitted. I told them to go to Fort Maguire, where the political officer would state the terms under which they would be allowed to return and settle down again.

On the 19th November I left for Fort Johnston with Lieutenant G. de H. Smith and 104 rifles, arriving there the following day, after two long marches.

Captain Stewart left the same day, with Lieutenant Alston, for Fort Maguire, and Lieutenant Coape-Smith was instructed to proceed to Fort Maguire with the remainder of the men as soon as the party he had sent in pursuit of Makanjira had returned.

Our casualties in the Makanjira expedition were :—

Lieutenant A. S. Hamilton, wounded.
4 Atonga wounded.
1 Yao, severely wounded.
—
6 wounded.

The enemy lost about thirty men killed.

During the operations we have released and freed the following number of slaves :—

| | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| Chindambo's (Makandanji) | 49 |
| Mponda | 379 |
| Makanjira's | 160 |
| Total | 588 |

We should have freed a great many more at Makanjira's if all the Arabs and coast men, after the fall of Zarafi, had not at once evacuated Makanjira's town, and proceeded to Mtaka's with all their slaves.

The officers and men throughout the operations behaved splendidly, notwithstanding the great hardships they had to undergo and the long and arduous marches performed. The main body in twenty-three days of actual marching covered 459 miles, or a daily rate of 19 miles, and some of the men of the detached columns marched a great deal more than this.

I was very pleased with the conduct of the few Yao Regulars that we have enlisted and trained. They seemed steadier than the Atonga and Makua, and were the only men of the native contingent who without Sikhs would assault a hill held in force by the enemy.

I would before closing this Report bring to your notice the following officers and men who have specially distinguished themselves :—

Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith, 11th Bengal Lancers, for his activity and bravery in heading the advance guard on the march to Zarafi's town, and for the brilliant march he conducted on the Makanjira expedition.

Lieutenant G. de H. Smith, 45th Sikhs, for the gallant way in which he stormed the heights with his Sikhs on the 27th October and held an advanced position in the presence of a numerous enemy, several of whom were armed with rifles.

Major L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, for the gallant way in which he led his men on the 27th October when clearing the heights above the pass, and for the careful and complete way he organized and commanded the transport of the forces during the Zarafi expedition.

Lance-Naich Naraik Singh, 19th Punjab Infantry; Lance-Naich Jowala Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers; Naich Atma Singh, 45th Sikhs; Sepoy Pertab Singh, 35th Sikhs; Sepoy Sundar Singh, 36th Sikhs; Lance-Naich Sham Singh, 15th Sikhs; Sepoy Pertap Singh, 45th Sikhs, for conspicuous bravery.

I inclose—

1. A plan of our encampment at night.
2. A Report from Commander Cullen, R.N.R., on his bombardment of Kasanka village.
3. A map.

(Signed) C. A. EDWARDS, Major,
Commanding Armed Forces in British Central Africa.

Zomba, December 27, 1895.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Plan of Encampment at Night when on the March.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Captain Cullen to Major Edwards.

Sir, "Adventure," at Monkey Bay, November 16, 1895.
 I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in accordance with your request, forty rifles, native contingent, 1,200 pounds rice, and forty loads Sikh ration have been conveyed to Fort Maguire, together with a letter for Lieutenant Alston, the whole being landed by 4 P.M., 14th November.

I also beg to report that in accordance with your desire I proceeded in Her Majesty's ship "Adventure" to the village of Kasanka on the morning of the 16th November, and, laying off at 500 yards, I set fire to the place with incendiary shell, and then running close in landed Mr. Savage, boatswain, and four men, and after anchoring landed myself with all other available hands.

Kasanka's people made a slight stand on the outskirts of the village, firing a few volleys, but a couple of volleys cleared them out, and after pursuing them about 2 miles I returned to the village, and after searching the houses burnt them all, with the exception of the mission house and buildings and the grain stores, the grain I handed over to a native policeman of Mr. Cardew's, who lives in the adjacent Nyasa village.

The houses numbered over 300, and several were much superior to the ordinary run. No guns were found, but most of the huts had powder and some cartridges, as we discovered when they were burning. There were no casualties on our side, but the policeman informed me that several of Kasanka's people were killed and wounded by the shells, and some were wounded during the pursuit.

