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R E P O R T

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

SLAVE TRADE  
(EAST COAST OF AFRICA);

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

APPENDIX AND INDEX.

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
*4 August 1871.*

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*Thursday, 6th July 1871.*

*Ordered*, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the whole question of the Slave Trade on the East Coast of Africa, into the increased and increasing amount of that traffic, the particulars of existing Treaties and Agreements with the Sultan of Zanzibar upon the subject, and the possibility of putting an end entirely to the traffic in slaves by sea.

Committee nominated :—

Mr. Russell Gurney.  
 Viscount Enfield.  
 Mr. Kinnaird.  
 Sir John Hay.  
 Sir Frederick Williams.  
 Lord F. Cavendish.  
 Mr. John Talbot.  
 Mr. O'Conor.

Mr. Percy Wyndham.  
 Mr. Kennaway.  
 Mr. Robert Fowler.  
 Sir Robert Anstruther.  
 Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
 Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
 Mr. Gilpin.

*Ordered*, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

*Ordered*, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

*Thursday, 13th July 1871.*

*Ordered*, THAT the Report addressed to the Earl of Clarendon by the Committee on the East African Slave Trade, dated the 24th day of January 1870, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, and the Correspondence respecting the Slave Trade and other matters, from the 1st day of January to the 31st day of December 1870, and the recent Correspondence respecting the Slave Trade, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1871, be referred to the Select Committee.

*Friday, 4th August 1871.*

*Ordered*, THAT the Committee have power to report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to the House.

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## R E P O R T.

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THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the whole question of the SLAVE TRADE on the EAST COAST of AFRICA, into the increased and increasing amount of that Traffic, the Particulars of existing Treaties and Agreements with the Sultan of *Zanzibar* upon the subject, and the possibility of putting an end entirely to the Traffic in Slaves by Sea;—HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:

THAT the slave trade in negroes on the East Coast of Africa is now almost entirely confined to a trade between the dominions of *Zanzibar* on the one hand, and the coast of Arabia and Persia and the Island of Madagascar on the other hand, the principal and by far the largest portion of the traffic being in the former direction. The dominions of *Zanzibar* extend along the Eastern Coast of Africa for about 350 miles, and lie between the Equator and 10 degrees south latitude, and include the islands of *Zanzibar*, *Pemba*, and *Momfia*, the head quarter of government being the island of *Zanzibar*, which lies opposite the centre of the coast line, and about 25 miles from the mainland. The town of *Zanzibar* is rapidly growing in importance, as is evidenced by the progressive increase of imports at the custom house there, from 245,981 *l.* in 1861-62, to 433,693 *l.* in 1867-68, of which trade about one-half is in the hands of British Indian subjects. It was reported in 1867 by General Rigby to be the chief market of the world for the supply of ivory, gum, and copal, and to have a rapidly increasing trade in hides, oils, seeds, and dyes, while sugar and cotton promise to figure largely amongst its future exports. The country in the interior of that part of Africa, and of which *Zanzibar* is the outlet, is said, according to the recent accounts of Livingstone and others, to be equal in resources to any part of India, and to be, as a rule, more healthy. Iron abounds in all directions, coal is to be found, and cotton can be grown to any extent.

The negro slave in general passes through three stages ere he reaches his final destination.

These are, (1) the land journey from his home to the coast, (2) a short sea voyage to the island of *Zanzibar*, where is the open slave market, and (3) the final sea passage from *Zanzibar* to Arabia, Persia, or Madagascar.

From the evidence laid before the Committee it appears that the large majority of the slaves are now brought from the western side of the Lake Nyassa (a distance of nearly 500 miles from the coast) to *Kilwa*, which is the principal port of shipment for *Zanzibar*, and is near the southern limit of the *Zanzibar* dominions.

Your Committee had before them extracts from Despatches of Dr. Livingstone, addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, when Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and his testimony as to the methods resorted to by the slave hunters, and the cruelties and horrors of the trade is fully supported by the evidence of witnesses who had travelled in the interior. This evidence is well summed up in the Report of the Committee on the East African Slave Trade addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, a quotation from which is as follows :—

“The persons by whom this traffic is carried on are for the most part Arabs, subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar. These slave dealers start for the interior, well armed, and provided with articles for the barter of slaves, such as beads and cotton cloth. On arriving at the scene of their operations they incite and sometimes help the natives of one tribe to make war upon another. Their assistance almost invariably secures victory to the side which they support, and the captives become their property, either by right or by purchase, the price in the latter case being only a few yards of cotton cloth. In the course of these operations, thousands are killed, or die subsequently of their wounds or of starvation, villages are burnt, and the women and children carried away as slaves. The complete depopulation of the country between the coast and the present field of the slave dealers' operations attest the fearful character of these raids.

“Having by these and other means obtained a sufficient number of slaves to allow for the heavy losses on the road, the slave dealers start with them for the coast. The horrors attending this long journey have been fully described by Dr. Livingstone and others. The slaves are marched in gangs, the males with their necks yoked in heavy forked sticks, which at night are fastened to the ground, or lashed together so as to make escape impossible. The women and children are bound with thongs. Any attempt at escape or to untie their bonds, or any wavering or lagging on the journey, has but one punishment—immediate death. The sick are left behind, and the route of a slave caravan can be tracked by the dying and the dead. The Arabs only value these poor creatures at the price which they will fetch in the market, and if they are not likely to pay the cost of their conveyance they are got rid of. The result is, that a large number of the slaves die or are murdered on the journey, and the survivors arrive at their destination in a state of the greatest misery and emaciation.”

From Kilwa the main body of the slaves are shipped to Zanzibar, but some are carried direct from Kilwa to the northern ports.

At Zanzibar the slaves are sold either in open market or direct to the dealer, and they are then shipped in Arab dhows for Arabia and Persia; the numbers of each cargo vary from one or two slaves to between three and four hundred.

The whole slave trade by sea, whether for the supply of the Sultan's African dominions or the markets in Arabia and Persia, is carried on by Arabs from Muscat and other ports on the Arabian coast. They are not subjects of Zanzibar, but chiefly belong to tribes of roving and predatory habits.

The sea passage exposes the slave to much suffering; and, in addition to the danger from overcrowding and insufficient food and water, the loss of life connected with the attempt to escape Her Majesty's cruisers is very considerable, it being the practice to use any means to get rid of the slaves in order to escape condemnation, should the dhow be captured. Between Kilwa and Zanzibar a dhow lately lost a third of the slaves; there were 90 thrown overboard, dead or dying, many of them in a terribly emaciated state.

The ready market found for the slave in Arabia and Persia, and the large profit upon the sale, are quite sufficient inducements for the continuance of the traffic.

It seems impossible to arrive at an exact conclusion as to the actual number of slaves who leave the African coast in one year, but from the returns laid before the Committee an estimate may be formed. At the port of Kilwa is the Custom-house of the Sultan of Zanzibar, through which pass all slaves that are not smuggled, and there a tax is levied on all that pass the Custom-house.

The following is a Return of the number of slaves exported through the Custom-house at Kilwa between 1862 and 1867, distinguishing those sent to Zanzibar from those shipped to other places:—

Year.	Zanzibar.	Elsewhere.
1862-63	13,000	5,500
1863-64	14,000	3,500
1864-65	13,821	3,000
1865-66	18,344	4,000
1866-67	17,538	4,500
	<hr/> 76,703	<hr/> 20,500
	20,500	
Total Exports from Kilwa } in Five years - - - }	<hr/> 97,203 <hr/>	

From a despatch of Dr. Kirk, dated 1st February 1870, it appears that 14,944 were exported from Kilwa in the year ending 23rd August 1869. But besides those passed through the Custom-house at Kilwa, numbers are exported from other places on the coast.

Such is the extent to which the exportation of slaves takes place from the Zanzibar territory on the East Coast of Africa. It has also been shown that there the slave trade still exists from the Portuguese territory to the Island of Madagascar, and that slaves are still imported into Turkish ports in the Red Sea, General Rigby having recently seen fresh importations even in the civilised port of Suez. It must not, however, be thought that those who are taken captive, great as the numbers are, represent in any degree the total number of the sufferers from this iniquitous traffic. Such is the fearful loss of life resulting from this traffic, such the miseries which attend it, that, according to Dr. Livingstone and others, not one in five, in some cases not one in ten, of the victims of the slave hunters ever reach the coast alive.

The slaves when liberated from the dhows have been sent of late years to Aden and Bombay, being maintained there at a heavy cost to the Imperial Exchequer. In time past some have been landed at the Seychelles, a dependency of the Mauritius. The climate in these islands is said to suit them exactly, and the inhabitants to be anxious for emancipated slave labour. Every variety of tropical product grows there in the greatest abundance.

Measures have at various times been adopted by the Government of this country to control and check the trade, but hitherto with but partial success; To control the trade, treaties have been made with the Sultan of Muscat, with the friendly Arab chiefs on the Arabian coast, and with the Shah of Persia. The treaties with the Sultan of Muscat are acknowledged to be binding upon the Sultan of Zanzibar, who has issued orders accordingly, and they prohibit the export of slaves from Africa, as well as their import from Africa into Asia, Arabia, the Red Sea, or Persian Gulf, but permit the transport of slaves to and fro between Kilwa, Zanzibar, and any coast port up to Lamoo, which is the northern limit of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions.

*See Appendix for list of Treaties.*

The result of the treaties, as far as the Sultan of Zanzibar is concerned, is, that not only are the slave traders enabled to rendezvous in great numbers at Zanzibar, but the dhows, often so laden that the deck is entirely covered with slaves, squatting side by side, and so closely packed that it is impossible for them to move, come up openly from Kilwa to Zanzibar, and then starting afresh, and provided with proper clearances for Lamoo, are enabled to make the first half of the journey north unmolested by British cruisers.

The object of the British Government in assenting to these treaty provisions was to avoid interference with the status of domestic slavery in the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, as appears by a Despatch from the Right Honourable Earl Russell, dated 14th March 1864, in which it is stated "that Her Majesty's Government do not claim the right to interfere in the status

“ of domestic slavery in Zanzibar, nor with the *bonâ fide* transport of slaves from one part of the Sultan’s territory to another. So long as this traffic shall not be made a cloak to cover the foreign slave trade, which his Highness is bound by treaty to prevent, and which Her Majesty’s Government are also determined to suppress.”

It appears from the evidence that the transport of slaves between the island and coast dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar has afforded a cover for the foreign slave trade, as the traders procure at Zanzibar or Kilwa the requisite port clearances and passes for Lamoo, and thence run northwards, taking their chance of escaping the British cruisers.

There are no means of ascertaining the exact numbers intended for the foreign market, but different witnesses have estimated the numbers annually needed to maintain the supply of slave labour in the dominion of Zanzibar, at from 1,700 to 4,000, which would leave at least 16,000 as the number destined for the foreign slave market. The treaty stipulations and agreements with the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar have been carried into effect by various Acts of Parliament and Orders in Council, which contain provision for the establishment of courts of adjudication for the trial of vessels captured as slavers at Zanzibar.

The carrying out of these measures has been committed to the Political Agent of the Government of India, who also holds the appointment of British Consul at Zanzibar, and, in addition to the ordinary duties of a Political Agent and Consul, is Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court. The expenses of this Establishment are borne by the Indian Government.

The Government have proposed to enter into a new treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar to the following effect:—

“ 1. To limit the shipment of slaves from the mainland to one point only on the African coast, namely, Dar Selam, and to prohibit entirely their export from any other places.

“ 2. To make Zanzibar the only port for the reception of slaves shipped from Dar Selam, but with liberty to transport from thence to Pemba and Mombaza only; imports of slaves to any other place, or which have not come through Zanzibar, should be declared illegal, and liable to seizure.

“ 3. That the number of slaves exported from Dar Selam to Zanzibar, and thence to Pemba and Mombaza, shall be strictly limited to the actual requirements of the inhabitants of those places, to be annually settled by mutual consent between the Sultan and the British Agent, such number to be gradually decreased so as to cease altogether within a certain time.

“ 4. That every vessel engaged in the transport of slaves shall be liable to capture, unless she is provided with a proper pass from the Sultan, which shall be valid only for one voyage, and with distinctive marks on her hull and sails; a heavy penalty being attached to any piracy of these passes or marks.

“ 5. That the public slave markets at Zanzibar shall be closed.

“ 6. That the Sultan shall engage from the date of the treaty to punish severely any of his subjects who may be proved to be concerned, directly or indirectly, in the slave trade, and especially any attempt to molest or interfere with a liberated slave.

“ 7. That the Kutchees, and other natives of Indian states under British protection, shall be forbidden, after a date to be fixed by the Government of India to possess slaves, and that in the meantime they shall be prevented from acquiring any fresh slaves.

Lastly, “ The treaty shall contain a stipulation providing for the eventual entire prohibition of the export of slaves from the mainland.”

The Government have sent out instructions to press this proposed treaty upon the present Sultan; but pending the inquiry of this Committee nothing more has been done.

It has been stated to the Committee that for the performance of the additional duties which would devolve upon the Consul, should the proposed treaty be carried into effect, some increase in the present small staff would be required, and it was recommended by witnesses that an officer be appointed at Zanzibar to assist the Consul and Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court in all matters connected with the slave trade, with the title of Assistant Political Agent and Vice Consul at Zanzibar, and to act for him in his absence; that a Consular Officer should also be appointed at Dar Selam, under the superintendence of Her Majesty's Consul, to whom he should report upon all matters connected with the slave trade, the number of slaves exported, and whether the Sultan's engagements with Her Majesty's Government are strictly observed. This officer would be required to visit, from time to time, the various points on the coast, and to report whether any irregularities exist, or any illegal exports are carried on; and as it is probable that for some time the slave traders would attempt to continue the exportation of slaves from Kilwa, the distance of which from Zanzibar and Dar Selam would prevent the British authorities at those places from watching and checking such practices, it might be necessary, at first, to station a consular officer at that port also.

It was also stated to the Committee that this proposal was concurred in by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for India in Council, who recommended that, as the duties of the agency and consulate at Zanzibar were of a twofold character—one part concerning the Indian, and the other the Imperial Government—that the cost of maintenance should be equally divided between the Imperial and Indian Governments.

This proposal was negatived by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, and it was stated in evidence that, in consequence of this refusal and of the representation of the Indian Government, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council had informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Foreign Office would no longer be privileged to send any instructions to the Zanzibar agent; and the whole matter, therefore, was brought to a deadlock.

The principal means used to check the trade have been the employment of some vessels of Her Majesty's Navy upon the East Indian station as cruisers to watch the East African Coast during the slaving season, which, depending upon the monsoon, is from April to the end of June, and from September to the beginning of November. It was stated in evidence that during the years 1867, 1868, and 1869, there were captured by the squadron 116 dhows, containing 2,645 slaves; while, according to the returns of slaves exported from Zanzibar and Kilwa during those years, dhows carrying 37,000 slaves must have evaded capture, making the captures about 6·6 per cent. only.

These figures are sufficient to show the insufficiency of the present squadron to check, much less to stop, the trade; and the reasons assigned are that the existing treaties and the instructions as to domestic slaves render it impossible to seize a dhow south of Lamoo, and during the south-west monsoon it is very difficult to keep the cruisers sufficiently near the coast to intercept the dhows as they run northward before the wind, while there appears a general concurrence of testimony that the present number of the squadron is insufficient for the work to be performed, and that the efficiency of the squadron would be materially increased by an additional supply of steam launches for the arduous boat service on that coast. The traffic in slaves was, on the 31st of May 1871, as reported by the Admiral Commanding in Chief on the station to be, "without doubt, as busy and profitable as ever."

In connection with the failure of the measures hitherto adopted it was given in evidence that much was owing to the want of recorded information, and the necessarily frequent change of commanders, who, moreover, are not supplied with the official reports of those who have preceded them, as well as to the inefficiency and untrustworthiness of the interpreters employed, who not unfrequently are in league with the traders, and mislead the commanders of the squadron.

Evidence given before your Committee shows the very great inconvenience and loss resulting to British residents, and a frequent diversion of trade into



into foreign bottoms from the want of any regular postal communication with Zanzibar; the mails lying sometimes at Seychelles for months together waiting for a chance vessel. It has been stated to them that a very small subsidy would suffice to start monthly steam communication, either with the Seychelles, distant about 800 miles, in correspondence with French steamers running from Aden, or from the latter port direct.

Your Committee having heard the evidence, are strongly of opinion that all legitimate means should be used to put an end altogether to the East African slave trade.

They believe that any attempt to supply slaves for domestic use in Zanzibar, will always be a pretext and cloak for a foreign trade, while the loss of life and the injury caused to maintain even the limited supply of slaves required for this purpose, must of necessity be so great as to forbid this country continuing to recognise any such traffic in slaves.

It has been stated by some of the witnesses, that should the Sultan consent to relinquish the slave trade a revolution would follow, and that a sudden stoppage of the importation of slaves into Zanzibar would seriously affect the industrial position of the island; but on the other hand, a witness of great experience has given it in evidence, that the Zanzibar Arabs are fully aware that the trade will be stopped, and are beginning to understand that more profit can be made by retaining the labourers to cultivate their own country, than by selling them away as slaves, while the abolition of the trade would encourage free labourers from all parts to reside at Zanzibar, so ensuring a larger and better supply of labourers than exists at present.

It appears from the evidence, that the parties from whom serious opposition may be expected are the northern Arabs, but the presence of an English naval force at Zanzibar would afford sufficient protection.

Your Committee therefore recommend that it be notified to the Sultan of Zanzibar, that the existing treaty provisions having been systematically evaded, and having been found not only insufficient to protect the negro tribes in the interior of Africa from destruction, but rather to foster and encourage the foreign trade in slaves, Her Majesty's Government, unless further securities can be obtained for the entire prohibition of the foreign slave trade, will feel itself compelled to abrogate the treaty, and to take such further legitimate measures as it may find necessary to put an end to all slave trade whatever, whether foreign or coasting.

Further, that should the Sultan be willing to enter into a new treaty, having for its object the entire abolition of the slave trade, Her Majesty's Government would agree to settle at Zanzibar a proportion of adult negroes, who might thereafter be captured by Her Majesty's cruisers, provided the Sultan agreed to such measures for their protection and freedom as might be deemed necessary.

It has been represented to the Committee by some of the witnesses, that as the Sultan derives a considerable part of his revenues from the slave trade, it would be necessary to make him some compensation for the loss he would sustain by the abolition of the trade.

It appears from the evidence, that the Sultan of Zanzibar levies a tax of two dollars upon all slaves shipped from Kilwa for Zanzibar, and four dollars upon those shipped for Lamoo, and a further tax of two dollars upon all slaves shipped from Zanzibar. The witnesses have estimated the proceeds of this tax at various amounts, some putting it as high as 15,000 *l.* or 20,000 *l.*; others as low as 5,000 *l.*; but whatever the amount may be, the prospect of compensation has been suggested in the negotiations for a new treaty with the Sultan, already alluded to in this Report.

It has been suggested that, as an equivalent for the supposed loss to his revenue, the Sultan should be released from the payment of an annual subsidy of 40,000 crowns to the Sultan of Muscat, which was arranged upon the partition of the dominion of the Imaum of Muscat, between his two sons, by the Indian Government as arbitrators; but it now appears that the circumstances under which it was supposed this release might be effected have altered.

It has been given in evidence that from 1,700 to about 4,000 slaves is probably sufficient to supply the requirements of the island and dominions of  
Zanzibar

Zanzibar, and this, therefore, is the extent of the legalised trade, and the value to the Sultan of Zanzibar at the present rate of tax would not exceed 4,000 £. annually

Your Committee, however, do not believe that the Sultan of Zanzibar would be ultimately a loser by the abolition of the trade; on the contrary, it was given in evidence that already the revenues of the Sultan, derived from the rapidly increasing trade of Zanzibar, and from his private estates in India are ample to maintain the Government of his State, independently of the sum received from the slave trade; while the witnesses generally concur in stating that were the slave trade abolished, and a more ready means of communication afforded between Bombay, Aden, and Zanzibar, the already flourishing trade of that State would be rapidly developed. Material assistance to this development might be afforded by a line of mail steamers to Zanzibar. Should the Sultan be willing to enter into a new treaty, the Committee recommend that it contain provisions for the entire abandonment of the slave trade, the closing of the Zanzibar and Kilwa slave markets, the punishment of any of the subjects of Zanzibar in any way engaged in the slave trade, permission to the British Government to station Vice Consuls at Kilwa, Dar Selam, and Lamoo; and on the part of the British Government an agreement to settle, under full and stringent measures for their protection, a certain number of negroes released from slavery by Her Majesty's cruisers.

The Committee concur in the opinion expressed by the witnesses as to the necessity of an increase in the consular establishment; and inasmuch as the staff of that establishment would be largely employed in the suppression of the slave trade, they think that the expense should be equally shared by the Indian and Imperial Government.

The Committee are of opinion that there should be for a time an increase, as recommended in the Report of the Committee on the Slave Trade, addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, as well as by the evidence of the naval officers, in the strength of the naval squadron; and that it should be well supplied with steam launches to perform the inshore duties, which necessarily must be conducted in boats.

The Committee feel that the disposal of the squadron must be left to the discretion of the commanding officers, and they would recommend that advantage should be taken of their experience as to the class of vessels to be employed; and that they should be provided, as far as possible, with all recorded information on the subject.

The Committee also recommend that some effort be made to provide the squadron with efficient and trustworthy interpreters.

It has been stated in evidence, that some time must elapse after the measures above referred to have been put in force before the slave trade could be stopped; and assuming that an efficient squadron is maintained, the Committee see that the disposal of the liberated slaves becomes a matter of large importance. They have recommended the liberation at Zanzibar of adult slaves on the assumption that the Sultan would enter into a new treaty; should he, however, oppose the formation of a depôt there, it will be necessary to seek some other locality for that purpose, and no other place combines the advantages possessed by the Seychelles Islands.

It was given in evidence that the Church Missionary Society are willing to enter into an arrangement for the superintendence and education of the children at the Seychelles, similar to that entered into with the Government with respect to liberated children at Sierra Leone, the Mauritius, and at Nassuck in Bombay.

In urging the necessity of retaining in this service trained and experienced men, the Committee consider that this principle most strongly applies to the Political Agency at Zanzibar. So complicated are our political relations at present with the Sultan, and so difficult will be the task of dealing with him, that they do not hesitate to advise that the services should be retained of the present acting Political Agent, bearing in mind his long and tried experience of Africa, its climate, its slave-trade difficulties, his knowledge of the Sultan, and his activity

vity in conducting the greater part of the work of the department for some years, they would recommend that no technical rules of the service be allowed to interfere with his appointment as Political Agent at Zanzibar.

In view of the considerable commercial interests which Germany, France, America, and Portugal possess in commerce with Zanzibar and the surroundings, your Committee suggest that Her Majesty's Government invite the co-operation of these several Governments in the suppression of a traffic so subversive of these interests. There is reason to believe that such an overture would be responded to, especially by the Government at Berlin in virtue of the preponderance of German trade at the port of Zanzibar.

It would be also desirable to enter into negotiations with the Government of Persia, to secure, if possible, for Her Majesty's officers greater facilities of search in vessels suspected of carrying slaves.

4 August 1871.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

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*Friday, 7th July 1871.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Russell Gurney.  
Mr. Gilpin.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.

Mr. O'Conor.  
Sir Frederick Williams.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.

Mr. *Russell Gurney* was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.]

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*Monday, 10th July 1871.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Gilpin.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Kennaway.

Sir Frederick Williams.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Sir Robert Anstruther.

In the absence of Mr. *Russell Gurney*, Mr. *Gilpin* was called to the Chair.

The Honourable *Crespigny Vivian* was examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at One o'clock.]

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*Thursday, 13th July 1871.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Gilpin.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.

Sir Frederick Williams.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.

In the absence of Mr. *Russell Gurney*, Mr. *Gilpin* was called to the Chair.

The Honourable *Crespigny Vivian* was further examined.

Sir *John William Kaye* and Mr. *Henry Adrian Churchill*, C.B., were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.]

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Monday, 17th July 1871.

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Gilpin.  
Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Lord F. Cavendish.

Sir Frederick Williams.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. John Talbot  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.

In the absence of Mr. *Russell Gurney*, Mr. *Gilpin* was called to the Chair.  
Mr. *Henry Adrian Churchill*, C.B., was further examined.  
Sir *Bartle Frere*, K.C.B., was examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at One o'clock.]

Thursday, 20th July 1871.

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. RUSSELL GURNEY in the Chair.

Mr. Gilpin.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Lord F. Cavendish.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir Robert Anstruther.

Major General *Christopher Palmer Rigby* and Sir *Leopold G. Heath*, K.C.B., were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.]

Monday, 24th April 1871.

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. RUSSELL GURNEY in the Chair.

Mr. Gilpin.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Mr. Percy Wyndham.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.

Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.

Sir *Leopold Heath*, K.C.B., was further examined.

Mr. *H. C. Rothery*, Sir *William Coghlan*, and the Rev. *Horace Waller*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.]

*Tuesday, 25th July 1871.*

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## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. RUSSELL GURNEY in the Chair.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Lord F. Cavendish.

Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. Gilpin.

The Rev. *Edward Steere*, LL.D., and Rear Admiral *Charles F. Hillyar*, C.B., were severally examined.

Major General *Christopher Palmer Rigby* further examined.

Captain *Philip Columb*, R.N., Mr. *Charles Allington*, and Mr. *Edward Hutchinson*, were severally examined.

The Rev. *Horace Waller* was further examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

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*Monday, 31st July 1871.*

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## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. RUSSELL GURNEY in the Chair.

Mr. Gilpin.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Percy Wyndham.

Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Mr. R. Fowler.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Two o'clock.]

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*Thursday, 3rd August 1871.*

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## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. RUSSELL GURNEY in the Chair.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Viscount Enfield.

Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. Gilpin.  
Mr. R. Fowler.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the Chairman, read a first time, as follows:

"1. That the slave trade in negroes, on the East Coast of Africa, is now almost entirely confined to a trade between the dominions of Zanzibar on the one hand, and the coast of Arabia and Persia and the Island of Madagascar on the other hand, the principal and by far the largest portion of the traffic being in the former direction. The dominions of Zanzibar extend along the Eastern Coast of Africa for about 350 miles, and lie between the Equator and 10 degrees south latitude, and include the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Momfia, the head quarter of government being the island of Zanzibar, which lies opposite the centre of the coast line, and about 25 miles from the mainland.

" 2. The negro slave in general passes through three stages ere he reaches his final destination.

" 3. These are, (1) the land journey from his home to the coast, (2) a short sea voyage to the Island of Zanzibar, where is the open slave market, and (3) the final sea passage from Zanzibar to Arabia, Persia, or Madagascar.

" 4. From the evidence laid before the Committee it appears that the large majority of the slaves are now brought from the western side of the Lake Nyassa (a distance of nearly 500 miles from the coast) to Kilwa, which is the principal port of shipment for Zanzibar, and is near the southern limit of the Zanzibar dominions.

" 5. Your Committee had before them extracts from Despatches of Dr. Livingstone, addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, when Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and his testimony as to the methods resorted to by the slave hunters, and the cruelties and horrors of the trade is fully supported by the evidence of witness who had travelled in the interior. This evidence is well summed up in the Report of the Committee on the East African Slave Trade addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, a quotation from which is as follows:—

" "The persons by whom this traffic is carried on are for the most part Arabs, subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar. These slave dealers start for the interior, well armed, and provided with articles for the barter of slaves, such as beads and cotton cloth. On arriving at the scene of their operations they incite and sometimes help the natives of one tribe to make war upon another. Their assistance almost invariably secures victory to the side which they support, and the captives become their property, either by right or by purchase, the price in the latter case being only a few yards of cotton cloth. In the course of these operations, thousands are killed, or die subsequently of their wounds or of starvation, villages are burnt, and the women and children carried away as slaves. The complete depopulation of the country between the coast and the present field of slave dealers' operations attest the fearful character of these raids.

" "Having by these and other means obtained a sufficient number of slaves to allow for the heavy losses on the road, the slave dealers start with them for the coast. The horrors attending this long journey have been fully described by Dr. Livingstone and others. The slaves are marched in gangs, the males with their necks yoked in heavy forked sticks, which at night are fastened to the ground, or lashed together so as to make escape impossible. The women and children are bound with thongs. Any attempt at escape or to untie their bonds, or any wavering or lagging on the journey, has but one punishment—immediate death. The sick are left behind, and the route of a slave caravan can be tracked by the dying and the dead. The Arabs only value these poor creatures at the price which they fetch in the market, and if they are not likely to pay the cost of their conveyance they are got rid of. The result is, that a large number of the slaves die or are murdered on their journey, and the survivors arrive at their destination in a state of the greatest misery and emaciation."

" 6. From Kilwa the main body of the slaves are shipped to Zanzibar, but some are carried direct to the northern ports.

" 7. At Zanzibar the slaves are sold either in open market or direct to the dealer, and they are then shipped in Arab dhows for Arabia and Persia; the numbers of each cargo vary from one or two slaves to between three and four hundred.

" 8. The whole slave trade by sea, whether for the supply of the Sultan's African dominions or the markets in Arabia and Persia, is carried on by Arabs from Muscat and other ports on the Arabian coast. They are not subjects of Zanzibar, but chiefly belong to tribes of roving and predatory habits, who come down to Zanzibar during the first four months of the year, carrying merchandise; they then make their purchases either at Kilwa or Zanzibar, and start on their return journey north in August and September.

" 9. The sea passage exposes the slave to much suffering; and, in addition to the danger from overcrowding and insufficient food, the loss of life connected with the attempt to escape Her Majesty's cruisers is very considerable, it being the practice to use any means to get rid of the slaves in order to escape condemnation, should the dhow be captured. Between Kilwa and Zanzibar a dhow lately lost a third of the slaves; there were 90 thrown overboard, dead or dying, many of them horribly emaciated and in a terrible state.

" 10. The ready market found for the slave in Arabia and Persia, and the large profit upon the sale, are quite sufficient inducements for the continuance of the traffic.

" 11. It seems impossible to arrive at an exact conclusion as to the actual number of slaves who leave the African coast in one year, but from the Returns laid before the Committee an estimate may be formed. At the port of Kilwa is the Custom-house of the Sultan of Zanzibar, through which pass all slaves that are not smuggled, and there a tax is levied on all that pass the Custom-house.

" 12. The following is a Return of the number of slaves exported through the Custom-house

house at Kilwa between 1862 and 1867, distinguishing those sent to Zanzibar from those shipped to other places:—

Year.	Zanzibar.	Elsewhere.
1862-63	13,000	5,500
1863-64	14,000	3,500
1864-65	13,821	3,000
1865-66	18,344	4,000
1866-67	17,538	4,500
	76,703	20,500
	20,500	
Total Exports from Kilwa in Five years	97,203	

“ 13. From a despatch of Dr. Kirk, dated 1st February 1870, it appears that 14,944 were exported from Kilwa in the year ending 23rd August 1869. But besides those passed through the Custom-house at Kilwa, numbers are exported from other places on the coast.

“ 14. Such is the extent to which the exportation of slaves takes place from the Zanzibar territory on the East Coast of Africa. It has also been shown that there the slave trade still exists from the Portuguese territory to the Island of Madagascar, and that slaves are still imported into Turkish ports in the Red Sea, General Rigby having recently seen fresh importations even in the civilised port of Suez. It must not, however, be thought that those who are taken captive, great as the numbers are, represent in any degree the total number of the sufferers from this iniquitous traffic. Such is the fearful loss of life resulting from this traffic, such the miseries which attend it, that, according to Dr. Livingstone and others, not one in five, in some cases not one in ten, of the victims of the slave hunters ever reach the coast alive.

“ 15. Measures have at various times been adopted by the Government of this country to control and check the trade, but hitherto with but partial success; these measures have been two-fold.

“ To control the trade, treaties have been made with the Sultan of Muscat, with the friendly Arab chiefs on the Arabian coast, and with the Shah of Persia. The treaties with the Sultan of Muscat are acknowledged to be binding upon the Sultan of Zanzibar, who has issued orders accordingly, and they prohibit the export of slaves from Africa, as well as their import from Africa into Asia, Arabia, the Red Sea, or Persian Gulf, but permit the transport of slaves to and fro between Kilwa, Zanzibar, and any coast port up to Lamoo, which is the northern limit of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions.

“ 16. The result of the treaties, as far as the Sultan of Zanzibar is concerned, is, that not only are the slave traders enabled to rendezvous in great numbers at Zanzibar, but the slaver, laden with slaves, starting from Zanzibar, and provided with proper clearances for Lamoo, is enabled to make the first half of the journey north unmolested by British cruisers.

“ 17. The object of the British Government in assenting to these treaty provisions was to avoid interference with the status of domestic slavery in the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, as appears by a Despatch from the Right Honourable Earl Russell, dated 14th March 1864, in which it is stated that Her Majesty's Government do not claim the right to interfere in the status of domestic slavery in Zanzibar, nor with the *bonâ fide* transport of slaves from one part of the Sultan's territory to another.

“ 18. It appears from the evidence that the admission of the Sultan of Zanzibar's right to transport slaves between his island and coast dominions has afforded a cover for the foreign slave trade, as the traders procure at Zanzibar or Kilwa the requisite port clearances and passes for Lamoo, and thence run northwards, taking their chance of escaping the British cruisers.

“ 19. There are no means of ascertaining the exact numbers intended for the foreign market, but different witnesses have estimated the numbers annually needed to maintain the supply of slave labour in the dominion of Zanzibar, at from 1,700 to 3,000, which would leave at least 17,000 as the number destined for the foreign slave market. The treaty stipulations and agreements with the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar have been carried into effect by various Acts of Parliament and Orders in Council, which contain provision for the establishment of courts of adjudication for the trial of vessels captured as slavers at Zanzibar.

“ 20. The carrying out of these measures has been committed to the Political Agent of the Governor General of India, who also holds the appointment of British Consul at Zanzibar, and, in addition to the ordinary duties of a Political Agent and Consul, is Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court. The expenses of this establishment are borne by the Indian Government.



“21. The Government have proposed to enter into a new treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar to the following effect:—

“1. To limit the shipment of slaves from the mainland to one point only on the African coast, namely, Dar Selam, and to prohibit entirely their export from any other places.

“2. To make Zanzibar the only port for the reception of slaves shipped from Dar Selam, but with liberty to transport from thence to Pemba and Mombaza only; imports of slaves to any other place, or which have not come through Zanzibar, should be declared illegal, and liable to seizure.

“3. That the number of slaves exported from Dar Selam to Zanzibar, and thence to Pemba and Mombaza, shall be strictly limited to the actual requirements of the inhabitants of those places, to be annually settled by mutual consent between the Sultan and the British agent, such number to be gradually decreased so as to cease altogether within a certain time.

“4. That every vessel engaged in the transport of slaves shall be liable to capture, unless she is provided with a proper pass from the Sultan, which shall be valid only for one voyage, and with distinctive marks on her hull and sails; a heavy penalty being attached to any piracy of these passes or marks.

“5. That the public slave markets at Zanzibar shall be closed.

“6. That the Sultan shall engage from the date of the treaty to punish severely any of his subjects who may be proved to be concerned, directly or indirectly, in the slave trade, and especially any attempt to molest or interfere with a liberated slave.

“7. That the Kutchees, and other natives of Indian states under British protection, shall be forbidden, after a date to be fixed by the Government of India, to possess slaves, and that in the meantime they shall be prevented from acquiring any fresh slaves.

“Lastly. The treaty shall contain a stipulation providing for the eventual entire prohibition of the export of slaves from the mainland.”

“The Government have sent out instructions to press this proposed treaty upon the present Sultan; but pending the inquiry of this Committee nothing more has been done.

“22. It has been stated to the Committee that for the performance of the additional duties which would devolve upon the Consul, should the proposed treaty be carried into effect, some increase in the present small staff would be required, and it was recommended by witnesses that an officer be appointed at Zanzibar to assist the Consul and Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court in all matters connected with the slave trade, with the title of Assistant Political Agent and Vice Consul at Zanzibar, and to act for him in his absence; that a Consular Officer should also be appointed at Dar Selam, under the superintendence of Her Majesty's Consul, to whom he should report upon all matters connected with the slave trade, the number of slaves exported, and whether the Sultan's engagements with Her Majesty's Government are strictly observed. This officer would be required to visit, from time to time, the various points on the coast, and to report whether any irregularities exist, or any illegal exports are carried on; and as it is probable that for some time the slave traders would attempt to continue the exportation of slaves from Kilwa, the distance of which from Zanzibar and Dar Selam would prevent the British authorities at those places from watching and checking such practices, it might be necessary, at first, to station a Consular Officer at that port also.

“23. It was also stated to the Committee that this proposal was concurred in by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for India in Council, who recommended that, as the duties of the agency and consulate at Zanzibar were of a twofold character—one part concerning the Indian, and the other the Imperial Government—that the cost of maintenance should be equally divided between the Imperial and Indian Governments.

“24. This proposal was negatived by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, and it was stated in evidence that, in consequence of this refusal and of the representation of the Indian Government, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council had informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Foreign Office would no longer be privileged to send any instructions to the Zanzibar agent; and the whole matter, therefore, was brought to a dead-lock, and the traffic in slaves was on the 31st of May 1871, as reported by the Admiral commanding in chief on the station to be, “without doubt, as busy and profitable as ever.”

“25. The principal means used to check the trade have been the employment of some vessels of Her Majesty's Navy upon the East Indian station as cruisers to watch the East African coast during the slaving season, which, depending upon the monsoon, is from April to the end of June, and from September to the beginning of November. It was stated in evidence that during the years 1867, 1868, 1869, there were captured by the squadron 116 dhows, containing 2,645 slaves; while, according to the returns of  
slaves

slaves exported from Zanzibar and Kilwa during those years, dhows carrying 37,000 slaves must have evaded capture, making the captures about 6·6 per cent. only.

“ 26. These figures are sufficient to show the insufficiency of the present squadron to check, much less to stop, the trade; and the reasons assigned are that the existing treaties and the instructions as to domestic slaves render it impossible to take a dhow south of Lamoo, and during the south-west monsoon it is very difficult to keep the cruisers sufficiently near the coast to intercept the dhows as they run northward before the wind, while there appears a general concurrence of testimony that the present number of the squadron is insufficient for the work to be performed, and that the efficiency of the squadron would be materially increased by an additional supply of steam launches for the arduous boat service on that coast.

“ 27. In connection with the failure of the measures hitherto adopted it was given in evidence that much was owing to the want of recorded information, and the necessarily frequent change of commanders, who, moreover, are not supplied with the official reports of those who have preceded them, as well as to the inefficiency and untrustworthiness of the interpreters employed, who not unfrequently are in league with the traders, and mislead the commanders of the squadron.

“ 28. Your Committee having heard the evidence, are strongly of opinion that all legitimate means should be used to put an end altogether to the East African slave trade.

“ 29. They believe that any attempt to supply slaves for domestic use in Zanzibar will always be a pretext and cloak for a foreign trade, while the loss of life and the injury caused to maintain even the limited supply of slaves required for this purpose must, of necessity, be so great as to forbid this country continuing to recognise any such traffic in slaves.

“ 30. It has been stated by some of the witnesses, that should the Sultan consent to relinquish the slave trade a revolution would follow, and that a sudden stoppage of the importation of slaves into Zanzibar would seriously affect the industrial position of the island; but, on the other hand, a witness of great experience has given it in evidence, that the Zanzibar Arabs are fully aware that the trade will be stopped, and are beginning to understand that more profit can be made by retaining the labourers to cultivate their own country, than by selling them away as slaves, while the abolition of the trade would encourage free labourers from all parts to reside at Zanzibar, so ensuring a larger and better supply of labourers than exists at present.

“ 31. It appears from the evidence, that the parties from whom turbulent opposition may be expected are the northern Arabs, the presence of an English force at Zanzibar would afford sufficient protection.

“ 32. Your Committee therefore recommend that it be notified to the Sultan of Zanzibar, that the existing treaty provisions have been systematically evaded, and have been found not only insufficient to protect the negro tribes in the interior of Africa from destruction, but rather to foster and encourage the foreign trade in slaves, Her Majesty's Government can no longer recognise those provisions as binding upon this country, but will take such legitimate measures to abolish the slave trade as may be deemed necessary.

“ 33. Further, that should the Sultan be willing to enter into a new treaty, having for its object the entire abolition of the slave trade, Her Majesty's Government would agree to settle at Zanzibar a proportion of adult negroes, who might thereafter be captured by Her Majesty's cruisers, provided the Sultan agreed to such measures for their protection and freedom as might be deemed necessary.

“ 34. It has been represented to the Committee by some of the witnesses, that as the Sultan derives a considerable part of his revenues from the slave trade, it would be necessary to make him some compensation for the loss he would sustain by the abolition of the trade.

“ 35. It appears from the evidence, that the Sultan of Zanzibar levies a tax of two dollars upon all slaves shipped from Kilwa for Zanzibar, and four dollars upon those shipped for Lamoo, and a further tax of two dollars upon all slaves shipped from Zanzibar. The witnesses have estimated the proceeds of this tax at various amounts, some putting it as high as 15,000 *l.* or 20,000 *l.*; others as low as 5,000 *l.*; but whatever the amount may be, the prospect of compensation has been suggested in the negotiations for a new treaty with the Sultan, already alluded to in this Report.

“ 36. It has been suggested that, as an equivalent for the supposed loss to his revenue, the Sultan should be released from the payment of an annual subsidy of 40,000 crowns to the Sultan of Muscat, which was arranged upon the partition of the dominion of the Imaum of Muscat, between his two sons, by the Indian Government as arbitrators; but it now appears that the circumstances under which it was supposed this release might be effected have altered.

“ 37. It has been given in evidence that from 1,700 to about 3,000 slaves is probably sufficient to supply the requirements of the island and dominions of Zanzibar, and this, therefore,

therefore, is the extent of the legalised trade, and the value to the Sultan of Zanzibar at the present rate of tax would not exceed 3,000 *l.* annually; any compensation, therefore, could only be based upon this small amount.

“ 38. Your Committee, however, do not believe that the Sultan of Zanzibar would be ultimately a loser by the abolition of the trade; on the contrary, it was given in evidence that already the revenues of the Sultan, derived from the rapidly increasing trade of Zanzibar, and from his private estates in India, are ample to maintain the Government of his State, independently of the sum received from the slave trade; while the witnesses generally concur in stating that were the slave trade abolished, and a more ready means of communication afforded between Bombay, Aden, and Zanzibar, the already flourishing trade of that State would be rapidly developed. Material assistance to this development might be afforded by a line of mail steamers to Zanzibar. Should the Sultan be willing to enter into a new treaty, the Committee recommend that it contain provisions for the entire abandonment of the slave trade, the closing of the Zanzibar and Kilwa slave markets, the punishment of any of the subjects of Zanzibar in any way engaged in the slave trade, permission to the British Government to station Vice Consuls at Kilwa, Dar Selam, and Lamoo; and on the part of the British Government an agreement to settle, under full and stringent measures for their protection, a certain number of negroes released from slavery by Her Majesty's cruisers.

“ 39. Your Committee recommend, that as an inducement to the Sultan to agree to such a treaty, this country should express its readiness to take upon itself, in combination with India, the payment of the subsidy to the Sultan of Muscat. The continuance of this payment to the Sultan of Muscat should be made to depend upon the due fulfilment, by that ruler, of the obligations of his treaty for the suppression of the slave trade. The payment of this sum would entail a charge upon this country, small in comparison with that of the squadron now maintained, and, your Committee believes, would lead to the early extinction of the slave trade.

“ 40. The Committee concur in the opinion expressed by the witnesses as to the necessity of an increase in the consular establishment; and inasmuch as the staff of that establishment would be largely employed in the suppression of the slave trade, they think that the expense should be equally shared by the Indian and Imperial Government.

“ 41. The Committee are of opinion that there should be for a time an increase, as recommended by the Foreign Office Committee, as well as by the evidence of the naval officers, in the strength of the naval squadron; and that it should be well supplied with steam launches to perform the inshore duties, which necessarily must be conducted in boats.

“ 42. The Committee feel that the disposal of the squadron must be left to the discretion of the commanding officers, and they would recommend that advantage should be taken of their experience as to the class of vessels to be employed; and that they should be provided, as far as possible, with all recorded information on the subject.

“ 43. The Committee also recommend that some effort be made to provide the squadron with efficient and trustworthy interpreters.

“ 44. It has been stated in evidence, that some time must elapse after the measures above referred to have been put in force before the slave trade could be stopped; and assuming that an efficient squadron is maintained, the Committee see that the disposal of the liberated slaves becomes a matter of large importance. They have recommended the liberation at Zanzibar of adult slaves on the assumption that the Sultan would enter into a new treaty. Should he, however, oppose the formation of a depôt there, it will be necessary to seek some other locality for that purpose, and no other place combines the advantages possessed by the Seychelles Islands, which are stated to afford abundant scope for a settlement, the climate and the food being well suited to the Negro races.

“ 45. It was given in evidence that the Church Missionary Society are willing to undertake the superintendence and education of the children at the Seychelles, as has been done at Sierra Leone, the Mauritius, and at Nassuck, in Bombay. Should the Sultan, however, oppose the formation of a depôt at Zanzibar, it would become necessary to seek some other locality for that purpose, and no other place combines the advantages possessed by the Seychelles Islands.

“ 46. In urging the necessity of retaining in this service trained and experienced men, the Committee consider that this principle most strongly applies to the Political Agency at Zanzibar. So complicated are our political relations at present with the Sultan, and so difficult will be the task of dealing with him, that they do not hesitate to advise that the services should be retained of the present acting Political Agency, bearing in mind his long and tried experience of Africa, its climate, its slave-trade difficulties, his knowledge of the Sultan, and his activity in conducting the greater part of the work of the department for some years, they would recommend that no technical rules of the service be allowed to interfere with his appointment as Political Agent at Zanzibar.

“ 47. In view of the considerable commercial interests which Germany, France, America, and Portugal possess in commerce with Zanzibar and the surroundings, your  
Committee

Committee suggest that Her Majesty's Government invite the co-operation of these several Governments in the suppression of a traffic so subversive of these interests. There is reason to believe that such an overture would be responded to, especially by the Government at Berlin, in virtue of the preponderance of German trade at the port of Zanzibar."

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the Chairman, read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1.—An Amendment made.—Another Amendment proposed at the end of the paragraph, as amended, to add the words: "It was reported in 1867, by General Rigby, to be the chief market of the world for the supply of ivory, gum, and copal, and to have a rapidly increasing trade in hides, oils, seeds, and dyes, while sugar and cotton promise to figure largely amongst its future exports. The country in the interior of that part of Africa, and of which Zanzibar is the outlet, is said, according to the recent accounts of Livingstone and others, to be equal in resources to any part of India, and to be, as a rule, more healthy. Iron abounds in all directions, coal is to be found, and cotton can be grown to any extent"—(Mr. Kennaway).—Question put, That those words be added to the paragraph.—The Committee divided:

Q. 596.

Q. 970.

Ayes, 4.

Mr. Kinnaid.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. Kennaway.

Noes, 3.

Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Paragraph, as amended, *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 2—7, *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 8 and 9, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 10—14, *agreed to*.

Amendment proposed, after paragraph 14, to insert the following new paragraph:—"The slaves when liberated from the dhows have been sent of late years to Aden and Bombay, being maintained there at a heavy cost to the Imperial Exchequer. In time past some have been landed at the Seychelles, a dependency of the Mauritius. The climate in these islands is said to suit them exactly, and the inhabitants to be anxious for emancipated slave labour. Every variety of tropical product grows there in the greatest abundance"—(Mr. Kennaway).—Question, That this paragraph be inserted in the proposed Report,—put, and *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 15—20, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 21—23, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 24.—Amendment proposed, in line 6, to leave out from the word "deadlock" to the end of the paragraph—(Mr. Shaw Lefevre).—Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.

Mr. Kinnaid.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Noes, 4.

Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the *Noes*.

Paragraph 24, as amended, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 25, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 26, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 27, *agreed to*.

Amendment proposed, after paragraph 27, to insert the following new paragraph:—"Evidence given before your Committee shows the very great inconvenience and loss resulting to British residents, and a frequent diversion of trade into foreign bottoms from the want of any regular postal communication with Zanzibar; the mails lying sometimes at Seychelles for months together waiting for a chance vessel. It has been stated to them that a very small subsidy would suffice to start monthly steam communication, either with the Seychelles, distant about 800 miles, in correspondence with French steamers running from Aden, or from the latter port direct"—(Mr. Kennaway).—Question put, That this paragraph be inserted in the proposed Report,—put, and *agreed to*.

Q. 596, 604.

Paragraph 28, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 29.—Amendment proposed, in line 2, to leave out from the words "Foreign Trade"

Trade" to the end of the paragraph—(Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*).—Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided :

Ayes 5.

Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Noes, 3.

Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Paragraph *agreed to*.

Paragraph 30, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 31, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 32.—Amendment proposed, in line 1, after the word "therefore," to insert the words:—"In view of the impotent efforts hitherto made to stop these horrible abominations, and of the duty which they believe to be incumbent on this country to attempt to put a stop to this terrible waste of human life, and regarding the benefit to be derived from the increase of trade confidently looked for on the cessation of the traffic in slaves, recommend"—(Mr. *Kennaway*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted."—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 4.

Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Noes, 4.

Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the *Noes*.

An Amendment made.—Paragraph, as amended, *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 33—36, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 37, amended and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 38, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 39.—Amendment proposed, to omit paragraph 39—(Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*).—Question put, That the words "Your Committee recommend" stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 3.

Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Kennaway.

Noes, 5.

Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Remainder of the paragraph *disagreed to*.

Paragraph 40, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 41.—An Amendment made.—Another Amendment proposed, in lines 2 and 3, to leave out the words "As well as by the evidence of the naval officers"—(Lord *F. Cavendish*).—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph."—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 6.

Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. R. Fowler.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Noes, 3.

Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Another Amendment proposed, in line 3, after the word "Squadron," to insert the following words: "The vessels forming the Flying Squadron are manned in a great measure by the reduction of force on the West Coast of Africa, consequent on the extinction of the slave trade there, and if the sum expended on maintaining this force were devoted for a short time to manning a proper class of vessels for service on the East Coast of Africa, the Committee believe it would be attended by the most fortunate results

results in extinguishing the slave trade, without any addition to the Navy Estimates"—(Sir John Hay).—Question put, That those words be there inserted.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 3.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.

Noes, 6.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Question, That the paragraph, as amended, stand part of the Report.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. R. Fowler.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Noes, 3.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Paragraph 42.—Amendment proposed in line 3, after the word "employed," to insert the words: "but they cannot help observing that the opinions of Admiral Hillyar and Sir Leopold Heath, the two officers who have commanded in these seas since 1867, have given evidence that an additional force must be maintained on this service; and it is further in evidence that at least three vessels are required to watch the Portuguese territory on the shores of the Mozambique"—(Sir John Hay).—Question put, That those words be there inserted.—The Committee divided: Q. 695, 696. 1155-1157. 1310.

Ayes, 4.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. R. Fowler.

Noes, 5.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Another Amendment proposed, in line 3, to leave out the word "and," in order to insert the words: "The Committee recognising how desirable it is that men and officers engaged on this monotonous and harassing service should not be detained for too long a period, recommend that more care should be taken in communicating to all naval commanding officers every information which may assist them in performing their duty, by providing them not only with accurate records of the proceedings of their naval predecessors, but with Parliamentary, Foreign Office, and India Office documents bearing on the question, which will assist them in forming a correct judgment as to the best mode of parrying the devices of the slave traders"—(Sir John Hay).—instead thereof.—Question put, That the word "and" stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Noes, 4.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. R. Fowler.

Paragraph *agreed to*.

Paragraph 43, *agreed to*.

Paragraphs 44—45, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 46, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 47.—Question put, That this paragraph stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Sir John Hay.  
Lord F. Cavendish.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. R. Fowler.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Noes, 2.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.

Amendment proposed, after paragraph 47, to add the following new paragraph:

“It would be also desirable to enter into negotiations with the Government of Persia, to secure, if possible, for Her Majesty’s officers greater facilities of search in vessels suspected of carrying slaves”—(Mr. *Kennaway*).—Question, That this paragraph be added to the proposed Report,—put, and *agreed to*.

Question, That this Report, as amended, be the Report of the Committee to the House,—put, and *agreed to*.

*Ordered*, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence, and an Appendix.

### EXPENSE OF WITNESS.

NAME or WITNESS.	Profession or Condition.	From whence Summoned.	Number of Days absent from Home, under Orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Allowance during Absence from Home.	TOTAL Expenses allowed to Witness.
				£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Sir Leopold Heath - -	K.C.B., R.N. . -	Southsea (twice) -	- -	3 2 -	- -	3 2 -

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

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# MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

*Monday, 10th July 1871.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Lord Frederick Cavendish.  
Vicount Enfield.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. O'Conor.  
Sir Frederick Williams.

CHARLES GILPIN, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Honourable CRESPIGNY VIVIAN, called in; and Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you have been for a considerable time connected with the Foreign Office?—For 19 years.

2. Are you connected with that department of the Foreign Office which takes cognisance of matters in connection with the slave trade?—Yes, I am senior clerk in charge of the slave trade department.

3. You have seen the terms of reference to this Committee?—I have.

4. What is the state of affairs at Zanzibar and on the East Coast of Africa, with respect to the traffic in slaves at the present time as far as you know?—Slavery in the first place is legal in Zanzibar. The sovereign of Zanzibar is an Arab, and his subjects are Arabs, and as such they consider there is no harm in slavery at all. By various treaties however, the export of slaves from Zanzibar to foreign countries, and also from Zanzibar to the dominions of the Imaum of Muscat in Arabia, is prohibited, but slaves are still allowed to be transported from the coast to the islands within certain limits, for domestic purposes; in fact, they do not consider that as slave trade.

5. What are the existing laws of Zanzibar with respect to slavery and the transport of slaves?—There are no laws except those of the Koran; it is rather custom than law. The punishments are by the sheiks, and the delinquents are punished, I believe, according to the Koran. I think Mr. Churchill will give you better information upon that than I can.

6. The government is a despotic government?—It is patriarchial, but, as you know, slavery among Mahomedans is considered a perfectly recognised institution.

7. What are the treaties between England and the present sovereign, or other sovereigns of

Zanzibar affecting the slave trade?—There have been several treaties; the first was in 1820 with the friendly Arab tribes on the Persian Gulf. By that treaty "it is provided that the carrying off of slaves, men, women, and children, from the coasts of Africa, or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature." That was the first treaty. There was then a treaty with the Imaum of Muscat (Muscat and Zanzibar being then under one sovereign) in 1822, and a further one in 1839, but it is hardly worth while referring to them, because they were both merged in a much stronger treaty in October 1845, which is the treaty to which we now appeal. That was signed by Captain Hamerton, who was our agent at Muscat, and Syud Saeed, who was Sultan of Muscat and Zanzibar. By that treaty the Sultan engaged to prohibit for himself, his heirs, and successors under the severest penalties, the export of slaves from his African dominions, and for the first time renounced for ever the right of importing slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, into Arabia, the Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, and engaged to use his influence with the chiefs there to prevent the introduction of slaves into their respective territories. Up to that time, he had always maintained the right to carry on the traffic between his dominions in Arabia and his dominions in Africa, but for the first time in this treaty he renounced that right. He gave permission to his Majesty's cruisers, as well as to those of the East India Company, to seize and confiscate his vessels carrying on the slave trade wherever found, excepting those engaged in transporting slaves from one port to another of his African dominions, between the limits of Lamoo to the north and Kilwa to the

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the south, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Momfia, so that he thus restricted the traffic entirely to his African possessions, and did not allow it to go on any further between Africa and Asia. This treaty was carried into execution by the Act 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78, which contained regulations for the trial of vessels and the bounties to be paid. The treaty was then communicated to the Arab chiefs in the Persian Gulf, and they severally engaged in April and May 1847, to prohibit the export of slaves from the coast of Africa and elsewhere on board their vessels, and those of their subjects or dependents, and permitted the cruisers of the British Government to detain and search their vessels, and to seize and confiscate any found violating this engagement by the exportation of slaves from the coast of Africa and elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever. This treaty also was carried into effect by the Act 12 & 13 Vict. c. 84. The traffic in slaves was thus entirely prohibited between Africa and Asia, and localised to the African coast within the limits of Kilway and Lamoo, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Momfia. On the 6th of May 1850, a declaration was signed by the Imaum of Muscat, granting permission to Her Majesty's ships of war to enter his creeks, rivers, and harbours, and territorial waters, to seize vessels engaged in the slave trade, and to destroy slave barracoons. This permission was, I believe, confirmed by a letter of the late Sultan, Seyud Majid (the man who has just died). In October 1863 Synd Majid (the late Sultan) issued orders forbidding the export of slaves from the port of Kilwa; and on the 1st of January 1864 he issued two notifications, one entirely prohibiting any transport of slaves during the season of exportation, viz., from 1st January to 1st May, and the second, prohibiting householders from renting houses to the northern Arabs, who visit Zanzibar for the purpose of kidnapping slaves. Those are all the treaties we have with the Imaum of Muscat.

8. What are the treaties we have with Persia, with respect to the slave trade?—A firman was issued by the late Shah (and confirmed by the present Shah) to his governors in June 1848, containing positive and strict injunctions to all the slave dealers trading by sea, that the importation and exportation of negroes by sea into the Persian Dominions is entirely forbidden, but not by land. "Not a single individual" (says the firman) "will be permitted to bring negroes by sea without being subjected to severe punishment." By the Convention of 1851 the Persian Government agreed that the ships of war of the British Government and of the East India Company shall, in order to prevent the chance of negro slaves being imported by sea, be permitted to search Persian merchant vessels, but not government vessels, provided a Persian officer is on board the British cruiser. If slaves are found they may be taken possession of by the British authorities, without causing further damage or undue detention to the captain or crew of the vessel, which must be delivered up to the authorities of the Persian Government, who undertake to punish and fine the owner in a suitable manner. The treaty was to run for 11 years, and it was renewed in 1857.

9. Was it renewed for any definite time in 1857?—For 10 years more; the treaty did not expire till 1862, then it was to expire in 1872, and then only by notice on one side or the other,

and no notice has passed. We consulted our minister in Persia whether it was likely that we should gain any good end by denouncing the treaty and proposing a new one; whether we could get rid of the stipulation that a Persian officer is to be on board our vessels, which has been found to be rather an inconvenient stipulation, but he advised us not to endeavour to procure a modification of the treaty, as we might probably lose it altogether.

10. Has the Sultan of Zanzibar fairly and faithfully carried out those treaties?—I believe that the Sultan of Zanzibar has to the best of his ability carried out the treaties, but I do not believe that the Imaum of Muscat has, or that the Arab chiefs in the Persian Gulf have. You will find from the information you will get, that all the damage is done by the Arabs coming down from the north; they come down with the north-east monsoon to Zanzibar, and whilst they are there, they are a terror to everybody there; no black man can show his head outside his house, and it is they who do all the damage. They are, for the most part, subjects of the Imaum of Muscat and of the chiefs of the Arab tribes in the Persian Gulf.

11. Muscat and Zanzibar, which formerly constituted one sovereignty, is now divided; when did the division take place?—The kingdom was divided in 1856; Seyed Saeed left Zanzibar to one son, named Seyed Mejid, and he left Muscat to his other son, named Thowaynee, who did not at all assent to the arrangement, and a quarrel was imminent, but in 1861 they referred it to the arbitration of the Government of India, and Lord Canning decided, by awarding Muscat to Thowaynee, and Zanzibar to Seyed Mejid, and Seyed Mejid was to pay the Sultan of Muscat 40,000 crowns (or about 8,500 *l.* a year) as a subsidy.

12. Lord F. Cavendish.] In perpetuity?—I believe so; but Sir John Kaye will give better information upon that than I can; there has been a question about the terms of the arrangement, but I fancy it is in perpetuity.

13. Chairman.] Is there any considerable number of British subjects in Zanzibar?—I think there are 22 English subjects, but there are a great many British Indian subjects; I think there are altogether 3,710 British Indians and British protected subjects.

14. Mr. Kinnaird.] Is there a trade springing up in Zanzibar?—I believe so.

15. Which is capable of almost infinite extension?—Yes, I understood so; I have not been there myself.

16. You understand so from your information?—Yes; I think there is a trade springing up which is capable of considerable expansion.

17. Chairman.] What is the system pursued by the slave traders on the coast to obtain slaves from the interior?—The Northern Arabs come down with the monsoon from Muscat on the Persian Gulf in January, February, and March, to Zanzibar, at which point, or on various parts of the coast, slaves have been collected in the meantime by the slave-hunters, and the slave dhows then carry off the slaves (at great risk to themselves, but one or two successful voyages make up for a good many failures), picking them up as they run along the coast. If they see one of our cruisers, they generally run on shore, turn all the slaves out, and escape as best they can.

18. You are acquainted, I presume, with the statements of Dr. Livingstone with respect to the slave traffic?—Yes; and we considered his book very much in connection with our Report.

19. Have his statements been confirmed by the information you have collected at the office?—Yes, certainly, we have found them generally very trustworthy.

20. You have stated that the limits within which the export of slaves is recognised from one port to another on the coast, are Lamoo on the north, and Kilwa on the south?—Yes, that includes a coast line of about 350 miles.

21. Have those limits been pretty much kept to, or have they been overstepped?—They are, no doubt, constantly overstepped.

22. The line on each side is, of course, only an imaginary line?—Yes.

23. What is the approximate annual export of slaves from the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar?—We estimated it in our Report at 20,000 a year, but it may be more. I was looking at Dr. Kirk's returns, in which he says, as I understand him, that between 1867 and 1868 the Sultan got 270,000 dollars for his tax upon slaves; if that is the case, that amounts to about 56,000*l.*; we only calculated it at 20,000*l.* a year on 20,000 slaves.

24. You suspect that the number would be double?—Yes, upon that calculation; but I am not quite sure whether Dr. Kirk included in that the sale of slaves as well as the tax; you can safely take it at 20,000, it certainly is not less.

25. Have you any reason to doubt the statement made by Dr. Kirk, and confirmed by Dr. Livingstone and the Rev. Mr. Waller, that four or five lives are lost for every slave delivered safe at Zanzibar?—I have no reason to doubt it, and the hardships the slaves encounter become greater every year. As the country near the coast becomes depopulated, and the slave hunters have to go further into the interior for slaves, so does the march become more horrible and deadly to the slaves.

26. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] From the last accounts, how far does it appear that the slaves are now brought?—According to the last accounts they are brought from Lake Nyassa.

27. Have you any idea what the distance would be?—No; several days' journey.

28. *Chairman.*] The plea on which the recognised slave traffic is carried on is, that there is a certain amount of labour required in Zanzibar and the adjoining islands, and that slaves are wanted for that purpose?—That is the case.

29. What is your idea of the number that would be actually required for that purpose?—Dr. Kirk estimates the requirements of Zanzibar at about 1,700 per year.

30. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] Nominally for domestic service?—Yes, there is nothing but slave labour in Zanzibar; all the menial offices connected with the household are performed by slaves; free labour can hardly be obtained.

31. There is no peculiar qualification required for that service?—No; they are employed in various works and drawing water, and in all the usual labour in a household.

32. *Chairman.*] How do you account for the difference between the 1,700 and the 20,000?—Most of the others go to the foreign slave trade.

33. I suppose, as far as female slaves are concerned, they are, to a great extent, taken to the

harems of the Imaum of Muscat and the Arabian chiefs?—I believe that most of the slaves are taken to Muscat itself and Soor, and from thence they are exported to various ports on the Persian Gulf, and to Persia itself, wherever the market is the highest; they go even up to Bussorah and Mohamrah, and from thence I have no doubt some find their way into Turkish harems.

34. In point of fact, I suppose, at Muscat there is a recognised slave market?—Yes.

35. I need hardly ask you whether the system of obtaining slaves and exporting them involves great hardships and misery?—In answer to that question, I cannot do better than read the beginning of our Report. "The slaves required, as well for the legal as for the illegal traffic, are obtained from the interior of Africa. Formerly they could be procured from the countries bordering on the coast, but constant slave raids have so depopulated those districts, that the slave dealers are now forced to go far inland for their supplies. Year by year further tracts of country are depopulated and laid waste, and at the present time it is chiefly from the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa and beyond it that slaves are obtained. The persons by whom this traffic is carried on are, for the most part, Arabs, subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar. These slave dealers start for the interior well armed, and provided with articles for the barter of slaves, such as beads and cotton cloth. On arriving at the scene of their operations, they incite and sometimes help the natives of one tribe to make war upon another. Their assistance almost invariably secures victory to the side which they support, and the captives become their property, either by right or by purchase, the price in the latter case being only a few yards of cotton cloth. In the course of these operations thousands are killed, or die subsequently of their wounds or of starvation; villages are burnt, and the women and children carried away as slaves. The complete depopulation of the country between the coast and the present field of the slave dealers' operations attest the fearful character of these raids. Having, by these and other means, obtained a sufficient number of slaves to allow for the heavy losses on the road, the slave dealers start with them for the coast. The horrors attending this long journey have been fully described by Dr. Livingstone and others. The slaves are marched in gangs, the males with their necks yoked in heavy forked sticks, which at night are fastened to the ground, or lashed together so as to make escape impossible. The women and children are bound with thongs. Any attempt at escape, or to untie their bonds, or any wavering or lagging on the journey, has but one punishment, immediate death. The sick are left behind, and the route of a slave caravan can be tracked by the dying and the dead. The Arabs only value these poor creatures at the price which they will fetch in the market, and if they are not likely to pay the cost of their conveyance, they are got rid of. The result is that a large number of the slaves die or are murdered on the journey, and the survivors arrive at their destination in a state of the greatest misery and emaciation."

36. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] You do not believe that there is the slightest exaggeration in that Report?—No; but of course evidence upon the state of things in the locality would be better given by people acquainted with the country.

37. *Chairman.*] What revenue does the Sultan of Zanzibar derive from the tax upon slaves?—We have

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have calculated it at 20,000 *l.* a year, but I make out, unless Dr. Kirk has included also the sale of slaves, that in 1867-8 he must have got about 56,000 *l.* by the tax upon slaves, that is to say, 270,000 dollars; whether that included the sale of slaves as well as the tax, I do not know.

38. According to that Report the value of a slave in the interior appears to be only a few yards of cloth?—Yes; at Zanzibar he is worth from 17 to 25 dollars.

39. What is his value on the coast of Arabia?—I believe about 60 dollars; but it must vary.

40. At what season of the year is the trade most active in Zanzibar?—From January to March is the time when the northern Arabs generally come down; then I think they go up again in March and April, and again in August and September.

41. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] Is the trade carried on generally, by the same set of people?—Yes; it is a regular trade; where they come from and who they are you will hear better from Mr. Churchill, but they are evidently old hands at the trade.

42. *Chairman.*] You told us that the slaves were principally exported to Muscat in the first instance?—Yes, and to ports in the Persian Gulf, and they go from there in small craft to the highest market.

43. Do the slave dealers come principally from the northern parts of Arabia?—Yes.

44. What measures have Her Majesty's Government taken to deal with these evils, and to suppress the slave traffic?—They obtained first of all the limitation I have already described to you; they found out when these Arabs principally came down from the north, and they obtained from the Sultan of Zanzibar his declaration that no export of slaves should take place between the prohibited periods.

45. Was not that at the cost of recognising a legal traffic in slaves during a certain time of the year?—No doubt we have always recognised the fact of slavery being a legal institution at Zanzibar. Zanzibar consists partly of the mainland and partly of the Islands, and the sovereign has always claimed the right of transporting domestic slaves from his possession on the continent to his possessions on the islands.

46. Waiving for a moment the question of the propriety of that local slave trade, that is a very small proportion of the slave trade, which we are here inquiring into?—Yes, it is under the cloak of that that these northern Arabs have managed to carry their slaves to the north; they are protected as long as they are within those limits, whether they are there for legal or illegal purposes.

47. Have our Government proposed to enter into a new treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar, and if so, to what effect, and with what result?—They proposed on the 16th of June last year to enter into a treaty to the following effect: "To limit the shipment of slaves from the mainland to one point only on the African coast" (it now extends over 350 miles of coast), "namely, Dar Selam, and to prohibit entirely their export from any other places." "To make Zanzibar the only port for the reception of slaves shipped from Dar Selam, but with liberty to transport them thence to Pemba and Mombaza only"; (those two being the other islands which want slaves also, we did not wish to prohibit them from transporting them to those other islands; we only wished that all slaves should be

taken to Zanzibar, and from there shipped to the other islands, so as to have a double check upon them.) "Imports of slaves to any other place, or which have not come through Zanzibar, should be declared illegal, and liable to seizure. That the number of slaves exported from Dar Selam to Zanzibar, and thence to Pemba and Mombaza, shall be strictly limited to the actual requirements of the inhabitants of those places, to be annually settled by mutual consent between the Sultan and the British agent; such number to be gradually decreased, so as to cease altogether within a certain time. That every vessel engaged in the transport of slaves shall be liable to capture, unless she is provided with a proper pass from the Sultan, which shall be valid only for one voyage, and with distinctive marks on her hull and sails, a heavy penalty being attached to any piracy of these passes or marks. That the public slave markets at Zanzibar shall be closed. That the Sultan shall engage from the date of the treaty to punish severely any of his subjects who may be proved to be concerned, directly or indirectly, in the slave trade, and especially any attempt to molest or interfere with a liberated slave. That the Kutchees and other natives of Indian States under British protection, shall be forbidden, after a date to be fixed by the Government of India, to possess slaves; and that in the meantime they shall be prevented from acquiring any fresh slaves. Lastly, the treaty should contain a stipulation, providing for the eventual entire prohibition of the export of slaves from the mainland.

48. That is not yet a treaty?—No; Mr. Churchill was engaged in pressing it upon the late Sultan when he died.

49. Has it been pressed upon the present Sultan?—We have sent out instructions to press it upon the present one, but pending this Committee nothing more has been done.

50. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] The Foreign Office is waiting the result of this Committee to take further action?—That I do not know; I say we have not done anything more pending the inquiry of this Committee. There is a new Sultan now, and our proposals have been pressed upon him.

51. Mr. *Crum-Ewing.*] Mr. Churchill has not been stopped in negotiating this treaty in a friendly way with the Sultan?—It is Dr. Kirk now who is acting in place of Mr. Churchill; on the contrary, Dr. Kirk has received instructions to press the same terms upon the Sultan, but the time and the mode of his doing it are left to his discretion.

52. *Chairman.*] Have Her Majesty's Government invited the co-operation of foreign powers in checking the slave trade?—They have; they have invited the co-operation of France, of Persia, and of Turkey.

53. Not Portugal?—No; I think it appears by a report amongst the last slave trade papers, that there is no slave trade at all on the Portuguese shore, or hardly any; it stops at Cape Delgado, I think. Slavery is abolished now in Portugal entirely.

54. Would you say there was any slave trade carried on from Zanzibar, under any flag except the Arab flag?—Yes; we had a representation that there was a slave trade carried on under the French flag; we have not got a right to search French vessels; if we have strong suspicions that a vessel sailing under the French flag is engaged in the slave trade, we can examine her papers, and

and in a flagrant case take her to the nearest French authority, but we cannot seize her, or take her off; we had representations made to us, that a considerable slave trade was carried on under the French flag, and we wrote to the French Government and protested. I hardly think that such is the case. There was a differential duty of about 10 per cent. between goods carried under our flag and goods carried under the French flag, in favour of the French, and I think that had a great deal to do with so many dhows adopting the French flag; that is all at an end now.

55. It is the fact, is it not, that under the Empire the strongest regulations were in force for putting down slavery?—No doubt.

56. Sir *John Hay.*] Have the French any vessels on that coast?—Yes, and they have an Admiral on the station, who I believe is on the very best terms with the English Admiral.

57. Have they captured any slaves?—I never heard of their capturing any.

58. *Chairman.*] What naval force is employed on the East coast of Africa in suppressing the slave trade?—It is difficult to tell exactly; I sent to the Admiralty for a return of the number of ships on the coast, and I could not get it in time; you would be able to get that information from the Admiralty.

59. What is the system pursued by the squadron, and do they act under special instructions?—They act under special instructions; their duty is, no doubt, a very difficult one. It fell to us to comment, as the Commodore thought rather harshly, upon the conduct of some of the officers of the fleet. There is no doubt that very great injustice has been done in a great many cases; that many dhows have been taken which ought not to have been taken, and I daresay a great deal of ill-feeling and ill-will has been caused thereby. Recently the Admiralty have issued instructions warning officers to be very careful how they destroy dhows, and directing them never to do so if by any chance they could bring them into a port of adjudication. In former times there were only two ports of adjudication at long distances apart; one at Aden, and the other at the Cape of Good Hope (there was another at Madagascar, but that was on the wrong side, and the dhows were seldom taken there). Now there is an Admiralty Court at Zanzibar, and that has worked extremely well, and our Commanders have not the same reason that they formerly had for destroying vessels.

60. Are the officers interested in obtaining the condemnation of slavers?—Yes; they receive bounties on their condemnation.

61. In the event of their destroying the dhows without bringing them before the Prize Court, do they get the bounty in the same way?—They have to establish that the dhow was a slaver, in the Prize Court; they have to bring in such papers as they find on board, and such witnesses as are necessary to prove the character of the enterprise in which the dhow was engaged, and the dhow is condemned, but on an *ex parte* statement, in some cases.

62. So that the officers of our cruisers are peculiarly interested in obtaining the condemnation of as many dhows as possible?—No doubt that is the case so long as the system of bounties continues.

63. What means have the officers of ascertaining whether the dhow is a slaver or not?—They find out that she is engaged in the slave trade by

the slave fittings on board the vessel, and also from the absence of the proper papers; then there are always indications of the dhow having had slaves on board from the filthy state in which she is; but upon that point Sir Leopold Heath could give better information than I can.

64. How do the officers deal with their prizes after capturing them?—If they can, they take them into a court of adjudication; and if they cannot, they take their dimensions for the purpose of claiming bounty, and then destroy them.

65. Why do they ever burn their prizes, instead of taking them into a port?—Very often there is a very strong monsoon, and those vessels would be unseaworthy in other hands than those of their owners. It is very often the case that they could not take them to a port of adjudication.

66. What becomes of the captured slaves and the master and crew of the slave dhow?—Such witnesses as are necessary to secure the condemnation of the slaver are taken to the court of adjudication, and the rest of the crew are either landed on the coast or transferred to another dhow that may be passing, as they may wish. The slaves are generally taken to the port of adjudication.

67. How are the liberated slaves finally disposed of?—They go in most cases to Aden, where there is very bad accommodation for them; they are imprisoned on a small island there till they can be sent on to Bombay; some of them are taken to the Mauritius; some of them are taken to Seychelles, another of our colonies. In those places the same regulations which apply to free labourers apply to them, and they are apprenticed for a certain number of years, and after that time if they can get employment, or show that they are capable of taking care of themselves, they are let go.

68. Is it considered to be out of the question their being sent to their own homes?—Yes, quite. You could not send them back hundreds of miles into the interior; even if you could, they would be certain to be recaptured by some of the Arabs.

69. Sir *R. Anstruther.*] The hardships they would encounter in going back that great distance into the interior would be as great as the hardships they had encountered in going down?—Yes; it would be out of the question their going to the country from which they had been taken. I think, however, it is very doubtful whether we are justified in taking those slaves into our colonies ourselves. I think it justly lays us open to the charge of making use of our crusade against the slave trade for our own purpose.

70. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] They are perfectly free in our colonies?—At the end of their period of apprenticeship they are free to do what they like; on their apprenticeship, I think a premium is paid by the planters who take them.

71. Sir *R. Anstruther.*] You must do something with them; you cannot send them home, and you cannot leave them where they are?—No.

72. *Chairman.*] What provision is made for their maintenance before they are transferred to our colonies, and at what cost?—In the case of those who are sent to Bombay they remain at Aden till a notification comes from Bombay that they can be employed there, and they are then sent to Bombay as they are wanted. The children go to the Nassick school there. We got from

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from the Bombay Government the other day a bill for nearly 16,000 *l.*, which extended over five years, for the maintenance of slaves at Aden, so that, taking the average, it costs us about 3,000 *l.* a year. In the case of those who are sent to the Mauritius, I believe, they cost us nothing; the planters give a premium which covers the whole expense of maintaining them.

73. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] You have heard no complaint of their treatment in the Mauritius?—No; on the contrary, I believe the negroes are happy there.

74. The Mauritius is a very excellent outlet for these liberated slaves?—I have no doubt they are happy there, but I still think that our taking them to our own colonies lays us open to the charge that we are putting down the slave trade for our own purposes.

75. What did the Committee of which you were a member recommend should be done with the liberated slaves?—That they should be landed at Zanzibar itself, under due precautions, where a depôt of liberated slaves should be established, so as to substitute gradually free labour for slave labour; that we should form a colony there of free labour to compete with slave labour.

76. Mr. *Kennaway.*] Would not they be liable to be carried off if they were taken to Zanzibar?—Of course they would, unless under very strong precautions.

77. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] The great objection to it would be, that unless the Sultan of Zanzibar behaved better than we could expect him to behave, in all probability they would be re-captured?—Yes, the Sultan could not do it himself; we should be obliged to help him.

78. Mr. *Crum-Ewing.*] The northern Arabs would be too strong for him?—Yes; it was only the other day that the northern Arabs were found engaged in a plot to kidnap his own slaves, and take them away to the north.

79. Sir *John Hay.*] Do you think if the export was practically stopped, those men would still find their way down to Zanzibar?—My opinion is that you ought to seal up both ends; you ought to seal up the coast, and you ought to prevent those men coming down; they have no right to come down; they are clearly breaking the treaty. We have treaties with every Power up in the north, and we ought to insist that those Arab slave traders should not be allowed to come down.

80. Mr. *Kennaway.*] If the risk of capture were very much increased, so that the trade became no longer profitable, they would not come down, would they?—As long as there is the demand for slaves that there is in the north, you will always find that they will run the risk.

81. Mr. *Crum-Ewing.*] How would you prevent the Arabs coming down?—The only way to do it would be to appeal to the chiefs, and say, "You have broken your treaty; these northern Arabs are coming down in great quantities every year, and we must insist upon no person coming in future who is not furnished with a pass from you, the chief, to show that he is an honest and legal trader." Some arrangement of that kind might be made.

82. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] What is done with the children who are liberated?—There are schools at Seychelles, and there is the Nassick school at Bombay; the children, I fancy, are very well cared for. Bishop Tozer has a school at Zanzibar.

83. Is that doing well?—Yes; and there is a French mission school.

84. Have the Church Missionary Society made an offer to take care of the children?—Yes; I think they wanted to establish a school for their reception at Seychelles; they seem to me to be unwilling to go to Zanzibar.

85. You say there is considerable insecurity at Zanzibar?—Yes; there would not be with proper precaution; it is all a question of expense.

86. Mr. *Crum-Ewing.*] A very small British force at Zanzibar would be sufficient to prevent the liberated slaves being carried away, would it not?—Yes, I think one vessel and a steam launch kept there would be sufficient.

87. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] Have you had an offer to receive children at schools in the Mauritius?—I am not aware of it. I fancy we must have landed a good many children there.

88. By whom is the cost of the transmission of the liberated negroes to our colonies paid?—A premium is paid by the planters who take them, and I believe that covers all the expenses.

89. If the French offered to take them into their colonies, do you not think we ought to facilitate their taking them?—I think that might be done; in fact, we proposed it in our report as a tentative measure.

90. If we offered them to other countries who undertook to take of them, it could not with the same justice be said that we were only serving our own purposes in putting down the slave trade?—No; we consider that a negro once taken by our cruisers is a free man, and that he has the right to dispose of himself as he chooses. I do not suppose, however, that their tastes are always considered.

91. *Chairman.*] What is the administrative staff at Zanzibar, and what is its cost?—There is a political agent and consul at Zanzibar, and a vice consul and a clerk. The political agent is an officer of the Government of India, who receives *ex officio* a commission as consul, the salary of both offices being paid by the Government of India; he is also Judge of the Admiralty Court there, and has an enormous amount of duty to perform.

92. What office does Dr. Kirk hold?—He is the vice consul, and he is now acting as consul in Mr. Churchill's absence. The total expenses are about 2,766 *l.*; our share, if we paid half of it, which we do not, would be about 1,400 *l.*; we do not pay a shilling.

93. Are the duties of the agent purely Indian or Imperial?—I should think by far the greater part of his duties were in connection with the slave trade, which is a matter of Imperial interest.

94. The Indian interests which he is there to protect are the interests of British Indian subjects, residents there?—There are a great many difficult political questions in reference to Muscat and the Persian Gulf; the connection which existed in former days between Muscat, the Persian Gulf, and Zanzibar is still kept up, and our policy in relation to all that region in connection with India is a very difficult one.

95. Is the Indian Government interested in suppressing the slave trade?—If they did not think that it was a matter of Imperial interest to suppress it, I do not think they would set themselves to work to suppress it.

96. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] They are carrying out faithfully and energetically the policy of England?—They propose to work with us as energetically as possible.

97. And they have done so?—Yes; but naturally

rally they object to pay the whole expense themselves.

98. *Chairman.*] Are British Indians in Zanzibar allowed to hold or deal in slaves?—There have been different orders about that; most of the British Indians in Zanzibar are not natives of British India, but natives of protected States. Many of the important men in Zanzibar are natives of Kutch, which is an Indian State under British protection, and the Rao of Kutch has by proclamation made over to us the protection of his subjects abroad, for us to deal with them in the same way as if they were British subjects; but I believe in Kutch itself domestic slavery is recognised. However, when our Committee met last year, we determined that on no consideration would we allow any Indians under British protection to hold slaves in Zanzibar, and it is one of the provisions of the proposed treaty that, after a certain date to be fixed by the Government of India, all slaves held by Kutchees are to be released, and, in the meantime, they are to be forbidden to acquire any fresh ones; they have been allowed to hold slaves.

99. Do you think the Sultan of Zanzibar could be compelled or induced to prohibit the transport of slaves by sea altogether?—I think he might gradually; I do not think he could do it at once; I do not see how he could do without some sort of labour in Zanzibar.

100. *Lord F. Cavendish.*] What is the size of Zanzibar?—It is about 25 miles in length, I think; the number of slaves required in Zanzibar, in Dr. Kirk's opinion, is about 1,700.

101. How would you suggest that the Sultan might be induced to put an end to the export of slaves?—I think you would have to give him a money compensation, to make up for the loss of his revenue.

102. *Sir R. Anstruther.*] He derives about a fourth of his whole revenue from the slave tax, does he not?—Yes; we calculated that he derived about 20,000*l.* a year from his tax upon slaves, so that we could not expect him to give that up without getting some compensation for it.

103. *Mr. Kinnaird.*] Those are not all slaves the traffic in which is recognised by the treaty?—No; and though, in answer to a previous question put to me by the Chairman, whether the Sultan of Zanzibar had ever violated the treaty, I answered that he had carried out the treaty, I have always thought that indirectly he must have violated it, because he must know that this large number of slaves cannot be required for Zanzibar; and he accepts a tax for a larger number of slaves than can be required for the legal traffic.

104. Was not there an idea entertained by the Committee, or by some Members of it, that if we relieved him from what he was obliged to pay to the Imaum of Muscat he might be induced to enter into a treaty to discontinue the slave trade in his dominions?—Yes; that would be about 8,500*l.* a year; that is what we suggested.

105. You suggested that, anticipating that if that was done, and if the slave trade was suppressed, other trade would spring up which would amply repay us for any outlay of that sort?—Yes; but I think, to inaugurate that new trade, you would have to go to other expenses. For instance, you would have to establish steam communication with Zanzibar; at present the communication with Zanzibar is extremely irregular.

106. There have been very liberal offers from steam companies to run to Zanzibar, have there

not?—There have been offers, but they all wanted a subsidy, and to that proposal the Government has turned a deaf ear.

107. Your opinion is, that one of the most useful ways of putting down the slave traffic would be by encouraging and subsidising for a time steam communication?—No doubt; nothing did so much good on the west coast, in the way of checking the slave trade, as the establishment of steam communication and opening up trade. Lagos, which is now a place of considerable trade, was formerly the very hotbed of the slave trade.

108. It now returns a very considerable revenue?—Yes.

109. *Chairman.*] What effect in your opinion would the abolition of the slave trade have upon the prosperity of Zanzibar?—If you did it suddenly, I think it would very likely provoke a revolution; if you managed it gradually, as the Committee proposed, by establishing a *dépôt* of slaves, either at Zanzibar, or on the coast, under proper precaution, and hiring them out to different employers under proper precautions for their safety and good treatment, I do not think any harm would result, on the contrary I think the resources of Zanzibar would be opened up, and that there might soon be a flourishing trade.

110. Who would be the people who would join in a revolution?—The Arabs.

111. Would they be strong enough to bring about a revolution?—The Sultan is a weak sovereign, and the Arabs do almost anything they please. We had some despatches to-day from Zanzibar, in which it was stated that the Arabs had sent a message to the captain of the "Wolverine" to say that one of Her Majesty's vessels had gone on shore and that 20 men had been drowned, and that she steamed off to the rescue: it turned out that it was a mere trick of the slave traders to get her out of the way.

112. What precautions would you suggest for the protection of the freed slaves?—In the first place every slave ought to be registered at the British Consulate, and should be under his protection. You must have a ship and steam launch there constantly till the scheme began to work, and the Sultan should publicly notify his intention of punishing most severely any attempt to molest or kidnap a freed man. Then if you managed to shut out the northern Arabs as well, I do not think there would be much danger of the liberated slaves being kidnapped.

113. You said that the liberated slaves were badly treated at Aden?—I hardly meant badly treated, but there is no employment for them there; they are virtually kept in prison there till they are sent off to Bombay.

114. *Mr. Crum-Ewing.*] When they go the colonies they are apprenticed for a certain number of years with a planter?—Yes; who has to give security for his treatment of the slaves.

115. Their position is the same as that of the coolie labourers?—Yes.

116. *Mr. Kinnaird.*] Why are they sent to Aden?—Those taken in the north are obliged to be taken to Aden; it would be difficult to bring them to Seychelles or Mauritius; they are kept at Aden till notification is received from Bombay that labour is required.

117. What is done with them at Bombay?—I do not know what happens to them when they get to Bombay; they are not slaves.

118. *Chairman.*] What steps have been taken to carry out the proposals in the Report of the Slave

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Slave Trade Committee of 1870?—This despatch dated the 16th of July 1870, embodying the proposed treaty, which I have read, was written to Mr. Churchill, in which he is requested to urge the views of Her Majesty's Government on the Sultan.

119. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Supposing you stopped the foreign slave trade, there would be no inducement for the northern Arabs to come down?—The foreign slave trade is prohibited entirely.

120. But it goes on underhand?—Yes.

121. If it was entirely stopped there would be no inducement for them to come down?—That is exactly the question, how we can stop it; the foreign slave trade is forbidden as much as it can be forbidden, by treaty now.

122. Supposing the plan which you have suggested were carried out, that would stop the seizure of slaves altogether, and there would be no inducement for the Arabs to come down from the north and carry on the trade?—No, they would probably try and carry it on for some time after we stopped it.

123. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] In recommending one central port for the shipment of slaves, you consider that that could be so effectively guarded that you would stop the trade altogether?—Yes; on the other hand you would have to keep vessels on the look out at the old ports of shipment; they would still try and export them from the places they had been used to; particularly from Kilwa.

124. You would have to continue watching those ports?—No doubt.

125. Sir *J. Hay*.] Has the proposal to obtain the cession of Zanzibar to this country ever been considered?—Not the cession of it, because they have never offered to cede it, but the seizure of it has been proposed; I do not see that we should have the slightest right to take possession of it.

126. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] Was the proposition to purchase the island ever entertained?—No, never to my knowledge.

127. *Chairman*.] Have you never heard that the Sultan would be ready to sell Zanzibar?—No; the Sultan has said, you may as well take all I have if you go on in this way, but that was mere pettishness; there was a proposal to take possession of it.

128. Have there been difficulties standing in the way of your doing more than you have done with reference to carrying out the proposals of the Committee of 1870?—Yes.

129. What have been the special difficulties?—The Government appear to have thought that those proposals did not go far enough. They said, that whatever their views might be, if the absolute extinction of the East Coast of Africa slave trade were in question, they were not disposed to spend a greater amount of public money than at present on measures which had the appearance of lending, at least, a partial countenance to the slave trade.

130. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] When was that opinion expressed?—This year. I cannot tell you exactly when; it was after the proposals of the Committee had been considered as to increasing the number of ships, appointing vice consuls and sharing the expenses of the Zanzibar Agency.

131. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] Which was strongly recommended by the Foreign Office?—Yes.

132. It is that determination of the Government on the proposals of the Committee which has hung up the question for the present?—Yes,

we have desired Dr. Kirk to make our proposals to the new Sultan, but without an increase of force and without consuls on the coast, I do not think our proposals will have very much effect.

133. Unless we follow them up with some active measures we cannot give effect to them?—It is of no use adopting them in part unless you adopt them in the whole.

134. The Committee, in making that report, anticipated that the Government would carry it out?—Yes.

135. *Chairman*.] You attach very considerable importance to placing an additional number of vice consuls on several parts of the coast?—No doubt; I think it would be necessary. Sir *Fowell Buxton* objected to that particularly; he said he did not consider it a proper duty for a British consular officer to look after the slave trade. He wrote a strong letter to the Foreign Office, pointing out that it was not the duty of British consuls to superintend the traffic in slaves.

136. The Sultan, as I understand, has not yet refused or declined to entertain those propositions?—The late Sultan had promised to entertain them, and he and Mr. Churchill were to talk the matter over. Then he became very ill and died, and the present Sultan absolutely refused to entertain them. When Mr. Churchill proposed them to him, he said he had had quite enough of treaties as they were, without going into any further ones, and Mr. Churchill and he separated not very good friends. However, since Mr. Churchill left, he has shown a disposition to come to terms, and he has made, indirectly, overtures to Dr. Kirk, to the effect that he is prepared to do something, but Dr. Kirk said the overtures fell so far short, even of what we, the Committee proposed, that he would not entertain them for a moment, but he is, no doubt, rather frightened at our attitude.

137. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] At what part of the coast would you think of placing the vice consuls?—At the old place of export Kilwa and Dar Selam (which we propose to be the sole port of export from the coast, it being opposite Zanzibar, and therefore easily controlled).

138. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] You would propose to have a consul also at Lamoo?—Yes, one at Kilwa and perhaps one at Lamoo to watch the two extremities of the coast, and one at Dar Selam, which we mean to make the only port of export. We recommended that "A consular officer should also be appointed at Dar Selam, under the superintendence of Her Majesty's consul, to whom he should report upon all matters connected with the slave trade, the number of slaves exported, and whether the Sultan's engagements with Her Majesty's Government are strictly observed. This officer would probably be required to visit, from time to time, the various points on the coast, and to report whether any irregularities exist, or any illegal exports are carried on. It is probable that for some time the slave traders will attempt to continue the exportation of slaves from Kilwa, while its distance from Zanzibar and Dar Selam will not enable the British authorities at those places to watch and check such practices; and it may be necessary at first to station a consular officer at that port also."

139. *Chairman*.] Are the latest accounts regarding the prevalence of the slave trade on the Zanzibar coast worse or better than heretofore?—Worse; Dr. Kirk says the trade has never been so vigorously carried on as it has been latterly.

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140. Sir J. Hay.] As the distance increases from which the slaves have to be fetched, so do the sufferings of the slaves and the loss of life among them increase?—No doubt.

141. Chairman.] What is your opinion as to the best course to pursue in order to suppress the traffic in slaves on the east coast?—I cannot say more than that I adhere entirely to the opinions which the Committee enunciate in this report; I do not think it has been sufficiently understood either by the Government or by such Members of this House as have taken an interest in the question, that we proposed to attach to the treaty an absolute stipulation that within a certain time the traffic should cease altogether, that there should be no transport by sea of slaves. We do not propose to do it suddenly, but gradually, and with an independent sovereign whose independence we have guaranteed; I do not think it right that we should take him by the throat and say, at the risk of losing your kingdom put a stop altogether to traffic in slaves by sea.

142. Have any communications taken place between our Government and the French Government respecting their policy with regard to the slave trade on the east coast of Africa?—Yes; as I have already stated we have drawn their attention strongly to cases in which there was a suspicion that the French flag was abused for slave trade purposes, and they have promised in return to make inquiries, at the same time they deny the accuracy of our information; I believe they are honestly anxious to put down the trade.

143. Under whose direct orders does the political agent at Zanzibar act?—He acts under the orders of the Bombay Government, subject to the control of the Secretary of State for India over here. But, after the Report of this Committee, in which we recommended strongly that the expenses of the agency should be shared between ourselves and the India Office, we agreed with the India Office that in all slave trade matters he should be under the control of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that in all Indian matters he should be under the control of the Secretary of State for India. Latterly the India Office have said, in consequence of the refusal of the Government to pay anything towards the expenses of the agency, that they would put the office on an entirely new footing, having reference solely to Indian interests.

144. Mr. Kennaway.] Do you know whether since the issuing of this Report, any decision has been come to by the Indian Government as to relieving the Sultan from the payment of the subsidy to the Imaum of Muscat?—Sir John Kay will be better able to give information upon that subject than I am.

145. Has any effort been made to get the Americans to co-operate with us?—No, I do not think the Americans have a consulate there even; there is a North German consul, a French consul, and our consul.

146. Mr. Kinnaird.] Have you any other suggestion to make to the Committee with a view to putting an end to the slave trade on the east coast of Africa than those you have already made?—No; I am very glad to see the interest that is beginning to be taken in the matter; I think affairs out there are in as unsatisfactory a state as they possibly could be, and I think it is very necessary that something should be done.