I gave instructions to the Police Captain to collect all the grain and report to Mr. Cardew the goats and sheep had all been driven away on the approach of the gun-boat.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) PERCY CULLEN, Senior Naval Officer,
 British Central Africa Administration.

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

Map of South-East portion of British Central Africa Protectorate.

No. 3.

Commissioner Sir H. Johnston to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 23.)


My Lord, *The Residency, Zomba, January 24, 1896.*
 I HAVE the pleasure to communicate to your Lordship the following copy of a Report made to me by Mr. A. J. Swann, the Collector for the Marimba district, in the Nyasa province, the said Report dealing with the expedition against the Angoni Chief Mwasu Kazungu in the interior of the Marimba district.

I would preface the Report by a few words explaining how the military expedition was rendered necessary.

Your Lordship will remember that at the time Captain Maguire was killed fighting on the shore of Makanjira's country,* the African Lakes Company's steamer the "Domira," which conveyed him thither, was stranded close to the beach, and was attacked by Makanjira's men, and that subsequently Makanjira's people put up a flag of truce and invited the Europeans in the steamer to come ashore and treat for peace. Dr. Boyce, the surgeon of the Indian troops, and Mr. McEwan, the engineer of the steamer, went on shore, and after going a short distance inland were murdered by a Lieutenant of Makanjira's, Saïdi Mwazungu, who said in so doing he was carrying out Makanjira's orders.

* See "Africa No. 5 (1892)."

PLAN OF ENCAMPMENT AT NIGHT, WHEN ON THE MARCH.



REFERENCE.


- O. — Officers.
- A. — Gun Ammunition.
- B. — Spare Rifle Ammunition.

In the extended line, the men went to sleep on the ground they occupied, and a sentry was furnished by the reserve, who in case of alarm would rouse the extended line.

The Yao Reserve was strengthened by some Alonga.

Fires were lit for cooking between the camp and the extended line.

C. Edward Kemp



MAP OF
SOUTH EAST PORTION
OF THE
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA
PROTECTORATE.

(Showing country over which the operations extended in 1895.)

Scale, 12 miles = 1 inch. R.F. 760,320.



A. E. Edwards

Some time afterwards Saïdi Mwazungu, fearing reprisals from the British, left Makanjira's country and crossed to the west side of the lake, proceeding far inland on a trading expedition. He was on his return to Lake Nyasa in 1893 when he heard of the final overthrow of Makanjira, and being afraid to proceed to Kota-Kota, which was friendly to the English, he stopped with the Angoni Chief, Mwasi Kazungu.

In 1894 we asked Mwasi to give up this man, but he refused, and by degrees such of Makanjira's fighting men as were recalcitrant, and did not come to terms with us on the opposite shore, gradually joined Saïdi Mwazungu, who commenced to build a very strong stockade in Mwasi Kazungu's country, and latterly was intriguing with the Angoni Chiefs to the north and south, and with the Mahommedans in Kota-Kota to help him to take possession of Mwasi Kazungu's country, to be followed by an attack on Kota-Kota, which was to end in driving the English and the Sikhs into the lake.

I directed Mr. Swann last autumn to again visit Mwasi Kazungu, and after negotiating a fresh Treaty with him to endeavour to obtain possession of Saïdi Mwazungu.

Mwasi, however, though he concluded a Treaty, declined to give up Saïdi Mwazungu, and when Mr. Swann returned to Kota-Kota Mwasi, who was very much under Saïdi's influence, was induced to declare war against the English and the people of Kota-Kota. He cut their well-known trade route to the Luapula, down which so much ivory comes, and he received with ostentatious friendship a number of half-caste Portuguese who came up from Tété with supplies of gunpowder, and received in exchange quantities of slaves and ivory. Nearly all these slaves had been raided from territories at the back of Kota-Kota.

Mwasi received promises of help from Mpeseni to the south, and some of the Angoni Chiefs to the north, and hearing that the Arabs were going to attack us at the north end of Nyasa, he thought the time had come to show an openly hostile attitude to the Sikh garrison at Kota-Kota which was much reduced.