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In my opinion the best plan of doing it is that which the Committee have suggested, viz., gradually to seal up the ports on the coast, and forbid the transport of slaves altogether. In addition to that, I think that the Northern Arabs ought to be prevented coming down at all; they do a great deal of mischief; they are not legal traders, and there is no doubt they are breaking the treaty.

147. Probably the delay that has taken place in carrying out the recommendations of the Report of that Committee, may have induced this revival of the trade of which we hear?—It may have had something to do with it; it is also to be borne in mind that there was cholera on the coast last year, and the operations of the slave trade squadron were suspended for some time; and also, there having been a diminution in the number of slaves supplied, probably there was a greater demand for them this year.

148. The action of the squadron, though not perfect, has, I suppose, been of immense service in checking the trade?—No doubt, but still our attempts to suppress the slave trade cause great loss of life, because whenever a cruiser is seen they run the vessel on shore, caring nothing what becomes of the slaves. I should like to see the action of the squadron supplemented by the other means of suppression to which I have referred.

149. Chairman.] You agree probably with what was stated the other evening, that one consular agent is worth a vessel?—No doubt.

150. Mr. Kinnaird.] This Report has been in the hands of Members of Parliament for some months?—Yes.

151. And it has been in the hands of the Government since January 1870?—Yes.

152. Do you attribute the delay which has arisen in carrying out the recommendations of the Report to the want of the means of carrying it out?—The provisions of the proposed treaty have not yet been accepted, but probably if the Government were determined to push their policy on that coast, they would go to work in a more energetic manner than they have done hitherto. It was of no use proposing to carry out one-half of a measure, if the other half was not to be carried out.

153. The sooner you can get this question brought to an issue the better?—Yes, if this Session, so much the better; you will not do it without expense; you must expect to spend money.

154. But with regard to expense, you think that a fair and legitimate trade would spring up, which would soon compensate any expense that would be temporarily incurred in putting down the slave trade?—I think so. You will have better information upon that point from local men, but that is the opinion I should form from the information that we receive.

155. Is Persia in any way mixed up in this question?—Yes; and as I have already stated, we have a treaty with Persia.

156. Does Persia carry out the treaty fairly?—I have no doubt they bring in slaves landed in the Persian Gulf; they import slaves by land; they have refused to bind themselves not to import slaves by land.

157. You think the argument that the Sultan would most understand, as an inducement to put down the slave traffic, would be a pecuniary consideration?—I think it would have a very great effect; naturally, a man does not like to lose 120,000*l.* of his revenue, and moreover an Arab does

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does not look upon slavery in the light that we do.

158. You do not think there is any insuperable obstacle in putting down the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa?—Not if we were really in earnest; of course it is difficult, but by no means insuperable.

159. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Have you any information as to the manner in which the slaves are treated after they are sold by the Arabs?—I fancy it depends on whose hands they fall into; in many cases they fall into good hands; generally, in Mahomedan countries, the masters treat their slaves kindly; all the cruelty is in bringing them from the interior.

160. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] If the treaty you recommended was pressed on the Sultan of Zanzibar, do you imagine that he would be likely to accept it?—Yes, if properly and justly pressed upon him; you would have to take into consideration the serious loss of revenue which the abolition of the trade would cause to him; in fact, it would require money.

161. He would not consent to put an end to the slave trade within a fixed date without the payment of a sum of money down?—He would not consent to give up his right to transport slaves within the prescribed limits without the payment of compensation.

162. You stated that there is a great loss of life when the slave vessels run ashore, in order to escape our cruisers; do you imagine that there are many such cases every year?—I should think, taking the whole slave season through, there is considerable loss of life.

163. Are many more ships run ashore than captured?—That I cannot tell you.

164. Are the great bulk of these slaves men or women?—Men, I believe, but you will get valuable information upon those points from Mr. Rothery.

165. Have there been any recent negotiations with Persia and Turkey on the subject of the

slave trade?—When we wrote this Despatch to Mr. Churchill on the 16th of June last, desiring him to press this treaty upon the Sultan, we at the same time wrote to Persia and to Turkey, begging them to act up to their engagements with us. We have not proposed any new treaty with them.

166. Have you had any answer from Persia and Turkey to those communications?—Yes; we have had a very satisfactory answer from Persia.

167. What has been the answer from Turkey?—Turkey is always ready to do what we ask her when we show her the particular point. If we point out a particular case, she is always ready to take means to punish the offender in the particular case; but generally, in Turkey, no doubt they wink at the introduction of slaves.

168. The Imaum of Muscat would have a greater power of putting down this trade than anybody else, I presume?—Yes.

169. Has he any pecuniary interest in the trade?—Yes; I believe there is a tax levied in Muscat on the import of slaves, just as there is a tax in Zanzibar on the export of slaves.

170. Would not negotiations with the Imaum of Muscat seem to promise at least as good a chance of success as negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar?—We have the strongest treaty in the world with him, but it is so much waste paper. The treaty of 1845 is with the Imaum of Muscat, because in those days Muscat and Zanzibar were one.

171. In spite of his evading the treaty, we compel the Sultan of Zanzibar to continue to pay over 8,000*l.* a year to the Imaum of Muscat?—Yes.

172. *Chairman*.] Have you heard that a number of slaves, and not an insignificant number, find their way from Zanzibar to Cuba?—I have heard it, but I do not think there is any foundation for such a statement.

Thursday, 13th July 1871.

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Lord Frederick Cavendish.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Gilpin.  
Sir John Hay.

Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Sir Frederick Williams.

CHARLES GILPIN, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

The Hon. CRESPIGNY VIVIAN, called in; and further Examined.

173. *Chairman.*] You wish to make some additions to your former evidence?—In describing the slave trade that is carried on on the African coast, I said nothing about the slave trade with Madagascar. There is a constant slave trade with that island from the southern ports of Zanzibar, and though it goes on in dribbles it is still permanent. That slave trade is also forbidden by our treaty with Madagascar of the 27th of June 1865, which is to the following effect: "Her Britannic Majesty and her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar, being greatly desirous of effecting the total abolition of the trade in slaves, her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar engages to do all in her power to prevent all such traffic on the part of her subjects, and to prohibit all persons residing within her dominions or subject to her from countenancing or taking any share in such trade. No persons from beyond sea shall be landed, purchased or sold as slaves, in any part of Madagascar; and her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar consents that British cruisers shall have the right of searching any Malagash or Arab vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, whether under sail or at anchor in the waters of Madagascar. Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar further consents that if any such vessels shall prove to be engaged in the slave trade, such vessels and their crews shall be dealt with by the cruisers of Her Britannic Majesty as if such persons and their vessels had been engaged in a piratical undertaking." So that there is a complete paper blockade of the whole of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa, and if the treaties were properly observed, the seas of Africa would be just as free from the foreign slave trade as the seas of England.

174. *Mr. Kinnaird.*] What do you consider to be the waters of Madagascar; how far do they extend beyond the island?—To a limit of three miles, I should suppose.

175. Have we made any remonstrance to the Madagascar Government?—Constantly.

176. What answer have you received?—They have always said that they mean to act up to their treaty, and lately they handed over to a naval officer a large cargo of slaves, which they had seized themselves.

177. You believe that there is every wish, on their part, to observe the treaty?—Yes; on the 0.116.

part of the Hova Government, but it is so close to Kilwa and the southern ports, that the trade is easily carried on. I think, if you sealed up Kilwa and the southern ports of Zanzibar, you would probably at once put a stop to that slave trade.

178. By blocking those ports?—Yes.

179. *Chairman.*] What does Madagascar want with slaves?—For labour, the same as at Zanzibar.

180. *Mr. Kinnaird.*] Is not slavery abolished in Madagascar?—No, it is legal there.

181. The imported slaves are not covered by the treaty?—It is the foreign slave trade that the Queen of Madagascar is compelled to suppress. With respect to slavery in Madagascar, a strong memorial was drawn up by the Anti-Slavery Society, urging its abolition, which memorial was forwarded, through the Foreign Office, to the Government of Madagascar, and the Prime Minister wrote to the society to say he was sure that it was their ignorance made them propose such a thing, because it would inevitably bring about a revolution in the country.

I was also asked on Monday whether the officers on the coast acted under special instructions. I said they did, and I now put in the instructions under which they are acting. Those special instructions were issued in November 1869, in consequence of the "serious irregularities and mistakes committed by officers commanding Her Majesty's ships employed in the suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa." (*The same were handed in, vide Appendix.*)

182. Is there any other addition which you wish to make to your former evidence?—I said on Monday, that chiefly owing to the circumstance of the duties under the French flag being lighter than those levied upon British vessels a great many dhows had adopted the French flag. I think this fact may be attributed also, in a great measure, to the immunity from seizure which the French flag gave them, that is to say, that dhows carrying on an honest traffic, would adopt the French flag, in order not to run the chance of seizure by the English cruisers. Then I wish to correct my evidence, as to the non-existence of an American Consulate at Zanzibar; there is one, but I have never heard that the Americans

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Americans have taken any active part in the suppression of the slave trade in East Africa.

183-4. Do you know whether the consul is an American born subject?—I cannot tell you that; Mr. Churchill will probably be able to tell you. Then, I want to refer to a very important point, about which, I think, you can get better evidence from Mr. Churchill. I said on Monday that I thought one of the chief levers to be made use of was the payment of a money compensation to the Sultan to induce him to give up his right to transport slaves by sea. Dr. Kirk, in a letter, dated December 24, 1870, (in the papers laid before Parliament in the early part of this year) advises us that there is another way of bringing pressure to bear upon the Sultan. He says "I think that we stand in a better position to bring his Highness to reason on the more weighty matter that will be pressed upon him, the suppression of the slave trade, on which I have as yet no reason to think that his Highness has altered his views. In re-opening the friendly relations between the Arab Government and British agency, I have allowed all advances to come from his side, and avoided compromising the advantage we hold in pressing important concessions upon a prince who has once, in insulting terms, declined to discuss questions submitted to, and entered into, by his predecessor; and who will be entirely in our hands the moment we choose to press the matter. My former intimate acquaintance with Seyed Burgash gives me little hope that he will give in without pressure, but this is easily applied through the commercial treaty, one half of the provisions of which have never been enforced. Should a favourable occasion offer I shall sound his Highness on the slave question; and the way has been prepared for further action by publishing in Arabic and Gujeratee an abstract of our treaty rights, which I had before submitted to Seyed Majid, at the time he hesitated to reduce the coast tax, then unequally levied on our subjects and the French. This abstract has been accepted by his Highness Seyed Burgash, as a fair embodiment of our treaty rights; but so ignorant is he of the financial arrangements of his government, that he does not see that there are clauses which, when enforced, will deprive him of two-thirds of his revenue." That means to say, if we insist upon the stipulations, which we have a right to insist upon, in this commercial treaty of 1839, we can deprive him of a great part of his revenue. That appears to me an important point to consider.

185. He considers himself bound by that Treaty of 1839?—Yes; abstracts of it have been printed in Arabic and Gujeratee, which he has accepted as correct versions. Then I wish to read to the Committee two or three extracts from important despatches received since I last gave my evidence, which may be of use to the Committee. The first is dated from Zanzibar, the 20th of March this year. Dr. Kirk says, "The whole subject (this is about the disposition of liberated slaves), of the disposal of slaves on shore here, is one requiring much consideration and careful organisation before being practised to any extent. In the absence of some official thoroughly conversant with both the Zanzibar people and the tribes of the mainland, I consider that it would be most dangerous to allow so helpless beings, as a cargo of freed slaves, to go into the hands of any proprietor here. Properly

directed, I believe, that a greater influence can be obtained for the abolition of slavery through those freed slaves than in any other way; and nothing can be more disgraceful than the present mode of dealing with them at Aden and Bombay. I am certain however that it will be found expedient, if not necessary, so long as Zanzibar remains a free Arab government, for us to have a free settlement somewhere on the coast, possibly not an English possession, but certainly under our administration. On such a station only could a mass of freed slaves be properly and advantageously dealt with for the first five years of their freedom, and a settlement of this nature on the coast, would be a break in the land route that will at once be opened when the sea transport is prohibited and blockaded." Next, as to the position of the slave trade, Dr. Kirk writes on the 4th of April this year, "It is notorious how active are the preparations for the slave trade this season, and how utterly powerless the Sultan is to prevent the system of kidnapping, and secret slave dealing, that is carried on by and for the northern Arabs. No one more readily acknowledges this than his Highness, who has of late seized in town 50 kidnapped slaves from the houses occupied by these Muscat people, but he knows that his officers are all open to bribes, and that although he can in a measure throw difficulties in the way of their leaving the harbour, he has no power to stop the transport of slaves in small lots, to other places on the coast at which the slave dhows call. Unfortunately no suspicion attaches to native vessels leaving the harbour in ballast, as so many cargoes of wooden rafters and corn are collected for Arabia from creeks and harbours along the coast, but the absence of the usual bounties so foolishly given to the Arabs of Oman, by the late Seyed Majid, will prove some discouragement to their return next year." Then Dr. Kirk writes on the 14th of April, "Seyed Burgash said, that from the English he had no fear, so long as he adhered to the word of the old treaties; these he said had been granted and could not be revoked, but that he well knew the English could not, and would not, force him beyond the text of what they had already got. He added that he fully expected they would write, talk, and threaten, possibly even send ships; but he was perfectly at his ease, knowing that they would not use force, unless he gave them the excuse by departing from what had been signed. Anticipating, through the English, trouble from Muscat, he said he had made a compact with Toorkee, and that both of them understood each other and the English also, that the one would not be made the means of ruining the other. Seemingly in connection with the last subject, his Highness sent me the original of a letter he had received from Seyed Toorkee, and I am aware that he had sent to Muscat 20,000 dollars a few days ago. I have also been informed that the subject of the renewal of the Muscat subsidy was discussed in Durbar, on receipt of letters from the agent of Jairam in Bombay, informing Ludda Damji that Toorkee has, or will receive permission from Bombay to claim the subsidy with two years arrears, and if not paid, enforce it in his own way. But I think for the payment of the subsidy Seyed Burgash is prepared. In all my former reports I have given Seyed Burgash the credit that is his due, for having cleared out a mass of iniquity and corruption in the course of law

law and justice, that disgraced the latter part of Seyed Mujid's reign, and to this agency he has been ever since I assumed the duties, most respectful; but I have invariably stated distinctly that I had no reason whatever to think that on the subject of the slave trade, he had in any way changed, or was prepared to grant what was asked through Mr. Churchill, although he had since then strictly fulfilled the letter of former contracts. Now it seems plain that he will not listen to any proposals, and to make such to him, without being ready at once with the means of enforcing them, would be injudicious. Remonstrance and intimidation are alike useless; to gain our object we must be prepared to act, and either to cripple his income or take the place from his hands. Whatever we do, ought, I think, to be done without previous notice, as Seyed Burgash, if I read him aright, is a man, once danger is plain to him, to save himself from us by any means, although these might compromise his independence. One thing is perfectly obvious to all who have had an opportunity of judging, namely, that as yet our endeavours have been thrown away, and that the slave trade will flourish as before so long as the old treaties alone are in force."

186. Lastly, I wish to read a report from Admiral Cockburn, which is dated from Zanzibar, the 31st of May, 1871: "I take an early opportunity after my arrival here, to write about the slave trade; I am sorry to be obliged to give a bad report. It is without doubt a fact, that the trade is as busy and profitable as ever it was; in spite of all our exertions, every new plan adopted by us is quickly met by a cunning device of the Arabs encouraged by the Sultan, if not actively, certainly negatively. It is painful to any naval officer to be obliged to acknowledge this. Under existing treaties, and the recent instructions respecting domestic slaves, the Sultan having the power to give passports to any number of vessels laden with poor living creatures to be transported to different parts of his dominions, it is rendered almost impossible for a cruiser to take a dhow anywhere south of Lamoo, and during the S. W. Monsoon it is very difficult to keep cruisers suffi-

ciently near the coast to intercept them running with a fresh breeze. I assure their lordships it is a matter of sneer and jeer by the Arabs; our impotent efforts to stop that horrible abomination; yes, my lords, even the Sultan says the English will talk and bully, but can't or won't stop the trade. It is positively evident that a new system must be adopted. I propose that the money we annually expend in this course be employed in a more profitable and useful manner; I suggest that a stationary ship to act as a depôt and guardship, with a steam launch, be sent here under a captain who has had some experience in this duty; that a certain sum per annum be paid to the Sultan, on condition that he gives up the slave trade, importing only a few to fill up vacancies in his dominions. Your Lordships are aware that the Sultan receives about 10,000 £. per annum, by a tax upon the entry as well as the exit of slaves. The sum given to the Sultan would be recovered by the saving in bounties for captured negroes; and the stationary guardship would be cheaper than a cruiser; a large frigate without steam would be the best vessel, jury-rigged, and kept like a man of war, with a commander's complement of officers and men. This ship would be a military support to the Sultan, if he agreed to our own terms. I would add the advantage of a stationary officer at this port is greatly increased by the known fact that the East India Government do not encourage their agent in his efforts for the destruction of the inhuman traffic, which of course hampers him, if it does not damp his zeal. I visited the slave market here yesterday, and a more painful and disgusting sight I never saw. Hundreds of poor negroes of both sexes, ranged about in all sorts of conditions, some living skeletons, others fat and well dressed, pulled about with a crook stick and examined just like sheep or other animals in a market. I will take another opportunity to give further information, but I would not delay the request for the stationary depôt and guardship." That nearly endorses the proposal of the Foreign Office Committee.

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Sir JOHN WILLIAM KAYE, called in; and Examined.

187. Mr. Kiinnaird.] WHAT office do you hold?—I am Secretary in the Political and Secret Department of the Secretary of State for India in Council.

188. How long have you held that office?—I have held it ever since the Secretary of State for India's office has been established in 1858, and previously to that time I held a similar appointment in the East India Company; altogether I have held the office for 15 years.

189. Has the India Office correspondence relating to the affairs of Zanzibar passed through your hands?—Entirely; in a ministerial position of course, under the Secretary of State.

190. Will you state in what manner British relations with the Sultan of Zanzibar are conducted?—They are conducted through an officer who is conjointly agent and consul; during the time of the East India Company he was the East India Company's agent, and he was also the consul appointed by the British Government; since the management of Indian affairs has passed under the hands of the Secretary of State for India in Council, he has been British agent

and consul; as agent appointed by the Government of Bombay, and as consul appointed by Her Majesty's Government; formerly, of course, the consular commissions were issued by the Foreign Office, but since the establishment of the office of Secretary of State for India, it was, after correspondence between Lord Stanley and Lord Malmesbury, agreed that the consular commission should be issued by the India Office, so that both as agent and consul he is under the India Office.

191. By whom is he, in fact, appointed?—He is absolutely and practically appointed as agent, by the Government of Bombay, and then, *ex officio*, he becomes consul on the part of the British Government.

192. He holds in fact the two diplomas, one from the Home Government and the other from the Bombay Government?—Yes, as political agent from the Indian Government, having his consular commission from the Queen; the only difference between the state of things formerly and since the establishment of the Secretary of State's office is this, that the Secretary of State

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for India signs the consular commission instead of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

193. He has always been an officer of the Indian Government?—He has always been, till Mr. Churchill was appointed. Mr. Churchill previously to his appointment had not been in the Indian service. In 1867, Colonel Playfair, an officer of the Indian Artillery, was British agent and consul at Zanzibar, and, finding that the climate did not agree with him (Mr. Churchill will probably tell you presently how it happened), he and Mr. Churchill managed to change appointments, Mr. Churchill being then consul general in Algeria. Colonel Playfair accordingly went to Algeria to be consul-general there, and Mr. Churchill was appointed to be agent and consul at Zanzibar. I believe it was approved by the Bombay Government; but Mr. Churchill was the first officer representing British interests at Zanzibar who was not an officer of the Indian Government; he became, by being so appointed, an officer of the uncovenanted service of the Indian Government, but he was not an Indian officer, trained up in the school of Indian diplomacy.

194. That was done independently of the authority of the Indian Government here?—Yes, we knew nothing about it here, but it must have been approved by the Bombay Government or it could not have taken place. I should state that the agent and consul at Zanzibar receives his instructions partly from the Foreign Office and partly from the Governments of India or Bombay.

195. Has any inconvenience arisen from the duplex action of the Foreign Office and the India Office?—A good deal, I think, at different times; but in order to avoid discordant instructions to the political agent and consul proceeding from two different authorities at the same time, we came to the arrangement that on all matters connected with the slave trade the entire instructions should come from the Foreign Office, and that the India Office should superintend the political and general business of the agency. It was contended, too, at the India Office, that as a very great proportion, indeed the larger proportion, of the business of the agent and consul at Zanzibar was the business of the slave trade, we considered it was extremely unjust to the India Government that the whole of the expenses of the Zanzibar agency should be defrayed, as they now are, by the Indian Government. Indeed, in Sir Charles Wood's time, it was said, that, considering that almost the entire business was business connected with the slave trade, he thought it might be advisable that the Foreign Office should take over the whole management of it, and pay the whole expense. This was demurred to, and, I believe, after some correspondence, the Foreign Office offered to pay 200 l. a year towards the expenses of it, which was not accepted.

196. What is the total expense of the British establishment at Zanzibar, which is paid out of the Indian revenues?—I had the account made out when recently we were in correspondence with the Foreign Office on the subject; it was calculated that if we had carried out the idea of dividing it, the share of each department would have been 1,509 l. the gross amount being 3,019 l.

197. What are the treaty obligations, politically, of the Sultan of Zanzibar to the British Government?—Independent of all the slave trade

relations, the principal obligations arise out of the arbitrament that was carried out in 1860 with regard to the division of the states of the old Imaum of Muscat, Syed Saeed, between two of his sons. Before his death he divided his kingdom or principality, or whatever it might be called, between two of his sons, leaving Muscat to his son named Syed Thowaynee, and leaving Zanzibar to his son named Syed Mejid; and the kingdom was accordingly divided between the two sons. It was afterwards arranged between them that, considering that the Zanzibar state yielded a larger amount of revenue than the other, it would be equalised by Zanzibar paying to Muscat the sum of 40,000 dollars annually. After a certain time, as generally happens amongst eastern people, the Zanzibar man did not pay the subsidy, and he was two years in arrear. Upon this, Syed Thowaynee appealed to our Government, and at the same time he prepared to fit out a maritime expedition to compel the Sultan of Zanzibar to pay this subsidy. His fleets were getting ready when the Government of India (who thought it would be extremely inconvenient that this expedition should take place, and so, perhaps, throw all the maritime chiefs along the Persian Gulf into confusion), recommended him to stop the expedition, and said that they would send a special commission to inquire into the circumstances. Accordingly the Government of Bombay (Sir George Clerk being Governor at the time), supported by Lord Canning, sent a special commission, at the head of which was brigadier-general, now Sir William Coghlan, which inquired into all the circumstances, and managed to conciliate the parties, and their conclusion was, that the Sultan of Zanzibar should pay the arrears of the subsidy, *i.e.* the 80,000 crowns that were due, and that he should go on paying the 40,000 crowns annually. The two chiefs agreed to this most cordially, and the award was guaranteed by Lord Canning, so that it became, in point of fact, a substantive engagement, though it does not take the form of a treaty. That, in a political point of view, is the most important matter in the relations between the Government of India and Zanzibar, and the present Government of India say, it is the only thing that binds us to Zanzibar at all.

198. Are the relations between the two states now on an amicable footing?—There has been a long history of revolution since that time. Syed Thowaynee, with whom the arrangement was made, and to whom the subsidy was paid, was killed by his own son, Syed Salim, who usurped the government; upon which Syed Mejid said, in effect, "it was all very well to pay this to my brother, but this man is a parricide and an usurper, and I demur to paying the money to him." Then that, of course, brought up a new embarrassment, and after a considerable amount of discussion on the subject it was arranged that the amount of the subsidy should be paid into the Bombay Government, as the Sultan of Zanzibar thought he could not properly pay the money to a man who had killed his (Syed Mejid's) brother. He said he did not wish to shirk his obligations, but he would pay the 40,000 crowns a year to the Government, and they might do what they liked with it. I think he paid in two years' subsidy; but in the meantime another man rose up, called Syed Azan-aben Ghias, and he turned out Syed Salim; he was not one of the brothers, but he was a distant connexion of the family, and it

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was then supposed, he not being one of the brothers, with whom this family compact was made, he was no longer entitled to receive the subsidy. Since that time, however, another brother, one of the genuine family of Syed Saeed, has come and driven Azan-ben Ghias away, so that the present state of affairs is, that we have one brother representing Muscat, and another brother representing Zanzibar, both of those being the sons of old Syed Saeed, who made this original division.

199-200. Do you consider that the award was of a perpetual character, and that it ought to be maintained, without reference to the individuality of the *de facto* ruler, as an arrangement between state and state?—That is one of the most difficult questions which I ever had before me, and one regarding which Indian authorities are greatly divided. My own opinion is, that as long as any member of the original family of Syed Saeed is the sovereign at Muscat, he has a fair claim on the subsidy from Zanzibar, but a man of a different family, an usurper, would not have the same claim; but others entertain a different opinion; they think it is an agreement as between state and state, and that the *de facto* ruler of Muscat is entitled to that subsidy, whatever his antecedents. I do not go so far as that; but Sir William Coghlan, who arbitrated the question, and to whom I wrote some time ago, when the matter of the subsidy was under discussion, said that in making that award, that was his view of it.

201. Do you consider if the Sultan of Zanzibar were relieved from the payment of the subsidy he would be more willing to put an end to the traffic in slaves?—I have not the slightest doubt that he would. He has several times hinted that he would do so. As to the action of the British Government; if any suggestion of that character was made, it was at a time when a man, who might be considered altogether an outside usurper, was in possession of Muscat; but the position of affairs is very much altered by a member of the reigning family being restored to power. The Slave Trade Committee, of which I was a member, which sat at the Foreign Office some time ago, recommended that the remission of the subsidy should be considered; but that was at a time when the family of Syed Saeed were entirely expelled from Muscat; so that the question of subsidy was then a more open question than it is now. The Government of India, however, have an extremely strong feeling on the propriety of maintaining, in every case, the payment of the subsidy.

202. As a matter of right?—As a matter of right, and as a matter in which the good faith of the British Government in India is pledged; and I think we should be obliged to maintain it now that Syed Tourkee, who is one of the brothers, has come to the throne. It would have been comparatively easy if Azan-ben Ghias had continued to reign at Muscat, to have said, You are not a member of the family of Syed Saeed, and you are not entitled to the subsidy.

203. You think that the arrangement recommended by the Committee might then have been carried out?—At the time we made this recommendation this usurper was in power; it would not be so easy to carry it out now.

204. You think the circumstances are rather altered?—The circumstances are altered since this Slave Trade Report was sent in.

205. What is the annual amount of revenue 0.116.

derived by the Sultan from this traffic in slaves?—In our Report it was stated to be about 20,000 l. a year. I think that must be rather in excess of the real amount, because the subsidy is only about 8,000 l.

206. Would the general financial condition of the State admit of a diminution of revenue to the extent of the amount derived from the slave trade, without causing serious embarrassment if the payment of the subsidy should still be enforced?—I should say it certainly would not; it would be a very large slice out of his revenue. I think if it was taken away from him it would cause such embarrassment that it would be extremely injurious to his people and to himself, and I do not think he could carry on his government if he lost revenue, unless it were made up to him from some other source.

207. The Indian Government are strongly in favour of the subsidy being continued?—Yes.

208. Does the Government of India attach much importance to its connection with Zanzibar?—There has been a good deal of conflict of opinion with regard to that. The present Government say that, except as having arbitrated with regard to the subsidy, there is no reason whatever why the Indian Government should have any connection with it. If the Home Government were to decide, as regards this question of subsidy, that Zanzibar should no longer pay the money to Muscat, the Government of India would recommend that we should entirely withdraw from all connection with Zanzibar, because they say, that except in supporting this award they have no interest in the country at all. This is the view of the present Government of India; but I wish to say, that Lord Lawrence's Government expressed a totally different opinion on the matter. The India Office have for years been in communication with the Government at Bombay and the Supreme Government of India respecting their views; and till the time of Lord Mayo, the answer invariably was, that it was of very great importance to keep up a connection between Zanzibar and India, because there was a very large trade between Zanzibar and India, and because our subjects went to Zanzibar.

209. What is your own opinion on the matter?—My own opinion is in favour of not severing the connection between the Indian Government and Zanzibar.

210. What is the extent of the trade between India and Zanzibar?—I have a statement here showing the progressive increase of imports at the Zanzibar Custom House; in 1861-62, they were 245,981 l.; in 1862-63, 332,092 l.; in 1863-64, 294,633 l.; in 1866-67, 380,051 l.; and in 1867-68, they were 433,693 l., of which about one-half is in the hands of Great Britain. That was taken from the last Zanzibar Administration Report for 1869-70.

211. Is it on account of this commercial connection, that the Indian Government has consented to burden its revenues with the expenses of the maintenance of an agency at Zanzibar?—I think almost entirely, with the exception as I mentioned before, that it has been obliged to maintain its awards and guarantees. The principal argument urged in favour of our continuing our connection with Zanzibar is, that there is a great trade between India and Zanzibar, and therefore, that we should go to a certain expense in retaining an agency there; but I have always thought it would be a more equitable arrangement

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ment if we paid the lesser part of the expense, and the Imperial Government the greater.

212. There are some Indian subjects residing at Zanzibar?—Yes.

213. Do you believe if the slave trade was suppressed, a very large legitimate trade would spring up?—It has been shown that there is a great deal of trade now; whether if slavery were suppressed in Zanzibar we could introduce free labour, is another question; I should think we could in process of time, but my recommendation would be that we should attempt gradually to suppress the slave trade, because you cannot import free labour immediately, and it might embarrass the industrial resources of the country very greatly if you suppressed the slave trade suddenly without providing free labour.

214. Has the Indian Government ever proposed or recommended the establishment of more rapid communication by steam, between India and Zanzibar, as a means of suppressing the slave trade?—I do not know that they have, but I know that the Slave Trade Committee which sat at the Foreign Office recommended that the subject should be taken into consideration, as one of very considerable importance.

215. You have stated that you were a member of that Committee?—Yes.

216. As representing the India Office, were you willing that the expenses of the Zanzibar establishment, on the scale recommended by that Committee, should be borne in equal parts by the Indian and the Imperial Exchequers?—Yes, certainly, and the views I took were fully adopted by the Secretary of State for India in Council, and we wrote a letter to the Foreign Office, representing that those were our views, and hoping that that recommendation would be carried out.

217. Has that scheme been adopted by the Government?—The scheme was concurred in by the Foreign Office; both the Foreign Office and the India Office were of opinion that it would be a fair mode of settling the whole matter.

218-19. Can you tell the Committee the reason why it has not been adopted?—The reason it has not been adopted, has been because the Lords of the Treasury refused to pay a farthing towards it; I can produce the correspondence if necessary.

220. *Chairman.*] Will you give the substance of the correspondence without putting the correspondence itself in?—The substance of the departmental correspondence is, that the Foreign Office asked the Treasury to pay and the Treasury refused. The result on the India Office is shown by this passage of a Despatch from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Mayo, dated 21st April 1871. "Your Excellency is aware the 'anomalous state of things' here adverted to was brought by Her Majesty's Government under the consideration of a Special Committee on the African Slave Trade, in which the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office, and the Admiralty were represented, and of which Mr. Churchill, your agent at Zanzibar (then on sick leave), was a member. The Committee were of opinion, that as the duties of the agency and consulate at Zanzibar were of a twofold character, one part concerning the Indian, and the other the Imperial Government, it was expedient that the controlling authority should be divided between the Foreign Office and the India Office, and just that the cost of maintaining this twofold establishment should be equally divided between the

Imperial and the Indian Governments. This recommendation was supported by the Foreign Office and the India Office, but it is with much regret that I have to inform you that the proposal has been negatived by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, who refuse to burden the Imperial Exchequer with any part of the expenditure necessary for the support of the Zanzibar establishment. Against this decision, I have protested. I concur in opinion with your Excellency's Government, that the revenues of India should on no account be charged with any part of the expenditure entailed by the efforts made for the suppression of the East African slave trade; but I do not agree with you in considering that the interests of India are in no wise promoted by the residence at Zanzibar of an officer appointed and controlled by the Indian Government. There is a large and increasing trade between India and Zanzibar, and many subjects of Her Majesty and of neighbouring Indian states are located in that territory; apart from all political considerations, it appears to me indeed to be open to serious question whether an entire severance of the existing connection between your Government and the state of Zanzibar would not be highly injurious to large numbers of the people under your rule. If, therefore, it should be finally determined by the Lords of the Treasury that no contribution shall be made by the Imperial Exchequer towards the maintenance of the British establishment at Zanzibar, I should consider it my duty, in communication with your Excellency, to place the agency on an entirely new footing, so that no payment should thereafter be made from the Indian revenues on account of any proceedings connected with the suppression of the slave trade, or any other measures not having for their object the benefit of the people of India; but it will be obvious to your Excellency that at a time when the Financial Department of Her Majesty's Government refuse to entertain a proposal strongly recommended by other departments for an equitable division of the expenses of the Zanzibar establishment, I could not, if I thought it desirable, recommend that the Imperial Government should relieve India altogether of the charge of the Zanzibar agency and consulate;" so that you see from this that the Secretary of State for India is very willing to share the expenses fairly and equitably with the Imperial Exchequer, but that the Imperial Exchequer declines to bear any part of the burden.

221. *Mr. Kinnaird.*] Has great inconvenience arisen from the refusal on the part of the Treasury to carry out that scheme so concurred in by the Foreign Office and the India Office?—Certainly, very great inconvenience must arise, because we have communicated to the Foreign Office that we consider that they will no longer be privileged to send any instructions to the Zanzibar agent; so that it must bring the whole thing to a deadlock.

222. So that this fearful traffic has latterly been increasingly carried on, owing to the action of one department of Her Majesty's Government?—Certainly; this would be the tendency; but I am not informed as to the fact.

223. You think that a matter deeply to be deplored?—I think it a matter greatly to be deplored.

224. The head of the department has authorised you to state that that is the view which he entertains?

entertains?—I think the head of my department has as sincere a desire as any man in the kingdom, to suppress the East African slave trade; but in the face of continued representations, which he is receiving from the government of India, he has considered that it would be a misappropriation of the Indian revenues to devote money towards that purpose. In their view it is not a question in which the people of India are in any way concerned, and therefore they have considered they could not conscientiously and honourably pass a vote towards that purpose; they consider it to be a matter entirely of Imperial interest. I may repeat that this is a very old question. It was brought up in Sir Charles Wood's time. The India Office in his time, continually represented to the Home Government, that the suppression of the slave trade was not a matter of Indian interest, and that the expenses of the Zanzibar agency should be paid by the Home Government. I have here a letter dated as far back as 1860, in which Sir Charles Wood says, "Every important communication from Zanzibar, related to matters especially in connection with the slave trade, more immediately within the cognisance and under the control of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, than of the Secretary of State for India." On the 26th of November, Sir Charles Wood again called the attention of Lord Russell to the subject, and on the 8th December 1860, the Foreign Office replied that they "concurred in the views of the Secretary of State for India, as to the propriety of the consulate at Zanzibar being replaced on the same footing as that in which it was placed in the time of Colonel Rigby's predecessor, who corresponded directly with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in all matters in which it was necessary that this office should be informed, and receive instructions on such matters from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;" and Sir Charles Wood sent out instructions accordingly. After that we again tried to make some impression upon the Imperial Exchequer, pointing out that we considered that as the Foreign Office agreed in opinion with us, that the matter was one of Imperial interest, and as they thought that instructions should go from the Foreign Office on all slave trade matters, they ought to pay part of the expense.

225. With regard to the recent refusal on the part of the Treasury, to allow part of the expenses to be borne by the Imperial Treasury, do you remember on what grounds they put that refusal?—I may state that the India Office has not had direct communication with the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury upon the subject, but that our information has come through the Foreign Office; the reason that the Treasury gives is, that the policy suggested does not warrant any addition to the Imperial expenditure; the policy suggested being the putting a stop to the slave trade on the east coast of Africa, and therefore the views of the Treasury, I suppose, are that the game is not worth the candle.

226. You understand by that, that the Treasury is perfectly aware that a small expenditure would be sufficient, but that it declines in any way to contribute anything towards the expenses of the agency at Zanzibar?—Yes; the Slave Trade Committee appointed to sit at the Foreign Office, composed of members of the different offices selected by their several chiefs of departments, sent in a Report, which had been most elaborately

and exhaustively considered by those gentlemen. This Report was laid before the Treasury and before Parliament; but the Treasury after reading the recommendations of that Committee, supported by the Foreign Office and the India Office, did not think that there was anything recommended by that Committee of sufficient importance to warrant their paying 1,500 *l.* a year towards it.

227. Fifteen hundred pounds was all that was required?—Fifteen hundred pounds by the Imperial Exchequer, against 1,500 *l.* to be paid by the Indian Exchequer for the expenses of the Zanzibar agency and consulate.

228. What is the date of the despatch to which you just referred, containing the refusal of the Treasury?—The 2nd of June 1871; the Foreign Office felt so strongly upon the subject that they referred the matter back again to the Treasury, forwarding further letters from us on the subject; but still the Imperial Exchequer, would not pay anything for the suppression of the slave trade; and this letter of the 2nd June 1871, to which I am referring, is the final answer of the Treasury.

229. What was the date of the Report of that Slave Trade Committee?—January 24th, 1870; so that nearly 18 months elapsed before the final decision of the Treasury.

230. Had that small amount been granted, would the arrangement have been carried out immediately?—It would as soon as we could have sent out instructions; we should have had to appoint one or two more vice-consuls; it was agreed to increase the establishment for the purpose of taking more effectual steps for the suppression of the slave trade. We made out what would be the cost of those new appointments, and we added that to the cost of the old appointments, and we found that the whole cost would be about 3,018 *l.*, and therefore, the share of each Government would be 1,519 *l.*

231. Both Dr. Kirk and the Admiral on the station, state that the slave traffic is now being carried on with increased vigour; that, I suppose, is owing to that loss of time of 18 months?—I have no doubt it is in a very great measure owing to the suspension of all active measures on our part. I was asked yesterday, by the Duke of Argyll, with reference to a letter from Admiral Cockburn, which Mr. Vivian has just read, to state whether the Indian Government had either thrown impediments in the way, or had discouraged the proceedings for the suppression of the slave trade, and I said I should not be at all surprised if that were the case; at all events, the whole thing is in abeyance owing to nothing having been decided. But I daresay that the increase of the slave-trade has not been occasioned solely by that, but that it has been partly occasioned by the accession of Syed Burgash. Syed Mejid was favourable to the suppression of the slave trade so long as he got a *quid pro quo*, but on his death, his brother, Syed Burgash, became the ruler of Zanzibar, and he is a man of different temper and character, and not so inclined to further the views of the British Government; but upon that subject Mr. Churchill will be able to give better information than I can.

232. You think we have lost, by this delay, a very favourable opportunity of coming to a treaty arrangement by which the slave trade might have been stopped?—I must give a qualified answer

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to that; I think we should have been able to carry out such an arrangement if Syed Mejid had lived, but owing to the death of Syed Mejid and the change in the government, I cannot answer so positively upon the subject.

233. *Chairman.*] Without reference to the last despatch, which has been the subject of discussion, have you any doubt as to the *bonâ fide* disposition of the Government of Bombay to put an end to the slave trade as far as in them lies?—The Government of Bombay in all these matters is very much under the direction of the Viceroy in Council; it is the Government of India, and not the Government of Bombay, that finally controls these proceedings, and it is from the Government of India that we generally receive our advices. The Bombay Government report to the Government of India, and the Government of India then send their views home to us.

234. With respect to the liberated slaves, a large proportion of them go to Bombay, do they not?—A large number of them go to Bombay; they are detained at Aden, and they are sent thence to Bombay; I came upon a letter the other day, in which I found that in the course of five years charges have been paid by the Indian Government, and eventually paid by the Treasury to the amount of 15,000 *l.* odd, nearly 16,000 *l.* for five years, for the maintenance and support of those slaves; so that they absolutely pay upwards of 3,000 *l.* a year for maintaining these captured slaves, besides, perhaps other expenses upon the same account which I do not know. But as far as I understand financial matters, it seems to be a system of “penny wise and pound foolish”; the Imperial Exchequer seems to be spending a great deal more money than it need spend, because it will not look the matter fairly in the face.

235. Sir J. Hay.] Is that 3,000 *l.* a year the charge for the maintenance of the depôt at Aden, or is it the whole charge for maintenance at Bombay and Aden?—It includes maintenance at Bombay.

236. Mr. Kennaway.] That is paid out of the Imperial Exchequer?—The Indian Government pay the money, and then we recover it from the Imperial Exchequer.

237. *Chairman.*] What becomes of those liberated slaves after they reach Bombay?—I am not able to say what becomes of them. The details of the slave trade are under the cognizance of the Foreign Office; they only come incidentally before me.

238. What is your opinion as to the prospect of increased trade arising between Zanzibar and Bombay?—I think, to a certain extent, that has been answered by the figures to which I referred showing the continued increase of imports at Zanzibar. I think, from the progressive increase shown in the last five or six years, the prospects are exceedingly good, and that there will be a still greater trade. A sudden stoppage of the importation of slaves into the island of Zanzibar would seriously affect the industrial position of the country, and therefore it would be very disadvantageous to disturb it suddenly, unless we were prepared at the same time with a scheme of free immigration.

239. Lord Enfield.] There has been a great saving annually on the Slave Trade Vote by the abolition of mixed commission courts, has there not?—Yes.

240. That has been so much gain to the Exchequer?—Yes, that is one of the points we considered in our Report. Mr. Rothery will give you the details, if he is examined.

241. In the summary of your suggestions these words occur: “Our views are to urge upon the Sultan the ultimate abolition of the legal slave traffic, and of the export of slaves from the mainland;” can you fix any date by which, supposing those suggestions to be carried out, and supposing there to be no financial difficulties in the way, we could look forward to the ultimate abolition of the traffic in slaves?—I think that was a point considered by the Slave Trade Committee; I am not competent to give an opinion from my own knowledge; but it would not be desirable to stop the trade immediately, because it might throw the affairs of Zanzibar into some embarrassment.

242. *Chairman.*] Summing up your evidence, it is practically a question of 1,500 *l.* a year?—Yes, in its immediate aspects.

243. If the Treasury were to advance 1,500 *l.* a year, in all probability we should live to see the ultimate abolition of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa?—I think we should; but at the same time the Committee must thoroughly understand that this 1,500 *l.* a year is only the amount to be paid to the agency, that is to say, the European officers and their staff; but the question is, whether we can stop the east coast of Africa slave trade without paying, for a certain number of years, a sum of money to the Sultan of Zanzibar. We cannot expect him to forego a part of his revenue without giving him something in return for it. His continuing the slave trade is based solely on the ground that he cannot maintain his government without the amount of revenue which he receives from the duty on slaves, just as we uphold in India what we all know to be wrong, viz., the opium monopoly and the salt monopoly, and other things; our only argument is, that we cannot carry on the Government without them; the Sultan of Zanzibar says he cannot carry on his Government without this tax upon slaves, and I think it is a great question whether the sum he receives from it, or a portion of the sum he receives from it, should not be paid in some way or other to him by the Government.

244. Mr. Crum-Ewing.] Would you pay him all the tax he derives from the slaves, or the sum he pays to the Imaum of Muscat?—It is stated in the Report that he receives 20,000 *l.* as the tax upon slaves, whereas the sum which he pays the Imaum of Muscat is 8,000 *l.*; but I think we must lay it down as a certainty that we must give him some bonus or compensation. It would be a matter for consideration what that should be.

245. *Chairman.*] For carrying out his treaty, in point of fact?—Yes; it was most strongly recommended a number of years ago by Sir George Clerk, when Governor of Bombay. He says, “The British Government must be prepared to support the Sultan by its ships and by its money. The strengthening of the Cape fleet, and the frequent extension of its surveillance to Zanzibar and the adjacent African coast; the stationing of gun boats at Zanzibar, and the grant of compensation to the Sultan for the revenue he will sacrifice, are measures which it would be presumptuous in this Government to advocate. The honourable the Governor in Council cannot for a moment doubt that if the horrors described by  
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an officer so cautious as Brigadier Coghlan were made known to the British nation, not a voice would be raised against so small an acknowledgment to Zanzibar as 8,500 *l* per annum for the attainment of so noble an object as the extinction of the East Indian African Slave Trade."

246. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] That does not contemplate the payment of the full amount of 20,000 *l*?—No; but that was 10 years ago, and probably the slave revenues have greatly increased since then.

247. *Chairman*.] We had it in evidence on Monday that all that the Sultan of Zanzibar had a right to, under his treaty, was the introduction of slaves for the service required in Zanzibar itself; and it was stated that for that purpose 1,700 slaves per annum was the outside quantity required; if that is the case he must derive a large revenue from an illegal slave trade, involving, as has been stated, the sacrifice of half a million lives in five years?—Yes; I would only recommend that he should be compensated for the surrender of the legal traffic.

248. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] Supposing that policy to be adopted, and the slave trade to be put down, you would save the amount that would be incurred in compensation by the withdrawal of the squadron?—Yes.

249. Putting it as an economical arrangement, it is by far the cheapest thing to pay him this compensation?—Yes, I have always thought so.

250. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Do you think the Sultan of Zanzibar could put down the slave trade if he were willing to do so without the assistance of the squadron?—No, he could not.

251. Mr. *Fowler*.] Do you think that in three or four years he would be able to do without the squadron?—Yes, if the suppression of the slave trade were done gradually and not hastily, and if steps were taken at the same time to import free labourers into Zanzibar, the thing might be done in time without damage to commerce, or the internal industry of the country.

252. Sir *J. Hay*.] The expenditure of 1,500 *l*, which you have just alluded to is entirely independent of the expenditure on the squadron?—Yes, entirely; the recommendation of the Slave Trade Committee that sat at the Foreign Office, was, that as a beginning the establishment at Zanzibar should be increased, because we wanted to put some vice consuls or agents upon the main land, so as to superintend the emigration, and so on, and that the cost of this increased establishment should be fairly divided between the Indian Government and the Imperial Exchequer; it was supposed that what is now 2,000 *l* a year, would be increased to about 3,000 *l* a year, and the proposal was, that the two Governments should divide the latter amount fairly between them.

253. The difficulty which the squadron has to encounter, as I understand it is this, that the transfer of domestic slaves along the coast within the legal limits, covers the illegal transport of slaves to foreign countries?—That is the difficulty.

254. That being so, your proposition is, that a sum by way of bonus should be paid to the Sultan of Zanzibar, as a compensation for the abolition of the present legal traffic in domestic slaves, so that the legal traffic in slaves should henceforth be no cover for the illegal traffic?—Yes; I should recommend that a sum should be paid to him equivalent to what he gains in

revenue on the slave traffic not prohibited by treaty.

255. Have you considered what that sum would be?—No; I am very imperfectly acquainted with the details of the slave trade itself, but I believe it is generally considered that the amount of the subsidy of 8,000 *l*, which he pays to the Imaum of Muscat, would about cover what he would lose; so that if he were freed from the payment of this 8,000 *l* to the Imaum of Muscat, he would be in a position to abandon the revenue to which I have referred, so I consider in round numbers about 8,000 *l* would be the right amount; that is about the sum recommended to be paid him by Sir George Clerk in 1860.

256. You think there is no reason to suppose that it would be required to be larger now?—No, I think not, because some agents of the Sultan of Zanzibar were in this country two or three years ago, and they hinted that if the Sultan was relieved from the payment of the subsidy, he would be able to carry out the wishes of the British Government.

257. Is any part of the expenditure which is required for the maintenance of the squadron employed in the suppression of the slave trade borne by the Indian revenue?—I know we pay a fixed sum towards the support of Her Majesty's ships in the Eastern seas, viz., 70,000 *l* per annum.

258. That is not specially applicable to the slave squadron?—No, it is for the entire maritime defence of India.

259. Would the Indian Government be prepared to make a larger contribution than that 70,000 *l*, with the view of increasing the squadron on the coast of Zanzibar, and thereby hastening the suppression of the slave trade?—I cannot answer that question. I do not think we would like to pay any more than the 70,000 *l* we now pay, considering that in addition to that we have to pay for our own tran ports.

260. Mr. *Kennaway*.] Have any instructions been issued to the Government of India, with regard to the continuance or discontinuance of the subsidy?—The last instructions which went out to the Government of India, with regard to the subsidy, have not yet been acknowledged by the Government of India, but the matter stands at present in this position. It is fair to state that there is a great difference of opinion between the different authorities with respect to the maintenance of the subsidy. The Government of India are strongly of opinion that we should maintain the subsidy, and that it would be a great breach of faith to release the Sultan of Zanzibar from the payment of it, while the views generally of Her Majesty's Government are, I think, that the Sultan of Zanzibar should be released from the payment of the subsidy. Under these circumstances the India Office has suggested that an officer of high rank and experience should be sent out to inquire into the state of affairs, and to bring about some amicable arrangement between the Sultan of Zanzibar and the Sultan of Muscat, which should be a permanent arrangement.

261. Did I rightly understand you to say, that the Treasury having refused to bear any part of the expenses of the Zanzibar agency, the Indian Government were about to send instructions to the agent to discontinue his endeavours to suppress the slave trade?—We have written to the

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Foreign Office most distinctly to say that, as the Imperial Government will not have any concern with it of any kind, and as the Government of India protest very strongly against paying for anything connected with the slave trade, we think that the Foreign Office should cease to send instructions to our agent at Zanzibar at all, thus leaving it to the Imperial Government to appoint their own agent there if they like.

262. Have you sent him any instructions as your agent, to discontinue his endeavours to suppress the slave trade?—The Secretary of State for India certainly has sent him no such instructions, but it is possible that the Government of India may have done so. I suppose that state of things described in the letter which has just been read by Mr. Vivian, that the Government of India were rather encouraging than otherwise the trade in slaves, or at all events, not discouraging it, has arisen out of this very embroglio to which we have been referring.

263. Would the agent at Zanzibar be allowed to act as judge of the Vice Admiralty Court still?—That is a question I have not considered. I think that the Government of India would not allow anything to take place that would cause any embarrassment and confusion. I conceive, therefore, that he would still act as judge of the Vice Admiralty Court.

264. Is much of his time taken up in slave trade matters?—I should consider that a larger part of his time was taken up with slave trade matters than with anything connected with India, but upon that question Mr. Churchill is ready to give evidence.

265. Mr. *J. Talbot.*] Do you think that the Sultan of Zanzibar, with the view of getting released from this subsidy, is putting a pressure upon us by encouraging the slave trade?—I think it is very likely. Syed Mejid died whilst Mr. Churchill was in Zanzibar, after that gentleman had sat upon the Slave Trade Committee, and I have no doubt that Syed Burgash thinks it very likely that he will be relieved from the payment of the subsidy.

266. The more he encourages the slave trade, the more pressure he puts upon the Government to relieve him from the payment of the subsidy?—I think it is very probable.

267. With regard to the suggestions of the Slave Trade Committee, of which you say you have no doubt the Treasury had cognisance, have they been officially pressed upon the Treasury as a means by which the slave trade might be abolished?—The Foreign Office have pressed these considerations upon the Treasury, and the Slave Trade Report was laid before Parliament.

268. Did the Treasury, after it was pressed upon them that by a small expenditure they could abolish the slave trade on the east coast of Africa, take upon themselves the responsibility of refusing that small expenditure?—Undoubtedly they did; the refusal was made when they addressed the letter to the Foreign Office to which I have referred.

269. Lord *F. Cavendish.*] The main part of the slaves exported from Zanzibar go to Muscat, do they not?—Some do; I do not think the main proportion do.

270. Have we any treaty with the Imaum of Muscat for the suppression of the foreign slave trade?—Yes; the original treaties were made

with the Imaum of Muscat, when he was also ruler of Zanzibar.

271. If the non-fulfilment of the conditions of that treaty with the Imaum of Muscat is one of the chief causes of the encouragement of this trade, do you consider that we are bound to enforce the payment of the subsidy to the Imaum of Muscat, in the case of his non-fulfilment of such engagement?—I do not think that this arrangement which was made for the payment of the 40,000 crowns by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the Imaum of Muscat, had any bearing upon anything connected with the slave trade at all. The arrangement was come to on this consideration, that the revenues of Zanzibar were larger than the revenues of Muscat, and it was supposed that the payment was necessary to the ruler of Muscat, with reference to his engagements to others; in point of fact, Muscat was originally the substantive state, Zanzibar being only a sort of appendage to it; and the question was, whether Muscat, being the more warlike state of the two, would not attack Zanzibar, and whether the Imaum of Muscat would not say, "In my father's time Muscat and Zanzibar were one kingdom, and I will make it one kingdom now." This arrangement was come to, to prevent any such disturbance, and it had no reference to the slave trade whatever. Of course any breach or violation of treaty on the part of Muscat towards the British Government, may be punished by us as we think fit, but it was not with reference to any revenues from slaves that the agreement as to the subsidy was made.

272. Do you consider it reasonable that he should expect the power of England to be used to enforce the payment of this sum to him, when he is putting us to an immense expense in the arrangements we are making for the suppression of the slave trade, in consequence of his not observing his treaty?—It is a question whether he is putting us to enormous expense. I do not suppose that our squadron is mainly employed on this service.

273. We were told by Mr. Vivian, that by far the largest proportion of the slaves from Zanzibar are taken to Muscat?—That, no doubt, was stated on much better information than I am able to give upon the subject. The details of the slave trade are superintended by the Foreign Office.

274. The recommendation of the Committee of which you were a member, with respect to the payment of our consular establishment at Zanzibar, was only a small part of the recommendations of that Committee?—We made several other recommendations.

275. Amongst other recommendations which you made, you suggested that a new treaty should be made with the Sultan of Zanzibar?—Yes.

276. Have you any reason to suppose that the Sultan of Zanzibar would accept such a treaty as you recommended?—I think he would, if we released him from the subsidy, or paid him an equivalent. My recommendation is, that if we do not feel ourselves to be in such a political position as to release him from the subsidy, we should pay the money ourselves.

277. Did I rightly understand you to say that the mere payment of 1,500 *l.* a year, by the Imperial Exchequer, would put an end to the slave trade on the east coast of Africa?—I have not stated that; I wish distinctly to be understood

to say that the payment of 1,500 *l.*, relates solely to the agency. I do not see that we could put a stop to the slave trade there, without relieving the Sultan of Zanzibar from the payment of the subsidy, or giving him some equivalent.

278. Would the recommendations which your Committee made with respect to the squadron, entail increased cost upon this country?—That I am not in a position to state.

279. Have you seen some observations made by Sir Leopold Heath on the Report of the East Coast African Slave Trade Committee?—Yes.

280. Perhaps, you recollect these extracts, "I very much regret that the evidence upon which the Report is based, has not been published, because any opinion I may give, will be merely that of an individual, and would, perhaps, have been materially modified had I seen the recorded evidence of others. With this reservation I have to state, that I can in no way agree with the opinion expressed in paragraph 36, that with three cruisers and one steam-launch, the slave trade will be effectually checked during the greater part of the year! I have frequently recorded my opinion, that all that England has done for the last 25 years, on the east coast, has been of no practical use in the suppression of the slave trade; and now that there is an apparent intention on the part of Government to inaugurate a more vigorous policy, I must earnestly hope that the squadron will be largely increased. So long as the existing domestic habits in slave receiving countries remaining unchanged, so long will there be more or less of slave trade. Those habits can only be changed by completely stopping the supply of slaves for a very long period, probably for a whole generation, and any system which stops short of that will fail of complete success. The trade will be scotched, but not killed, and will revive whenever the pressure is taken off. I recommend, therefore, that at least 10 vessels, besides the flagship, should be appropriated to this source." Do you concur in that opinion?—Not being a naval officer, I am not competent to give an opinion upon that.

281. He further says: "I wish to add, that notwithstanding my general agreement with many of the proposals of the Committee, and my belief, that if carried out, they will make slave trading more hazardous, and tend to reduce its amount. I am yet more and more convinced, that the only certain way of stopping the traffic is by purchasing the sovereignty of Zanzibar, and thus obtaining a central position from which to work upon the neighbouring coast, and ultimately, upon the interior of the country." From those passages, it appears that, at any rate, Sir Leopold Heath is not of opinion that the mere payment of 1,500 *l.* a year would stop the slave trade?—I do not think anybody would say that the mere payment of 1,500 *l.* a year would put a

stop to the trade, but we must have a beginning, and this is the agency by which it is to be stopped. The expenses of the agency might have to be supplemented afterwards by other payments, but this is a beginning, and this is all which the Treasury hitherto has been called upon to pay. There may subsequently arise a question, because it is still an open question, about relieving the Sultan of Zanzibar from the payment of the subsidy, as a matter of breach of good faith, and if we cannot relieve him from the payment of the subsidy, it would have to be considered whether we can in any way produce a sum of money sufficient to compensate him in another way for the surrender of the revenue which he derives from his slave trade. The 1,500 *l.* is a beginning; of course there would be subsequent expenses, but as to what Sir Leopold Heath says as to purchasing Zanzibar, you might as well talk of purchasing Germany.

282. He speaks of the island of Zanzibar?—That is the head-quarters of Zanzibar; how could we do it? In the first place, the Sultan would not sell it. There has been subsequently another recommendation, that we should annex it, as the term goes. I believe the Bombay Government supported that view of the matter, but immediately it was known here the India Office telegraphed to India that it would not be entertained for a moment.

283. Possibly, even with a sincere desire on the part of the Treasury to put down the slave trade, the view might be held that it is not worth while to incur the expense of 1,500 *l.* unless the country is further prepared to go to the expense of maintaining 10 ships on the coast, besides other expenses?—What I say is, that it might be economical in the end, even if that increase of the squadron were required (to which I cannot speak), because to maintain 10 ships for three years is better than to maintain three ships for 20 years; it is only a matter of calculation; the probability is that it would be cheaper in the end. The Committee assumed that there might be a temporary increase of expenditure to be set off against permanent diminution.

284. *Chairman.*] Evidence was given the other day, and you have confirmed it so far as your knowledge goes, that a certain limited number of slaves is sufficient for the labour required in Zanzibar proper; it is only with reference to that limited number of slaves that the treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar permits any slave traffic; that number being given us as 1,700 only per year, there must be a large illegal traffic in slaves?—I do not know how the 1,700 is calculated; whether that is the absolute number of able-bodied labourers, or whether allowance is made for those too old to work, or for children. I am not responsible for these figures.

Mr. HENRY ADRIAN CHURCHILL, C.B., called in; and Examined.

285. *Chairman.*] YOU have resided some considerable time at Zanzibar?—Two years and nine months altogether.

286. In what capacity?—As political agent and consul.

287. Without going into all the particulars which have been stated already, as to the amount of the slave trade and so forth, I will ask you whether you are acquainted with the statements O.116.

of Dr. Livingstone with regard to the slave trade?—Yes; I have read his book, and I do not think them exaggerated at all from what I have heard from Dr. Kirk, who accompanied Dr. Livingstone. In conversations with the former, I have gleaned that the road between Nyassa and the coast is strewn with the bones of slaves that have been killed or abandoned on the road, and the villages which, on their first visit were flourishing

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flourishing, were on their second visit quite abandoned and destroyed; in fact, the whole place had been reduced to a state of desolation.

288. You would not think the statement exaggerated, perhaps, that for every slave brought to Zanzibar there is a loss of four or five additional lives?—No, I think it is not exaggerated; they are better taken care of, of course, after they reach Zanzibar; there, they become comparatively happy. I do not even think they would return to their own country if they had the offer to do so; but the land journey is very trying, and in the course of it they are subjected to great cruelty, as is also the case when they are carried by sea, particularly when they fall into the hands of the northern Arabs.

289. Your special duties at Zanzibar, I presume, are, first, the general political relations, and, secondly, the protection of such British subjects as there are in Zanzibar?—Yes; British subjects, and British protected subjects.

290. How many British subjects and British protected subjects are there?—You may take them at about 4,000 altogether; 3,710 British protected subjects and British Indians; mostly British protected subjects from Kutch.

291. You have, I presume, to preside at the courts?—There are many lawsuits amongst those peoples, and the political agent has the decision of them when the plaintiff is an Arab or a subject of our own, and the defendant a British protected subject; the number of lawsuits decided in the first year that I was there was something like 90 or 100, later it came down a little. Dr. Kirk reported that in 1869 there were 67 lawsuits, and that the amount adjudicated for was about 11,000 *l.* or 12,000 *l.*

292. Have you any criminal jurisdiction?—Yes, as in all eastern countries. We can sentence a man to twelve months' imprisonment, and to a fine of 1,000 dollars, but not beyond that. If the offence was one requiring a greater punishment the criminal would have to go to Bombay.

293. What do your consular duties involve?—The ordinary consular duties; shipping, naval courts, the protection of seamen, and everything connected with shipping; the protection of British subjects, the issue of passports, notarial deeds, and so on; and beyond that there is the slave trade, which is quite peculiar to the Zanzibar consulate; that occasions an enormous amount of work; in fact, the greater part of the work connected with Zanzibar is the slave trade. The establishment of the Vice-Admiralty Court has involved a great deal of work.

294. You preside there?—Yes. During the first year it was established, about 30 dhows were condemned, and I think about the same number are condemned every year. That involves a great deal of work, particularly as the staff of the consulate is very limited. The staff of the consulate is so small, that I was obliged to apply for the services of Dr. Kirk, who was the medical attendant of the agency; his duties were simply to attend to the health of the establishment, it being at the same time open to him to offer his medical services to the Sultan, and to the inhabitants of the place; but with Dr. Kirk's concurrence, I wrote to India, and got him an increase of salary, and by that means he was enabled to give up a portion of his practice, and assist me in my consular duties. I subsequently obtained the services of a clerk, as

the work went on increasing, and besides Dr. Kirk and the clerk there is a native interpreter, who writes the Arabic letters. That is all the establishment.

295. Are there any Indian subjects, or English protected subjects, who hold slaves?—None but the British protected subjects, the Kutchees.

296. Those do?—Yes, many of them do. In General Rigby's time, when he was political agent at Zanzibar, he deprived the whole of the Kutchees, and every Indian subject, of the slaves they held, but he was succeeded by Colonel Pelly and Colonel Playfair, who made a difference between British protected and British subjects. They represented their manner of thinking to the Government of Bombay, and the Government adopted their views; since that time the Kutchees have been enabled to buy slaves, having placed themselves under the protection of the Sultan of Zanzibar; they abstained from inscribing their names in our register, and abandoned our protection altogether; then of course they were allowed to hold slaves; in fact they were told that they would enjoy the same privileges as the Arabs themselves, and the Sultan laid great stress upon the letters he had received from Colonel Playfair upon the subject, and insisted, in a correspondence with me, when I protested against their holding slaves, that they had a right to do so, in consequence of those letters.

297. With reference to the protection of the slaves which are set free by the operation of the cruisers, and in other ways, what means are taken for their protection?—With the exception of those who have been landed for the missions—a very small number, I do not think it is more than 20 or 30 altogether—none have been landed lately at Zanzibar, in fact none have ever been landed there; but when General Rigby liberated about 4,000 slaves, he gave them papers of freedom, and made certain arrangements with their former masters to buy them small estates on which they were placed, by which means they managed to live, and I have never heard of any of them becoming slaves again; some may have been kidnapped, because it is a matter of every day occurrence; the Sultan himself loses his own slaves sometimes, when the northern Arabs come down from Arabia, who do not ask who the slave belongs to, but just take possession of him and carry him off, so that some of the slaves that were liberated in Zanzibar may have been kidnapped; there would be no protection against that, but I look upon it as an evil you must put up with; I do not think it would be carried to any great extent.

298. What are the last accounts you have had from Zanzibar as to the slave trade?—They are very bad; from a private letter I have received, I learn that the slave trade had increased in activity; the policy of Seyd Burgash towards the British agency had also altered; he was at first rather frightened at the attitude of the agency towards him; he did not know exactly what the British Government might do, and he was particularly anxious to please; but afterwards, seeing that nothing came of the insolent language he had held immediately after his accession, he changed about again, and became as insolent as ever; as far as the slave trade is concerned, I believe he has not changed his views.

299. What course would you recommend to be adopted to put a stop to the increase in the slave

slave trade?—I think the Arabs do not understand forbearance at all; they put it down to impotency; they think you are not in a position to insist upon anything, and they misunderstand the motive; in my opinion, the best plan would have been to have adopted strong measures towards the Sultan, and to have forced him to a certain extent.

300. What sort of strong measures do you refer to?—One would be to curtail his income, which we can very well do. Our British subjects have been in the habit for a long course of years, of paying an export duty of 5 per cent. on produce from the coast, coming to Zanzibar. The Sultan has a perfect right of levying octroi duty on the coast, and to facilitate matters; as the custom-house officer is an Indian, he insists upon the Indians, who are the people who carry on this trade, paying him at Zanzibar the 5 per cent., instead of getting it paid inland. If the Hindoos were told that they would no longer be obliged to pay this, I do not think the Sultan would be able to raise the money, and it is a considerable sum; something like 36,000 dollars. I think by our supporting the Hindoos in refusing to pay that, we should bring the Sultan to his bearings immediately; he would see we could do him a great deal of harm, and he would, in order that we should not do him that harm, come to terms with regard to the slave trade.

301. Have you any information as to the amount of trade at Zanzibar, and the probability of increase in it?—I have looked into the returns sent by Dr. Kirk, from which it appears that 310,000 dollars is paid by Jairam Sewji as the farmer of the revenue, and it further appears from the table of imports at Zanzibar, that we have 2,055,954 dollars as representing the imports; 5 per cent. on that, which is the amount levied, would come to 100,000 dollars. Then, on the other side, we have the exportations; the total amount is 1,527,800 dollars, but out of this you have to take 100,000 dollars for copal which pays a special duty, 2,400 dollars for hippopotamus teeth, 663,600 dollars for ivory, and also 270,000 dollars for slaves, that amount representing the value of the slaves. Altogether the deductions which would have to be made from the amount I have given, namely, 1,527,800, would reduce it to 792,900 dollars, on which 5 per cent. is paid, making 36,780 dollars. This, added to the amount received from the copal, which is 20 per cent., would make 20,000 dollars more; add to this the amount received from ivory, which is about 12 dollars per frasilah, it would make an addition of 132,700 dollars, altogether amounting to 289,000 dollars instead of 310,000. Evidently, from this calculation, Jairam Sewji, who is the farmer of the customs, has not put down the amount at its proper value; he has reduced it considerably; he must make a profit, no doubt, out of the business, and if you put it down at 400,000 dollars, it would show that the importations and exportations of Zanzibar are at least one-third more than they have been represented.

302. What is your idea as to the increase of traffic in the event of the abolition of the slave trade?—I think it would increase considerably in the course of time, but it would depend on the manner in which the abolition was carried out. If you attempted to suppress the slave traffic by a sudden stroke, the immediate effect would

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be to decrease the trade of Zanzibar, but if it were done gradually I do not think it would decrease the trade much, and in the course of time it would increase it considerably.

303. There is a certain slave trade recognised as legal, viz., the slaves wanted for the service of Zanzibar proper?—For Zanzibar and the coast.

304. Are there 1,700 required for the purposes of Zanzibar?—In my opinion, that amount is too small; I think that it is more than that; I would say 3,000 or 4,000; when I was there, between 17,000 and 18,000 were imported in the year.

305. Whatever the number may be that is required for service in Zanzibar, it is only the traffic in slaves required for that purpose that our treaties countenance?—Our treaties do not go into those details; they merely say we will not interfere in the transport of slaves from one end of the Sultan's dominions to the other, from Kiliva to Lamoo; but what we protest against and forbid in the treaty is the carrying of slaves from the coast of Africa to the coast of Arabia.

306. If you carry them from the coast of Africa to the coast of Arabia *via* Zanzibar, is not that as clearly a breach of the treaty as anything else?—Yes, undoubtedly.

307. Is not it obvious, if there is only a certain small number of slaves required annually for the service of Zanzibar, that the large proportion of those that are proved to be shipped from Africa to Zanzibar are so shipped for the illegal traffic?—Yes, only the Sultan and the people of Zanzibar would never acknowledge that they require a limited number of slaves at Zanzibar; they are all interested in the slave trade; I think the Sultan indirectly is interested in it too. For instance, his relations with Muscat induce him to favour the northern Arabs; not only does he favour them by allowing them in an underhand manner to take away the slaves, but he sends them large presents amounting to something like 40,000 dollars a year.

308. You say that you think the requirements of Zanzibar would be from 3,000 to 4,000 slaves?—Yes.

309. Large numbers of slaves are sent to the north?—Large numbers are sent to the north of the Sultan's dominions during the season when the carrying of slaves is allowed, and they are there kept in readiness by the inhabitants to be shipped off to the north, and as soon as the season comes round, the northern Arabs transport them to Arabia.

310. Are the hardships to which they are subjected very great?—They are very considerable; I have witnessed them myself; the slaves are starved while they are on board. I was in the "Daphne" when there were about 325 liberated slaves taken, and 11 of them died before we reached Zanzibar; that was only eight or 10 days' voyage; they died from sheer starvation; the captain and the crew of the "Daphne" took the greatest care of them, and tried to bring them round; the doctor used to visit them every day, but he could do nothing, they had become so much reduced.

311. Viscount *Enfield*.] Were they in that condition before they were shipped?—No, I do not think so; they had not been shipped very long; they had been taken on the coast between the northern limit of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions and Brava on the Equator, beyond the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and that

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that is what makes me think that whatever treaty we might make with Zanzibar, and whatever money we might spend, we shall not be able to put a stop to the slave trade totally, because it is carried on beyond the limits of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions, as well as within them; that was on the Somali coast.

312. Sir *J. Hay*.] Were they taken by Arab dhows?—Yes.

313. Viscount *Enfield*.] Are any of the slaves destined for Madagascar?—To some extent they are. Those taken from the southern part of the dominions of the Sultan, namely, from Kilwa to the south towards Cape Delgado, and even from the Portuguese territory, are carried to Madagascar; some are taken to the Comoro Island; these are more for the French who use them as liberated slaves; they are taken to Mohilla; people come across from the French possessions, and the Arabs sell them to them. The French are allowed to buy slaves, and they are liberated, or nominally liberated immediately, and sent to the plantations for a certain number of years.

314. Sir *J. Hay*.] For 10 years service?—Five years.

315. *Chairman*.] You have heard, of course, the terms of the suggested new treaty?—Yes; I received instructions from the Foreign Office to propose them to Syed Majid, which I did when I reached Zanzibar. I embodied them in an Arabic letter, and sent them to him. He took some time to consider the matter, and at last, being pressed, he said, he would discuss the question with me, and wanted me to go over to the coast with him for that purpose. I was prepared to go, but he was so ill at the time, that he begged me to put it off till he could send me notice; instead of that he came back himself, and 10 days after that he died. I pressed the same proposals on Syed Burgash, his successor. On the day of his succession, I took the precaution of calling him to the consulate, and having a conversation with him to see what his views were with regard to political matters and the slave trade, for I might have given my support to some other candidate, there being two or three, though he was the strongest claimant to the throne, and he promised everything; but the very next day he repudiated everything, and said, that he had made no arrangement whatever; that he had never promised anything; that it was all false, and even had he done so, he was not Sultan then.

316. I suppose you have no doubt if that portion of the suggested treaty were adopted, confining the export of slaves absolutely to one point on the coast of Africa, that would, to a very great extent, stop the slave trade?—It would reduce the slave trade considerably, because the place that has been selected is only about 25 miles from the south end of Zanzibar; and when the south west monsoon blows, no boat could leave Dar Selam and go outside the island; she would have to go between the island and the main coast, and the steam launch which we proposed to have there, could prevent all communication between Dar Selam and the Arabian coast direct; the slavers would have to pass between the islands, and we could put a stop to the traffic. Then there would be a great supervision, because we proposed to have a vice consul at Dar Selam, who would have an eye upon everything that was going on, and would be able to report and prevent any irregularities.

317. What naval force is employed on that part of the coast now?—I think seven or eight vessels. I am led to understand that the force has been increased lately; I counted seven, the "Forte," the "Nymph," the "Columbine," the "Cossack," the "Bullfinch," the "Teazer," and the "Wolverine."

318. What is the name of the flagship?—The "Forte." Of course they have other work to perform; the flagship is mostly on the coast of India.

319. I suppose it is not unnatural that the officers in command of those vessels have all sorts of complaints brought against them of their interfering with legal traffic as well as illegal?—Yes; and unfortunately many of the complaints are well founded; but I do not think it proceeds from any wish to be unjust on their part, but merely because they do not know a real slaver from a legal trader; they cannot distinguish the difference; even before my windows at Zanzibar, after I had shown the "Penguin" a slaver, and she was captured in the harbour of Zanzibar, the officers, on their own responsibility, overhauled a dhow that was just coming in, and seized her; I happened to be looking out of the window, and saw that they had seized a wrong dhow, so I got into my boat and went and told them; but it was with the greatest difficulty that I could persuade them that that was the case, and no doubt had this taken place at a little distance from Zanzibar, the dhow would have been destroyed, and we should have had a case before the Vice Admiralty Court, of no colours, unseaworthy, destruction of dhow and prize.

320. I suppose, as the officers receive bounty-money, they are interested in destroying as many dhows as they can?—I do not think that is the inducement.

321. I do not say that that influences them, but still they have a bounty?—They are very eager, no doubt, to get as many dhows as they can; it is the eagerness of sportsmen almost; the men are at the masthead to see whether they can spy a dhow, and they come with the greatest glee to the captain to say that a dhow is in view, and they are very much disappointed if they are not allowed to go after her; in fact, I have been told by some of the officers commanding, that it was a very difficult thing for them to keep within the bounds of justice, and not satisfy the ship.

322. When slaves are captured, how are they maintained?—They are maintained on board ship till they are landed by the captain.

323. Does that come out of the bounty money?—I do not know. I am under the impression that the captain pays for their maintenance, out of the money he receives. They are taken then to the nearest place where they are required, or sometimes where they are not required, for they have been taken to Aden, where they are considered a great nuisance. It was proposed to land them at Zanzibar; but none have been landed; yet, as the measures that were recommended by the Committee have not yet been carried out, they had first of all to be accepted by the Sultan, and afterwards the Treasury had to be consulted; so that in the instructions I received from Lord Clarendon, the question of the landing of slaves at Zanzibar was reserved.

324. What is the cost of the political agency and staff?—I put it down at 3,100 *l.* a year; there are certain contingencies that have not been taken

taken into account; the pay of the political agent is 1,400 rupees per month; the doctor receives 650 rupees; the clerk, 100 rupees; the interpreter, 60 rupees, and then there are nine or 10 peons who receive in all 190 rupees; all that put together, with a certain amount for contingent expenses, boats, flags, stationery, house rent (for though the establishment of the surgeon and the agency belong to Government, still you have to put down 100 rupees as the amount of interest that the capital expended on those houses would render), would make it 3,100 *l.* Then if you established vice consuls on the coast, it would make it a little more than that, because the salary would be something like 300 *l.* or 400 *l.* a year for each one; so that if you had three or four, it would come to about 1,200 *l.*, which, with the other amount, would have to be divided between the two Governments.

325. Mr. *Fowler.*] You spoke of 3,000 slaves being required for the population of Zanzibar; are those slaves kindly treated?—They are very well treated in the Island of Zanzibar, but of course they are always slaves; the master has the power of life or death over them; he might be amenable to a local court of justice, but I do not think he would be very severely punished for killing a slave. The blood money of a slave varies according to the value of the slave himself; if he is what they call a green slave (that is a slave just come from the interior), the blood money is only 25 dollars; if he is at all accustomed to manual labour it is 50 dollars; for an artizan, a bricklayer, and so on, it would be 75 dollars, and for a good looking concubine it would be 100 dollars.

326. There is no restraint upon the treatment

of slaves by their masters, except their own interests?—That is so; they are treated as you would treat your horse.

327. But the slaves are generally kindly treated?—They are very kindly treated, except on the transit between the coast of Africa and the coast of Arabia; I would not say they are harshly treated there, but they are packed very closely, and ill fed; I take it that they are ill fed because they are much more easily managed when they are weak, and in ill condition, than when they are strong; if they were very strong they might overpower the crew.

328. Are you acquainted with Egypt?—Yes.

329. Would you consider that, practically, the system of slavery in Zanzibar was like the system of slavery in Egypt?—I think there is very little difference.

330. I have always understood that in Egypt the slaves are very kindly treated?—Yes; they are so in Zanzibar, too.

331. I presume that in Egypt there is more restraint upon the power of life and death, for instance?—Yes; though the law would be the same, the Koran. In Turkey, since Sultan Abdul Mejid came into power, they have instituted the *Ka-noon*, which is a law beyond the Koran; there is no such law as the *Ka-noon* in Zanzibar.

332. I presume that contact with western civilisation which has operated in Turkey and Egypt, would not have had any effect in Zanzibar?—Very little. There are very few Europeans there; still, the Arabs of Zanzibar are very gentle, and I may say, quite as civilised as the Turks.

Mr.  
*Churchill.*

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Monday, 17th July 1871.

MEMBERS PRESENT;

Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Lord Frederick Cavendish.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.  
Mr. Gilpin.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Sir Frederick Williams.

CHARLES GILPIN, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. HENRY ADRIAN CHURCHILL, C.B., re-called; and further Examined.

Mr. H. A.  
Churchill,  
C.B.  
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333. *Chairman.*] I WILL ask you, in continuation of your evidence on the last occasion, what was the condition of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa, in the districts we have been considering in former times, that is to say, previously to your being there?—In former days, the condition of the slave trade was very flourishing, so much so that the East India Company considered it necessary to try to put it down, and their agents in the Persian Gulf and at Muscat entered into treaties with the various chiefs of the Persian Gulf and Muscat, for that purpose. But the difficulties attending the suppression of the slave trade, with regard to the Indian Navy, were so great that the officers belonging to that service never made any captures. In the courts of justice at Bombay, a captain, after having made a capture, was deprived of his command, in order that the evidence of the officers might not be influenced by him; so that very few captains took the trouble to capture slaves; in fact, I have heard them say, that they put the helm the other way, and went away clear of the dhow whenever they came across one; but matters changed afterwards, when the Royal Navy came to replace the Indian Navy.

334. About what date was that?—I do not exactly recollect, but I think it was when the East India Company was abolished.

335. What was the result of the appointment of the Royal Navy?—The Royal Navy was, on the other hand, too eager, and too great facilities were given to the Royal Navy in not being obliged to go to Bombay to condemn their dhows. They had the option of going there or to the Cape of Good Hope or Mauritius; the last two places being very far from their cruising ground, the Arabs could thus have no possible means of defending themselves. The facilities offered for taking dhows, and condemning them, were so great, that the effect was quite the opposite to what was desired, and they took a great many dhows which were not engaged in the slave trade.

336. Then the Foreign Office, as well as Colonel Playfair, who was then at Zanzibar, suggested certain measures to prevent this?—Yes; at the Foreign Office rules were made, and measures were taken to prevent this. One of those measures was the establishment of the Vice Admiralty Court at Zanzibar itself, which

has had a great effect in preventing irregularities. At the present moment cruisers are obliged to go to Zanzibar to get the dhows captured in that neighbourhood condemned, and there the Arabs themselves have greater facilities in defending themselves.

337. When you first went to Zanzibar, what arrangement did you propose for the stoppage of the slave trade?—There was a question of the subsidy that was paid to Muscat by the Treasury of Zanzibar under discussion; it had been awarded by the Governor General of India. It so happened that the Sultan of Zanzibar refused to pay this subsidy on account of a murder that had taken place; the murder of his brother by Salim, who had succeeded him at Muscat. I was told before I went to Zanzibar, that it would be a great thing if I could get this award put aside, and that by this means the Sultan would do anything for us with respect to the slave trade. When I went there, I sounded him on the subject, and I said, "Now, supposing the Government were to let you off the payment of this money, what would you do with respect to the slave trade?"—After a great deal of discussion, he said he would limit the carrying trade coastwise (I do not mean the trade with Arabia, because that was prohibited by treaty); he would limit it to a strip of land on the coast, between Dar Selam and Mombasa; that would diminish the distance by about six degrees; at present it is about nine degrees from one end of the limit to the other, so that about three degrees would remain.

338. That would lessen the distance by two-thirds?—Yes; and beyond those limits no carrying trade would be allowed; but it so happened that that was a plan that was very much opposed by the Indian Government, and although it has since been proposed by the Committee that sat last year, it has never been carried out.

339. Would that arrangement be now practicable, do you think?—Circumstances have changed since then. This murderer was succeeded by a man who, it is true, belonged to the reigning family, but who had no right to the throne of Muscat; he, in his turn, has been succeeded within the last six months by Seyed Turkee, who is one of Seyed Saeed's sons, and a brother to Seyed Burgash, Sultan of Zanzibar.

Zanzibar. It so happens that there are now two brothers, one at Zanzibar, and the other at Muscat; and it was under those particular conditions that the award was made that one brother should pay a subsidy to the other, so that there would be no reason for the Sultan of Zanzibar declining the payment now, whereas there was then a sufficient pretext for not forcing him to pay it.

340. The Committee asked you questions with regard to the trade of Zanzibar on the last occasion, but I will now ask you this; was the trade direct from England to Zanzibar?—The British trade is direct and indirect; on the whole it amounts to a little more than half the whole of the trade of Zanzibar, but that does not appear on the statement that has been published here by Dr. Kirk, for he says in one portion of his Report that the British trade appeared to diminish by 257,000 dollars; that was in the year 1866–1867 only; and again, it is mostly British trade that is carried on by foreigners. The Hamburg and the French houses send their vessels direct to England, and import into Zanzibar British merchandise. The Arabs do not know where it comes from; they only see that it comes in a French vessel, or that it is imported by a French house, and they put it down as French goods, but it is really English goods. The trade of Zanzibar with Great Britain is increasing every day.

341. But that is principally in foreign bottoms, is it not?—Yes, and even in English vessels; the trade is carried on by Germans and French, generally speaking. Within the last two years, an English house has been established. Messrs. Wiseman & Co. have considerable trade with Zanzibar now, and I believe they are intending to enlarge it very much; but the Indian trade with Zanzibar, though it has really increased, has not increased in the same proportion as the other trade; comparatively speaking, it has decreased.

342. How would the opening of the Suez Canal affect the trade on the East Coast of Africa?—In former days merchandise was sent to Zanzibar, and from Zanzibar to Europe by the Cape of Good Hope, in sailing vessels; the facilities now are so great *via* Egypt that steamers will be employed. In former days merchants' capital could only be turned over once in 12 months; but now as the voyage through the Canal only occupies, going and coming, about 75 days, it may be turned over three or four times; they will be satisfied with less profits; but they will make quite as much, if not more money, through being enabled to use their capital so many more times in a year. I think that Austria and France will, if we do not pay attention to the matter, derive more benefit from it than we shall.

343. Have you turned your attention to what course you would recommend the English Government to take to put an end to the slave trade in these quarters, and with regard to the Sultan of Zanzibar, to enforce the treaties which he has entered into?—Yes; my opinion is that strong measures should be taken with Seyed Burgash, for he is a man who will not understand forbearance. If strong measures cannot be taken, for certain reasons, then I should propose that we should force him, indirectly, to make a treaty with us to put a stop to the slave trade, by menacing him with the deprivation of a certain portion of his income that he derives, without having a

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right to it, from our Indian subjects who carry on the trade between Zanzibar and the coast. The treaties say we are not to pay any export duty; the farmer of the customs at Zanzibar is a Banyan British subject, and most of the men who carry on the petty trade between the coast and the island are Banyans also, who are afraid of him, and of his influence and he has induced them to pay him the tax of 5 per cent. on everything that is imported into Zanzibar from the coast; but in reality it is export from Zanzibar, and it amounts to something like 36,000 dollars a year; this, if Seyed Burgash was not particularly agreeable to us, we might take away from him.

344. By simply claiming the fulfilment of the treaty?—Yes; having deprived him of this source of income, we might hereafter say we would give it back to him, as a compensation, if he made a treaty with us putting down or limiting the slave trade.

345. Mr. Kennaway.] You mean allowing him those charges which he makes illegally at present?—Yes.

346. Chairman.] Is the Sultan of Zanzibar the only Arab Chief that it would be necessary to make terms with?—No; there are chiefs on the Somali Coast (on the Coast of Africa), between Cape Guardafui and Zanzibar, whom we should call upon to pay more attention to their treaties; and then again there is the Sultan of Muscat; and a great many of his subjects (in fact, most of the Northern Arabs are his subjects) come down purposely to carry on the slave trade. They belong to the neighbourhood of Ras il Had, and trade under his jurisdiction. I do not suppose he derives any direct profit from the slave trade (though that is questionable); at all events, he might exercise his power over his subjects to prevent them from going down to kidnap slaves; and when they go back with the slaves, he would assuredly have the power of detecting them.

347. Have you any idea of the number of slaves that find their way into Persia, and how they get there?—Lately, in Bombay, I made inquiry on the matter. There is a man of great influence there of the name of Aga Khan, who is the spiritual chief of the Mussulmans of Bombay; and though I did not see him, I saw some of his relations, and they thought about 3,000 or 4,000 slaves found their way into Persia annually.

348. How do you say they get there; they go to Muscat first, I suppose?—Yes; they are first taken to the coast of Arabia from Rasal Had to the Persian Gulf, and from that they are crossed over into Persian territory.

349. A former witness told us that at Muscat there was an open acknowledgment of the existence of a slave market; do you think that is the case?—I do not think there is, but I am not quite sure. General Rigby would give the Committee better information on that point than I can.

350. Sir R. Anstruther.] Are those slaves that find their way into Persia shipped from Zanzibar and the ports adjacent?—Yes; they are shipped from Zanzibar and the ports in that neighbourhood.

351. Chairman.] Do any slaves find their way into India?—Yes, I have heard so.

352. As slaves?—Yes; as slaves. General Rigby was political agent at Kuttawar for a certain

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certain time, and I am under the impression that he saw slaves imported there.

353. The Committee have heard that the slave trade recently has very much increased at Zanzibar and on the coast; can you give the reasons for that?—The demand has increased in the Persian Gulf, I should say, more particularly, in consequence of the cholera that has been raging in the Persian Gulf lately. About six months ago it was at Bender Abbas, and a great many of the inhabitants and slaves died, and no doubt those people want to get as many as they can in consequence. I think the trade greatly depends upon the demand. If the demand is considerable, the supply will be considerable.

354. Mr. *Kennaway*.] Would you recommend entering into treaties with the chiefs on the Somali coast?—Yes, I think that would be of use; some of them are anxious to enter into a treaty with us. A few days before I left Zanzibar a chief of the interior, beyond Brava, a man of great influence, who has command even over the chiefs of Brava, wished to enter into a treaty, and drew up a rough draft of a treaty with an Englishman who is there, a Mr. Heale; but the English of it was so bad that one could never think of signing anything of the kind. I drew Dr. Kirk's attention to it, and I dare say he has written about it. I think it would be a great thing to enter into treaty engagements with the chiefs of the interior.

355. Are there not several independent chiefs there?—The chief I refer to commands all along the coast between Magadoxa and Brava; he is the man who attacked Juba some time ago, and destroyed it. Then there are other chiefs higher up; it would, perhaps, be rather difficult to enter into treaties with them.

356. And if they kept out of it?—But I do not think they would keep out of it. The Chiefs of Brava made a treaty some years ago with Captain Paisley, but it was more for the protection of British seamen who might be wrecked on the coast than for any other object.

357. Would those ports be the natural ports of export for slaves, and give facilities for it?—There are no slaves exported from the ports I have just mentioned; but three years ago, in 1868, when I went up there in the "Star," they were importing slaves that had been exported from Fazeé, close by; they were importing them along the coast at Brava, at Merka, and at Magadoxa, and were undoubtedly engaged in the slave trade. They could not take them far up, on account of the south-west monsoon, which was just towards its close; the slaves could only go as far as those ports, where they would be fattened up, and educated, and made something of, until the slave trade season would come round; then dhows would come down from the Arabian coast, and take them away to Rusel Had, Muscat, and even to Persia.

358. Have we not a treaty with the Sultan of Muscat?—Yes.

359. If that was enforced, and the market for slaves were closed thereby, as it might be, would not that go a long way towards a settlement of the difficulty?—I do not know that there is a slave market at Muscat, but I should almost think there was. A great deal could be done at Muscat to put a stop to the slave trade. The attention of the Government has not been drawn to that as it should have been.

360. At what do you estimate the income that

the Sultan of Zanzibar receives from the export duty on slaves at this moment?—I have always considered it to be something between 15,000 *l.* and 20,000 *l.* My calculations are founded on this: that when I was in Zanzibar about 17,000 slaves were imported into Zanzibar, and I believe altogether 23,000 slaves were exported through the Custom House at Kilwa. There is a tax of 2 dollars at Kilwa for the exportation of slaves to Zanzibar, a tax of 2 dollars for the exportation of slaves from Zanzibar to the coast, and a tax of 4 dollars for the exportation of slaves from Kilwa to the coast; putting it altogether, I made it somewhere between 15,000 *l.* and 20,000 *l.*; it may be nearer 20,000 *l.*

361. In the evidence of the Honourable Mr. Vivian, taken before this Committee, he speaks of the tax derived by the Sultan of Zanzibar on slaves, and he says, "We" (that is to say, the Foreign Office) "have calculated it at 20,000 *l.* a year; but I make out, unless Dr. Kirk has included also the sale of slaves, that in 1867–8 he must have got 56,000 *l.* by the tax upon slaves; that is to say, 270,000 dollars"?—Yes, 270,000 dollars; but this Report of Dr. Kirk's represents the value of the total number of slaves imported, and not the tax that was levied upon them.

362. You do not think that there is any reason for putting it at that amount?—Certainly not.

363. With regard to the disposal of slaves; have you given the Committee any part where you recommend that liberated slaves should be placed?—I would recommend that they should go to Zanzibar.

364. Do you think that you could possibly keep them there in a state of perfect safety?—Yes, I see no reason for doubting it, only the Sultan of Zanzibar must be willing to co-operate with us; if he is at all opposed to it, it would be quite impossible.

365. How would you propose that the liberated slaves should be employed; on the coast, or on the island?—Some might be employed on the coast, and others on the island. There was an English company a little while ago that tried to obtain a concession of land on the coast; they wanted land between Dar Selam and the south, and they would have taken any number of liberated slaves. Captain Frazer would take about 500 or 600 in the Island of Zanzibar.

366. At all events, you think there would be no difficulty about it?—I think not. When General Rigby was there, he liberated about 3,000 or 4,000 slaves, and took the necessary means of protecting them, and I never heard that any of them had been made slaves of. I do not mean to say that none have.

367. But, on the whole, you think they can be protected?—On the whole, I think they can be very well protected.

368. With regard to those privileges for our Indian subjects, why should we submit to this tax being levied?—The question was raised by the Indian Government, and Ludda Damjee, the farmer of customs, was requested to state how it was that he had levied this tax; he replied that he had nothing to do with the tax on slaves, and that it went to the Sultan's private cash box; that he did not farm the slaves.

369. But I mean the tax that he levies on our Indian subjects; how do you explain that?—I think we knew nothing about it; it is only lately that it has been discovered.

370. Would other persons claim the same privilege

privilege if we enforced it?—At the present moment the French houses on the coast do not pay this tax; but they are very few, and I dare say an English house, if we had one established on the coast, would not pay. But the natives of India, who are, more or less, under the influence of the farmer of the customs, have paid it; and when they were asked why they did not come forward and claim their rights, they said, "Would you have us ruined," because Ludda Damjee could do it easily if he chose.

371. With regard to enforcing their redemption, would not the objection be that the Sultan would then be left without a sufficient revenue?—Yes; no doubt it would cripple his power altogether, and that would be the best means of bringing him to terms. If he found that he could not carry on his Government without this money, he would come to us and say, "I must carry on my Government, so let us come to terms."

372. What is the proportion of children, with regard to girls and boys, who are captured?—I think there are returns made by the commodore, which are sent in every year to the Admiralty; but I should say that there are about as many boys as there are girls, and as many men as women.

373. Dr. Kirk has had very large experience, has he not?—Dr. Kirk went out with Dr. Livingstone formerly, and has travelled a good deal in the country, and knows a good deal of the interior; his knowledge of Zanzibar is considerable.

374. Do you think that, in your absence, any one could be more safely left in charge than Dr. Kirk?—Certainly not; he is the best man for the post. It is a great pity that certain rules would militate against his appointment. When in Bombay I recommended his appointment, but the Governor said that it had been decided between the Government of India and the India Office that medical officers should not fill the appointment of political agents.

375. Is Dr. Kirk continuing there?—Yes, he is continuing there; but I am under the impression that as soon as he learns officially that he is not to aspire to the agency, he will give up his appointment, because it is not worth his while to remain in an out-of-the-way place like that, without the prospect of obtaining the best appointment possible.

376. And you think his leaving the place would be a great misfortune?—I think so.

377. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] You mentioned that the slaves that are now taken to Muscat could be taken to Zanzibar; could they employ such a number there?—Dr. Kirk says they require, at least 1,700 slaves a year; but according to my calculations they would require more, say, 3,000 at least, as some would have to be sent to Samoo and Pemba. They could certainly find employment for the number we could send; we do not capture more than 700 or 800 a year, so that for a considerable number of years they would require slaves there. I mean liberated slaves, of course.

378. But the 700 or 800 does not include, of course, the number that are sent up to Muscat?—No, I think about 10,000 or 11,000 are sent.

379. If those cruisers were very active they would stop more, would they not?—Undoubtedly.

380. But that would lead also to the capture of slaves up the country?—Yes, it would; if 0.116.

proper measures were not taken to prevent the northern Arabs from coming down, and kidnapping slaves; but the sending the liberated slaves to Zanzibar, would tend to diminish the slave trade. I do not think you could suppress it altogether, because so long as the demand exists the supply will exist. I do not think anything in the world will suppress it, until you prevent Persia and Turkey from employing domestic slaves. You might diminish it considerably, but as for putting it down, it is almost impossible.