I was apprised of these facts by Mr. Swann, and as soon as the war with the Arabs was over I dispatched Lieutenant Alston with 50 Sikhs and 100 negro soldiers, and Sergeant-Major Devoy with one 7-pr. gun to assist Mr. Swann, who promised to raise 2,000 or 3,000 irregulars amongst the Kota-Kota people.

The latter responded very eagerly to his call, as will be seen, and 5,000 men marched out with Mr. Swann and Lieutenant Alston.

I hope to be permitted at some future time to convey to Lieutenant Alston an expression of your Lordship's satisfaction with the manner in which he has carried out this military expedition.

I have subsequently heard that Captain F. T. Stewart's expedition against the Yao Chiefs, Tambala and Mpemba, has been completely successful. These Chiefs have been driven out of the Protectorate, and a fort has been built by Captain Stewart on the site of Tambala's supposed impregnable stronghold on a mountain 4,000 feet high. I have no details of this expedition at the time of writing, but will forward them when I got a report on the subject.

I have the pleasure now to inform your Lordship that, as far as I am aware, there does not exist a single independent avowedly slave-trading Chief within the British Central Africa Protectorate, nor any one who is known to be inimical to British rule.

I also desire to impress on your Lordship the fact that these enemies whom we have recently conquered, like all with whom we have fought since our assumption of the Protectorate, were not natives of the country fighting for their independence, but aliens of Arab, Yao, or Zulu race who were contesting with us the supremacy over the natives of Nyasaland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. H. JOHNSTON,

Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Extract from Report by Mr. Swann.

Mwasi, although nominally chief, was a puppet in the hands of Chabisa, an Angoni chief, and of Saïdi Mwazungu. Although he promised to cease raiding for slaves and exporting them to the Zambezi, and sending ivory out of the country without payment of duty, he nevertheless continued to send his caravans all the same.

Only the other day I intercepted one of these, and my police took some of the women out of the slave sticks. Chabisa stopped the regular mails which I was sending to the Europeans established on the Chininda concessions in the British South Africa Company's territories, and closed the great trade route to the Luapala. The position thus became unbearable to the people of Kota-Kota, who were fretting at having their commerce with the interior cut off. I therefore sent Mwasi Kazungu an ultimatum, demanding the surrender of Saïdi Mwazungu and Chabisa, the son of whom had just murdered one of the local chieftains who was friendly to us. An evasive answer was returned to my message, followed by an absolute refusal to all my demands. Having placed the situation before you, Sir, you promised to place at my disposal a small force when the Arab war was finished, and in due time 150 regulars (50 Sikhs, and 100 Makua, Atonga and Yaos), commanded by Lieutenant Alston, and accompanied by Sergeant-Major Devoy and a 7-pr. gun, towards the end of December, landed at Kota-Kota.

I joined this force as political officer, and having called for volunteers at Kota-Kota, 5,000 men presented themselves, of whom 2,300 carried guns, the rest spears. When within one day's march of Mwasi's principal town, I sent him a final message advising him to settle the matter peaceably. No definite answer was returned, though a few headmen attempted to delay us by idle talk. After a short wait I broke off negotiations and placed the matter in the hands of Lieutenant Alston, to be settled by recourse to force. I advised Lieutenant Alston in particular to take the towns of Mwasi, Chabisa, and another very bad chief named Kipwalia; and I asked him to endeavour to discriminate as far as possible between these towns and those of the rest of Mwasi's people that were the indigenous inhabitants of the country, and in no way to blame for Mwasi's raids.

(Mwasi himself is a stranger and an alien, of Zulu extraction.)

This was a difficult problem for Lieutenant Alston, seeing that there were about 113 villages closely grouped together; but by the admirable disposition of his force he managed to confine the war to the prescribed area.

Marching from our last camp at daylight under heavy rain (the force being brought out in skirmishing order), we crossed a flat country and approached the first village of the enemy, which we found deserted. This was burned to prevent a rear attack, likewise two others on the right and left flanks. When within a mile of the main town, Saïdi Mwazungu was sent out to us bound, some quarrel having arisen between him and Mwasi's subsidiary chiefs; but Mwasi and the said chiefs, though giving up Saïdi Mwazungu, sent to say "They would fight the matter out, and send us back to eat the fish of Nyasa," and, further, "that Mwasi would raid the country as he pleased, and that it was no business of ours to interfere." We did not take further action for a little while, hoping to be able to resume negotiations, but as the enemy now began to fire on our flanks we felt we were in a difficult position and must conquer decisively, or have our retreat cut off.