381. You think it could not be stopped for the present?—No; for instance, we may enter into a treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar. Let us say that he will do everything in his power to prevent the trade; but is this sufficient? Two years ago slaves were being exported to the north of his limits to a place with which he had nothing to do.

382. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] I want to ask you if you know whether domestic slaves in Zanzibar are ever exposed for resale in the foreign slave market?—There is no foreign slave market; there is a slave market for the inhabitants themselves, and decrees were issued by the Sultan on several occasions forbidding the inhabitants of Zanzibar from selling slaves to the northern Arabs, and there was a heavy penalty against it; but it is always done. A northern Arab who wishes to buy a slave gets some one to buy it for him; he does not appear in the market, but he gets the slave all the same.

383. He gets a slave from a person who has already been employing this African as a slave?—From a negro who goes and buys him in the market.

384. I was referring, not so much to direct purchase by an individual coming from the interior, but I see some evidence in the first Blue Book in which it is stated that a girl was taken to Kilwa and kept husking rice for a year, and then taken to Zanzibar and sold in the slave market of the Sultan; practically she would then be resold?—Yes; she would have passed through several hands.

385. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Are they exposed for sale regularly at Muscat?—I do not know, but I should say they would be, because only 25 years ago they were exposed regularly at Constantinople for sale.

386. Do you know whether there is much exportation from Muscat of slaves sold to go to the country there?—I do not suppose they do it openly.

387. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] If the Sultan of Zanzibar was induced by us to accept a treaty, do you think he would have the power, even if he were willing, to enforce that other power?—To a certain extent he would, I think; he would require money, and he would require the means to keep up an army to prevent the northern Arabs from coming down, ostensibly for the purpose of trade, but in reality to kidnap slaves; they get hold of the slaves and carry them off into out-of-the-way corners where they are not seen. An army or police force might prevent that.

388. In fact, we should have to subsidise him in order to give him the means of fulfilling his treaty?—Either that, or, as I said before, enter into an arrangement with him with regard to the amount we pay now of 5 per cent. on the export trade.

389. But if I rightly understand the matter we

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we are already paying that?—Yes; but I propose that it should be taken away from him, and then held out to him as an inducement to make a treaty.

390. But has he at present sufficient powers to enforce such a treaty unless his means were increased?—To the extent of the treaty that we recommended in the Foreign Office Committee I should think he might.

391. He would be able to confine the export of slaves to one port, would he not?—Yes, I think so.

392. Sir R. Anstruther.] But if he cannot enforce his own decree with regard to the resale of slaves for the northern Arabs, for his own subjects, what means would he have of enforcing such a treaty?—There are a great many reasons for not enforcing the decrees; many of his own people are engaged in the slave trade, the great folks of Zanzibar, and when they are detected he does not like to punish them.

393. Would not that apply also to the liberated slaves?—We should have a supervision over them; we should prevent them being kidnapped. I dare say some might be kidnapped, but, on the whole, I think we might protect them sufficiently well. The Sultan's own slaves are sometimes kidnapped.

394. Then the expense of the protection to liberated slaves would fall on us, and not on him?—To a certain extent it would fall upon us, certainly.

395. Lord F. Cavendish.] Could you state at all what expenditure we should be put to in order to enable the Sultan to put an end to this treaty. We have had it in evidence that the mere expenditure of 1,500*l.* a year, and the fees of a consular establishment, would put an end to the slave trade; is that your opinion?—No, certainly not. That would lead in a considerable degree to bringing the matter to a close ultimately; but I do not think it would put an end to the slave trade at all.

396. Can you give the Committee any kind of estimate with regard to the expenditure we should be put to in order really to grapple with this trade?—I cannot.

397. Can you form any opinion whatever of what the expense would be?—No; it would be a matter for future negotiations, I should say.

398. If the slave trade was confined to one port on the adjacent coast, would it not have the effect very much of increasing the land journey?—Yes; it would have the effect of increasing the land journey by the distance existing between Kilwa and Dar Selam; that would be a matter of four or five days.

399. And on those four or five days the suffering would be very considerable, would it not?—Not more considerable than the sufferings of the slaves in the dhows.

400. I think you stated that, after all, this trade, like all other trades, depended on the demand; should we not have a better chance of checking it if we checked the demand by making the landing of slaves much more difficult in Muscat, and the other places?—Yes, certainly. I propose that we should call on the Sultan of Muscat, and the chiefs of the Persian Gulf, to prevent the importation of slaves into their dominions and to punish those who engage in the trade.

401. Muscat is the main port of entry, is it not?—No; not Muscat itself, but all the small

ports along the coast of Arabia on the Gulf of Oman.

402. Are they all subject to the Imaum of Muscat?—Yes, most of them.

403. What other rulers are there beyond?—Beyond, in the Persian Gulf, there is the Chief of Bahrein, and a little lower down, the Chief of Abuthubbee.

404. Do they encourage or restrain the slave trade?—They encourage it just as the rest do, by allowing their subjects to carry on the trade with impunity.

405. They have a large pecuniary interest in it, have they not?—Yes, indirectly.

406. Have we any treaties with them?—Yes, with all of them.

407. But all those treaties are evaded, are they not?—Yes; Colonel Disbrow, who went the round of many of those ports, saw slaves landed openly there.

408. Chairman.] Have not many British subjects placed themselves under the Sultan of Zanzibar, in order to be able to hold slaves with impunity?—A great many.

409. That is principally since the Naturalisation Act has become known there, is it not?—It is many years ago that British protected subjects of India were allowed to take the protection of the Sultan of Zanzibar; ever since the year 1862, I think.

410. Do you mean that they were allowed that protection by the connivance of the British Government?—General Rigny prohibited it; at least, it was never entertained during his time; but when he was succeeded by Colonel Pelly, it then began to be allowed; and in Colonel Playfair's time, with the sanction of the Government of Bombay, I believe, the Sultan was told that British protected subjects who had not entered their names in the consular register, were to be considered as Arab subjects. The first question the Sultan asked was whether they might hold slaves, and he was told that they were considered as Arab subjects, and might do what they liked, and they immediately began to buy slaves.

411. On whose authority was such a statement made; was it on the authority of the Government of India?—I am under the impression that it was; it could not be otherwise, I should say; but when I went to Zanzibar this subject attracted my attention, and I made representations about it, and the answer that I obtained from the Bombay Government was, to the effect that it might be very proper to deprive the said Indians of their slaves, but who was going to pay the compensation to which they would be entitled; certainly not the Indian Government. However, the question was very well ventilated, and the last orders of the Indian Government were that, although they should be allowed to keep the slaves they had, they were not to buy or sell any more.

412. I wish to ask you a few questions for Lord Enfield, who has left the room for a short time; the first is, are you aware that the late Sultan of Zanzibar ever violated the Slave Trade Treaty?—I have never heard of his having done so.

413. Did he discourage, as far as he could, the visits of the northern dhows?—He did; on one occasion he went so far as to say that he would burn every dhow that came from the north. I thought it a very general way of putting it, and I proposed that he should only burn those dhows

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that were engaged in the slave trade, that came openly for the purpose of carrying away slaves; but that if they came for the purposes of trade, he should leave them alone, because we had treaties with those people, and it would be our duty to protect them in their legitimate trade.

414. Would there be sufficient justification on the ground of alleged violation of the treaty for coercing the Sultan to surrender his right to transport slaves from the coast?—That is a matter for the Government to consider; when the late Sultan was about to die I called Seyed Burgash to my house; he was supposed to be a great fanatic, at least he pretended to be so; and he did not like the English at all; he had been engaged in a revolution against Seyed Majid before, and General Rigby had taken very strong measures against him; but when he came to me, and was questioned with regard to his politics, and as to what he intended doing, he promised everything; he said he knew all about the demands of the English Government with respect to the slave trade, and would do everything we required, and much more than Seyed Majid would have done. I inquired regarding the debts of his late brother to Ludda Danjee, who is one of our subjects, and he said he would take on himself the whole. After entering into a verbal arrangement, made in the presence of Dr. Kirk, he went away, and the very next day he denied everything, saying that he never made any arrangement at all. I think when a man breaks his faith in that way he should be called to account for it.

415. Has the late or present Sultan, to your knowledge, ever offered to sell or cede the island of Zanzibar?—No, never; he on one occasion said, "If you go so far as to demand the total abolition of slavery, and the carrying of slaves on my coast, you had better take the island away from me altogether." But that did not mean that he would either give or sell it.

416. Would a free settlement on the coast tend to prevent the slave trade, do you think?—I think so.

417. Where would you suggest it should be established?—I should think Monfia, to the south of Zanzibar, between Kilwa and Zanzibar, a very good place.

418. What would be the cost of protecting such a settlement?—It would not be very considerable. I think it would pay itself in the course of a few years; you would have to have a governor there, I should say; and 200 or 300 men would protect the whole place; it is a small island.

419. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] Whom does it belong to?—It belongs to the Sultan of Zanzibar. I do not think he would offer much difficulty to our securing it.

420. *Chairman*.] Would it be possible to prevent the slave hunting in the interior; and, if so, how?—Only by a decree from the Sultan; that is to say, that he should prevent his own subjects from engaging in that trade; and it is generally his own subjects who go up country with merchandise and set the negroes fighting against each other for the purpose of obtaining slaves.

421. We have been told that most of the slave traders come from Muscat, or from places in the north with which we have slave treaties; could we not prevent the annual visits of these northern Arabs to Zanzibar?—We have treaties with them that, so long as they carry on a legitimate trade, we are to protect them in that

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trade; therefore when they go down in a proper way, for the purpose of carrying on a *bonâ fide* trade, I do not think we could or ought to prevent them; but, unfortunately, it so happens that they are almost all more or less engaged in the slave trade. They take down merchandise from Muscat, and return with a cargo of slaves. The Arab authorities on the coast of Arabia, with whom we have treaties, must necessarily take cognisance of this illicit trade, and they should be called upon to punish most severely those who engage in it.

422. Should we be justified in charging the Sultan of Muscat, or the chiefs in the Persian Gulf, with violating their Slave Trade Treaties, and in insisting upon them stopping their slave dhows from coming to Zanzibar?—I do not think we should be justified in stopping all the dhows; every dhow is susceptible of being a slave dhow in the country; there are not particular dhows for the purpose.

423. They are not particularly fitted up for the slave trade?—No; that idea has misled a good many people. On the West Coast of Africa there were vessels fitted out purposely for the slave trade, with slave decks, and everything else; but on the East Coast there is no such thing.

424. Sir *J. Hay*.] Then how is it possible for a slaver to be detected?—That is the great difficulty that is encountered by our men-of-war; when they first go to the East Coast of Africa they are liable to take almost every dhow for a slaver.

425. Without a certain amount of water butts and other fittings, I suppose?—There are only two or three sizes of water butts. A small dhow may have a very large water tank, but that would not be a criterion of the dhow being a slaver; they may require a great deal of water, and a tank, about a cubic yard, is not a very considerable size.

426. There are no special fittings, then, by which a vessel is supposed to be condemned?—Most of the vessels that I would condemn would be those on which slaves were found on board, but the difficulty is in knowing a domestic slave from a slave that is for sale. The latter have particular marks on their heads when they come from Kilwa; they are marked like sheep. A part of the hair is taken off, and if you see 20 or 30 of them marked in the same way, you may be quite sure that they are for sale.

427. *Chairman*.] Can you suggest any means to prevent those northern Arabs from engaging in the slave trade, while at Zanzibar on professional or commercial pursuits?—The only means would be to have a good strong police force, but unfortunately the Sultan's troops are not very well in hand; when I was there they were bribed right and left to allow the dhows to go.

428. Do you think that it would be impracticable to reconvey the slaves to their own homes in the interior?—It would be very difficult; many of the villages from which they came have been destroyed when they have been taken. Villages are destroyed, and children are kidnapped, and the old are allowed to die on the spot, and if the liberated slaves were to return to their country, they would find nothing but desolation there.

429. Would the establishment of such a free depôt as the Foreign Office Committee suggested cost more than the 3,000*l.* a year, which is now paid

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paid for the maintenance of liberated slaves at Aden and Bombay?—No, I think not.

430. Have you any observation to make on the present system pursued by Her Majesty's cruisers employed in suppressing the slave trade now?—We made certain recommendations in the Committee, but very few have been carried out.

431. Have you any suggestions to offer for its amendment beyond those recommendations made in the Report of the Foreign Office Committee?—No, I think not.

432. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Under whose dominions are those tribes among whom the slaves are captured?—They have chiefs of their own; they are under no particular dominion; some of them are very important tribes in their way, but others are small.

433. *Chairman*.] You have said that the trade with Zanzibar has been gradually increasing; is it true that communication with Zanzibar is very irregular and uncertain?—Very much so; I have been six or seven months without receiving a letter from any part of the world. It is only when our cruisers come in that direction, and receive orders to touch at the Seychelles, that we get letters from Europe.

434. Would greater facilities for communication tend to develop trade in general, and assist to check the slave trade?—Considerably; so much so, that several houses have taken into consideration whether they would not sacrifice a certain amount at the commencement, and put on a line of steamers; they have applied to Government to know whether they could obtain a subsidy, but they did not receive a very favourable answer, I believe.

435. Do you consider the appointment of vice consuls along the East Coast a necessary element in any scheme for the suppression of the slave trade?—Yes.

436. At what places would you appoint them?—One at Kilwa, to see that no slaves were exported; another at Dar Selam, to have supervision over the slaves that were sent through there; another in the north, at Mombasa, or at Lamoo (they are close to each other), to see that the northern Arabs did not come and take the slaves away.

437. Do you think it probable that if vessels under the Arab flag were entirely prevented from carrying on the slave trade, and if Zanzibar

were entirely closed to it, slave traders would adopt the French flag, or a slave trade spring up from the coast of Mozambique?—No; I think an understanding might be come to with the French Government to prevent that; at present, certainly, the number of dhows navigating under the French flag is increasing, but I do not know that such a trade in slaves is carried on under the French flag. I do not think that any of our cruisers have ever detected slaves being carried under the French flag.

438. Have you in any way changed your opinion as to the expediency of the proposals suggested by the Foreign Office Committee, of which you were a member?—No.

439. You are of the same opinion as when you signed that Report?—Quite.

440. Mr. *Kennaway*.] Could we, in your opinion, enforce the proposals of the Foreign Office Committee, that all dhows engaged in the legitimate traffic of domestic slaves should bear a distinguishing mark on their hulls?—I think the Sultan would have no difficulty in effecting that. We could not enforce anything on him, but if it were proposed, and the Sultan were inclined to make any such arrangement with us, he would have no difficulty in carrying it out.

441. With regard to the ships that come down from the north, would it be practicable to unship their rudders and only return them when they could prove they had got a legitimate cargo on board?—That plan has been adopted at Zanzibar by the customs; that is to say, as soon as a dhow comes in, to prevent her from going away or changing her ground, they unship the rudder and take it into the custom house, and she is totally at the mercy of the custom house officer. I think the same plan should be adopted everywhere, and all northern Arabs should be, without exception, disarmed on their arrival in the Sultan's dominions.

442. Sir *J. Hay*.] With regard to the recommendation of Admiral Cockburn as to having a stationary guard-ship at Zanzibar, do you think that would be a good plan?—I think the best plan would be to have a ship that could cruise, but I understand he proposes a stationary ship in addition to a cruising ship; this would entail an additional expense.

443. Have you anything to add to your evidence?—No.

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444. *Chairman*.] I BELIEVE you are a Member of the Indian Council?—Yes.

445. Has your attention been turned to the subject which the Committee is now investigating, and in what manner and to what extent?—My attention has been a great deal directed to the subject of the East African slave trade. Since the year 1838 I have been on terms of more or less intimacy with Colonel Hamerton, General Rigby, and Colonel Playfair, who have held office on that coast; and I have been also intimate with Dr. Livingstone, and I have taken very great interest in the depôts at which liberated slaves are taken care of in India, and at Aden.

446. Have you read, and if you have read, how far do you agree with the previous evidence

given before this Committee?—I agree very generally with Mr. Vivian in his evidence. There are a few points in which, I think, additions might advantageously be made to what he has stated on the subject. I think he has rather under-estimated the extent to which the French flag is made a cover for aiding a modified kind of slavery, or something which amounts almost to slavery; not at all with the consent or connivance of the French officials, but wherever those who use it are out of their sight. The system which is known as the system of *engagés* is very apt to lapse, when it is not carefully watched, into something very like a system of slavery. Then I should like to add a few words to what is said by Mr. Vivian on the way in which the slave trade appears to have grown up. I know

know that when Colonel Hamerton first went to Zanzibar, he was very much surprised to find that the slave trade had already acquired such dimensions as he observed; but at that time the slave trade was very much less, and on a very much smaller scale than it is now. The Arabs in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, and on the coast, are naturally a very active maritime people, and for probably a century and a half, before the beginning of this century, they had been very active pirates, not only on their own coast, but down the coast of Africa, and along the coast of India, as far as Singapore, certainly. It appears that one of the hereditary modes in which they employed the maritime energy of the nation was at that time piracy. That was checked, and almost suppressed by our naval officers, and then the pirates turned to the slave trade. There can be no doubt that a great many of the people, and the vessels, and the firms who are now engaged in slaving, are the sons and grandsons of those who used to devote themselves to piracy. I have no doubt, if the slave trade were stopped, you would find these same people devote themselves with equal energy to what we should call legitimate commerce.

447. Do you recollect pretty nearly the date when Colonel Hamerton went to Zanzibar?—I think it was about 1837 or 1838.

448. I think you heard a portion of Mr. Churchill's evidence, and probably you have read his evidence given on the former day; have you any remarks to make on that evidence?—I have no doubt with regard to the facts of the case that Mr. Churchill's evidence is very full, and accurate; but I entirely disagree with the remedies he proposes for putting a stop to the slave trade. It appears to me that the cardinal evil which you have to deal with, is the oscillation of our own opinions in the matter. Up to about the time when Lord Palmerston died, for many years, the general opinion of all parties in England had been in favour of a determination to put a stop to the slave trade wherever we could possibly do so without infringing the rights of other nations, and the whole weight of the Government influence had been put on the side of suppressing the slave trade. But of late years it has been manifest that there has been very considerable wavering of our own opinions upon the subject. Many of those who were most active in promoting measures for the suppression of the slave trade in former times have thought, perhaps, that the work was done; and because the work was effectually carried out on the West Coast of Africa they have rather relaxed their efforts, and one sees in public writings a good deal of a kind of excuse for slavery, which certainly would not have been put forward some years ago, and would not have met with any kind of public favour and acceptance. That seems to me to be the cardinal evil with which we have to contend, and our Government, representing public opinion, appears to me of late years to have been very half-hearted in the matter. The first thing to be done seems to me to be to make up our own minds with regard to what is to be done, and whether we really are in earnest as we were 25 or 30 years ago.

449. Following upon that would naturally come the question, what measure you yourself would recommend for adoption in order to stop the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa?—

0.116.

I should begin by saying that I do not agree with the opinion that Mr. Churchill has expressed, when he says that the Arabs do not understand forbearance. I believe that, like all other strong-handed nations, at least those with whom I have had to deal, they understand real forbearance when they know it is forbearance, and not weakness; they understand it better than we do ourselves, perhaps, and they certainly do understand justice and their own interests. Our first business is to interest them on our side, and to carry their opinion with us, and to let them know what we wish, and what we want, and what we think would be for their interest. As far as I have ever seen those people, and people of the same kind, they would be very apt to respond to that by taking our advice, and being a good deal guided by our wishes in the matter. That has certainly been the case with regard to the suppression of piracy, and in many other things in which their own interests were very much concerned. When they once understood what we wanted and what we wished, and why we wanted it, and why we wished it, they have been very ready to come into our views. They are not acted upon by fears in the way that weaker nations are, but when they have once made up their minds they are all on that account the more to be trusted. There were some other points connected with Mr. Churchill's plans with which I could not agree. I do not think that we have the slightest right to interfere with the internal taxation of Zanzibar; we must leave them to tax everybody who lives under their rule very much in the way they think best. For the good of their own exchequer they would always be willing in the long run, quite as willing as we are, to give due weight to our arguments in the matter; and I think throughout all our dealings with them we ought to recollect how long it took in our own country to put an end to slavery. There are people now alive who can recollect domestic slavery in English homes; it has been seen in a very recent generation in England itself, and it has only been by persistent argument and efforts that we have arrived at our present state of public and private morality on the subject. We ought to consider that the Arabs cannot be expected to be very much more rapid in the movement of public opinion among them than we are among ourselves. I would say that the best measures for putting a stop to slavery, as far as I can judge, on that coast, are those shadowed out in the opinion given by Sir George Clerk's government, quoted at Question 245, of Sir John Kaye's evidence. That was given in Lord Canning's time, and I think had Lord Canning's complete assent. I need not mention that Lord Canning's feelings were very much interested in the work of putting a stop to slavery, and that his whole opinion was in favour of doing all that could be done to put an early stop to this branch of the slave trade.

450. I think that, as a matter of explanation, I should say the evidence given by Mr. Churchill with regard to what you call interfering with the internal arrangements of Zanzibar arose from the fact that a portion of the treaty already made had not been carried out by the Sultan; is not that so?—I would rigidly enforce the treaty as far as it is fairly enforceable, but I would not attempt to carry treaties out by cutting off any source of revenue that is in itself a reasonable source of revenue, and to levy which does not interfere

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interfere with our national rights, though we may not think it very wise, viewed by our lights of political economy. Some of the Sultan's most industrious subjects, some of those who are the main stay of commercial affairs in his dominions, are men of Indian extraction, who come there and are subject to poll taxes. I have no doubt it would be a wise measure, if he could afford it, to remit the whole of a poll tax of that kind; but, I think, it should be left to his own sense of his interest, and unless there is some national question which enables us to say, "You shall not tax our subjects," we should abstain from interfering with him.

451. Mr. Churchill said, I think, that inasmuch as a treaty had been made by which certain duties ought not to be levied, but had since been levied *sub silentio*, there would be in our power the offering of a *quid pro quo* for his giving up the traffic; was not that his evidence?—Possibly that is the explanation. There are some six or seven preventive measures which, if the Committee will permit me, I will refer to. The first seems to me to be to limit the transport from the main land to Zanzibar. As I understand the question, it is reasonable that we should for a time, at all events, offer no effectual objection to the Sultan of Zanzibar having such a number of slaves belonging to himself or his subjects, as he requires to transport from the main land to Zanzibar, but that we should not allow that transit to be made a cover for slaves who are not really intended for domestic or agricultural purposes in the island of Zanzibar, but who pass to the sea, and so away to the northward; and it is proposed to limit the transit to the export from one particular port. I should think from what I heard from the agents of the Sultan at different times in Bombay, and even in this country, that they would be very willing, if they saw their way clear to what we were about, to make that transit much more restricted, and subject to much more stringent rules than appeared to be contemplated by the report of the Foreign Office Commission. For instance, I should think, if it were properly put before the Sultan, he would be very willing to have the whole legalised transit of slaves between the mainland and Zanzibar managed by steam-boats, with regard to the departure of which from the mainland and their arrival at the island, there would be much less doubt and discretion than there would be with regard to sailing vessels, and that every slave who was so passed should pass only under a permit which would come under the view of some authorised functionary of the English Government.

452. Sir R. Anstruther.] That would diminish the export of slaves from the main land by about three-fourths, would it not?—It would diminish the export of slaves to a very considerable extent. There is some difference with regard to the number required; some authorities say between 1,700 and 1,800; others, and I think Mr. Churchill, who has probably the soundest opinion, says nearly 3,000 or 4,000; but whatever it may be, I would give an outside limit; I would not attempt to draw the thing too tight at once; if you limit the route by which they should go, you are pretty certain when you once get them to Zanzibar that you will have them more under your own view and your own control. Then I think you must be prepared when you are requiring the Sultan to cancel what he

thinks a very valuable right to give him something in return. I think the means of doing so are afforded by the very peculiar position into which he has returned with regard to his relative, who is reigning at Muscat. The whole of the arrangements between the two kingdoms have been fully explained in the evidence which has been given in the last two days, and it amounts to this; that the cost of carrying out in perfect good faith, as far as we are concerned, an arrangement which was very solemnly entered into a very short time ago under the authority, not only of Her Majesty's Government in England, but of the Government in India; I say, that the cost of carrying that arrangement out is in round numbers 8,000*l.* This arrangement affords the means, first of all, of keeping peace between Zanzibar and Muscat, and keeping both the branches of a very important family, a family to which civilisation and the English Government in India are under considerable obligations, in a position of honour, and in a position in which we should wish to see them placed, and where, if they understand us and act on their family traditions, they are quite certain to do very much what we ask them to do. It does not seem to me a large sum to pay, if it were divided between the Exchequers of England and India, for such very great objects. It is very much less than we have been in the habit of spending year by year for the purpose of putting an end to slavery; and it would help to put an end to it in a natural and, it seems to me, a legal, as well as a very politic mode. It would give us a very great hold both on Muscat and Zanzibar. But our agents on the spot must know what the Government really intends to do, and must act vigorously as their predecessors have acted. The English Government has been extremely well represented hitherto, both at Muscat and Zanzibar; and whenever our consuls have known what we wanted, they have given great effect, both by argument and influence, to what the English Government required. That is the second point which I would urge, namely, that, between England and India, we should arrange for the payment for which Zanzibar is at the present moment bound to Muscat, and that we should take that as a stand point; and, referring to the benefits which we have conferred on both, say, "Now in return for this you should do something that we consider desirable, and also for your benefit." The third point is, that I would place our consuls and the consular service there, generally, on a better footing. Both Muscat and Zanzibar are extremely trying climates. The position is one which wears out men very fast; they are very ill paid, and they are almost without subordinate assistance; they are especially deficient in the means of employing vice-consuls, and persons in that position at the outports. I have no doubt that if you were to deal with those gentlemen as the Indian Government has always been in the habit of dealing with great political officers, and giving due weight to their representations, as to the want of an additional outlay of 150*l.* or 200*l.* a year at particular places, for particular objects, I say I have no doubt that a little more liberality in that respect, enabling them to employ, not necessarily English agents, but consular agents, whether they might be natives of India, or Arabs, or Egyptians, you would find that they would always have the means of knowing what was going

going on at the outports. The want of such knowledge is one of the great defects of our present system, because our consuls are really dependent on those who are interested in keeping up matters as they are. The fourth point is this: I think more attention should be paid to the views of our naval officers with regard to efficient squadrons. I think that taking officers like Sir Leopold Heath, and the present Admiral on the station, every deference should be paid to their opinions with regard to the kind and strength of squadron which they really require to enable them to do their duty on that coast. At present a great deal of the duty is done by open boats with a young officer, very often only a midshipman on board, and those boats are out for weeks together, I believe I might say for months together, in the most exposed positions, with really not the means that are requisite to effect the object for which they are employed; they make up by their energy and dash for their want of number and want of power, but still there can be no doubt that if, instead of those small open boats, you had a kind of small steam gunboat perhaps, but, at all events, steamboats capable of going into very shallow water, and also capable of making head against the very strong currents which run along that coast, and are one of the great difficulties of the navigation, you would enable your naval officers to put an effectual stop to the traffic much more rapidly than they can at present. They ought also to be enabled to watch the northern Arabian ports themselves much better than they are now watched. The number of ships is not sufficient to watch the northern ports, and to look after the slave dhows after they get away from the immediate African coast. I believe that there are some restrictions under which they act with respect to a three-mile limit from the shore. Now, if we get the Sultan's Government, and the Imaum of Muscat's Government with us entirely, and act, as I think we are bound to act in those seas, rather in supplementing their defects, than in superceding their authority, and if we make use, as far as possible, of their authority, I think we should be able to get rid of a great many of those inconvenient limitations which very much harass and impede our naval officers. There should be much more liberality in the way of efficient interpreters, and the admiral on the station, I think, should have full power to employ interpreters of a much higher stamp than those usually furnished. Then a fifth, and very important point, seems to me to be the provision of lines of communication, and post office steamers, along all those coasts. I think this has been very strongly recommended already, and I would merely mention that none of those objections that have been started appear to me to be of any validity, as opposed to a system of subsidies for limited periods, such as that under which the Indian Government has extended the lines of steam communication from Rangoon up to the Euphrates. Such subsidies are certain to be brought every year, at least some portion of them, under the supervision of the Government, and the Government is perpetually reminded by rival companies if they are paying more than the service can be done for. I think if a just medium is struck of what is sufficient, and not more than sufficient to enable a commercial body to start lines of the kind, they would very soon prove almost self-

supporting; but I would always keep a certain subsidy payable to them, in order to give the Government the power of enforcing regularity of departure. For, viewed merely as part of the anti-slavery machinery, regularity of departure is a very important point, because it at once marks those who are in the service of the Government; and though, like the regularity of the policemen on their beat, it may tempt evil-doers to try to evade the officers of the Government, still if the officers of the Government are on the watch, it also enables them to catch evil-doers when they attempt to pass unseen. Then, steam communication, if it were fully developed, as I believe it would speedily be, by natural commercial causes on that coast, would, I have no doubt, lead to a good deal of natural emigration from one point to another, and where there was surplus labour you would find that people would not be afraid to transfer their labour to other parts where it is wanted. This would again strike at one of the roots of the evil, because there can be no doubt that the attempt to enslave people and carry them off as slaves, is one of the irregular remedies for an irregular distribution of labour over the surface of the globe. The sixth remedy is one that has already been very fully discussed in the evidence that the Committee has heard, namely, a colony for liberated slaves on the mainland. On that point I have only to add to what I find on the evidence, that I think care should be taken not to make it, if we can possibly avoid it, an English colony, but to make it a colony of English people, living under the flag of the Sultan, under his protection, and under his guarantee, and watched over by English officials. That would get rid of a good many difficulties in the way of founding fresh colonies; and it would also insure the great object of all, namely, the Sultan being carried with us, and the native local authorities being carried with us in all that we do. I think that free use should be made of the establishments which the Church Missionary Society, and other missionary societies, and some of the French Roman Catholic Missions have on those coasts. They are very willing to co-operate, and to take a great part of the labour off the hands of the Government; and I think every use should be made of them in the way of head money, paid not in the very stinted and niggardly way in which it has been paid of late years, but paid very much in the way in which it was done at the time when the slave trade was suppressed on the West Coast of Africa. Above all, there is the necessity for a very able and well-selected consul being appointed, who will not only strongly press on the Sultan all that the English Government wishes in the matter, but will really be to him a support; such as the Imaum of Muscat, and others in his position, and the Sultan of Zanzibar have always found the political officers who have come up to the mark of real efficiency in the service. Lastly, it appeared to me that as the subject had a good deal changed its position since it was last under the review of Her Majesty's Government here, and the Government of India in Lord Canning's time, it would be very desirable to place this matter in the hands of a person who would go both to Muscat and to Zanzibar, specially charged by the Government of India, or Her Majesty's Government, as the case might be, but in the confidence of them both, well acquainted with what lengths he

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Sir B. Frere, might go to in dealing with those Governments, and prepared with some authority, and with the dignity of a special envoy to press these points on those governments.

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453. What is the nature and extent of the Indo-African trade, exclusive of slaves?—It is very considerable. Some of the reports before the Committee give the figures. But the point that should be noted especially is, that it is a very old and reviving trade. Before any authentic Greek history, it is quite clear that there was a very considerable trade on this coast, and India had a very considerable share in it. It is more than probable that a good deal of the African trade, such as it was, which found its way to Tyre and Syria, was carried on then, as now, by Indian merchants, who had their houses of agency at African ports. The earliest travellers, both those who came from the north and those who came with the Portuguese round the Cape, found Indian traders at every port along the coast, and a very considerable Indian trade carried on between Africa and India. And that trade was only crushed for a time, or very much lessened, at all events, by the action of European and Arab piracy. All the novels of Defoe's time speak of piracy in those seas very much as we refer to expeditions into the far west of America; and it is quite clear, if you read the memoirs of Captain Singleton, or any books of that kind, that active young men went into those seas and plundered everybody, but especially the Indian merchants, almost without any sense that they were doing wrong. It was only when the trade had got to be almost entirely confined to large ships that piracy came to be less profitable. Of late years this trade has revived, and judging from all analogy, there can be no doubt that if it were properly dealt with, and not impeded, as it is impeded, by the slave trade, it would increase very rapidly. I may mention that almost all of what we may call the banking business at those ports is done by natives of India, who have their homes in Scinde, Kurrachee, Kutch, Kattewar, and Bombay, and some as far south as Cananore and Cochín. They never take their families to Africa; the head of the house of business always remains in India, and their books are balanced periodically in India. The house in Africa is merely a branch house, though many of those people will assure you, and they give very good evidence of the fact, that they have had branches in Africa for 300 years, and possibly for much more. When you have that kind of network of indigenous activity existing as a mercantile agency, it is impossible to believe but that the traders will be as ready to push legitimate trade as they have proved themselves to be in India.

454. What is your view of the comparative importance of those African traders to England and India?—I should say the trade is equally important to both.

455. But I mean with regard to the amount?—With regard to the amount of it, the trade used to be almost all carried on through Bombay. The first change was that a portion of it was taken to the *entrepôt* at Aden; but latterly a great deal of it has come direct from Europe to Africa. There is a considerable and increasing American trade, or rather there was before the American war, and the German and French trade is very rapidly increasing. The German trade has become a matter of very great interest to all German mercantile men and political economists,

and German attention has been very much directed to that coast. But notwithstanding the large direct trade that has grown up, the Indian trade continues to increase almost as much as the English trade, and there seems to be an almost inexhaustible field for trade on that coast. I had the advantage of having Dr. Livingstone living with me for some time, between two of his expeditions to Africa, and he is, as the Committee are aware, one of the most keen and careful observers that one could possibly meet with. He was extremely struck when he had travelled a little in Western India; he made two or three journees to a short distance from Bombay, and he was extremely struck with the immense apparent facility for a very large mutual trade being carried on between the two continents. Dr. Livingstone pointed out that there was an almost unlimited power of producing food in Africa. We had been in the habit of supposing that in India we should never have to import food from anywhere else; but it so happened, during the time he was with me, that in one province of India famine was threatened, and the prices were at once lowered by importation from the Persian Gulf. He remarked the fact immediately, and pointed out that the grain that was imported, was grain that could be produced to any extent in some of the high lands at a little distance from the coast of Africa, and that grain of different kinds, suited to the Indian taste, could be laid down on the coast at a rate which would render its transit to India a matter of commercial certainty.

456. Sir John Hay.] The grain being cultivated by free labour, I suppose?—There was very little free labour known then, but he spoke rather of the capabilities of the coast; he spoke particularly of the coast round Mombaza, where there are a few Englishmen settled, I think, who belong to the Church Missionary Society.

457. Chairman.] How are the liberated slaves disposed of at Bombay and Aden?—When there were very few of them, I think it must be about 20 years ago, they were made over to the police in Bombay, and the chief magistrate of police was charged with the duty of finding employment for them. It was not difficult to do so as long as they were very few, and as long as they were chiefly adults, but after a while a very large number of children were brought; they quite exceeded the power of natural absorption by any means at the command of the police, and there were some very painful cases, some of the men being kidnapped, and others, women, being found in a state of prostitution in the bazaars. The Government of the time took the advice of some of the Missionary Societies, and the Missionaries, at the suggestion of the Government, took some of the children, who were made over to them, and gradually there grew up at Nassick, not far from Bombay, about 70 or 80 miles from Bombay, where there is a station of the Church Missionary Society, an African colony, and the children were all taught industrial occupations of different kinds. They trained the boys as bricklayers, carpenters, and smiths, and so on, and as servants fitted to earn their own livelihood in India. Dr. Livingstone took from that institution nine boys, I think, who went with him to Africa, and I believe they are the African boys who are supposed to be with him still. In the last letter I got from Dr. Livingstone, about two years ago, there was an allusion to those boys, and

and there can be no doubt that boys brought up in the way they have been are quite able to earn their livelihood, either in India or if they go back to Africa.

458. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] I think that you are of opinion that rather an unwise economy has been exercised somewhere, which has prevented this policy which you have indicated being carried out?—Yes, I think an economy has been exercised which, as far as I can judge, is very unwise, if the Government really wishes to put a stop to slavery.

459. Has that proceeded from the Indian Department of the Government?—No, not from the Indian Department of the Government, I think. The general feeling of the Indian Government has, I think, been this; that the suppression of the slave trade was pre-eminently an imperial work, which had been undertaken and almost carried out by Her Majesty's Government, and that, as a purely anti-slavery question, India was not bound to take any action, or to go to any expense in the matter; but they were willing to go, and they would have gone, much further than they have ever gone, in the way of meeting Her Majesty's Government half way, to carry out what they were told was a matter of imperial moment; and, I have no doubt that if the feeling which actuated Her Majesty's Government some years ago actuated them still, and if the matter were put before the financial authorities of the Indian Government, the Indian Government would not hang back in any way from doing what they were told the Cabinet considered their duty to do in the matter. But when they saw that Her Majesty's Government appeared to be half-hearted in the matter and inclined to curtail every expense, they naturally said, "If that is the case with regard to their own efforts, *a fortiori*, it is our duty to save everything we possibly can, and not to attempt in a quixotic spirit that which has been found too much for Her Majesty's Government to effect."

460. In your communication with the Indian and with the Foreign Office, did you find any impediments?—None whatever; the Foreign Office appeared to hold the same views that they have always held.

461. You have no doubt that it proceeds from the Chancellor of the Exchequer's over watchful care, I suppose?—I have no doubt it proceeds from some general view of financial policy which is more apparent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer than it is to the public or to me.

462. From the evidence you have given, you think it is clear that as a very lucrative trade would probably spring up, it is a penny wise and pound foolish policy?—I feel as convinced as I can be of anything theoretical, that that is the case.

463. Then with regard to the steam communication that you have alluded to, have any of the companies ever offered to open a trade and carry the mails to Zanzibar?—Yes; I believe there have been two or three offers, but it has always been found that the Post Office has dealt with it as a purely Post Office question. At present, of course, when some three months elapse without an opportunity of receiving or sending a letter, the letters are as few as they would have been in the days of Richard the First, between London and York; but there cannot be a doubt that there would be a very large postal communication, if a proper and regular system were

established; and no doubt, as has been the case everywhere else in those seas, there would ultimately be a very large steam traffic.

464. Could not the Indian Post Office undertake that in itself?—I have no doubt they would do their share, as they have done with regard to the Peninsular Company, and other companies, whenever they saw that the Government at home did their share, and pointed out what they thought India might reasonably be expected to do.

465. Suppose a liberal and judicious offer was made by the Indian Government, would the Post Office here be disposed to refuse it, do you think?—I presume they would look at it as a mere Post Office question, and, departmentally, no doubt they would be right. They would say, "It is not our business to look after possible profitable routes. Somebody else must do that; the number of letters that we get stamped at the Zanzibar post office is such that a steam line would not pay." But it seems to me a Cabinet question, which should be dealt with as a matter of general policy, in which the Post Office, as well as the India Office, and every other department of the Government, should be required to do what is considered necessary by the head of the Government to carry out the great national work of putting a final stop to slave trade by sea.

466. In India the Indian Government and its Post Office acts in a very different spirit; it endeavours to develop, by means of the Post Office, the countries through which it can possibly communicate, does it not?—Undoubtedly it has been very successful in that way. I may mention cases, like the communication between Bombay and Scinde, where, originally, a rather heavy subsidy was required, but at each renewal of the term the subsidy was reduced until now little is paid for that particular voyage. The same would no doubt be the case elsewhere, and you might always make sure of reducing your subsidy to just that point which is necessary to allow the Government to have an opportunity to say something with respect to punctuality of arrival and departure.

467. With regard to Rangoon, has there not been a very marvellous development of trade with Rangoon?—There has been an enormous development of trade with Rangoon, but I think that the circumstances of this East African Coast are still more favourable, inasmuch as there is a long line of coast with very few harbours, and with very strong currents and persistent winds for a great portion of the year. Those are just the circumstances under which sailing vessels are shy of making the coast, and you can never expect much to be done by sailing coasters; but steam coasting vessels can always either be sure of making the port, or keeping from not exposing themselves to danger.

468. It is steam communication which may be said to have developed that Rangoon trade, or very materially developed it, at all events?—Certainly; the development has been most important since steam communication commenced.

469. It is almost in that way a considerable supply of food is obtained from Rangoon, is it not?—There is a great exportation of rice.

470. With regard to the evidence you gave us on that old connection of so many centuries between Africa and India, have those points been fairly brought before the English Government; is there no department of the English Govern-

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Sir *B. Frere*, ment who is cognizant of those facts?—They are matters of historical certainty.

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471. At Bombay you were not required to give to the Foreign Office or the Post Office any information, were you?—The facts were no doubt embodied in a report, but they are buried, like many other things, in the official reports. The case in which India received a very important supply of food from Persia, was an instance in point; there was a sudden failure of the monsoon, and of the periodical rains in Guzerat; and all the local officers and the grain dealers were convinced that famine was impending. This was telegraphed in all directions, and, among other places, it was telegraphed to Persia and Bassora; and the result was that a steamer which was then due from the Persian Gulf brought down a large importation of wheat, which immediately reduced the prices, the grain dealers saw that there were means of supplying it; and in that particular instance the grain was reduced in price at once by the combined operation of the telegraphic and steam communication in a way that would have been quite impossible 10 years ago.

472. You think that, under those circumstances, subsidies wisely given are of incalculable benefit in developing the trade of a country?—Yes, given with what I will call frugal liberality. That would be quite the best way of developing that commerce which would bring slavery to a natural end. I might mention that when the Zanzibar envoys were in England two or three years ago, one of them said in terms (I forget the exact words), that they found, on the main land now, it was more profitable to employ natives in growing sesamom seed for export to Marseilles, than to hunt them down as slaves. That is the kind of operation which, I think, would promote the due development of a legitimate commerce.

473. It would materially help the American, German, and French trades, if they had a regular mail; would they not, then, very much use our telegraphic and postal communication?—Enormously, no doubt; as much as we should.

474. So that there is almost a certainty of a very great trade developing itself?—It seems so to me.

475. And that would most effectually stop the slave trade, would it not?—It seems to me the only thing. You can stop it by force, but you cannot keep it stopped by anything but the growth of such a commerce as would grow up on the East, as it has done on the West Coast.

476. Did you say that Dr. Livingstone was very strongly of that opinion?—Entirely so. That was after seeing more than most casual travellers have seen of Western India.

477. You spoke of the want of additional consuls; would there be any difficulty in obtaining the services of very efficient men there?—Not the least; if you required commissioned officers, such as our military and political officers in India, and those of the regular civil service of the Government there, they could be spared. But you might have a great deal of agency which has only grown up of late years, that is to say, educated native agency. I have met young Mahomedan and young Hindoo men of those particular castes, who go out to that coast, and who engage in trade there; I have met them able to speak and write as good English as we do ourselves, and quite able to pick up any languages of the people they are among.

478. Would there not be an indirect advantage in finding occupation for our own Indian subjects in that way?—Of course there would be, though that would be only in a few cases, but I would leave the matter as much as possible in the hands of our head consular authority: and if he said, "I have a place for which I can only ask you to give 50 l. or 100 l., and that is not enough for an Englishman, but I think it would be enough for a Mahomedan or Hindoo, and there is such a person there;" I would leave it to him very much to select his own agents and give every weight to his recommendations with regard to payment.

479. Had the consul applied to you when you were Governor of Bombay you would have had no difficulty, I suppose?—I could have found the agents but not the money.

480. I suppose the same remark applies with regard to interpreters; there is no difficulty in finding competent interpreters, is there?—None whatever, only they should be regularly paid, and be, as far as possible, in regular service.

481. Do you know instances in which the admiral had alleged, or had reason to believe, that an efficient force was not sent in response to his application?—I think, whenever he applied in India, we were able to give him some one who was efficient. We did all that he required; but I have known that, from want of opportunity of applying, the captains have been very badly served in the matter of interpreters; they have been obliged to take up men with a mere smattering of Hindoostanee, and who were not fitted, from their imperfect understanding of the language, to interpret between the captain and the chiefs.

482. It must be an immense detriment to the service having no direct or constant mail communication with Zanzibar, must it not?—It is a most serious detriment.

483. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] With regard to the compensation for the expenditure of 8,000 l., which you have recommended that the English Government, conjointly with the Indian Government, should undertake; how would the Exchequer be compensated for the outlay?—In the first place, I should rather demur to their requiring direct compensation. I should regard it rather as a portion of the sum which England has been paying for the last two generations, to carry out this great national object of suppressing slave trade; but I have not the least doubt that, like a subsidy to the line of steamers, ample compensation would be found in the very large commerce, which must follow anything like settled Government, and the suppression of the slave trade. Such commerce, as does exist at Zanzibar, has grown up, or has revived rather, since it was conquered by the late Imaum of Muscat. He was a man of very great ability; he reigned for a very long time, and in his early days he had the conduct of negotiations with Lord Wellesley, and had helped to keep the French out of those seas in the revolutionary war; and he ended by conducting the anti-slavery negotiations of the Governments in our own time. Nobody can watch his career without feeling certain that if his descendant would go on in the same course, building up a considerable marine, as he did, and giving protection to all the people that he obtained influence over or conquered, we should be having our work

work done in these latitudes much better than we could do it ourselves.

484. It might materially assist us, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if we could show a certain saving on the *per contra* side of the account. Have you anything to say of the depôt for liberated slaves at Aden?—I would take that depôt as an instance; the slaves were necessarily released there, for they could not be sent back, and could not be sent on to Bombay, and there was nothing for it but to release them there; of course in a place like that there is very limited power of absorption for such labour as those slaves could furnish, and such a want was very quickly filled up. There remained then an overplus of a particular kind of labour at Aden. Why? because there were no steamers in which they could be sent to such a depôt as it has been proposed to establish at Zanzibar, where there would have been an unlimited power of absorption, and you could not trust them to go anywhere else; they would have been made slaves immediately, if you had sent them to one of the neighbouring ports of the Red Sea.

485. You have recommended, I think, that the colony of the liberated slaves at Zanzibar should be under the flag of the Sultan of Zanzibar?—Yes, for this reason; that in the first place, if it was done in good faith it would greatly disarm the Sultan of Zanzibar's objections to anything of the kind, if we proved to him, as we have proved before to his predecessors, that we did not want to seize his kingdom, and oust him; we should then carry him with us, instead of having him against us. It would get rid of all the jealousies which would certainly be created among other European powers by our establishing a colony of our own there, because they never would believe that it was done merely for the purpose of putting a stop to slavery, and we should have sullenness and intrigues, and probably a good deal of underhanded attempts to undo what we were doing there; whereas, if we merely had it on the same footing as our missionary establishments, and as the missionary establishments of the French are on there, you get rid at once of all local, as well as all European, jealousies.

486. It was mentioned to the Committee that the Sultan of Zanzibar was not able to enforce the decrees which he had issued; would he be able to protect this colony, do you think, if it was under his flag?—He would be backed by our own power. He would know that the consul's flag, and the naval force at our command, were there to protect our subjects and his authority; the two would be bound up together. The northern Arabs would set him at defiance, possibly, of whom he would certainly be very much afraid; but they would think twice before they meddled with an English establishment which was supported, not only by the Sultan of Zanzibar, but any insult to which would certainly be avenged by our own force in those seas.

487. Sir J. Hay.] I gathered from you that your impression was that if the blockade on the East Coast of Africa were maintained as strongly as that on the West Coast of Africa was maintained in former years, by that means you would anticipate a speedy stoppage of the slave trade?—Yes.

488. Have you considered that the successful termination of the slave trade on the West Coast of Africa is considered by many to have been

more due to the closing of the places at which slaves could be received, than even to the vigorous prosecution of the blockade on the coast itself; I allude to the fact that when the Brazilian Government carried out most loyally their treaties, and when the places at which slaves could be received were limited to the coast of Cuba, the operations of the navy became successful rather by a rigid blockade of the coast of Cuba, than by watching with strict vigour, and large numbers of ships, the various ports from which slaves could be shipped?—Certainly; I meant to include in the operations of the squadron the whole of the Persian Gulf also, and I think I mentioned in one of my answers that it was quite necessary that those ports should be watched carefully, by an agency on shore, in the shape of an efficient consular agency maintained in correspondence with our political agent and consul at Muscat, and also by an efficient squadron at sea.

489. Are the places at which the foreign slave trade from the East Coast of Africa is at present actively carried on limited to such points as could be conveniently watched; or rather, is it not a very great extent of coast, so that if you stopped the trade, and entirely stopped it at one place, it would spring up at another, and make it very difficult to complete the arrangement without treaties with Persia and other places on the Persian Gulf?—Yes, certainly. You cannot limit your operations to Zanzibar and Muscat; you must extend your operations to the independent tribes with whom you have already treaties, which, if they were properly enforced, would do all that you required; and I think the matter should be pressed on the Persian Government. I see the minister at Teheran objected to take any action with respect to the Persian Government, on the ground that we might lose the footing that we already have. I have no doubt he knows the bearings of the case much better than I do; otherwise I should have been very much disposed to doubt that. I believe it is one of those points in which you can succeed by persistent and perpetual pressing on a court, without hectoring or bullying; if you do not convert them by reason, they come to regard it as a concession to a very importunate person, whom it is not desirable to thwart, or refuse a small concession to. I think that if pressure had been applied to the Government of Persia in that way, without presuming to dictate to them, that we should have carried our point, as we have done elsewhere.

490. The operation that is contemplated (I speak navally) is a blockade of some 4,000 miles of coast; 2,000 miles of Africa, and 2,000 miles of Asia?—Probably it might amount to that.

491. That would require a squadron of 30 or 40 ships, instead of from three to seven ships, would it not?—You would take into account that it is only during certain seasons, and if you have good information of what is going on at the ports along the coast you may very much limit the number of ships employed. I may mention that very recently, one of the principal persons who was intended to give information to our agent in the Persian Gulf on this subject, and on whose information he relied, was very broadly accused of being a very great slave importer himself; our agent was unable for want of means to employ anyone else, but if he had had a trustworthy person in the shape of a consular agent on

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on the spot, no doubt he would have made very short work of his faithless correspondent; that kind of information accurately given, and given with rapidity to the head quarters of a squadron, would, I should think, enable the naval officers to diminish the number of ships employed.

492. Do you think that the Persian Government would accede to a seizure by our ships on our own investigation, by their authority, of a laden slaver in their own ports?—They are just now rather sore on such subjects, but I have no doubt they would do, in the long run, what is reasonable.

493. At present I think the Indian subsidy to the Royal Navy is 70,000 *l.* in addition to the transport service?—Yes.

494. Do you think that they would be inclined to increase that amount very considerably for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade, supposing the diplomatic arrangements could be made?—I think they would do whatever was reasonable, and whatever Her Majesty's Government said, might fairly be expected of India, though, no doubt, they would be unwilling to take any additional expense upon themselves, unless they saw it was part of a general imperial policy.

495. Is it your opinion that the Royal Navy could best perform the service, or a local force, such as the Indian Navy formerly was?—That is a large question, but I have no doubt that the Royal Navy could perform the service very efficiently if the Admiralty were a little less strict in the enforcement of some of the rules which they have laid down for themselves. I think, if they allowed us to deal with their officers, and ships, more in the way in which the Horse Guards allow us to deal with their battalions and brigades, the Royal Navy could perform the duty just as efficiently as any other.

496. You would place them under the direction of the Governor of Bombay, rather than that of the Admiral on the station?—They should be always under the direction of the Admiral on the station. So far as my experience goes, the Governor of Bombay will never have any difficulty in getting done whatever is necessary. But I allude rather to that special devotion to that particular service. It is a peculiar service in which the men get more efficient after having been four or five years on the coast; and under the present system they are removed just as they are getting to know their business thoroughly.

497. You do contemplate, then, that even with the ships of the Royal Navy; the officers of that particular service should be continued there for a much longer period than the period for which the officers of the Royal Navy continue, for any given service?—Yes.

498. And that they should become locally qualified for the service?—Yes, and that would obviate most of the arguments for a local naval force.

499. Mr. *Kennaway*.] One of your suggestions was that we should have the right to seize slavers within the three-mile limit, was it not?—Yes.

500. Is it the fact that we have not the right to seize slavers in Zanzibar and Muscat by the declaration of the *Imaum* of Muscat, dated 6th May 1850?—I do not recollect that; I was thinking more particularly of the African coast.

501. But in the year 1850 would not Zanzibar

have been under the *Imaum* of Muscat?—Yes; I may state that I know, as a matter of practice, that unless a vessel has been without the three mile limit she is rarely captured; if she is chased on shore then they follow her; but otherwise they leave alone vessels hugging the land.

502. Then, what further stipulations would you suggest should be added to the treaty with Persia, we having the power to search vessels if we have a Persian officer on board, and having prohibited also the import of slaves?—That is rather an inconvenient restriction, but I would get, if I could, the same facilities from them that we have from any other power; the greatest facilities.

503. You would propose additions to that treaty; an amended treaty, in fact?—Certainly. I would keep the subject always before the Persian Government, and press it on their attention, until I obtained the utmost facilities I thought possible.

504. Dr. Kirk writes, on the 14th of April: "I had no reason whatever to think that, on the subject of the slave trade, he had in any way changed, or was prepared to grant what was asked through Mr. Churchill;" you think that if we were willing to relieve him of this subsidy, his objections to curtailing the slave trade would be done away with?—Yes.

505. Would you propose that we should pay a subsidy to Muscat?—Yes; that we should relieve Zanzibar from all concern in the payment.

506. Then we should be at the mercy of the Sultan of Zanzibar if he did not carry out the treaty, should we not?—Hardly. A man in his position, who is really at our mercy the whole of the time, is not in a position to say that he had forgotten a treaty in which that was a stipulation binding on him.

507. But his successors might not consider themselves bound by that treaty?—I think they would be as careful to observe any arrangement that they had entered into, as we should be. I do not agree with the view that is taken by many people, that there is always a disposition on their parts to recede from their engagements.

508. In addition to the expense of the liberated slaves at Aden, is there not a sum paid in bounties to cruisers?—Yes.

509. We pay a considerable sum in bounties, do we not?—Yes.

510. If the slave trade was diminished, of course we should save considerably in that respect, should we not?—Yes.

511. Have you calculated at all what would be the whole expense of carrying out your plan?—No. It would be a matter of very easy calculation; but it would be increasing in one way and decreasing in another. If your vessels were as effective as they ought to be, I think you would then very speedily reduce the amount expended on your squadron, reduce the amount of the bounty, and the head money, and so on. But on the other hand, I think you ought to be prepared for some increase in the consular services.

512. Taking it on the Persian Gulf, would you propose that this should be shared between the Indian and Imperial Governments?—Yes.

513. In the Persian Gulf, are not the interests rather more Indian than Imperial?—I think not; and I think that the interests are almost equally shared. It may be a doubt as to which division

division of the general government the care of those interests should be entrusted to.

514. In general, is not a divided control, such as you propose, of the Indian and Foreign Office, rather inexpedient?—Certainly; and if we could arrive at any other division which would not involve a divided control, I should say it would be an improvement.

515. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] You have stated that you thought that the Sultan of Zanzibar would be satisfied with an acknowledgement of the 8,500 *l.*, but that would only be a portion of the revenue that he obtains from the slave trade, which has been put at 22,000 *l.*; is not that so?—You must, to some extent, bring him over to your view, that this matter of slave trading is a bad one for him. I have no doubt that in time he could be brought to see it in that light; at all events, I think he would be willing to make a great sacrifice to gain your good will.

516. That would involve a sacrifice of 13,000 *l.* or 14,000 *l.*, which is an important thing, is it not?—I hardly think that it would involve as much as that, because he would certainly not anticipate our being able to stop it at once.

517. How many consuls would you think it would require on the coast?—I cannot say. Mr. Churchill would give the Committee better information on that point than I can. I should be inclined to deal liberally in that matter, and let the consuls either have a European or native vice-consul or consular agent, or whatever he might ask for; and then you would be able to judge, after a year or two, whether he was doing any real good or not.

518. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] There is an establishment at Zanzibar for freed slaves, is there not?—There is a very large French mission, which takes a few, I believe; and there may be some subsisting there; but there is no regular establishment for maintaining freed slaves, or employing them in any way.

519. Not connected with any European country?—I believe not.

520. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] If we relieve the Sultan of Zanzibar of the payment of the subsidy to the Imaum of Muscat, and if we made him really wish to put down this trade, would the Sultan of Zanzibar have the power to control the northern Arabs?—I have no doubt he would, being backed by us. We do coerce them now with regard to their gradually, in defiance of his orders, assembling a very considerable naval force at Zanzibar. As long as it is merely a matter between him and those with whom we have no concern, our officers are unable to interfere, but they would make very short work of the northern Arabs if they were once allowed to aid him.

521. We should be forced to keep a small force off the coast in his support in that case, should we not?—Yes.

522. Would the Indian Government consider it fair that half this subsidy to Muscat should be paid out of the Indian Revenues?—I can hardly say what their view would be. The Government in India has altered its view very considerably from time to time. Regarding its own interests at Zanzibar, in Lord Cannings time, they were

looked upon as very important; but latterly they have been looked upon, I think, without due reference to the facts, as of less importance. The Government of India being also further removed from the ports which trade with Zanzibar is not, perhaps, so strongly impressed with the value of the trade, and its capabilities of supplying the Government of Bombay.

523. Is the East Coast of Africa an unhealthy coast?—The lower parts, at the mouths of the rivers, are, I believe, very unhealthy, but directly you get through Deltas, and the low country on the coast, you get to a country which has been described to me as remarkably healthy; you rise up a kind of steppe into a table land, and you find that is healthy.

524. With regard to the recommendation of increasing our fleet off this coast, would the service be an unhealthy one for the crews?—I should say not, because you would not be much in the River Deltas; they would be mostly at sea, which is not more unhealthy than the tropical service at sea generally.

525. With regard to subsidising a line of steamers, between what ports should such steamers ply, do you think?—I should say they might diverge from Aden or Maculla, which is a port between Muscat and Aden. They should run down the coast as far south as there is any English trade, and they should possibly include in that tour some of the islands, such as Seychelles, that communicate between Zanzibar and the Seychelles Islands.

526. Have you any knowledge what kind of subsidy the merchants would require to start such a line of steamers; would it be 10,000 *l.* or 50,000 *l.*, or what?—No; I should say it would not be very expensive. Besides there is known to be a considerable trade, and I think they would be content with a very short term, probably, at first starting.

527. The high price of coals on that coast would make the service an expensive one, would it not?—The coals would probably be supplied direct from England. Vessels would go out ballasted with coals, and return with cotton or sugar or other produce as they now do.

528. You would have to go by the Suez Canal, would you not?—They would join in with the Suez line at Aden.

529. *Chairman*.] In No. 65 of the Report addressed to the Earl of Clarendon by the Committee on the East African Slave Trade, there is a suggestion with regard to freed slaves, that "the greatest care should be taken to provide efficient protection for the freed slaves, and to prevent their being ill-used by their employers, or kidnapped by the slave-dealers. They should be under the special protection of Her Majesty's Consul, although amenable to the laws of Zanzibar; a register should be kept of them at the British Consulate; they should be provided with printed certificates of freedom, and, as we have already suggested, the Sultan should declare his intention to punish severely any attempt to molest them;" should you concur in those recommendations?—Those are exactly the kind of regulations that I would propose.

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*Thursday, 20th July 1871.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Lord Frederick Cavendish.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Gilpin.  
Mr. Russell Gurney.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. John Talbot.

RIGHT HONOURABLE RUSSELL GURNEY, IN THE CHAIR.

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Mr. *Vivian* read a letter received from Dr. *Kirk* on the 10th of June 1871—(*Vide Appendix*).

Major General CHRISTOPHER PALMER RIGBY, called in; and Examined.

Maj. Gen.  
*C. P. Rigby.*

530. *Chairman.*] WERE you at one time Consul at Zanzibar?—I was Her Majesty's Consul and Political Agent for the Indian Government nearly four years, from 1858 to the end of 1861.

531. Had you previously to that been acting in any capacity which gave you a knowledge of the affairs of that district?—I had been stationed at Aden for four years, where I studied Arabic and Persian, and the language of the African Coast, the Somali language; and I had also been nearly two years up the Persian Gulf; I was the magistrate at Bushire, superintendent of police, and Persian interpreter to the general commanding during the Persian War.

532. Had you any opportunity of becoming acquainted with the proceedings of the slave traders previously to your being appointed Consul at Zanzibar?—I had heard a good deal of the trade when I was up the Persian Gulf, being very much thrown amongst officers of the Indian Navy.

533. At that time, that is before the year 1858, was there any considerable slave trade carried on up the Red Sea?—I think very few slaves indeed were carried up the Red Sea. There were always one or two vessels of the Indian Navy stationed at Aden, and they operated almost as a complete check to any slaves passing into the Red Sea.

534. In 1858, who was the reigning sovereign at Zanzibar?—Syed Majid, the late Sultan.

535. Had you much communication with him?—The British Consulate at Zanzibar had been closed 18 months before I went there on account of the death of my predecessor, Colonel Hamerton. I was the only Englishman there, and of course it took me some time to become acquainted with the slave trade; every individual on the island was interested in keeping me in ignorance of it as much as possible, and it was only gradually that I became aware of the vast extent of it.

536. I suppose it has existed there for a long time?—It has grown gradually from year to year; but it is within the last 20 years that it has become developed to what it now is.

537. You found it prevailing to a great extent

in 1858, as soon as you were able to become acquainted with what going on?—Yes; at that time the slave trade to the Persian Gulf and to the Red Sea, was not so active as it is now, because the chief number of the slaves, particularly the adults, were taken away by the French. When I went there I found a most active slave trade carried on at Zanzibar itself, and along the coast by the French vessels, and at that time the French slave vessels went escorted by French men-of-war.

538. Would those slaves be taken to the Mauritius?—To Réunion and to Mayotta.

539. Did the slave trade increase or decrease during the time you were there?—For sometime after I went there it increased very much. The French Government encouraged the trade; the French Admiral used to say, we want labourers for our colonies, and we are determined to have them; the French consul also gave his active support to it; not only was encouragement given to slavers under the French flag, but also to slavers under the Spanish flag.

540. Has that state of things continued up to the present time?—I brought this to the notice of the Foreign Office, and I followed the subject up as much as I possibly could, but it continued till Prince Napoleon came into office as Foreign Minister in France, and he issued very stringent orders prohibiting this slave trade, which did check it very much for a time, but afterwards they carried it on under the free engagées system.

541. Have you reason to suppose that that has been continued to the present time?—It was checked afterwards by our Government entering into an arrangement with the French, by which they were allowed to take labourers from India.

542. Was the principal part of the slave trade carried on at that time, that which was carried on under the French flag?—In addition to that, there was a great slave trade to Cuba under the Spanish flag.

543. That I suppose has ceased before now?—I think that has entirely ceased. Large houses at Marseilles and Barcelona entered very largely into

into the slave trade; they used to have splendid vessels come out; no expense was spared, and a very large amount of capital was embarked in the trade; that was a great deal checked, and during the last year that I was at Zanzibar, out of six vessels that were sent out from a certain house at Marseilles, five were either lost or captured.

544. Was there at that time any considerable trade carried on by the Arabs?—Yes, but not to such an extent as now, because the French outbid the Arabs very much; they could afford to pay a larger price for the negroes than the Arabs could.

545. What was the price of a slave at that time at Zanzibar?—Whilst the French were buying them, I should say the price of a full grown slave was from 30 to 40 dollars.

546. That gave a very large profit to the seller of the slave to the French, did it not?—Yes.

547. To what extent was the Arab slave trade carried on while you were there?—I think the second year after I was there I got the returns from the Custom House, which showed that it was 19,000.

548. That included all, I suppose?—Those were the slaves which passed the Custom House at Zanzibar, and which were supposed to be kept, if they had obeyed the treaties within the Zanzibar dominions, but probably at the very lowest estimate, three-fourths of those were sold to the northern Arabs.

549. Not to the French?—No; the late Sultan was always very fair; he was himself very anxious to put a stop to this French slave trade in his dominions, and he remonstrated constantly with the French; but he said, what can I do when they send their slave vessels with men-of-war; if I attempt to interfere, the French Consul immediately threatens me with the interference of his Government.

550. Did the Sultan derive the same profits from the slaves carried by French vessels, as from the others?—He derived no profit at all from them.

551. His only profit was from those carried by the northern Arabs?—Yes, those that passed the Custom House at Zanzibar.

552. Where did the French take them from?—All parts of the coast. They used to send agents to the Island of Zanzibar also, and have them collected and taken to the back side of the island which is almost uninhabited; where there are no roads and no huts, and have them shipped off secretly from there.

553. Was the Sultan equally honest with respect to the slaves carried by the northern Arabs?—No; he was afraid of the northern Arabs, they being of his own race; I have intercepted letters from his own nearest relatives sending orders to Zanzibar, describing the exact number and sexes of the slaves they required, just as if they were sending orders for horses to be shipped.

554. Besides any fear he might have of the northern Arabs, he would be deprived of the profits on the slaves by putting down the trade?—Yes; because a tax is paid upon the slaves passing the Custom House. At that time it was a dollar per head, and I think in 1860 he increased the tax to two dollars. On all slaves imported by his own family no tax is paid, so that the Sultan does not get a revenue upon the whole number.

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555. Were you called upon to remonstrate much with the Sultan as to the continuance of the trade notwithstanding our treaties with him?—During the whole of the four years I was there I was perpetually remonstrating with him. His attitude towards us depended a great deal upon the state of circumstances in which he happened to be in at the time. When he was in want of our assistance he would act very fairly, and do anything I wished, at other times, when he thought there was no danger of rebellion, he would not.

556. What was the sort of assistance which he expected to obtain from us?—Whilst I was there, his brother, the present Sultan, Syed Burchash, rebelled against him, and no doubt the Sultan would have lost his life and the whole of his dominions would have been in a state of anarchy, had not he given me sole authority over the town to do what I liked. Fortunately I got assistance from a man-of-war which happened to be at the time in the harbour, and I went and seized the present Sultan, who had hidden himself in his house in the town, and I made him prisoner, and sent him to Bombay. At that time the Sultan would do anything; but after the danger had passed he gradually relaxed; he became very much annoyed by the more active proceedings of our cruisers, and at last he got into a very bad temper, and would not assist us in any way.

557. At that time was it your opinion that he had some reason to complain of the proceedings of our cruisers?—In very few instances. Great complaints were made, but, when investigated, it turned out in almost every case that the Arabs were instigated by the French or other foreigners who viewed our interference with the slave trade with the greatest dislike and jealousy.

558. We had no assistance from the French ships?—Quite the reverse. Previous to my arrival in Zanzibar, I had not known of any instance of a slaver being captured in the Zanzibar territories by any of our cruisers; certainly no captures took place for six years before that. After that our cruisers were very active indeed, and a great many slavers were taken, particularly northern Arab dhows. As nothing had been done previously to my arrival, of course the Sultan and all the Arabs considered that the activity of our cruisers was owing to my personal action, and they had the idea that when I left the whole thing would drop.

559. Did the seizures by our cruisers give any considerable check to the trade?—Very great; so much so, that I found, when I was leaving Zanzibar in October 1861, that on the coast north of Zanzibar slaves were selling for five dollars a piece; the sale of them had become so difficult then that the men who had bought them at Zanzibar and taken them north, with a view to shipping them to Persia and Arabia, were glad almost to give them away; they found such difficulty in getting rid of them.

560. Is the profit of the trader who buys slaves at Zanzibar and on the coast adjoining Zanzibar, and exports them to the Red Sea, very large?—Apparently it is very large, that is to say, a slave sold in the market at Zanzibar for, say 20 dollars, would be resold in Muscat for 60 to 100 dollars, but the mortality during the sea passage is so very great that it very much reduces the profit.

561. What occasions that very great mortality?—The way they pack the slaves in those small dhows; the want of proper food; the state of filth they are in; the want of water; and if they happen

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happen to sight an English steamer at sea the slavers frequently cut the throats of the whole number of the slaves on board and throw them overboard.

562. Then the sufferings of the slaves on board are rather increased by our cruisers being stationed on the coast?—Very much indeed; there is no doubt of it. I remember the case of a dhow that was captured in the harbour of Zanzibar by the ship "Lyra." I had had information that that dhow had got slaves on board, and just before she sailed I went with Captain Oldfield of the "Lyra," and boarded the dhow. There were 112 girls on board her, evidently selected to be sold at a high price for the harems of Arabia and Persia. The dhow was taken alongside the "Lyra," and these slaves were taken out. A fatigue party from the "Lyra" was sent into the dhow to take out the provisions, but each man as he went into the hold of the dhow fainted away; the doctor then gave orders that the vessel was to be towed out and scuttled, and he said from the frightful stench, and the state the dhow was in, if she had gone to sea, there could be no doubt that in a week the whole of those slaves would have died; that I think is a very common case. They go to sea so ill provided, that the sufferings of the slaves are very great, and particularly if they have put off their departure to the last, or if the northern winds, set in earlier than usual, and they cannot beat up against them; then the sufferings are frightful.

563. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] What is the average length of the voyage to Muscat?—Thirty to 35 days; if they have any slaves on board, they have to put in at two or three ports for water; and that circumstance gives great facility to our cruisers to check the trade, because they have only to watch a few ports on the coast to the north, and they are sure to catch a great many of those dhows.

564. *Chairman*.] Do you think by active exertions on the part of our cruisers, the trade could be prevented, looking at the large profit there is on the slaves?—I have not the slightest doubt that within five years it could be entirely stopped; but to stop it, we want what we have never yet had, viz., system; one year you get an active officer on the coast, who enters into the spirit of the thing, and checks the trade a good deal; then he goes away, and another man comes with quite different opinions; or you get a captain of a cruiser who takes the advice of the Consul and pulls with him, and he does a great deal of good; and then, perhaps just as he has become acquainted with the secrets of the trade, and begins to know where the slaves are shipped, and where the dhows put in for water, and can distinguish between a legitimate trader and a slave dhow, which it takes a long time to do, he is ordered away and never goes back again.

565. If one slave dhow in five arrived at its destination in safety, would it pay for the loss of four?—No; I do not think it would. I should say that the loss of one would take the profits upon four; because, when you take the price of provisions and all together, there is not so much profit.

566. So that if the cruisers succeeded in capturing one out of five, you think it would be sufficient to destroy the trade?—Yes; I do not think they have hitherto captured anything like that proportion.

567. What force has there been on that coast?—There has never been any regular squadron kept up. When I was there, the squadron that the Admiralty sent out was a common cause of joking amongst the French, and the Americans, and the Germans. That such a squadron should be sent out to check the slave trade was an absurdity. There was the "Sidon," an old tub, that any dhow on the coast could beat; there was the "Gorgon," that took 40 days to do 800 miles, and vessels of that class, perfectly useless for any other service.

568. You think that the cruisers alone could put a stop to the trade; but does it occur to you that any means might be taken to make it the interest of the Zanzibar people to put a stop to the trade?—I think the Zanzibar Arabs are now fully aware that it will be stopped, and their ideas are very different now as to their own interests to what they were a few years ago. The late Sultan of Zanzibar sent his brother-in-law and a cousin on a mission to the Queen two years ago, and at the Sultan's particular request I was appointed to take charge of the mission. The person who acted as secretary is now the minister to the present Sultan, Syed Burgash, and in talking with him daily on the subject, he said that the Arabs are now beginning to find out that the English are quite right, that there is far more money to be made by keeping the labourers in the country and cultivating the rich valleys by their labour, than by selling them out of the country.

569. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] Would they be employed as slaves in the country?—There would always be a certain form of slavery on the coast, but it is not attended with any cruelty. Arabs are passionate and hot tempered, but they are not cruel to their slaves; they are nothing like the French or the Portuguese in their treatment of slaves.

570. *Chairman*.] They would have the power of stopping it altogether without our cruisers if they were really in earnest, and if they were satisfied that it would be to their interest to keep the slaves in their own country as labourers?—The difficulty is that the Zanzibar Arabs are so much afraid of these piratical tribes from the north, that come down with the north winds in great numbers.

571. Who make expeditions into the interior, and capture the slaves?—No, those are men of a different class, those are half castes, who organise those expeditions, and plunder slaves from the interior.

572. They are the men who provide the slaves for the northern Arabs?—Yes.

573. Have you any suggestion to make with regard to what might be done in the way of putting a pressure upon the Sultan to induce him to put a stop to the trade?—We have tried all sorts of means through treaties, through remonstrances, and through advice, and they have all done very little good. From what I know of Syed Burgash, I do not think he would be so much inclined to meet our views as the late Sultan was, but I have always been of opinion that our Government should put down the slave trade with a strong hand.

574. In what way?—I wrote out a short extract from one of Lord Palmerton's letters to my predecessor, and I often used to read a translation of it in the "Durbar" to the Sultan, and I often gave copies of it in Arabic to the principal chiefs

chiefs. Lord Palmerston instructed Colonel Hamerton to inform the Imaum, "that the traffic in slaves carried on by his subjects was doomed to destruction; that Great Britain was the chief instrument in the hands of Providence for the accomplishment of this object; that it is useless for these Arabs to oppose what is written in the Book of Fate; that if they persisted in the continuance of this traffic it would involve them in trouble and loss; that they had better therefore submit to the will of Providence, and abandon this traffic, cultivate their soil, and engage in lawful commerce." I have always been of opinion that that was the proper view to take of it.

575. Nothing having been done to carry that out for a good many years, do you think it would still have the same effect?—We might well say to the Sultan we have left it to you to act up to the treaties, and to abolish this horrible man stealing; you have not done it, we do not say you are wilfully and knowingly keeping up this slave trade, but it has been, chiefly through the instrumentality of the English Government, suppressed in every other country in the world, and we will no longer allow you Arabs to be an exception.

576. We have no treaties with them which prohibit man-stealing altogether?—No, but we should simply say we will not allow this; I think the Arabs quite understand that way of putting it. I often said to the Sultan, You Arabs come down here because you find a very pleasant and fertile country preferable to your own barren deserts, but that does not give you any right to depopulate half Africa, and to go and steal the population and sell them.

577. You consider we should be justified in interfering with a strong arm in the interior of Africa to prevent the stealing of the natives?—By means of an efficient squadron you would be able so to check the trade that in a few years it would be given up; we could not interfere in the interior.

578. We cannot interfere with anything except the foreign slave trade?—No.

579. They are entitled to take any number of slaves necessary for their own use under our treaty?—Yes, as long as that treaty is in existence the slave trade will be carried on to a certain extent.

580. You think it is absolutely necessary to get a new treaty?—Yes; I think there could be no more favourable occasion for proposing a new treaty than the present; we are under no obligations to Syed Burgash. It may be said that he is under obligations to us, for I sent him under British protection to Bombay; he certainly was kept there as a state prisoner, but he was well treated, and probably by his being sent there I saved his life. The Arabs now see that slavery is abolished throughout the United States of America; the Portuguese, their own nearest neighbours, who carried it on in a most shameful and cruel way, have abolished it now by law, and I think we might very well say to the Sultan, as Lord Palmerston says here, "Great Britain is the instrument of Providence, and it is written in the Book of Fate that the slave trade shall stop, and we will be the means of stopping it."

581. We have been told that there is a much greater trade between other countries and Zanzibar than there used to be; the trade is principally with the Germans and the French, is it not?—

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I think the French trade has died out very much; the Germans have a large trade, and so have the United States; I think, if possible, the best course to adopt would be to induce all the foreign nations that have consuls there to join our Government in putting down the slave trade; I do not see why they should not, and I think it most likely that they would.

582. Would not it be almost necessary to get them to join with us?—Yes; very great mischief has been done, and very great mistrust has been instilled into the minds of the Arabs by foreign merchants; they are all very jealous of our interference with the slave trade.

583. Do you think the Sultan could hold his own now without the profits which he derives from the exportation of slaves?—His profits on slaves, compared with his other means, are the merest trifle. The means of the present Sultan are very much greater than what his father and his brother had. Old Syed Seeed had to keep up his territories in India and in the Persian Gulf, in addition to Zanzibar, and he always had to be on his guard against the encroachments of the Wahabahs. The commander of Her Majesty's ship "Imogene," which visited Zanzibar in 1834, stated that up to that time there was no trade at all scarcely. It only came to be anything like a place of trade after the late Imaum transferred his own residence there, accompanied by the British consul. It was the presence of the British consul there, and the feeling that there was always justice to be had where there was a British consul, that induced a large number of our Indian fellow-subjects to go and settle at Zanzibar, and they have created the trade. I think, up to the year 1838 or 1840, the revenue the Sultan derived from customs at Zanzibar was only 50,000 crowns a year. In 1859, the farm of the customs was 196,000 dollars. In 1870, in the latest return from Dr. Kirk, it is 310,000. Therefore, in 10 years, the revenue which the Sultan got from his customs was increased by 114,000 dollars, or, in English money, about 24,000*l.*

584. Mr. Kennaway.] Does that include slaves?—I never could understand whether the customs master included the slaves; I do not think he did, because the profits from the slaves went into the private purse, as it were, of the Sultan. At any rate, the trade is so greatly increased that, at the lowest estimate, he is getting now 24,000*l.* more per annum from the customs revenue than he did in 1859-60. In the previous 10 years the increase was quite as much. The customs are farmed to an Indian Banyan for five years at a time, and almost every five years there is an increase in the same ratio. Notwithstanding that the customs master pays over this large amount, I happened to make the will of the old customs master, and he left 3,000,000 dollars in hard cash. Old Syed Saeed, the father of the late Sultan and the present Sultan, though he had an immense establishment, and a family of over 20 children, left, I do not know the exact amount, but it must have been several millions of dollars. As far as the resources of the Sultan go, they are ample to keep up the Government there.

585. You think he is not at all dependent on the sum he receives from slaves?—Not in the slightest degree; he has large estates in Zanzibar which are becoming every year more productive. The late Sultan was put to great expense in paying these northern Arabs; he was afraid of them;

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he thought if his brother rebelled he would want their assistance, and he paid them every year 40,000 dollars as bribes in point of fact. The present Sultan, having a friendly brother at Muscat, will be under no obligation of that sort.

586. As I understand, the only means which you suggest, with a view of suppressing the slave trade on the east coast of Africa, are, increased activity on the part of our squadron, and requiring the Sultan to enter into a new treaty with us so as to put a stop to the internal slave trade?—Yes; the chief point with regard to the squadron is to have an experienced naval officer in a permanent appointment there, who should have a command or supervision over the whole east coast, embracing the Mozambique and Madagascar coast, where there is a very large and increasing slave trade going on now. He should not be always required to reside at any one place, but to go about in the cruisers. In a short time he would have a thorough knowledge of where the slave trade was carried on in all its branches, and as each new cruiser came on to the ground, the commander would not be perfectly in the dark as he has been hitherto, sometimes taking vessels that are not slavers. All that would be avoided, and the mere fact of having an officer there acquainted with the coast and able to give instructions to the officers coming out, would certainly save the expense of two vessels there.

587. Do you know anything of the expense which is now incurred in the support of liberated slaves?—I have no recent knowledge upon that point. When I was at Zanzibar I emancipated about 6,000 slaves who had been held in slavery by British Indian subjects. I never had the slightest trouble in providing for them, and they never cost the Government a shilling.

588. Did you obtain labour for them, or did they find it for themselves?—They found it for themselves. There was always a great demand for labour, not only in the plantations, but in the service of American and German and French houses. There is a great trade in cowries, which employs a great many people; then labourers are required in sifting and washing the gum copal, and in husking the cocoa-nuts; it constantly occurred that I discovered slaves in the employment of those foreign merchants whose masters were British subjects. I sent for them and had them emancipated by the Arab judge, and they took their certificates of emancipation and went back to their work, the only difference being that instead of handing over all the pay to their masters, they kept the pay themselves.

589. Do you attach importance to having consuls or vice consuls at other ports on the coast besides Zanzibar itself?—I do not think it would be possible. I know Mr. Churchill has recommended that, but I do not think you would get a respectable class of men to undertake the office; and if you could get them I do not think, on the average the men would live three months, the climate is so very unhealthy. I never knew a white man go there yet without getting one of the deadly fevers. I was on the coast myself, and I very nearly died. I caught a fever that lasted for eight months.

590. Is Zanzibar itself unhealthy?—The town is not, but it is almost certain death for any white man to sleep in the plantation. Some years ago the commodore went with several officers and a boat's crew to one of the Sultan's country houses in the interior of the island, a distance of about

15 miles; they only slept one night in the interior, and a few days afterwards the only one of the whole party alive was one who had slept in the boat, the vegetation is so dense and rank.

591. Do the natives suffer from the climate?—Not in the same degree, the Arabs do, very much; I think very few Arabs of pure race reach manhood.

592. Have you kept up your acquaintance with what has been going on in Zanzibar since 1861, when you left?—Yes; I have been in constant correspondence with people out there, Mr. Churchill and Dr. Kirk, and natives. I happen to have received last Monday some very interesting letters, one of which was from the customs master complaining bitterly of the want of postal communication.

593. Was your attention directed to that subject while you were there?—It was a constant subject of correspondence with me the whole time I was there.

594. Was there not at one time a suggestion made that tenders should be advertised for a subsidised line of steamers?—I made a report on the matter to the Government of Bombay. I had constantly represented the desirability of having a subsidised line, and when I came home on leave I had an interview with Sir Charles Wood, who was then the Minister for India, but nothing was done. When I went back to India I found that the subject had been noticed by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce in consequence of a good deal of trade which used to find its way to Bombay being intercepted by foreign merchants, and taken to Zanzibar; for instance, Germans and Americans now send their ships to Muscat and to Bussorah for gums and hides, and to the coast of Mekran for wool, thereby cutting off very nearly all the wool trade and the gum and hide trade from Kurrachee and Bombay; that is all brought to Zanzibar, and sent away in German and American ships.

595. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] Round the Cape?—Yes, since the opening of the Suez Canal, another change has taken place, and I think a good deal of trade is coming back to this country.

596. *Chairman*.] Is that diversion of trade to which you have referred, attributable in any way to the want of postal communication?—I consider it entirely due to that; perhaps I may be allowed to read a few remarks from the report which I made to the Government at the time, which express my views at the present moment. The Government of Bombay had been in communication with the Postmaster General upon this subject, and happening to be at Bombay at the time on my way to England, they referred the matter to me; and this is my memorandum, dated the 3rd March 1867: "During my residence at Zanzibar, I had many occasions of observing how very desirable a regular postal communication would be between that port and Bombay; and on my return to England, I brought this subject to the consideration of Sir Charles Wood, then Secretary of State for India, pointing out how the rapidly increasing commerce of Zanzibar was being monopolised by foreigners, and the trade of Aden, Muscat, Bussorah, and the coast of Mekran being gradually diverted from Kurrachee and Bombay into foreign bottoms, owing to the German and American merchants at Zanzibar intercepting it, and carrying the coffee, gums, hides, &c., from Aden and Mocha; the dates, hides, &c., from Muscat, and the wool from Mekran,

Mekran direct to Zanzibar. Zanzibar is also becoming the emporium for the sea-borne trade of Madagascar, the Mozambique, the Comoro Islands, and the whole of the East Coast of Africa. It is now the chief market in the world for the supply of ivory, gum, copal, cloves, and cowrees, and has a rapidly increasing export trade in hides, oil, seeds, dyes, &c., whilst sugar and cotton promise to figure largely amongst its future exports. The foreign trade of Madagascar has increased with extraordinary rapidity since the ports of this island have been opened to commerce. It is impossible to foresee what may be its extent in a few years. As one example of this increase, I was informed by the United States Consul at Zanzibar, that during the north-west monsoon of 1865, upwards of 60 large bugalows and dhows proceeded from Zanzibar to the western ports of Madagascar, to load rice for Kutch and Kattiwari, in consequence of the deficient harvest in those provinces. All this valuable trade is at present lost to British merchants, because until there is a postal communication with Zanzibar it is impossible for them to compete with the foreigners, who at present have it all in their hands, and whose vessels, arriving with the latest state of the markets, they are thus enabled to regulate their purchases and sales. Nearly the whole of the local trade of Zanzibar is in the hands of British-Indian subjects, viz., Banians, Khojahs, and Borahs, some of whom are very wealthy. The American, French, and German merchants conduct nearly all their business through these natives of India, who would however much prefer trading with English merchants, as they know that all disputes arising would then be settled by the British Consul, and according to the same law for both parties. The way in which the want of postal communication operates to prevent any of the trade being carried on by merchants at Bombay, may be illustrated by the following example of what several times occurred during my residence at Zanzibar:—A wealthy native firm at Bombay chartered a large British ship to proceed from Bombay to Zanzibar to load a cargo for London; the letter of advice to their agent at Zanzibar to purchase a cargo being duly sent by the mail steamer to Aden. There being no postal communication between Aden and Zanzibar, the letter does not reach the latter port for several months. In the meantime, the ship arrives at Zanzibar; the agent, having no advice, has no cargo ready; the foreign merchants acting on an agreement existing between them for the purpose of excluding British merchants from any participation in the trade, run up the price of all produce in the market 40 per cent., sharing whatever loss there may be amongst each other. The ship, after waiting in vain for a cargo, comes on demurrage, and is finally dispatched to London in ballast, entailing a heavy loss on the charterers in Bombay, who give up in consequence any intention of establishing a trade with Zanzibar. The expense of establishing a monthly communication between Zanzibar and the Seychelle Islands in correspondence with the French mail steamers running between Aden and La Reunion, and which call at Port Victoria, Island of Mahi, would be inconsiderable. The distance between Zanzibar and the Seychelle Islands is about 800 miles, almost due east from Zanzibar. Both monsoons are a fair wind, but there are frequent long calms, and the navigation on the Seychelles Bank is tedious and dangerous for sailing

vessels, owing to the very strong currents. A small steamer would consequently be preferable to a sailing vessel. I think that if a regular communication were established with the Seychelles, a considerable trade would soon arise; natives of India residing at Zanzibar would be attracted to those lovely and salubrious islands, and the expense of keeping up a small vessel would be in part or entirely covered by freight and passage.

597. You would look to the increase of commercial intercourse as having considerable effect in diminishing the interest which the natives have in the slave trade?—I would; it is impossible to calculate what the trade of that coast might become in a few years if the slave trade were once abolished.

598. In what way does the existence of the slave trade prevent the growth of a legitimate commercial trade?—The great export of able-bodied labourers from the country, deters free labourers from coming to settle at Zanzibar or along the coast, because they know that as long as the slave trade is going on they are not safe for a day.

599. Were any of the 6,000 you emancipated retaken, and sold again as slaves?—They were not interfered with. When I was at Mandavie, the principal port of Kutch, where I was staying for a considerable time investigating the revenue accounts of the port for 60 years, many of those men came to me evidently very proud of the passes they had received from me.

600. Seeing that those 6,000 remained untouched, why should not free labourers be safe from capture?—Those slaves that I emancipated were all registered at the British Consulate; they were emancipated legally according to the law of the land by the Kazi; they then brought their certificate of emancipation to me, and I signed it, and affixed the seal of the Consulate to it; I registered every particular regarding them in a book kept at the Consulate; most of those men afterwards had their certificate of emancipation tied round their necks in a silver box or wore it on their arms; and I heard afterwards, from naval officers, of those men being met with in many other ports in Mozambique, and on the coast of Madagascar.

601. Was anything done upon that memorandum which you have read?—The resolution of the Government of Bombay was that a copy of the papers should be forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Government of India, with a recommendation that tenders be invited for the conveyance of a monthly mail.

602. Were tenders invited?—I left Bombay shortly afterwards, but I believe nothing has been done.

603. No tenders have been invited?—I never heard of any.

604. Do you suppose that a line could be established with a moderate amount of subsidy?—I have no doubt it could. Hearing the subject mentioned on Monday, I went to one of the directors of the British India Steam Navigation Company, and he sent me a memorandum this morning, showing all the lines which their Company at present work with a subsidy from the Government, and he says, in a note, that his Company are very anxious indeed to tender for a line from Aden to Zanzibar, which would form a continuation of the communication with the Persian Gulf and the whole of the west coast of India and Ceylon.



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605. Can you tell us for what amount of subsidy such a line could be established?—I think, most likely, since the opening of the Suez Canal, the trade is taking a different course, and I think that so much trade would be attracted that a very small subsidy would suffice. My idea formerly was, that a steamer should go across to Seychelles, and there should meet the French, giving thereby direct monthly communication.

606. What do you propose now?—There is a Mr. Wiseman, who has entered into the Zanzibar trade very largely, which he carries on by steamers through the canal; he is anxious to tender for the establishment of a regular line to Zanzibar; he sends his steamers now to Zanzibar, but not with any regularity, as he would if there was a subsidy. In the note which I received from the customs master at Zanzibar on Monday, he says, "I only hope your endeavours will prove successful in regard to the postal communication with Zanzibar; if you do succeed you will have the hearty thanks of the Zanzibar community, native and European. At the time of writing, our mails for March, April, and May are lying at Seychelles; nothing to bring them over. Admiral Cockburn in flagship "Forte," left yesterday for Seychelles, he has promised to send these with the June mail from Mahi next month; yet a month to wait."

607. The French steamers touch at Seychelles?—Yes, on their way to Mauritius and Reunion. He complains that the Post Office will persist in sending his letters to Seychelles. Seeing that there are only chance opportunities of forwarding letters from Seychelles to Zanzibar, it amounts to denying British subjects at Zanzibar all postal communication.

608. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] You have read the Report of the Slave Trade Committee of 1869, which sat at the Foreign Office?—Yes.

609. What do you think of the terms of the treaty which it recommends should be negotiated with the Sultan of Zanzibar?—I do not think any treaty would have the slightest effect; treaties with Arabs are mere waste paper.

610. You think we should get rid of our present treaty?—We can easily do it, by saying, "This treaty has never been observed by the subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar or of the Imaum of Muscat, and it is no use having a treaty in force that is never observed."

611. Would you at once forbid all export of slaves to the island of Zanzibar?—The worst part of the slave trade is that from Lake Nyassa to the south, Kilwa being the port of shipment. The whole of that vast and rich country is becoming depopulated. Banyans who have been for years at Zanzibar have told me that they remember, when they first came to the coast, the whole country was densely populated down to the sea coast, and now you have to go 18 days' journey inland before you come upon a village almost. That is fully confirmed by Baron Van der Decken and Dr. Rosher, who travelled that route. Baron Van der Decken talks of miles and miles of ruined towns and villages the whole way up towards Lake Nyassa, where there is now no population at all. Every year this slave trade is extending further and further inland. A great number of the slaves are now brought from the western side of Lake Nyassa; the Arabs have got dhows in the lake on purpose to convey their slaves across. I had a proof at Zanzibar of how the slave trade extends from nation to nation in Africa. I found, in

registering all the slaves I emancipated, that amongst the recent arrivals most of them gave the names of their tribe as Manganga. I could not at that time exactly fix the position of their country; however, shortly afterwards I saw a letter of Dr. Livingstone in the paper, saying that he had recently travelled through the Manganga country, where the whole population was engaged in the cultivation and working up of cotton, and he said that he had never seen such a wonderful cotton country in his life, or such a fertile country. I think, a year or two afterwards, he went through the same country, and found it entirely depopulated, all the huts being full of dead bodies. The children had been carried away, and most of the adults slain. That is one of the worst features of the slave trade in that country. When the slave traders go into a district, they kill all the men and women, and burn the villages, and carry off the children. The reason they give for taking the children only is, that the children are driven more easily, like flocks of sheep, or they are tied with ropes and chains; the men they lose more by desertion on the way.

612. My question was whether you would prohibit the present trade which we allow between the main land and Zanzibar for the purposes of Zanzibar itself?—Unless the Government choose to do what I think is the proper course, viz., to stop it with a high hand at once, and say we will not have this trade go on, it might for the sake of the Arabs in Zanzibar be permitted for a short time between Mirama and the Island, or coast opposite Zanzibar; there is not the same atrocity in that traffic, because it is not carried on on the organised system that the other trade is; probably from what is called Mirama, 4,000 slaves are annually brought to the Island of Zanzibar; that would be sufficient to keep up the supply in Zanzibar and Pemba; they are men and children who have been kidnapped. The slavers do not burn towns and villages, and murder the grown-up people to get those slaves.

613. Sir *J. Hay*.] Are they exported from Dar Seelam?—Mirama is the coast district opposite the Island of Zanzibar; Dar Seelam is quite a recent creation of the late Sultan of Zanzibar, and it is now going to ruin again.

614. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] When you speak of stopping the slave trade with a high hand, do you mean by a squadron, or by any interference on land?—By a squadron; I do not think the squadron need be very strong; but it would be ineffective without an experienced naval officer, an officer whose heart would be in the work.

615. If the trade were allowed from one port only to the Island of Zanzibar, would not there be a danger of slaves being taken overland, even from Lake Nyassa to that port?—That could be checked, because there is such a marked difference in the tribes; I would severely punish any man who should export natives of those southern tribes; you could easily stop that.

616. What do you think of the recommendation of the Slave Trade Committee, that freed slaves should be landed by our cruisers on the Island of Zanzibar, and left there?—I think it the very best destination for them; I have thought a good deal about it, and I do not think any other plan would be satisfactory. The climate of the Mauritius does not suit them at all; they die there like rotten sheep in the cold weather. Seychelles suits them exactly; they get there the food they are used to, cassava and fish, but

but it appears that Seychelles does not want them.

617. Would not there be a danger of their being kidnapped by the northern Arabs, if they were landed at Zanzibar?—Our squadron must stop all that; I found no difficulty with the 6,000 I emancipated; each slave had his own certificate of emancipation; I watched them pretty well; I used to send my guard about the island to find if they had been kidnapped, and no complaints ever reached me.