We were now close to Kazungu Mountain, and large bodies of men were seen occupying the shoulder of the hill near which the column was passing, but Lieutenant Alston detached a party of men, who extended in skirmishing order, scaling the hill and taking this large force in the rear. This was most fortunate, because we were now under a heavy fire as we reached the crest of rocks. But our Atonga were most eager, and dashed on the enemy, driving them from the position more easily since the rear attack had greatly disheartened them. Mwasi's men then retreated in an orderly manner across the open plain, shouting to us in a derisive manner, and gradually forming a line right across our front. The column was then halted, and, after a brief rest, Lieutenant Alston mounted the 7-pr. on an eminence and extended his line right and left, just out of range of the enemy's guns, the object being to prevent the enemy retreating past us up the mountain, where it would have been difficult to dislodge them.

Telling off a body of Sikhs and Makua and fifty Kota-Kota irregulars to accompany me, Lieutenant Alston ordered me to march across the front of the town, out of range of the enemy's guns, and take up a position to the extreme right. This was done, the people of the town abusing us heartily as we passed, and the Atonga replying with their well-known exuberance of spirit. Meantime the main body took up its position, covered by the gun under the charge of Sergeant-Major Devoy. When the centre and left wing were in position, Lieutenant Alston ordered Sergeant-Major Devoy to shell the villages, which extended for miles at short distances. Immediately in our front was Chabisa's stockade, and this was the key to the position, as Mwasi had no fortified village.

After a few well-placed shells had burst in the stockade, the bugle sounded the advance, and after fixing bayonets and firing several volleys, the Sikhs and Atonga, led by Lieutenant Alston, yelled as they disappeared over the stockade and were lost amongst the vast collection of houses. A rear party of Kota-Kota men were told off to burn everything behind them. There was no stopping the men in this advance. They poured in hundreds into the maze of villages, although a sharp encounter took place on the right with Chabisa's men, which delayed us a little. Chabisa's soldiers, however, were more anxious to drive off their cattle than to contest the position. They failed, however, in doing so, leaving a number of their men dead on the field. On reaching Mwasi's town, another check ensued, as the bravest amongst Mwasi's men had remained compactly massed to attempt to stop our further advance. Lieutenant Alston rallied the Atonga, who were slightly disconcerted by the enemy's heavy fire, and poured a succession of well-directed volleys into Mwasi's men. Then, letting the Atonga charge, he himself rushed through the trees followed by the Sikhs, and swept the enemy clean out of the town. All Mwasi's forces, which must have amounted to a rabble of quite 20,000, now broke and fled in all directions, but chiefly westward. They were pursued by Sergeant-Major Ali Kiongwe and a few Atonga.

This advance party again met with a determined resistance at the boma of Kipwalia. Ali sent back for reinforcements, but just as we were approaching he gallantly charged the enemy, and took from them their Arab standard (a beautifully inscribed one), then, disappearing through the gates, set fire to the extensive village and captured an enormous quantity of European clothes, guns, cloth, &c. "Goree" sticks barricaded the approaches to Chabisa's house, showing unmistakable signs of active slaving operations, and Saïdi Mwazungu's Yaos, fighting in their own town, showed how far they had succeeded in the plans I judged them to be carrying out in their attempt to secure a hold over Mwasi's country. They gradually fell back, however, before the attack of our forces, and were thoroughly routed.

The next day Mwasi's father came in, and, being an old man, was taken care of, whilst several chiefs brought in a peace offering and accepted our terms.

Meantime Lieutenant Alston proceeded to clear the mail road as far west as the forest, destroying Mwasi's Headmens' strongholds, and obtaining the submission of the border chiefs.

The casualties on our side were :—

- 1 Atonga and 5 Kota-Kota men killed.
- 3 Atonga and 2 Kota-Kota men wounded.
- 3 men struck by lightning, and their guns smashed.
- 1 man struck by an arrow.

The enemy lost forty-two killed, as far as we could count the bodies in the stockades, but more must have been wounded, and many were probably killed in the pursuit by the Kota-Kota men.

We captured :—

- 1 Arab standard.
- 250 head of cattle.
- 564 lbs. of ivory.
- 632 prisoners, of whom 14 were Headmen, or Chiefs.
- 94 guns.
- 170 sheep and goats, together with
- A large quantity of calico and European goods, and gunpowder, most of which was carried off as loot by the Kota-Kota men.

Owing to the sudden attack on the main position and the prompt advance of his forces Lieutenant Alston completely paralysed the enemy, and gave them no chance to make a second stand, which, if they had done, would certainly have resulted to us in a great loss of life.

After thoroughly settling up the affairs of the country we left a garrison and Ali Kiongwe to occupy the site of Mwasi's town, and the rest of the troops were withdrawn to Kota-Kota, whilst the Kota-Kota men returned to their homes.

Lieutenant Alston subsequently proceeded with his troops overland to join Captain Stewart's expedition against Tambala.

The results of this fighting with Mwasi Kazungu are that we secure a direct highway into the British South Africa Company's territories in the direction of the Luangwa and Luapula Rivers. This is a valuable trade route which for many years has enriched Kota-Kota. By holding Mwasi's we cut the trade route to the Zambezi, and render it impossible for slaves to be sent thither, and gunpowder to be imported thence.

We separate the two powerful Angoni clans, one under Mpeseni to the south, and the other, the northern Angoni, formerly ruled by Mbera; the latter had been showing a tendency to move south which will now be checked.

We have destroyed the growing clique of Yao slave-traders who were rapidly consolidating their position; and in the capture of Saïda Mwazungu we shall be able to avenge at last the foul murder of Dr. Boyce and Mr. McEwan under a flag of truce in 1891.

Further, I might mention that of late Chabisa and Mwasi had prevented the industrious inhabitants of the country, who belonged to the Achewa branch of the Anyanja race, from going to work in the coffee plantations round Blantyre. This ban has now been removed, and I expect hundreds of labourers will soon start in that direction for they are very anxious to start work and amass calico.

Mwasi's country will be a most valuable market for European goods, as it produces quantities of cattle, and is rich in ivory. In fact, I might mention that whilst on the road the expedition ran into a herd of elephants, but so far as I am aware the elephants got off scot free.

Since returning to Kota-Kota, Mpeseni has sent to me asking for our flag, and we may rest assured that the downfall of Mwasi has had a salutary effect on more than one native autocrat who was persistently carrying on the slave trade and blocking the advance of Europeans into the interior.

Mwasi's fell on the 31st December, 1895, and we drank the Queen's health and the New Year whilst the most boisterous rejoicings were being carried on by the Kota-Kota men, hugely delighted at the downfall of their old enemy.

(Signed) A. J. SWANN.

No. 4.

Foreign Office to Commissioner Sir H. Johnston.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 26, 1896.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge receipt of your despatch of the 24th January, giving a full account of the operations conducted by Mr. Swann and Lieutenant Alston against the Chief Mwasi Kazungu. On receipt of your telegraphic summary of these proceedings the telegram, which is inclosed herewith, was sent to you by direction of the Queen, conveying to you, to Lieutenant Alston, and to the officers and soldiers of the Protectorate engaged in the recent operations, Her Majesty's congratulations on the success of your efforts.

I am now to express to you the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the result of the series of operations against the slave-raiders in the lake districts, which have reflected much credit on yourself, and on all the officers employed in them; and I am to state that the services of the military officers and Sikhs will be brought to the special attention of the Secretary of State for War, and of the Secretary of State for India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. PERCY ANDERSON.

Inclosure in No. 4.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Commissioner Sir H. Johnston.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 14, 1896, 8 A.M.

BY direction of the Queen, I convey to you, to Lieutenant Alston, and to the officers and soldiers of the Protectorate engaged in the recent operations, Her Majesty's congratulations on the success which has attended the gallant efforts to break the power of the slave-raiding Chiefs in the various districts of Nyasaland.

CORRESPONDENCE respecting Operations against
Slave-traders in British Central Africa.

[In continuation of "Africa No. 2 (1896)."]

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. April 1896.*