618. In fact you think precautions might be taken to prevent any danger of kidnapping?—Yes; when the northern Arabs came down, and were prowling about, the slaves whom I had liberated, without any hint from me, formed amongst themselves a vigilance committee, who used to patrol the town all night to protect the emancipated slaves; and they very often used to wake me up in the night if the Arabs had attempted to take any of their children.

619. Whose subjects are the northern Arabs, who chiefly carry on this trade?—They are chiefly the piratical tribes; the tribes who in former years gave us a great deal of trouble.

620. Are they subject to any power?—That is the difficulty in dealing with the slave trade; a great many of them are nominally under the jurisdiction of the Imaum of Muscat, but in reality the Imaum of Muscat has no power at all over them; he can do nothing effective.

621. To what ports do those northern Arabs chiefly take the slaves?—A great many now go Mocullah and Ras al Had, and other ports in Arabia, and a great many go to ports in Persia.

622. You think that the chiefs having control over those ports, would not have sufficient power to stop the import of slaves, if they wished it?—In dealing with them I should send an English man-of-war round with proclamations in Arabic, which I would have read out by the sheikhs and elders of the tribes, giving them distinct notice that after a certain date the provisions of our treaties with all those chiefs, declaring the slave trade piracy, would be rigidly enforced, and that the commander of every dhow found with slaves on board would be hanged.

623. The slave trade to Cuba was first efficaciously stopped when we were able to station a squadron round Cuba; do you think this trade might be more easily stopped if our ships cruised off the ports of entry instead of cruising off the ports of export?—We should do both, and it could be more easily done in this case on account of the prevailing winds. The Committee which sat at the Foreign Office suggests that one vessel could easily watch the entrance of the Persian Gulf; one stationed at Aden could easily watch the entrance of the Red Sea. It is during the months when the southern monsoon prevails that the slaves are carried north, and one vessel in addition cruising off Socotra would intercept most of those. Of course, the northern Arabs would persist for some time, but they would very soon find that it was a losing trade.

624. Do you know whether cruising off the east coast is unhealthy for the men?—Not at all; the climate is nothing like so bad as that on the west coast, but it is an enervating climate; the men ought not to be kept too long on the coast.

625. For a short period the climate does not affect the men?—No; at the time when they would not be required on service they have got a place to go to which has one of the finest climates in the world, viz, the Seychelles Islands,

where they can get fruits and vegetables and fresh meat in the greatest abundance.

626. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] You mentioned that, at one time, a considerable trade in slaves was carried on with the French Islands; is that entirely given up now?—We have no recent information, I believe, about that. Two or three years ago Lord Campbell carried a motion in the House of Lords for an Address to Her Majesty, to appoint a consul at Mozambique. I think it is a most unfortunate circumstance that that has never been acted on. Not only have we no consul at Mozambique, but the consulate at the Comoro Islands has been abolished, so that from Zanzibar to our own territories in Port Natal, there is nobody to watch British interests, or to interfere with the slave trade. In consequence of the ports in Madagascar having been thrown open to foreign trade since the death of the old queen, there is such an immensely increasing trade in the products of Madagascar, that they have begun to import slaves into Madagascar very largely, in order to cultivate their rich land; and, although the Portuguese Government have abolished the slave trade in Mozambique, I must say I do not believe it is abolished, or will be abolished without a British squadron to watch it. Up to recently there was no trade whatever in the Mozambique dominions except the slave trade; the whole business of the Portuguese population was men-stealing and men-selling. At the five chief ports, Ibo, Mozambique, Inhambane, and the mouths of the Zambesi, the only trade was in men. Large parties of half-caste Portuguese, led very often by Portuguese, scoured all the interior, and brought those slaves down to be sold.

627. Do you think that slaves are still taken to Réunion?—I have no recent information about it. We have now a consul at Réunion, and I should think he would be able to state whether they are still importing slaves under the name of free engagées.

628. What are the products of the interior of the country about Lake Nyassa?—All sorts of grains and vegetables. In the valleys of those large rivers opposite Zanzibar, within the Sultan's dominions, they are now cultivating sim-sim, from which most of our fine olive oil is made, which goes very largely to Marseilles. In the last few years a great trade has sprung up in orchilla, which is a purple dye, and sugar is grown to a great extent. I believe very few people know what a fertile country that is. Baron Van der Decken, whose very interesting work has lately been published, speaks in the very highest terms of the fertility of the country, and of the opening there is for trade there. He describes a good deal of the country, a little to the north, as being a mountainous country, very much resembling Switzerland, and he says the chiefs are very anxious to have Europeans come and settle amongst them.

629. *Chairman*.] You mentioned that Dr. Livingstone had found one district near Lake Nyassa where cotton was being cultivated?—Yes, the Manganga country towards Lake Nyassa. He describes the whole country as being a field of cotton, all the people of both sexes being busily engaged in spinning and weaving.

630. Mr. *O'Conor*.] You think it useless to make treaties with the Sultan?—From my knowledge of the Arabs treaties are utterly useless. I understand that some of the witnesses who have been examined have suggested that the Sultan

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Sultan might be induced to give up the slave trade if the 40,000 dollars which he annually pays as subsidy to the Imaum of Muscat, were remitted. I am convinced that he would never fall into that arrangement. When the mission was over here that was a point which the secretary urged upon me more than any other; he said the Sultan of Zanzibar would rather give up the country and go to live at Mecca for the rest of his days. I think any negotiation upon that basis would be sure to fail; the Sultan would look upon it as a great humiliation, and it would be so considered by all the Arabs; they would say, there is the Sultan of Zanzibar become a paid servant of the Feringhee, and the chances are that he would lose his life.

631. Would you abolish the trade and give him no compensation?—I would not give him any compensation; I do not see on what ground he can be supposed to be entitled to compensation for giving up this horrible slave trade, which they have carried on for years in defiance of treaties, and in defiance of all laws.

632. You do not agree with the witnesses who have stated that it would cause a revolution in Zanzibar if the slave trade were put down?—No; I think the Arabs are now quite prepared for its suppression; it has been dinned into their ears for so many years, and they have seen slaves emancipated in so many other places, that I think they are quite prepared to see our Government setting to work to put a stop to it.

633. Sir R. Anstruther.] Do you agree with the statement in the paragraph at page 4 of the Foreign Office Report, that "the commerce of Zanzibar might be ruined if it were at once deprived of the slave labour on which it has hitherto relied, before proper provision is made for supplying free labour in its stead?"—I do not think it would interfere with the commerce of Zanzibar in the slightest degree; I think the Arabs would find their slaves more valuable; they would take more care of them, and there would be less mortality amongst them; and if the slave trade was prohibited so that free men could come and work there, there would be abundance of free labour, because, if the slave trade were abolished, thousands of people from Madagascar, from the Comoro Islands, and from India would come and reside at Zanzibar; but the mere fact of all agricultural labour being done by slaves, deters those people at present from coming and engaging themselves in that work, because they think it degrades them to work side by side with slaves.

634. In a previous part of the Report reference is made to the loss of revenue that would be incurred by the abolition of the trade. Would you propose to abolish the trade without compensating the Sultan in any way for the loss of revenue which he would thereby incur?—As I have already stated, I think the loss of revenue would be very trivial indeed; his revenue from other sources is so rapidly increasing that he would not feel very much the loss of that which he at present receives from slaves.

635. Mr. Kennaway.] You expect him to give up the 20,000 l. which he is supposed to derive from the slave trade; that is a "decree of fate" which a man does not submit to without a struggle generally?—I think, at the outside, it cannot be more than 8,000 l. which he gets from the duty on slaves. Mr. Churchill, I think, takes the whole number of slaves landed, including the

slaves belonging to members of the Sultan's family which do not pay any duty, and there are a great many branches of the Sultan's family, the members of which are the chief slave dealers.

636. Do you think that the British Indian subjects in Zanzibar are in any way supporters of the slave trade?—They were very large supporters of the slave trade till I put a stop to it by putting up a notice at the Custom House and on the gates of the Consulate, that whereas I had discovered that British subjects were holding slaves in violation of the laws, they would be allowed one month from that date to emancipate them legally, and, failing to do so, the provisions of the Act 5 Geo. 4 would be applied to them. At the end of the month many of them did not emancipate their slaves, and they were fined and imprisoned; and gradually I forced them all to emancipate their slaves; but after I left, the officer who succeeded me took a different view of it, and he held that we had no right to do this with regard to native Indians who belonged to protected States; and they have been allowed, unfortunately, to become slave holders again.

637. By taking the protection of other states?—No, merely on the ground that they were not directly British subjects, but only subjects of British protected states like Kutch.

638. Would they, in claiming to hold slaves, deprive themselves of the protection of the British Consulate?—I do not know on what terms it was done, but I suppose those who declared themselves subjects of Kutch or Kattywar were allowed to throw off their allegiance.

639. Mr. Shaw Lefevre.] They then became entitled to hold slaves?—Yes; I put a stop to their holding slaves, on this ground, that those men in their own country would not be allowed to hold slaves, for they would be prohibited by the British as the superior power, and it was not right that the subjects of those very states going to Zanzibar should be permitted to hold slaves.

640. Now, if a man wishes to hold slaves, all he has to do is to change his nationality?—Yes.

641. Sir J. Hay.] The Naturalisation Act was not in force when you were there?—No, they were prohibited from holding slaves; I understand that the natives of India are going to take advantage of the Naturalisation Act, and to throw off their allegiance to the British Government on purpose to be able to trade in slaves.

642. Mr. Churchill states that they have already done so?—I am sorry to hear it; it will open a new field for slavery; a great proportion of the plantations on the Island of Zanzibar now belong to British subjects; the Arabs are very dissipated and reckless, and they have mortgaged most of their plantations to those wealthy Banians and Indian Mahommedans.

643. Who, having been British subjects, have now become Zanzibar subjects?—They were obliged, as long as they were British subjects, to cultivate their plantations by free labour; now they will buy slaves and cultivate them with slave labour again.

644. You have no doubt that Mr. Churchill's evidence upon that point is correct?—No; Dr. Kirk has written to the same effect; that is an additional argument why we should stop the whole trade summarily.

645. Mr. Kennaway.] Do you know anything of the slave trade which is carried on between the interior of Africa and Egypt, by Zanzibar?—That has sprung up chiefly since the abolition

of the Indian navy. No doubt there is now a very considerable traffic in slaves from Zanzibar up the Red Sea to Turkish ports, and also to Suez. In 1867 I brought home three African slaves that I had emancipated at Zanzibar, and we stopped at Suez, and in walking through the town we found it was full of negroes who, no doubt, were quite recent importations, because they could not speak anything but their own language. I visited the Consul and spoke to him about it, and he said he was perfectly aware of it; and he said that the way they were sent to Cairo was in the empty water tanks on the railway trucks.

646. Do you think that still goes on?—I do not know; I have not much faith in anything the Egyptian Government would do to stop it.

647. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] You spoke of the great increase in trade between Zanzibar and France and the United States; do those countries keep any cruisers off the coast?—Till recently the French Government kept a squadron under an admiral, and they made much more naval display than we did.

648. Was that ostensibly for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade?—Quite the contrary; the French naval officers supported it in every way.

649. Were they instructed by their Government to take measures to put a stop to the slave trade?—I do not think the French Government cared anything about putting a stop to it, except for a short time when Prince Napoleon was at the head of the Foreign Office; they certainly were then in earnest in stopping it; the last year I was there I got the chief Arab agent who supplied the French ships to give me information when the French slavers were coming, and in consequence of that, five of the vessels belonging to the principal French house carrying on the trade were taken, and the last ship they had was run ashore by the captain.

650. Latterly the French Government have kept no cruisers there, have they?—I do not know whether they have withdrawn them; I know it was stated that they intended withdrawing their squadron altogether.

651. Do the United States keep any cruisers on the coast?—No, our cruisers are the only cruisers engaged in suppressing the slave trade on that coast.

652. Is the cultivation of the Island of Zanzibar mainly carried on by slaves?—It was when I went there; but, as I have stated, so far as British Indian subjects were concerned, they were not allowed after that to have slaves; amongst those 6,000 slaves that I emancipated, a good many were agricultural labourers, and many of them said we do not know what to do when we are emancipated; and I made an agreement with the Indian planter to give up a part of the land sufficient for the slave to grow provisions for himself and his family on condition that he worked for the master four days in the week, and had the remaining three days to himself.

653. What proportion does free labour bear to slave labour in the Island of Zanzibar?—Up to the time I left I emancipated, 6,000 slaves.

654. How many slaves do you suppose there are in the Island?—It is almost impossible to tell.

655. You spoke of there being an exportation from the mainland to the island of about 4,000 annually?—Yes.

656. That would indicate that there must be 0.116.

a very large number of slaves in the Island of Zanzibar?—But a very small proportion of slaves brought to Zanzibar remain there; they are exported away.

657. Are slaves largely employed in cultivation on the mainland?—They are employed there to a very large extent, and as cultivation increases there is increased demand for slave labour.

658. You said that the Arabs are now beginning to discover that it is more profitable to employ their slaves in cultivation in the Island of Zanzibar and on the mainland than by exporting them to Muscat?—Yes; the present minister of the Sultan spoke to me very strongly upon that point; he said the Arabs were now beginning to see the wisdom of abolishing the slave trade.

659. That is to say, the export trade in slaves?—Yes.

660. Not the employment of slaves on the island or the mainland?—No.

661. Supposing we were able to prevent the export of slaves altogether, there would still be a supply of slaves from the interior for the purpose of cultivation in the Island of Zanzibar and on the mainland?—You cannot stop that; and there is not so much cruelty in that trade as there is in the other.

662. We should not stop the man-stealing in the interior?—A great deal of it would be stopped; it would not be carried on on the organised scale that it is now.

663. There would still be a considerable demand for slaves in the island and on the mainland, and that supply would have to be provided out of the interior?—Yes.

664. Sir *J. Hay*.] I understand you to say that many persons in the Island of Zanzibar, who were formerly British Indian subjects, have changed their allegiance for the purpose of holding slaves; why do those persons prefer slave labour to free labour for the cultivation of their estates?—I account for it in this way. Our British Indian subjects were very savage at having their slaves emancipated, and it has always been a thorn in their side that their former slaves should have a certain amount of liberty; that they should be able to leave their employment when they were not well treated, and that they should only be required to work four days in the week instead of five, as they were obliged to do before they were freed.

665. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] From the communications which you have had with the consuls of other Powers at Zanzibar, do you think they would be prepared to co-operate with us with a view to stopping the export of slaves?—I think the Consul of the Germanic Empire would cordially co-operate with us. The gentleman who was the French Consul when I was there, supported the slave trade.

666. Is not it the case that, in the Mauritius, coolie labour has successfully competed with negro labour, and, in fact, almost driven it out?—I have no doubt of it.

667. Do you think that that is likely to occur in Zanzibar itself?—I think coolie labour, or labour of any description from India would successfully compete with negro labour in Zanzibar, coolies would not work in company with slaves, because they would consider that they would be degrading themselves by doing so.

668. Lord *Enfield*.] In what length of time do you

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Maj. Gen. C. P. Rigby. you think the traffic could be entirely suppressed, supposing the views which you have expressed here were carried out?—I think in five years it might be stopped.

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669. Did I rightly gather from the early part of your evidence that you approve of the suggestions of the Committee which sat at the Foreign Office?—Yes, generally; I think they recommend that all slaves should be exported

from Dar Seelam only. Dar Seelam was the creation of the late Sultan, and I hear that the present Sultan will not have anything to do with it, and that it is deserted.

670. Generally, the recommendations of the Committee meet with your approval?—Yes, I think nothing could be better than the recommendations contained in that Report.

Sir LEOPOLD G. HEATH, called in; and Examined.

Sir L. G. Heath.

671. *Chairman.*] You had the command of the squadron on the East African Coast?—Yes, I commanded it from the middle of 1867 till November last year.

672. During that time was the slave trade carried on with considerable activity?—With very great activity.

673. What force had you?—I had, generally speaking, seven ships, including my own flagship. During the Abyssinian War I had an addition of ships for that special purpose, which were withdrawn immediately afterwards.

674. Your force was seven ships, including the flagship?—Yes.

675. Did they deserve the character that has been given to some of them by the last witness?—I only imperfectly heard the last witness.

676. Were they ships well adapted for the purpose?—Yes, I think some of them were remarkably well adapted for the purpose. The "Nymph," the "Bullfinch," and the "Teazer" are, more or less, well adapted for that particular service. Those three vessels are types of three new classes of vessels; their accommodation is, generally speaking, better than that in the old class, and they carry a larger proportion of coal, that is to say, they can steam for a longer distance than the old vessels could. Vessels of the class of the "Teazer," which is the smallest of the three, require modifications in the details of their fitting, ventilation, and things of that sort.

677. Were your crew healthy?—On the whole, the squadron was fairly healthy.

678. You did not find any objection to keeping them on that station, on the ground of health?—No; because by sending them to the north when the sun was to the south, and to the south when the sun was to the north, we managed, generally, to get a certain relaxation, but I think ships should not be kept longer than three years on that station.

679. Was the time known at which they would be obliged to leave particular ports?—It is known that during the south-west monsoon they must be somewhere away from the strength of the monsoon; in that way, it depends on the seasons.

680. Were all those vessels employed for the suppression of the slave trade?—No; they were on the East Indian station for any purposes that might be required.

681. What number of ships were really employed for the suppression of the trade?—During the slaving season, speaking generally, they were all employed. I made arrangements for employing them on other work at the time when they could not be upon the East Coast.

682. It is during one particular part of the year that the trade is carried on with any activity?—Yes.

683. The earlier months?—The earlier months

and the latter months, from April to the end of June, and September to the beginning of November.

684. Was much trade carried on which you were not able to prevent?—The official Custom House returns at Zanzibar state, that on the average about 20,000 slaves a year are imported into Zanzibar; besides that, there must be a large number of slaves exported from the mainland which do not pass through the custom house at Zanzibar; Zanzibar cannot want anything like that number, and therefore you must presume that the surplus is carried away for export to foreign countries.

685. What number in the year did you succeed in capturing?—For the year ending December 1867, 18 dhows were captured, and 431 slaves were emancipated; those being the cargoes of the 18 dhows. During that year, the squadron were all employed in Annesley Bay in the expedition against Abyssinia, and the efforts against the slave trade were comparatively small. In the year ending December 1868, the total number of vessels captured was 66; the total tonnage of these dhows was 7,233; and the total number of slaves liberated was 1,097. In the year 1869 the total number of dhows captured was 32; the total tonnage of those dhows was 3,431; and the total number of slaves liberated was 1,117. During the second year's cruise my ships were distributed principally along the coast of Arabia, from Ras-el-Hadd as far as Makallah, one being stationed near Socotra, and two down in the Zanzibar neighbourhood. The vessels boarded during the spring season were upwards of 400 dhows; out of those 400 dhows there were but 11 slavers, and in those 11 slavers there were 958 slaves. I am exceedingly puzzled to know how it is that the enormous number of slaves exported get along the coast without being found out. I believe that very few dhows could have passed the squadron during those months; and though, comparing the wants of Zanzibar with the known importations at Zanzibar, there must have been not many short of 20,000 slaves exported, yet it appears that there were not above 1,000 slaves on board these 400 dhows. This rather shows that naval efforts alone will not put down the trade.

686. As to those 400, were you satisfied that all except the 11 were perfectly free from any complicity in the slave trade?—I think it is morally certain that scarcely any guilty dhows escaped amongst that 400.

687. Sir John Hay.] Do I rightly understand you to say that scarcely any dhows escaped going north with slaves?—I cannot understand how they could have passed us, distributed as we were.

688. When a dhow is captured, have not the ships

ships to leave the cruising ground, and might not many dhows pass then?—No; the number captured was only 11, and the slaves were not in sufficient number to require the ships to leave their ground, except in three of those cases.

689. *Chairman.*] According to that it seems to be utterly hopeless by any efforts of the cruisers to put a stop to the trade?—By any efforts of cruisers in numbers such as we have now, I think it is hopeless.

690. But the number would appear to be sufficient in this case, because you say that you think hardly any guilty dhows escaped?—I think the cruisers should be near the rivers and places of export, at the same time as they are near the places of import. I had not ships enough to do both.

691. Then with an increased squadron you think something more might be done?—I can only say I hope something more might be done.

692. One may collect that you do not anticipate any complete stoppage of the trade by any efforts of the cruisers?—I think we have gone on for 25 years and have done no good whatever.

693. Can you suggest any way in which we could do good by means of the fleet?—I think, before giving up the attempt as hopeless, we must try every possible method that suggests itself for carrying out England's wishes, one of those methods clearly is the increase of the squadron, but the result which I have detailed of my own experience rather shows that the number of slaves sent to foreign countries cannot be as great as the custom-house statistics would show.

694. You think there are not really so many exported?—I think there are not really so many exported; at the same time, I cannot understand what becomes of them; the number reported to be exported is taken from data which seem reliable.

695. *Sir J. Hay.*] Supposing you were appointed again to the East Indian command, and you were told that you might have for three years, or two years, or till the trade was suppressed, an unlimited number of ships, both for the blockade of the Arabian Coast and the Persian Gulf, and the portions of Africa from which the slaves were exported; will you state for the Committee, what number of ships you would conceive to be necessary to enable you to carry out with certainty the total annihilation of the slave trade?—I do not think any number would suffice with certainty, but I should ask for 10 ships to begin with.

696. *Chairman.*] Ten instead of seven?—Yes.

697. Do you think that would very materially increase the number of captures?—I think the number would be increased.

698. *Sir J. Hay.*] I think you have had considerable experience on the West Coast of Africa?—Yes.

699. Are you aware of the number of ships that were employed on that length of coast, as compared with the number employed along this length of coast; was not the number of ships employed on the West Coast of Africa very much more considerable than that for which you now ask?—Very much more considerable, and the nature of the sea is far more favourable for blockading operations.

700. Not looking to the economical question, or to the probability of the number of ships that you might ask for being given you, assuming

that the country was determined to put down the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa in the same way as on the West Coast; would you say that 10 ships, or anything like 10 ships, would be sufficient to cover the 4,000 miles to be blockaded on the East Coast?—No matter how many ships you have, there will of course always be some vessels which escape being boarded; it is quite possible, that, though we boarded 400 dhows during the season I have spoken of, there may have been 400 others that passed outside us; but when I said that I thought we must have boarded nearly all dhows that came up, I referred to those that passed along the coast; the Arabs have very good information; I do not think that they knew what I intended to do, but it is quite possible that they did.

701. *Chairman.*] Do you think that by having more Consular Agents along the coast, you would have the means of deriving better information upon the subject of the slave trade?—I think the appointment of Vice Consuls along the coast, would be a most valuable thing, not only as regards giving us information, but as regards pushing our political influence.

702. Did you hear the evidence of the last witness with respect to the desirability of appointing a naval officer to be permanently stationed on the coast?—Yes.

703. Do you approve of that suggestion?—It is practically what is now going on; there is the Admiral commanding the whole of the Indian station; he has as his senior officer a captain of some standing generally stationed for a considerable time down at Zanzibar. I do not attach as much importance as General Rigby seemed to do, to prolonged experience; I think the experience of one year is no guide to what will happen the next; if I were there myself, I should take care to vary my tactics annually, because I believe whatever is done in one year would be frustrated by the Arabs the next; if they knew I had adopted one line in one year, they would themselves adopt some other line the next, and I should try and meet them.

704. Was there anything in your instructions that in any way impeded your success; any limitation of your power?—There was nothing whatever in my instructions to limit my action till the issue, by the Admiralty, of a circular dated 6th November 1869, which appears at page 94 of Class B, East Coast of Africa Correspondence from 1st January to 31st December 1869. That circular made an unpleasant impression upon all the officers commanding the ships under my orders. Its manner was accusatory as to the past and threatening as to the future; its matter was, principally the forbidding the capture of dhows for having domestic slaves aboard.

705. Do you think there were many slaves carried in that way in those dhows which were not classed as guilty dhows?—There is no doubt that a very large number of slaves must have been carried in that way. At page 75 of the same Blue Book are extracts from letters found in some of the dhows, being inclosures in my letter to Sir Seymour Fitzgerald replying to a complaint of Sir Edward Russell, the Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court at Aden, as to dhows being captured for having domestic slaves on board. These show that domestic slaves are frequently carried to sea for sale.

706. What I was wanting to arrive at was whether, allowing the dhows to pass with domestic

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tic slaves on board, would in your opinion account for a great number of these at present unaccounted for?—No, I think not; because till November 1869, dhows having domestic slaves on boards had always been captured.

707. In 1868, 66 dhows were captured, while in 1869 only 32 were captured; but if this order did not come till November 1869, it would not have any bearing upon that decrease?—No; the larger number of captures in the earlier year was, because in the previous year the slave dealers had been left alone, owing to the Abyssinian War.

708. There is a large difference between those captured and those who appear from the Custom House returns to have been exported, and which are unaccounted for in any way?—Yes.

709. Sir R. Anstruther.] What means have you of distinguishing domestic slaves on board a dhow from any other slaves?—The Admiralty in that circular have laid down as a definition of what are to be considered domestic slaves, “where the slaves found on board are very few in number, are unconfined, and appear to be on board for the purpose of loading or working the ship, or attending upon the master or the passengers, and there is no other evidence that the vessel is engaged in or equipped for the slave trade.”

710. I may take it as your view that the action of this circular to which you have referred has been more or less to impede the squadron in the capture of slaves?—If you put it in the future tense it will have that effect very largely, I think. I should like to quote, as illustrating my views on that point, a portion of my annual Report of 22nd January 1870 (it is in the Correspondence for the year 1870): “On the 6th November, their Lordships issued ‘Instructions for the Guidance of Naval Officers employed in the Suppression of the Slave Trade.’ Those instructions forbid the detaining of vessels having slaves on board, if there are attendant circumstances showing that the slaves are not being transported for the purpose of being sold as slaves; and there is added, as an example of the nature of those circumstances, ‘Where the slaves found on board are very few in number, are unconfined, and appear to be on board for the purpose of loading or working the ship, or attending upon the master or the passengers, and there is no other evidence that the vessel is engaged in, or equipped for, the slave trade.’ I believe that, just as it is said a drunkard can only be cured by total abstinence, so the slave trade by sea can only be put down, if at all, by a rigid forbidding of the carrying to sea of any slaves of any description. As I have before remarked, even what is called a domestic slave is not only a saleable article, but an article which is very often sold; and the return of those embarked to the port they originally left depends solely upon whether or no a good offer has been made for them at the ports they have visited in the interval.”

711. Chairman.] Seeing that the fleet you have had under your command is not sufficient to prevent the escape of a very large proportion of the slaves exported, has your attention been directed to any measures which might be adopted to prevent the continuance of the slave trade?—In answer to your question, I will quote part of my letter dated 1st March 1869, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, in the Blue Book, containing the correspondence of 1869: “I observe that it is not unusual to close these reports with an expression of hope that the heavy blows

which have been dealt at the trade during the past year, will go far to check it for the future. I can express no such hope. The trade is far too profitable, and will not be affected by a risk so small as that incurred by the proceedings of Her Majesty’s ships. It supplies a want which has not been left unsatisfied for many centuries past; a want which, sanctioned by the religion of the country, has grown almost into an instinct. To put down this trade, requires far more effort, and far more energy than England has yet shown in the matter. Twenty-five years have elapsed since the first treaty with Muscat, and all that time we have been contented with the capture of a very small per-centage of the total exports; a per-centage large enough to irritate the legal traders, who are harrassed and annoyed by the visits of our cruisers, but too small to affect materially the illegitimate trade. We must do far more than this to insure success. We must double or treble our squadron. We must establish vice consulates at the ports of export, but above all, we must force the Government of Zanzibar into active acquiescence in our views, and, if necessary, purchase or take possession of that island.” In subsequent letters urging the same view, I have altered this last sentence, and said, “purchase the sovereignty of the island.”

712. Is that the only thing that occurs to you as a means of putting a stop to the trade?—I think that if a treaty is made in the sense of Lord Clarendon’s proposals to Mr. Churchill (page 30, Correspondence of 1870), if that part of the existing treaty which is supposed to allow domestic slavery afloat is abrogated, and if the squadron is increased so as to make it difficult to evade that treaty when made, we shall have a chance of success; but I still hold that the only radical cure will be the making Zanzibar a centre from which British civilisation can radiate into that part of Africa.

713. You mean becoming actually possessed of it as being a colony of Great Britain?—Yes.

714. Or a protected state?—That is a matter for the Foreign Office to determine.

715. Zanzibar is not a very healthy place, is it?—Zanzibar is undoubtedly an unhealthy place, but I do not know that it is more so than many other tropical colonies or English settlements.

716. We heard of its being impossible to sleep out of the town?—Bishop Tozer has a sort of missionary school superintended by two or three English ladies, and he has two or three clergymen with him. I know he has a farm-house three miles outside Zanzibar, and my belief is that that is considered a sort of sanatorium. Captain Fraser, an Englishman, who has a large sugar manufactory, goes out to his estate as a sort of change, when he wants fresh air, and I was surprised to hear the accounts given by General Rigby of the extreme deadliness of the climate.

717. Are you able to give us any information as to the healthiness of those parts of the coast where it is proposed that vice consuls should be stationed?—The only fact I know as to that is, that a Mr. Heale, an Englishman, engaged in the purchase of hides at Brava, lived there for some months, and I never heard that he was seriously affected by the climate.

718. Have you read the Report of the Committee which sat at the Foreign Office?—Yes, I read it, and I was called upon officially to report upon it.

719. Is your Report published?—My letter on it is in the Blue Book for 1871, at page 64. The Report, as laid before Parliament, is not the same Report as was submitted to me. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th paragraphs have been altered in accordance with my suggestions.

720. Taking it as it stands now, how far do you agree with the recommendations of the Report?—As it now stands I agree with the recommendations of the Report in a general way.

721. Do you think if those were carried out, a very material effect might be produced even without the British Government becoming possessed of Zanzibar?—The proposals made by Lord Clarendon for a new treaty, which I have referred to before, practically embody the greater part of the recommendations of the Committee, and I agree with them in a general way.

722. And you think they might produce a material effect?—I think so, provided also, that the transport of domestic slaves by sea is forbidden.

723. And the squadron increased?—And the squadron increased.

724. I hardly know how to reconcile that with the statement you made before, that you thought hardly any guilty dhows escaped?—I quite admit the difficulty; it is as much present to myself as to you. I know that during the three months of the height of the slaving season we boarded 400 dhows, and only captured 11 of them with 958 slaves; I cannot account for it. It is supposed, and apparently with good reason, that 20,000 slaves are exported for sale, and I do not know how they go. If any large number of guilty dhows passed my ships during that season, they must have gone by an outside route, and with more ships that route could be watched.

725. *Sir J. Hay.*] Do you think that the slave traders ever send out vessels as decoys to mislead the squadron?—No, I think not.

726. *Chairman.*] Were you succeeded by Admiral Coburn?—Yes.

727. Have you seen the proposals which he has made?—No, I have seen none of his correspondence.

728. Do you agree with General Rigby as to the uselessness of treaties with Arab chiefs?—I am hardly able to give an opinion upon that which would be of any use to the Committee; General Rigby has great local experience; the treaties must at any rate be of value as justifying us in taking aggressive measures when the treaty has been broken.

729. *Lord F. Cavendish.*] You said you were for some time on the west coast of Africa?—I commanded a ship for some time on the west coast of Africa.

730. That fleet was very much larger than any fleet which it has ever been proposed to establish on the east coast?—Very much larger.

731. Was not it the case that all the efforts of the fleet on the west coast of Africa were really useless, and that the trade went on till we were able to station our fleet off Cuba?—No, I think the suppression of the trade was not due to that. I think the efforts of the squadron by themselves would, perhaps, never have put down the west coast slave trade, though they had a very strong repressive influence, and considerably diminished the exports; the ultimate putting down of that trade was due, I think, partly to political pressure, and partly to the growth of humane feelings in the Spaniards and Brazilians. Public opinion  
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in those countries eventually stopped the demand for slaves, and then the supply ceased.

732. Was not it the case that the stationing of her fleet off Cuba, after the agreement which we came to with the United States, had a very great effect?—I was not on that station; I never knew that it had.

733. At the same time we obtained possession of the port of Lagos, did we not?—Yes; I was there at that time.

734. Had that a great effect?—I think that it has had a very great effect indeed; it has been a great encouragement to legitimate trade, and I should anticipate the same sort of result from taking possession of the government of Zanzibar.

735. You think no efforts of our cruisers are likely to be productive of great success till the transport of domestic slaves is prohibited?—That is my opinion.

736. What probability is there of the Sultan agreeing to such a prohibition?—The Sultan has never, that I know of, objected to it; but if he has, his objections have been overruled. It is the interpretation of the treaties by either our Foreign Office or our Admiralty, of which I speak.

737. Do you think the Sultan would consent to the entire prohibition of all movement of slaves between the coast and the island of Zanzibar?—He certainly would not do so willingly.

738. You think pressure might be applied to him that might oblige him to consent?—I think you have only got to say what you want and you will have it done. I think it would be very hard upon him to make the trade cease immediately. I think the proposal to make it cease by degrees a much wiser one. I think the annual importation should be limited, and that the number allowed to be imported should be decreased for a certain number of years till it was finally stopped.

739. *Sir J. Hay.*] Do you contemplate the application of force to obtain that concession from the Sultan?—Moral force, I think, would be quite enough.

740. *Lord F. Cavendish.*] Would moral force also enable us to obtain possession of the Island of Zanzibar?—With a certain amount of money; I think that amount would probably be less than what you are now paying in abortive and ineffectual efforts.

741. *Mr. J. Talbot.*] As to the number of slaves exported in the year, did you say that about 20,000 were exported annually?—I know that the custom-house importation returns at Zanzibar show, generally speaking, an importation into Zanzibar of 20,000. I know that a large number are exported from the main land who do not pass through the custom-house, and since the wants of Zanzibar itself cannot exceed 3,000 or 4,000 a year for making up the deficiencies of its population, I assume that there must be an export of something like 20,000 a year.

742. The number captured by your cruisers was about 1,000 a year?—About 1,000 a year is the maximum number captured by the cruisers.

743. Nineteen thousand, in round numbers, escape?—Nineteen thousand are unaccounted for.

744. You regard that as an unsatisfactory result of all our national efforts for the suppression of the slave trade?—Very unsatisfactory.

745. Passing from that to the question of the healthiness

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healthiness of Zanzibar, do you know Dr. Steer, who lived in Zanzibar for four years?—I made his acquaintance; he is one of Bishop Tozer's party.

746. Would he, do you think, be able to give valuable information to the Committee with reference to the healthiness of the climate?—Any Englishman who has lived there four years would be able to give you information on that point.

747. Viscount *Enfield*.] As to the Report of the Slave Trade Committee which sat at the Foreign Office, do you agree with the recommendations of that Committee as to the amount of naval force required on the east coast?—No.

748. Generally, you do not agree with the Report as to the number and the distribution of the naval force?—No; I think the number proposed is a great deal too small. In my official report on that paper I suggested 10 ships besides the flag ship. I suggested also that the vessels which were stationed there should, as far as possible, be provided with steam launches, because though the launches are unfit for distant cruising, they are very valuable to cruise in the offing, the ship being anchored near at hand. The vessels being small would require special fittings; their big guns would be removed, and possibly the position of the funnels would have to be altered also.

749. Putting that aside, on the whole you are not inclined to disagree with the majority of the recommendations of the Committee?—No; there is one small point as to the jurisdiction of the courts in which I think the Committee have made a mistake as to localities. They recommend that dhows captured near Zanzibar should be judged at Zanzibar, and that dhows taken near Muscat should be judged, I think, at Aden. Now, the object of the Committee, I presume, was to insure a fair hearing, and this would not be attained by the Committee's proposal. A Zanzibar dhow captured off Mokullah, in the Gulf of Aden, would be judged at Aden. Similarly, a Muscat dhow captured in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar would, under the Committee's recommendation, be judged at Zanzibar. In neither case would the Committee's object, of having the adjudication at the place where the owner lived, be attained.

750. What is the time in which you think the slave trade could be virtually abolished in that district, supposing the recommendations of the

Committee were carried out, and there were no financial obstacles in the way?—I doubt whether you will ever stop the trade completely, even by adopting the Committee's recommendations.

751. Yet you approve of the recommendations of the Committee as far as they go?—I approve of them as far as they go.

752. You do not think they would be effectual in abolishing the traffic altogether?—I have said in the letter to which I have referred, in which I make observations on the Committee's Report, that "so long as the existing domestic habits in slave-receiving countries remain unchanged, so long will there be more or less of slave trade. Those habits can only be changed by completely stopping the supply of slaves for a very long period, probably for a whole generation, and any system which stops short of that will fail of complete success. The trade will be scotched but not killed, and will revive whenever the pressure is taken off. I recommend therefore, that at least ten vessels besides the flagship should be appropriated to this service, and since the tactics of the dealers vary with the information they receive as to the position of the cruisers, I would leave the officer commanding entirely unfettered in his disposal of them." I think the Committee's recommendations would partially check the trade; but, as I have said before, you must have a complete stoppage for a long period to produce a good result.

753. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] With regard to guilty dhows escaping, do you think you always know a guilty dhow when you board it?—I think the vigilance of the officers can be completely trusted in that respect.

754. Are the signs unmistakable?—There are signs unmistakable when the dhow is carrying a large number of slaves; sometimes domestic slaves might be on board without your finding them out; but, under existing regulations, having domestic slaves on board does not constitute a guilty dhow.

755. Slaves for sale cannot be concealed without your knowing it?—In small numbers they might be. This regulation permitting the carrying of domestic slaves will make it still more difficult to ascertain with certainty the character of a dhow which is carrying 10 or 12 or 14 slaves for sale.

Monday, 24th July 1871.

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Lord Frederick Cavendish.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Viscount Enfield.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.  
Mr. Gilpin.  
Mr. Russell Gurney.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. John Talbot.  
Mr. Percy Wyndham.

RIGHT HONOURABLE RUSSELL GURNEY, IN THE CHAIR.

Sir LEOPOLD HEATH, K.C.B., called in; and further Examined.

756. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] You were for three years yourself on the station?—Yes.

757. During the whole of that time had you seven vessels under your command?—Yes; in the early part of the time I had more, but they were engaged in the Abyssinian Expedition.

758. Were they during the whole of the year on the Zanzibar coast?—No; they did the general duties of the Indian station as well.

759. So that during the greater part of the year they were on the Indian coast?—They were on the Indian coast during those months of the year when the dhows did not run.

760. During only three months of the year they were on the African coast?—I should say more nearly five months.

761. You found that they were ineffective in preventing the slave trade?—They captured on the average 1,100 slaves a year; and there is good reason for supposing that 20,000 slaves are exported.

762. Every year?—Every year.

763. You agree with that?—I agree with that; but I do not think that those 20,000 can all go by sea to the Persian Gulf or that neighbourhood; and I say so, because, though I have no statistics to prove the number of dhows on that coast, still, I can hardly fancy there would be tonnage enough available for carrying those 20,000 every year.

764. You state that the vessels under your command, boarded no less than 400 dhows in the course of the year?—They boarded a great many more than 400 during the year, but that was the number boarded in those particular three months to which I referred in my last day's evidence; and I mentioned that particularly, because it was rather a new disposition of the squadron which I had adopted.

765. Will you explain what that disposition was?—The disposition was attempting to blockade the ports of Arabia as had been previously recommended in the reports of Colonel Playfair, Colonel Pelly, and other gentlemen, who had paid great attention to the subject of the slave trade.

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766. What ports of Arabia?—My eastern vessel was off Ras-el-Hadd; the western one was off Macullah, and there was one between those two; one vessel was just south of Cape Guardafin, which is on the African coast, and two were left to act as the senior officers in command of them, thought best in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar. My own ship, the flag-ship, was cruising from Ras-el-Hadd up to Macullah; there were thus four stationed along the coast of Arabia; one near Cape Guardafin, and two at Zanzibar.

767. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] Was it with the view of blockading the ports of imports as well as the ports of export that you made that disposition of the fleet?—It was with a view of blockading the ports of import which had not been previously attempted on so large a scale, but I did not think it right to leave the ports of export quite clear, or to leave the consul at Zanzibar, and the British community, quite unprotected.

768. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] By which ships were the greatest number of captures made during that disposition of the fleet?—By the ship, or ships, south of Cape Guardafin.

769. Not by the vessels watching the Arabian coast?—There were seven full slavers captured during that season; of these one was in Zanzibar harbour; two were off Ras-madraka; one off Cape Fertaka; three south of Socotra, the others had but a small number of slaves on board.

770. Notwithstanding that disposition of the fleet, it is probable that only one dhow out of ten was captured, according to the calculation which have been made?—I would not say one dhow out of ten. I would say only one slave out of 20 reported to be exported was captured.

771. You expressed the opinion in your evidence on Thursday that it would be necessary to maintain ten vessels on the coast, with the view of stopping the trade entirely; what disposition of the fleet would you make, supposing you had ten vessels?—I named ten vessels as the very least that should be sent there, if an earnest effort would be made. I look on the naval proceeding as only auxiliary to others. I look upon them as quite necessary, but still only auxiliary.

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I should leave the disposition of those ten vessels entirely in the hands of the officer commanding them. The tactics of the slave dealers vary each year, and each year the officer commanding must vary his disposition of the fleet also.

772. If the seven vessels under your command only succeeded in capturing one slave out of 20, what reason have you to suppose that 10 vessels would entirely put a stop to the trade?—I have never said that that was my opinion.

773. You do not think that 10 vessels would put a stop to the trade?—No.

774. In the evidence you gave on Thursday last, you complained of the Admiralty regulations, with reference to the capture of vessels carrying domestic slaves, and I think you expressed an opinion that that rather tended to prevent the squadron exercising due vigilance in the capture of slave dhows?—Yes.

775. Are you aware that complaints had been made to our Government of the capture by our squadron of vessels which were really carrying only a limited number of domestic slaves, not for sale?—So far as I am aware, the first complaint that was made was by Sir Edward Russell, the Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court at Aden; his complaint was made in a letter, which will be found in the Blue Book for 1870, at page 73, a letter dated 29th January 1869. So far as I am aware, up to that time it had been the universal custom to consider that naval officers had nothing to do with the particular sort of slavery, for which the slaves found in the dhows were intended; their printed instructions are very distinct. You will find at page 22 of those instructions, that an officer is justified in concluding that a vessel is engaged in, and equipped for the slave trade, if you find any slaves on board. There is no limitation as to the status of the slaves, and up to the date of that letter, all judges had condemned dhows for having domestic slaves on board. I may instance, Mr. Churchill, a Member of the recent Committee, having condemned a dhow whilst I was in Zanzibar, merely because there was one single slave on board. Mr. Churchill asked my opinion about it, not officially, and I said that it had been the universal practice to condemn dhows for having domestic slaves on board, and I thought that the instructions would not justify an officer in not taking a dhow in which he found domestic slaves. I should have to lengthen my answer very considerably if the Committee wish me to argue the point as to whether under our treaties domestic slavery at sea is allowed.

776. I think it is unnecessary to enter upon any justification in the matter; I only want to know whether, as a matter of fact, complaints were made of dhows being captured which were carrying domestic slaves not for sale?—It can hardly be called a complaint, because it was the universal practice to forbid slaves being carried at sea whether domestic slaves or others.

777. Up to the time when the new regulations were made by the Admiralty, it had been the universal practice to capture dhows even when they had a limited number of domestic slaves on board not expressly for exportation?—Yes; the reason probably was that a domestic slave is a saleable article, and is very often sold, as shown by extracts from correspondence and from reports, which will be found at page 75 of the same Blue Book.

778. Is it not the fact that many of the vessels

engaged in ordinary trade are manned by slaves?—Many of them are manned partly by slaves, probably taken to sea with the view of selling them if a good price was found for them.

779. Was it the practice to capture those vessels equally with others?—Yes.

780. *Chairman.*] Is there anything you wish to add to the evidence you have given?—I should like to give the Committee my opinion about the Muscat subsidy, if the Committee wish to hear it. I should like, in the first place, to read a letter which I addressed to the Governor of Bombay, dated 12th February 1869; that was at a time when the question of stopping the subsidy was being agitated: "My Dear Sir Seymour,—Although I am neither your political Secretary nor a member of your Council, I hope you will not object to my offering an opinion upon the Muscat subsidy question, in which I naturally take a considerable interest. I understand that the Secretary of State is willing to release Zanibar, provided India will make the payment out of Indian funds, or, as an alternative, that he will allow the payment to cease altogether if you should report that Muscat can do without it. I take for granted that India will not pay this subsidy, and I am afraid that, if you should say the money is essential to the strength of Muscat, the Secretary of State will leave the matter in *statu quo*. I cannot think that the power of Muscat in the Persian Gulf depends upon the receipt of this annual sum. Its vessels, its forts, its guns, its troops, are all perfectly contemptible even with the subsidy, and its superiority over its neighbours rests really upon the known friendship of the Indian Government. I should doubt the policy of much strengthening its military position; but if it were desirable to do so, the loan of an engineer officer, and the expenditure of 1,000 *l.* in properly mounting and arranging one or two of our old guns, would, I think, be more effective than the annual 10,000 *l.* (this should have been 8,500 *l.*) now paid into native hands. I have never seen the papers connected with our guarantee, but however loosely they may have been worded, it never could have been intended that we should be bound for ever, and under all possible contingencies. The present opportunity seems a fair one for shaking off our obligation. The throne is no longer in the possession of a descendant of Saed Saed, and Toorkee might be distinctly told, that if he accepts any help whatever from us in establishing himself at Muscat, he must remember that we have withdrawn our guarantee, and that, practically, the Zanzibar subsidy will never again be paid. I have a strong impression that the time has come for either withdrawing from all attempts at putting down the East African slave trade, or for prosecuting our assaults upon it with far greater vigour than heretofore. The Sultan of Zanzibar declares, that so long as he has to pay this large annual sum, so long must he continue to encourage this slave trade, on account of the revenue he derives from it, and England's guarantee thus becomes an active incentive to the continuance of the traffic.—Yours, very truly, L. G. Heath." Though the circumstances have changed since that letter was written; though the present rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar are now again both sons of Saed Saed, still we have the same opprobrium hanging over us. England's guarantee is still put forward as being a direct incentive to carrying on the slave trade at Zanzibar; I think the proper

proper way to deal with this question will be to release Zanzibar from paying this subsidy, on the ground that we are going to insist upon the cessation of all sea slave trading by Zanzibar, and that since this insistence on our part will diminish the revenue of Zanzibar, the grounds of our original arbitration, namely, the greater wealth of Zanzibar, as compared with Muscat, will no longer exist. With respect to Muscat, I think that as we guaranteed this annual payment to that state by Zanzibar solely in order to stop a maritime war which would have disturbed our commerce, we should ourselves pay the cost of our withdrawal from that guarantee, but as Saed Toorkee knows perfectly well that there is much doubt as to whether our award was between persons or between states, and whether it has not already legally ceased, I think it would be quite fair to deal with him on the footing of that doubt, and to agree with him to pay him during his reign, say 5,000 l. a year, and that we should not be bound in any way to his successor.

781. *Mr. Shaw Lefevre.*] During the time you were off the coast were there other cruisers belonging to other powers there?—There were French men-of-war, but they took no part in suppressing the slave trade.

782. Does the French Government permanently keep cruisers off that coast?—The French Government have settlements there, and they keep their ships there to protect those settlements and to push their commerce.

783. If the French cruisers co-operated with the English cruisers in endeavouring to prevent the slave trade, do you think it would tend very much to facilitate its suppression?—It would be like all joint operations, liable to disturbance, though of course it would be well to gain their goodwill.

784. *Mr. P. Wyndham.*] Do you think the Imaum of Muscat would have reason to complain, on the score of equity, if the subsidy were withdrawn; might he not say that he could have enforced it by force of arms if we had not originally interfered and made this settlement between him and the Sultan of Zanzibar?—The present Imaum of Muscat has only been on the throne a few months; our policy towards him has been one of the most hesitating and uncer-

tain nature. One of the first duties I was called on to perform in India was to go to Muscat and prevent the present sovereign, viz., Toorkee, from taking possession of Muscat. I took him over with me to Bombay, having signed, in conjunction with the Political Agent, a treaty, granting him 1,200 l. a year out of the Zanzibar subsidy, so long as he chose to remain in India. I became, during the cruise to Bombay, great friends with him, and I think he is perfectly aware that there are two opinions about that subsidy; that some think the guarantee was a guarantee only as regards the two first occupants of the two thrones, when the kingdom was divided, while others think that it is to continue, but I do not suppose that Toorkee has any idea that the guarantee will go on in perpetuity. There have been on the throne, since the guarantee was entered into, two sovereigns, besides the one there at that time; Toorkee is the third in succession to Syed Thowaynee, who was the man on the throne when we entered into the guarantee.

785. Was it in your view in the nature of a guarantee to him personally, or to the throne he occupied?—That is a question which is disputed; I have never myself seen the papers.

786. Was it a guarantee of the Indian Government, or of the Imperial Government?—I am almost sure it was by the Indian Government. I think it was the Governor General who guaranteed it.

787. *Chairman.*] Are you aware whether any large number of slaves are held by English subjects?—In the Island of Mohilla is a sugar planting estate, owned by an Englishman, who was for a long time our consul. I think that rather than give up his slaves he gave up his consulate. I know of no other case.

788. *Mr. Crum-Ewing.*] Where is Captain Fraser, is he in Zanzibar?—Captain Fraser was at Zanzibar at the time I was there. I think I have heard that he has since come home; I am not sure.

789. He had a considerable number of slaves, I think?—He had at one time a large number of slaves; but by some arrangement with the Sultan, I believe, their name was changed; they were no longer called slaves.

MR. H. C. ROTHERY, called in; and Examined.

790. *Chairman.*] You are legal adviser to the Treasury in all matters relating to the slave trade?—Yes.

791. How long have you filled that office?—Since the beginning of 1860.

792. I suppose, in the course of that time your attention has been a good deal directed to the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa?—Since the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa has been brought to our notice by the capture of vessels there.

793. About when was it first brought to your notice?—I should think about the year 1864.

794. How have the present Admiralty Courts at Zanzibar and Aden worked?—I think that the establishment of a Vice Admiralty Court at Zanzibar has been attended with very great advantage.

795. When was that established?—It was

established by Order in Council bearing date 9th August 1866.

796. Was that in consequence of there being no Court within a great distance of Zanzibar to which dhows could be taken for condemnation?—Yes; it was considered to be a great injustice to the Arabs that the condemnation could only take place at very distant places, as the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, or Bombay; and, in consequence, a Vice Admiralty Court was first established at Aden; but even Aden was found to be too far, and accordingly the Order in Council of the 9th August 1866 was passed, establishing a Vice Admiralty Court at Zanzibar.

797. Do you think there is any necessity for any additional Courts now?—No; but I think it very desirable that the Court at Zanzibar should be kept up.

798. And that at Aden too?—Yes.

799. Has your attention been called at all to the

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the disposal of the liberated slaves?—Yes; as a member of the committee that sat at the Foreign Office, our attention was a good deal called to that point.

800. What is your opinion upon that subject?—We thought it very desirable to make Zanzibar the receptacle for the liberated slaves; hitherto they had been taken to Aden or Seychelles, and the Seychelles it appeared had as many slaves as they required.

801. One advantage in having a depôt of liberated slaves at Zanzibar would be that the labour which is wanted in Zanzibar could by that means be easily obtained?—We thought that that would be so.

802. That would tend to remove the objection of the Sultan to the repression of the slave trade?—We thought it would supply the want that would be felt in the event of the slave trade between the main land and the island being put a stop to.

803. You spoke of the Seychelles having as many slaves as they could accommodate now; are not a large number of those who are captured children?—I have a difficulty in answering that question correctly. I do not speak from any personal experience on the coast, but I am inclined to think that on the East Coast of Africa the number of children captured in proportion to the adults is not so great as it used to be on the West Coast of Africa. I have the number of males and of females captured, and that is the only classification which the Returns at the present time give.

804. The Seychelles would be a good place in which to dispose of the children, schools having been established there?—It would, and I believe many children have been sent to the Seychelles.

805. Has your attention been called to the effect of the bounties?—I have to report to the Treasury whether bounties are due and payable.

806. Have any difficult questions arisen as to whether bounties should be paid or not?—The question was discussed before the Foreign Office Committee whether it was desirable to continue the system of bounties, or whether it would be better to give the officers and seamen rather larger pay when they were engaged in suppressing the slave trade.

807. Did you form any opinion upon that point?—We referred to that subject in our Report, but I confess that I have formed no very strong opinion upon the point; it seems to me that the advantages and disadvantages are pretty nearly equally balanced. It is very much the same question as arises with regard to prize in time of war; there have been always two opinions on the subject; one, of those who hold that higher pay should be given to those from whom additional services are required, and the other, of those who hold that it is better that the captors should have the benefit of any captures they might make, as they would thus have an incentive to greater exertions.

808. Is there any want of interpreters on the East Coast of Africa?—We were informed that there was a great want of interpreters on the East Coast of Africa, and that they were very untrustworthy persons.

809. How can that evil be remedied, in your opinion?—I cannot answer that from any personal knowledge; I understand that there has been evidence given before you to the effect

that there would be no difficulty whatever in supplying the want of good interpreters. We thought one means of doing it was by paying them more highly, and at the same time not allowing them to share in the bounties.

810. So as not to have an interest in misinterpreting the evidence?—Yes.

811. With respect to the recent instructions from the Admiralty, probably you had something to do with advising upon that matter?—Yes.

812. What has been the effect of those instructions?—I think it has been to introduce more regularity into the captures than previously existed.

813. And to remove any ground of objection on the part either of the Arabs, or of the Sultan?—I think so.

814. Have they had any material effect in diminishing the number of captures of guilty dhows?—That I can hardly say, for I do not know how many ships there are at the present time on the East Coast of Africa; but certainly there have been fewer captures of late.

815. Have you learnt whether there is any difficulty in distinguishing a legal trader from a dhow?—I have always understood that there is very little difficulty in distinguishing between them, except in the case of legal traders, who do sometimes take a few slaves on board. There is no distinction in appearance, I am told, between legal and illegal traders, but when a slaver has a cargo of slaves on board, there is no difficulty in distinguishing whether they are domestic slaves, or whether they are slaves carried for sale.

816. Have you been able to learn from any papers that have come before you, whether domestic slaves are often taken to sea for sale?—I should have thought not; I should have thought it exceptional; the captain of the dhow perhaps might, if he had a good offer for a slave, sell him, but I should have thought, generally, that the slaves he had on board would be so valuable to him, as hardly to make it worth his while to sell them.

817. If they are trained for mariners at all, they would be much more valuable on the ship than on the main land?—Many of these dhows have perhaps half their crews composed of slaves, and, if they sold them, I should have thought a master would have great difficulty in navigating his dhow home again.

818. How do you know a domestic slave from a slave intended for exportation?—I have always understood that the slaves when they got to Zanzibar were well treated, that they became more civilised, and got into better condition; whereas the slaves exported from Kilwa, which is the chief port of exportation, are generally in a state of the greatest emaciation.

819. Are the two descriptions of slaves differently guarded?—I should have thought so.

820. Are the slaves for exportation in the hold?—Not always, I believe; when they have only small cargoes of slaves that would not be necessary.

821. Can you give us any assistance in suggesting means for the suppression of the slave trade?—No other suggestions occur to me than those which we made in the Foreign Office Committee Report.

822. From any information you have obtained subsequently, have you had reason to change your opinion at all?—Not on any point.

823-4. With respect to the subsidy paid to the Imaum of Muscat, have you any reason to suppose that the Imaum of Muscat would consent to the discontinuance of the payment to him of that 8,000 *l.*?—I can give no information upon that point.

825. Is the income of the Sultan of Zanzibar so large that that subsidy of 8,000 *l.*, which he pays to the Imaum of Muscat, forms only a small proportion of it?—The information we had before us with respect to the income of the Sultan of Zanzibar was, I think, of a very loose character; we estimated the whole of his income, I think, at about 80,000 *l.*

826. Did that include the receipts from slaves?—Yes.

827. Sir *R. Anstruther.*] As to the children, have you any means of ascertaining what proportion of the captured slaves are adults and what proportion are children?—No, not now; formerly the returns used to state the numbers of the "men, women, and children," now they only state the numbers of "males" and "females."

828. Since when was the column of "children" discontinued?—It used to be given in the Return from the West Coast of Africa, but in the Returns from the East Coast it has not generally been continued.

829. Would it not be desirable, in your opinion, to reinstate that column in the Return?—I think it would. The officers on the East Coast are, for the most part, not legal gentlemen, and the Returns, therefore, are not quite so perfect as they might otherwise be.

830. To what officers do you refer?—To the superintendent at Aden, and the Consul at Zanzibar, who are not legal officers.

831. They have not been called on to specify how many children are captured?—No.

832. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre.*] The Admiralty instructions issued in 1870 were drawn up in consequence of reports made by you?—Yes.

833. Those reports being made upon representations by the Sultan of Zanzibar to our Government, I think?—Certainly; and also upon representations from the Consul at Zanzibar, Dr. Kirk, and Mr. Churchill.

834. They had reference to the destruction of dhows engaged in commerce, but which had domestic slaves on board?—Partly to that, and partly to vessels that had been destroyed, which were undoubtedly legitimate traders.

835. Without any domestic slaves on board?—Without any domestic slaves on board.

836. Take the first case; it had come to your knowledge that a considerable number of dhows were captured which had comparatively few domestic slaves on board?—Yes.

837. And you come to the opinion that such captures were quite illegal?—Yes.

838. And the Government were so advised by their law officers also?—Yes.

839. In consequence of that, it became necessary to issue fresh regulations forbidding that practice?—Yes.

840. The Vice Consular Court has held such captures to be illegal?—Yes. We had no idea that the officer commanding could have so misapprehended his instructions. The instructions are entitled, instructions for the suppression of the slave trade, and not of slavery.

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841. The instructions issued by the Admiralty were really for the purpose of carrying out the law?—Yes.

842. And preventing this illegal course being followed by our cruisers?—That was the object.

843. As to the destruction of vessels previous to condemnation, have several cases come to your knowledge where that had operated very harshly on native vessels?—Many. There is one that occurs to me at the present moment; the "Petrel" on her way south to the Cape of Good Hope, met with a valuable dhow, having 42 passengers and crew altogether on board, and a valuable cargo. She detained the dhow on the ground that there were six domestic slaves on board. The whole of the cargo was transferred to the "Petrel," the dhow was burnt, and the passengers were sent back to Zanzibar, together with those six alleged domestic slaves which were the ground of destroying her; and having arrived at the Cape of Good Hope, the officer obtained her condemnation there. That was one instance; I have 13 or 14 others.

844. Instances of illegal capture of the same kind?—Yes.

845. And causing great complaints on the part of the traders in Zanzibar?—Yes; and great terror.

846. And stopping the legitimate trade?—Yes.

847. I presume it is to the increase of legitimate trade that we may look, more than anything else, for the suppression of the slave trade?—I should have thought entirely.

848. There is a considerable legitimate trade growing up, is there not?—Yes; the accounts are that the East Coast of Africa might produce an enormous trade.

849. With reference to bounties for the destruction of vessels previous to condemnation, have you formed any opinion upon that point?—My very strong opinion is, that where a dhow is destroyed at sea, the bounty of 1*l.* 10*s.* a ton ought not to be granted. Previous to my appointment to the office which I now hold, it had been the habit for a very great number of years to grant this bounty. I called the attention of the Treasury to the subject, and pointed out that under the terms of the several Acts, I did not think that the bounties were, strictly speaking, payable; the Treasury, however, thought that after so long a usage they could hardly refuse the bounty, and in that opinion I concur. At the same time, I think it very desirable that an Act should be passed that the bounty of 1*l.* 10*s.* a ton should not be granted, except where the vessel has been brought into port and there destroyed, or under other exceptional circumstances.

850. You think the practice of giving bounties for vessels destroyed on the alleged ground of unseaworthiness before condemnation, has led to a very loose practice of destroying vessels in order to prevent the question of their true character being raised?—I may as well state to the Committee the history of this 1*l.* 10*s.* bounty. Formerly when the slave trade was carried on on the West Coast of Africa, the vessels engaged in it were very fast sailers and very valuable; they were brought into port, and were there sold, and the slave traders competed with one another for the purchase, sometimes giving very extravagant prices

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prices for them; the result was, that the same vessel was captured over and over again. I believe there are instances of the same vessel having been captured five and six times over. I should here state that the proceeds of the vessels were given to the captors, as well as the bounties upon the slaves captured in them. It was accordingly decided that the slave vessels should be broken up, but the naval officers then complained that this was depriving them of a great portion of their reward, and accordingly, as a compensation to them, it was ordered that, where a vessel was broken up and sold in separate pieces, a bounty of 17. 10 s. additional should be granted to the captors to make up to them for the loss sustained by the destruction of the vessels. That rule has been applied to the case of dhows captured on the East Coast of Africa, which are of very little value.

851. You think 17. 10 s. a ton a very high compensation to pay in the case of those vessels?—Certainly, in those cases.

852. Then the Admiralty regulations were, in fact, to put a stop to those two illegal practices, that is to say, to stop the condemnation of vessels having domestic slaves on board, and, if possible, to put a stop to the improper destruction of vessels previous to condemnation?—Yes.

853. Where there is no real ground for supposing that they are slavers?—Yes; I may mention another instance which led to the issue of those instructions; one of our officers captured a vessel, and brought the slaves (the slaves being domestic slaves) to Zanzibar; Dr. Kirk or Mr. Churchill said that the vessel was undoubtedly a legitimate trader, but that officer, notwithstanding that the vessel was restored, carried off the slaves to the Seychelles.

854. Our Government has been compelled to pay heavy damages in respect of that and in respect of another vessel also improperly captured and destroyed?—Yes.

855. In your opinion, is it exceedingly important that every protection should be given to honest trade there?—I think it should be encouraged in every possible way.

856. And great care should be exercised with regard to the condemnation of slavers?—Yes, I think so.

857. Mr. *Gilpin*.] You mentioned just now the case of the "Petrel," and the capture she made, and which, I think, was taken to the Cape of Good Hope; do you recollect whether that prize was condemned?—Yes, it was condemned.

858. Then the capture itself was not illegal, was it?—Yes, it was in my opinion illegal, but the dhow was condemned on an *ex parte* statement.

859. Who was the judge?—The judge of the Vice Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good Hope; a *prima facie* case was laid before the Court but on the evidence of the captors only.

860. By whom was the treaty made by which the Imaum of Muscat receives 8,000 l. or 9,000 l. a year; I presume by the Indian Government?—I believe so.

861. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] Do you think now that there is a Prize Court both at Aden and Zanzibar there would be any difficulty in requiring that all vessels should be sent for condemnation to a Prize Court?—I am very strongly of opinion that vessels ought not to be destroyed except

under very great emergencies, and that, in the event of their not being able to be taken to Zanzibar, Aden, or Muscat, that they should be left in some port belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar, under the charge of his officials, before being destroyed.

862. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] The port of Aden is not convenient for a Prize Court, is it; has not it been found highly inconvenient?—Highly inconvenient in some cases, but not in all. Some vessels have been captured by Socotra, and then it is very convenient, if the wind is blowing in a particular direction, to run with them to Aden.

863. You stated, in answer to Mr. Lefevre, that you looked to the establishment of commerce entirely to put a stop to the slave trade; you did not, I presume, intend to imply that the naval force was of no use?—Most certainly not.

864. You meant in conjunction with the naval force?—Yes.

865. You quite admit the great value of the squadron?—Yes, but for the ultimate extinction of the slave trade I look entirely to legal commerce.

866. *Chairman*.] The existence of the slave trade very much prevents the extension of legitimate commerce?—Yes; the accounts by Dr. Livingstone are that the whole coast for a considerable distance inland is almost utterly depopulated, and that the area is increasing year by year.

867. Sir *J. Hay*.] I think I understood you to say, that except under very exceptional cases, where it was absolutely necessary, captured dhows should be brought to one of the Prize courts?—I think it very desirable that they should be.

868. Looking to the strength of the monsoon, and to the considerable distance that they have to be towed, and the time it would occupy, is it your opinion that in general cases it is possible to tow the captured dhows into port against the monsoon?—Possibly not; but in such a case I should say that the dhow should be left in one of the ports in charge of the Sultan's officers.

869. Then supposing that course were taken, and the captured dhow were to be taken to one of the ports, how would you propose that the crew should be dealt with during their detention?—I should leave the dhow in charge of the authorities at the particular port, and I should take the captain and two or three of the principal persons on board the dhow to the port of adjudication to obtain the condemnation. Then when the vessel was condemned, orders should be sent to have the vessel destroyed.

870. *Chairman*.] What would you do with the slaves?—Just exactly as they are now disposed of; they are generally taken on board Her Majesty's ships to the port of adjudication.

871. Sir *J. Hay*.] Would not there be a difficulty in carrying a considerable number of slaves on board one of Her Majesty's ships?—Yes; I know there is a difficulty about that, but they do it now; they do not leave the slaves behind them, but carry them to the port of adjudication, often very much to their inconvenience.

872. Supposing a captured dhow with a certain proportion of the crew were left in charge of the Sultan of Zanzibar's officers at a distant port, would not it be something like two seasons before the official condemnation could be obtained?—

tained?—I should have thought not; supposing that there were a delay, I do not know that there would be any great inconvenience in that. I do not see the inconvenience; if it is left in charge of the Sultan's officer, he would be responsible, and the Sultan would punish him in the event of his allowing any malpractice.

873. Are there any ports on that coast in which it would be convenient to treat captured slaves in that way?—I should have thought there were several ports where they could be left without much difficulty; the dhows themselves do not require an important port, they are not like ships of war.

874. Are you under the impression that the Sultan of Zanzibar and his officers would be willing to be responsible for the ships and cargoes?—The recommendation of the Committee was, that an arrangement should be entered into with the Sultan to do that, and we had no doubt whatever that the late Sultan would have done it; whether the present Sultan would enter into such an arrangement, I do not know.

875. The coast over which these operations would extend, would be a length of 4,000 miles, besides the Red Sea?—I have been told that; as far as regards the export trade, the captures

are principally made between Kilwa and Brava, and when they are captured beyond that, they are captured close to Socotra.

876. It has been stated in evidence before the Committee, that it would be necessary to intercept slave dhows on the coast on which they landed the slaves, as well as the coast from which the slaves were exported; in that case it would be something like 4,000 miles over which the operations would be extended?—You might say that, but you would not require to blockade every portion of that coast of 4,000 miles.

877. It would have to be left to the naval officer in command of the station to determine whether having regard to the strength of the monsoon and the power of Her Majesty's ships, it would be advisable to take the dhows into any particular port?—Yes, many have been captured in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar, and they have been destroyed at once; where a vessel can readily be taken into a port we think that it should be done. There are circumstances in which it is impossible almost to do that, and then naturally the vessel would have to be destroyed; it would be of course on the responsibility of the commanding officer.

SIR WILLIAM COGHLAN, called in; and Examined.

878. *Chairman.*] WHAT position have you held which enables you to give the Committee any information with reference to the slave trade?—I was about nine years Political Resident and Commandant at Aden, and during that time I was employed as agent of the Viceroy of India to settle the question between the two sons of Syed Saed, the Sultan of Zanzibar, and the Sultan of Muscat.

879. You negotiated that treaty which led to the payment of that subsidy?—Yes.

880. The Indian Government attached considerable importance to the prevention of hostilities in that part of the world?—Yes; they were sending their ships against each other.

881. Was your attention drawn to the liberated slaves who were sent to Aden?—I have myself on several occasions liberated slaves.

882. Under what authority was that?—I was also appointed the Judge of the Admiralty Court.

883. What was done with the slaves liberated at Aden?—If they had been in any large number there would have been a difficulty; I found no difficulty because the numbers were few. I released the men, and let them take their chance as free labourers, and the women I apportioned amongst the respectable families; that would not work on a large scale.

884. Was there any difficulty in finding employment for the men?—None whatever. In one case I sent a number of children to Bombay; several girls to one of the mission schools there.

885. Was any considerable expense incurred by the British Government connected with them?—None; I do not remember to have incurred any.

886. Have you made a report to the Foreign Office, or to the Indian Government upon the subject of this trade?—Yes; I made a very careful report upon the subject a long time ago;

it was as far back as the 1st of November 1860.

887. Have you had no further information upon the subject since that time?—No; I found that my figures were discredited, and I did not say anything more about it.

888. That report has never been published?—Not to my knowledge.

889. Subsequent to 1860 you say you have received no fresh information on the subject of slave trade?—No, I have had nothing to do with the slave trade since. In 1863 I was at Aden, and some representations were made to me by the merchants at that place, but I have made no report since 1860.

890. You have no doubt as to the correctness of what you state in your report?—No; it was prepared under great advantages. I had very able assistance in preparing it. I had also the assistance of General Rigby, who was at that time the consul at Zanzibar, and I had personal access to both the Sultans. I was at Muscat, where I saw Sultan Thowaynee, and discussed the slave question with him.

891. *Mr. P. Wyndham.*] You negotiated the settlement of the difficulty between Muscat and Zanzibar?—Yes.

892. What is your view of the subsidy; do you regard it as an award to the Sovereign of Muscat individually?—No; I regard it as a dynastic arrangement.

893. Do you think we could with propriety withdraw from our position with respect to that subsidy?—I think not. I think the only opportunity we ever had of withdrawing from it was missed. That was when the young man Sultan Salim killed his father; that would have been a fair opportunity to have freed Zanzibar from the subsidy, because the Sultan represented that it was a hard case that he should pay it to his nephew, a parricide, who had murdered his (the Sultan's) brother.

894. Supposing

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894. Supposing its reconsideration came before the Imperial or the Indian Government, do you think it should be decided on its own merits or mixed up with the slave question?—On its own merits, I think; though I was reporting on the slave traffic, my principal business was the adjustment of affairs between the two Sultans. The slave traffic was merely a matter thrown in.

895. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] It was not for want of representation, I think, from the Indian Government that that opportunity was missed; it was the Home Government who neglected the opportunity?—I understand (in fact, some papers were sent to me on the subject) that the Governor General decided that it must be paid.

896. His view being that it was a dynastic arrangement?—Yes.

897. When you returned to Aden, in 1863, three years subsequent to your report, did any additional evidence come before you at all to alter your report?—Nothing at all; in fact, the only way in which the question of the slave trade was mentioned to me on that occasion was by a complaint from some of the native merchants, who said that their traffic was interfered with by the cruisers; they did not complain of the operation of the law; they did not complain of vessels being interfered with which really carried slaves; but they said, in some cases, vessels which carried no slaves were condemned, and with them all evidence of their character; therefore, they said we are afraid to send our ships to sea.

898. Do you believe, from your residence in the East, that a very large legitimate trade would grow up, if the slave trade was put down?—I have no doubt that there would be a large development of trade on that coast.

899. Have you any suggestions apart from your report to make, as to the best mode of suppressing the slave trade?—Obviously the first would be to get the Sultan of Zanzibar to cancel the treaty by which he is allowed to carry slaves within his own dominions.

900. If he agreed only to have one port of export, which could be watched, would not that greatly facilitate the suppression of the trade?—It would be still better to have none; Sultan Majid, the one who died a few months ago, agreed with me that it should be so; he said, I will do anything you please, only I request you to remember that this forms a sixth part of my revenue.

901. If our Government undertook to free him from that liability to pay 8,000 *l.* a year, would he agree to the treaty being altered, and abolish the slave trade?—I should think he would for less than that; he said to me that this formed one-sixth part of his revenue; say that 19,000 slaves were imported into Zanzibar; upon that 19,000 he got two dollars a head, that is 38,000 dollars, that would be 7,000 *l.* or 8,000 *l.*

902. Would that, in your opinion, be a very good mode of stopping the slave trade?—I think so; General Rigby is a better authority upon that subject than I am.

903. Would not the relieving him from the payment of the amount of the subsidy be much cheaper than keeping a large squadron on the coast?—Yes.

904. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] Would it prevent the necessity of keeping a squadron on the coast?—Perhaps not altogether, because people would be found to break the law; in fact, Europeans

would do it. One of the greatest slave traffickers of my day was a Spaniard; I saw his vessel captured with 860 slaves on board.

905. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Where was he taking them to?—I saw the vessel just after she was captured at the Mauritius.

906. Were they taking them to Cuba?—Yes.

907. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] What date was that?—About August or September 1860; she was a large ship, captured by the "Brisk."

908. Have you any reason to believe that there is even now a trade in slaves from the East Coast of Africa to Cuba?—I have no means of forming an opinion upon that.

909. Sir *J. Hay*.] Is not the great difficulty in stopping the slave trade there more than in any other place; the difficulty in distinguishing between domestic slaves and slaves intended for sale in foreign ports?—That would be a difficulty to naval officers, but during the time that I was at Aden there was no difficulty of that sort; almost all the country craft that came into the harbour were navigated by slaves; we never thought of interfering with them; but if a vessel had come in with slaves for sale, we should at once have seized her.

910. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] You are of opinion that we cannot terminate the subsidy now paid to the Imaum of Muscat?—I think not.

911. Is there no termination to it at all?—When I made the award, I looked to a period when the two Governments would fall into one hand as before, under the father; that was always looked to as a possible contingency. That, of course, would have smoothed the difficulty at once.

912. Mr. *P. Wyndham*.] Do you think that the Sultan of Zanzibar is likely now to be satisfied with the same sum that you think would have satisfied him previously as a compensation for giving up the slave trade?—I think so. I found him tractable.

913. You have no reason to believe that the trade is more valuable to him now?—No.

914. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] The Imaum of Muscat would look to the Sultan of Zanzibar in the first instance for the payment of his subsidy?—Yes; there is no longer an Imaum of Muscat; he is the Sultan of Muscat; of course he would look to his brother, but it is morally guaranteed by the British Government.

915. Mr. *Kennaway*.] Did the Sultan of Zanzibar, in any conversation he had with you with reference to the slave trade, contemplate the possibility of its being put down?—Yes, I put the question to him, and you will find a reference to it in my report.

916. Did he see any difficulty in its being put down?—No; he said I will do whatever you please, only give me your support, by which of course I understood he meant money.

917. *Chairman*.] Not merely moral support?—No; I quite understood he meant by that, that he wanted to be indemnified.

918. Mr. *Kennaway*.] Would he have been satisfied with a few old guns?—No, he had plenty of them.

919. *Chairman*.] Is there anything you wish to add to the evidence you have given?—I may mention that, so far as the native chiefs within the Gulf of Aden are concerned, I made a treaty with, I think, every one of them; I visited every port

port on both sides of the Gulf of Aden, and I think I failed only in one; that was at Tadjura; I was politely received, but the governor intimated to me that the Sultan of Constantinople was his master.

920. Did those treaties give us authority to seize ships having slaves on board?—Yes; those treaties are all printed (see pp. 184-186 in No. XLIX., New Series, Bombay Government Records, 1859).

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REV. HORACE WALLER, called in; and Examined.

921. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are now a Clergyman in England?—I am.

922. Have you been on the East Coast of Africa?—I joined the Universities' Mission to Central Africa at the end of the year 1860, and I was there till the year 1864, when I returned to this country and took Holy orders.

923. In what part of Africa were you?—On the River Zambezi and in the neighbourhood of Lake Shirwa.

924. You remained there for four years?—In that part very nearly three years.

925. What distance were you from Zanzibar?—A very considerable distance to the southward of it.

926. Towards Nyassa?—To the south of Lake Nyassa, within 100 miles of Lake Nyassa, in the part of the country from which slaves were principally collected to be sent down to the coast, and also down the River Zambezi into the Portuguese dominions.

927. Were there very large exports of slaves from that part of the country?—At that time the exports were very large, perhaps they had never been so large before in that part of Africa. The whole of the country to the north of the Zambezi was for the first time invaded by slave traders, who took advantage of Dr. Livingstone's previous explorations, using his good name and fair fame amongst the natives, and saying that they were the same sort of white people that they had previously seen; and in that way the natives allowed them to come into their country. Before that time no Portuguese had ever been into that part of the country. I may state that the slave trade that was opened out there was of two descriptions. In the first place, the Kaffir tribes to the south of the River Zambezi had been fighting for a great number of years amongst themselves. No slaves are taken from the Kaffir tribes for the slave trade which we have under consideration, but owing to the hardships of warfare nearly all the women and children had disappeared from those tribes, and the Kaffirs were most anxious to replenish and strengthen the tribes, and therefore they told the Portuguese that they no longer wanted muskets which burst, and with which they were very much cheated, but they would prefer to have women and children sent to them. The Portuguese thereupon collected all the women and children they could in the highlands bordering on the River Shiré, and sent them down to Tette, which is the principal Portuguese port on the River Zambezi, whence they were sent to the Kaffir tribes in the interior of the country, and traded away for ivory and gold dust. Then again there was at that time another very large export of slaves to the mouth of the River Zambezi, to Quillimane, another of the Portuguese settlements. The French *engagées* system was then in full force, and a large export of slaves was going on from Quillimane. Besides those there was also a trade carried on to the north by Arabs, the slaves for which trade were taken

from this part of the country to Kilwa to be exported to Zanzibar, and they were also taken in very large numbers to Mozambique, whence they were exported to the Comoro Islands and to Madagascar, and some of them to Réunion.

928. Sir J. Hay.] Slaves of all sexes?—Of all sexes.

929. Sir R. Anstruther.] And of all ages?—In a gang of 84 slaves that Dr. Livingstone and two or three of us liberated, there may have been seven women of 21 years of age; there may have been 10 men of 19 years of age, and the rest were boys and girls of from 17 down to six or seven. I must explain that for those Kaffirs the Portuguese collected women and children only; it was useless sending them young men of 18 or 20; the Kaffirs wished for women and children only. The slaves collected for the French *engagées* system would be principally of the age of 18 to 25, because they could be put on the plantations at once, but in all slave gangs by far the largest proportion consists of children. The slave dealers prefer children because they are not so troublesome to drive, they are much easier caught if they attempt to escape, and they very soon settle down in their occupations, and they do not pine as slaves of greater age would.

930. *Chairman.*] When you say children what age do you mean?—From seven years of age upwards; you will find in every slave gang a great many children of seven to 10 years of age; they are, perhaps, the most valuable slaves that can be captured.

931. Sir R. Anstruther.] Can you form any idea of the proportion of children that have been exported lately?—I know from letters which I have received from Dr. Livingstone, and which I would have brought had I known I was going to be examined to-day, that the same devastation is going on up to the latest dates; he has been through an immense tract of country which is now entirely depopulated; on all sides there are signs of this slave trade having swept away the whole of the population.

932. *Chairman.*] Where is that?—The country between the East of Lake Nyassa and the coast.

933. How far is Nyassa from the coast?—I should say 300 or 350 miles.

934. Do you mean that all the country, from the coast to Lake Nyassa, is depopulated?—It is depopulated to within a short distance of Lake Nyassa.

935. You referred just now to slaves collected for the purpose of being employed on the French *engagées* system; that has entirely ceased now, has not it?—The French *engagées* system has entirely ceased, but it was so profitable a trade that the Portuguese on the River Zambezi sold off nearly all the slaves they had on their farms to supply it, and therefore during the latter part of the time that I was in the country they were getting fresh slaves down for the cultivation of their farms; and the whole of the country in which we were was depopulated for their trade.

936. That

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936. That was not for export?—Not for export at that time, but if the opportunity offered they would have exported those slaves.

937. If they could have got for them such a price as would have compensated them for the loss of their labour on their estates?—Yes.

938. Our attention is rather directed to that portion of the trade which you have described as being carried on by the Northern Arabs?—If you will allow me I should very much like to avail myself of the opportunity of describing the cruelties I have seen connected with the collecting of the slaves. I think I am not asking too much to be allowed to state this, because I know that many of the slaves taken from the part of the country we were in find their way to Mozambique, and that many of them find their way to Zanzibar. Dr. Livingstone recognised slaves at Zanzibar that had been brought from that part of the country, and I have recognised at Mozambique some who had recently been taken from the highlands, and indeed the slaves themselves told us where they had seen us, so that we could at once identify them as having been drawn from the country we had been in. I think that attention should be prominently called to the condition of those unfortunate people in their transit from the interior, because, though I can quite see that one's mouth is rather closed as to the status of a slave when he gets to an Arab master, that has nothing to do with the sufferings connected with his capture. It is true that a slave is well treated by his Arab master; as has been well observed, a man will not ill-treat his slave so as to hurt him, any more than he will his horse, but life is so cheap in the interior of the country that this rule does not hold good at all, as far as regards what takes place before the slave is finally sold. When I first went there in 1861 (and the state of things was even worse when I left in 1864), the ordinary price of a slave was two yards of calico; that is to say, for a boy 10 years of age; a woman would fetch something more if she was likely to be sold to the Kaffirs, or if she was likely to go on to one of the Portuguese farms, or to go to any of the Portuguese in Mozambique; she might have fetched eight yards of calico; but the price varied very much. The process of catching the slaves is this: the slave dealer goes into the country with so many muskets, and so many pieces of calico, and he finds out the most powerful chief, and he gives him spirits and keeps him in a state of semi-drunkenness the whole time, and tells him he must have more slaves; he gives him muskets and powder on account, and the man immediately finds out an opportunity to settle some old outstanding quarrel with some other chief, and therefore a war breaks out. As soon as war breaks out, favourable conditions are created for the carrying on of the slave trade, because famine is sure to follow in a country where the people are dependent on one wet season for tilling the ground, for it is only during the wet season that corn can be sown. Then a chief without food and without the means of buying food, will sell off his people very cheaply indeed. Captures are made in war. Kidnapping is prevalent all over the country; which leads again to all sorts of petty disputes and retaliation, and the more disturbed the country is, the cheaper slaves become; so cheap do they at last become, that I have known children

of the age of from eight to 10 years bought for less corn than would go into one of our hats, and you may easily imagine where they are bought so cheaply, and where they fetch so large a price on the coast, it pays the slave dealer very well to collect as many as he can, knowing that he must lose a certain proportion on the way, but also knowing that the remnant he saves will pay him a very large profit. It is like sending up for a large block of ice to London in the hot weather; you know that a certain amount will melt away before it reaches you in the country as it travels down; but that which remains will be quite sufficient for your wants.

939. *Chairman.*] Can you give us any idea of the comparative price of a slave on the coast, and in the interior where they are bought?—I ascertained the price of slaves at Mozambique, and I found they were worth there about eight dollars, the same slaves having been bought in the interior for a few yards of calico.

940. *Sir R. Anstruther.*] What is the proportion of waste of life in the transit?—It is very difficult to say what is the waste of life in the transit without having travelled with a slave caravan the whole way. Sickness may break out; they may cross a part of the country where there is very little food, and then many die of famine. Then, again, if there is anything like insubordination in the slave gang, the axe and knife are used very freely indeed, and an indiscriminate slaughter takes place amongst all those who are strong enough to be at all obstreperous. We liberated a gang of 84 slaves one morning, and within a few miles of the place where we liberated them we were shown places in the bush where slaves had been killed only that morning; one poor woman had a child on her back which she had recently given birth to, and which she was too weak to carry further, and the slave dealer took it by the heels and dashed its brains against a tree; another woman was ill herself, and could not keep in the line, and the slave dealer dashed her brains out with the axe, and she was cut out of the slave thong. They are all united in a long string, the men being yoked in heavy forked sticks, which are kept on their necks from the time they are captured till the time they are delivered to the slave shipper, sometimes for six weeks and sometimes even three months at a time.

941. *Chairman.*] What is the time generally occupied in the transit to the coast?—It varies; the slave gang is made up as the dealers travel about; they do not collect all the slaves at one place and go straight to the coast, the slaves are marched to and fro in the country, to a chief here and to another there, wherever the dealers hear that slaves are to be sold, and then they are all eventually taken to the coast. The travelling is very slow; I should say it is no uncommon thing for a slave gang to be some three months from the time it is first formed to the time it reaches the coast. The loss of life is very terrible indeed, owing to the hardships of the transit, and owing to the brutality of the drivers.

942. Dr. Livingstone, in one of his letters, estimates that about one-fifth reach the coast; do you think that that would be a fair average?—I should say that one-fifth do reach the coast, perhaps more; but I would also state this, that the Doctor believes that for every slave that comes to the coast perhaps 10 lives are lost in the interior,

interior, and I would have that distinctly borne in mind; that is my own opinion and the opinion of many others who have the best means of forming a judgment on the matter.

943. That is to say, taking into account the lives lost in warfare?—Taking into account the lives lost in warfare, and in the famine that succeeds, and those that are lost from the disease which always accompanies famine there; I never saw cholera break out, but I have seen a species of dysentery sweep off whole villages at a time.

944. Brought about by want of proper food?—Yes, and the want of proper food has originated in the disturbed state of the country; drought will very often prevail for a long time in the country, which, of course, aggravates the state of things very much; the Nyassa or Mañganja tribe are very timid, and they suffer exceedingly.

945. Dr. Livingstone mentions one part of the country which at one time he found well cultivated, and where a great quantity of cotton was grown, and which on a subsequent visit he found entirely depopulated?—Yes, that is the country I am speaking of in which so great a change took place. Many of the Doctor's statements have been discredited, but he is not a man to exaggerate in any respect; I know that contrary opinions about the country have been stated, and it has been hinted that he has coloured things rather too highly, but when I was there I had opportunities of seeing the remains of villages in all directions, the population of which had been entirely swept away; I have seen as many as three villages burning in one morning within two hours, and I have seen hundreds of captives carried away from those villages.

946. The villages are set on fire, and, in the confusion, the men, women, and children are captured?—Yes.

947. Within what time did that change take place from its being a flourishing cotton-growing country to its being depopulated?—In about two years.

948. Do you remember in what year Dr. Livingstone saw it in its flourishing condition?—I think the Doctor came home to England and represented the flourishing state of affairs in 1859, and we found the altered state of things in 1861; the inhabitants of that district were a very industrious and intelligent race; they had an immense quantity of iron all through the country; coal also was found there, and gold; and copper was taken away to the coast in the form of malachite.

949. They have been swept away?—Entirely swept away. I may say that the country was formerly so thickly populated that you might have travelled for 70 or 80 miles, and have come to a village at every two miles; in many places you would have found a village at every half mile. It is thoroughly well watered, and it is hardly necessary in any case to take any precaution about water. Another proof of the great population in the hill country is this: that there was no game to be found at all, with the exception of a few guinea fowl.

950. Sir R. Anstruther.] The consequence of this depopulation is that all this land is lying waste?—The Doctor, in one of his last letters to me, speaks of having to cross a tract of 120 miles where they found not a human being of any kind

All this land that I am speaking of is perfectly swept of its inhabitants, and I have no hesitation in saying that every bit of this damage and misery has been caused by the slave trade.

951. *Chairman.*] Where are the slaves obtained from now?—The slaves are now brought from great distances in the interior. The belt of country between the Lakes and the East Coast is denuded of its inhabitants, and, therefore, they have to be brought from the west side of Lake Nyassa; they are transferred across the lake in Arab dhows; there are settlements of Arabs on both sides of the lake, and the Doctor in his travels has given very accurate accounts of the slave trade crossing the lake.

952. To what power are those Arabs subject?—They are not subject to any one; they are perfectly lawless; they have no master at all; the greater part of the slaves that go to Zanzibar now are brought from the vicinity of that lake, the great proportion of them from the west side of the lake, simply because the rest of the country is depopulated.

953. Of course the further the slave dealers have to go inland for the slaves, the greater the waste of life?—The cheaper they are to buy, and the greater the loss of life there is in bringing them down to the coast.

954. You do not know anything as to what is going on now, I presume, except from the letters of Dr. Livingstone?—I am in constant correspondence with Dr. Kirk; and I may state that Mr. Young, who went up to search for Dr. Livingstone in 1867, went through the greater part of the country I am speaking of, as far as the middle of Lake Nyassa, and according to his account the same state of things was going on at that time. I have since heard from more recent accounts that it is still going on, and, in fact, it must go on as long as slaves are exported from the East Coast.

955. Sir J. Hay.] Are those slave dealers of whom you are speaking Portuguese subjects, or Arabs?—Most of them are Portuguese subjects; some of them are Arabs.

956. Have the Portuguese Government no means of restraining them?—I speak of things as they were; I can only say that the Portuguese who were sent out there, were sent out to shift for themselves; the Home Government did not wish to hear anything more of them, and the slave trade was never interfered with in any way except on paper.

957. Mr. J. Talbot.] Did you accompany Dr. Livingstone on any part of his travels?—Not as one of his expedition, I went out with Bishop Mackenzie, but I was with Dr. Livingstone, off and on, for nearly four years; I joined him because we wished to save the lives of a great many of those poor men and children who had been liberated by us, and the Doctor and myself were working together for that purpose for some time; eventually he sent me down to the Cape with them, and a great many of them are there at the present time.

958. *Chairman.*] Have you any suggestion to offer to the Committee with the view of suppressing the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa?—Having listened with much interest to the evidence which has been given here, I should like to suggest that which seems to me to be one very good plan, and which I think might be adopted. The suggestion has been made that vice consuls should

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should be placed at different parts of the coast to watch the slave trade, and to aid the fleet, as they certainly would be able to do in a most valuable way. General Rigby thinks that it would be difficult to get men to undertake that office, on account of the unhealthiness of the coast, but I think that difficulty might be removed in a measure, by having what I have heard called a "Floating-consul;" that is a consul who should have a yacht at his command, and who should ply between, say, Zanzibar and Madagascar; he might spend some part of his time at Kilwa, and some part of his time in Mozambique harbour; he might cross to Johanna, where a large slave trade is going on, and he might cruise along the coast of Madagascar if need be, though, perhaps that would be too large a field. At all events, I think the danger to a man's life would be obviated by his being able to move about. To put a man in a very unhealthy place is not only likely to kill him in a short time, but it makes him non-efficient very quickly indeed. The result of two or three attacks of fever is very serious; if the man is not moved away, he, in some cases, becomes morbid in his ideas, and, in other cases, he becomes exceedingly nervous. In some cases I have known men become really demented as long as they have been within the reach of the malaria that has made them ill. It is necessary, in that country, to be moving about. You may undergo any hardships as long as you move about, and are in active employment; but once be stationary in an unhealthy place (and there is no place so unhealthy as a small Arab town), and your life is very much hazarded. I would add that I think there are also other advantages in such a plan. I think the slave dealers would then never know where to expect this officer; he would be master of his own actions and movements much better than he would if he had to be dependent on calling upon a man-of-war to take him from one place to another. I do not think the expense of such a service would be very great; it would be a popular service, and many men would be found who would enter heart and soul into it.

959. Do not you think the same service could be performed by one of the fleet cruising about in the same way from port to port?—I think not so well, because I attach importance to the vice-consul being enabled to reside on shore for a short time, by which means he would be able to obtain information which he otherwise could not obtain. The floating-consul might go to any of those ports, and remain a short time at them; and then, without the necessity of asking anyone's leave, he might weigh anchor the next morning, and communicate with any of the fleet.

960. Have you any other suggestion to make with a view to putting a stop to this slave trade?—I will simply add this; I have seen a good deal of the Arabs in the Comoro Islands, and other places, and I should certainly advise that we should deal with them with a strong hand in preference to any dallying with them; I would put the utmost pressure upon the Sultan of Zanzibar at once; I should show him that though we might be taking away from him shillings by stopping his slave trade, yet that the vast increase in the legitimate trade that there must be in the course of a few years would be putting back pounds into his pocket. He is now a beggar set upon horseback; he is a man of enormous income;

and from what General Rigby has said, he is a man with whom I think strong action would have more effect than any paper warfare in the way of treaties, and so forth.

961. You have probably seen a great deal to enable you to form an opinion as to what would be the increase of commercial intercourse if the slave trade were abolished?—I know most of the merchants connected with the trade on the East Coast, and I get letters constantly from Dr. Kirk at Zanzibar; I also know Dr. Steere, who has resided there some time, and Mr. Alington who was there; I knew Mr. Thornton who was with Baron Von Der Decken; and I have indirectly had very many opportunities of knowing how the trade of Zanzibar is increasing daily.

962. Do you think that the merchants resident there are anxious to have the slave trade put a stop to?—I think they are certainly. When the northern Arabs come down with the monsoon to carry away the slaves to Arabia and the Persian Gulf, there is no security for the life of Europeans in Zanzibar, and if a better state of things were established, if safety could be ensured, I am sure they would all be very glad. I cannot conceive that Europeans could have two opinions about it.

963. They are not themselves at all connected with the slave trade, are they?—Not at present. I cannot say that such was the case a few years ago. I know that a great commotion existed at Zanzibar, and also in the Comoro Islands, from the fact that Englishmen were very large employers of slave labour, but that has been put a stop to by the Foreign Office.

964. You think now there is a very general feeling among the merchants there that their interests would be promoted by the suppression of the slave trade?—I am sorry I cannot back my opinion by evidence upon that point, but there are gentlemen in this country (one gentleman especially whose house is connected with Zanzibar, a member of the firm of Wiseman and Company, one of the leading merchants there) who, I am sure, could offer you better information on the subject than I can.

965. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Captain Fraser had a large number of slaves, had he not?—Yes; the fact of Captain Fraser employing slaves led to everlasting murmuring on the part of the natives. One morning they would see us burning the dhows which were engaged in the slave trade, and the next morning they would see an Englishman working factories and plantations with those slaves safely landed; it was a question which puzzled far more acute people than they were. The same thing existed at the Comoro Islands; it was a mere sham and delusion; the poor slaves were hired in gangs from their Arab master; the Arab master was called in by the English employer, who, merely as a matter of form, said "Now mind all these people are to be free labourers on my plantation. I will hand over their wages to you." But, of course, they were not handed over. It was encouraging the slave trade.

966. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] As far as the slaves were concerned, they were as much slaves after the transaction as before?—Yes.

967. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] After they were manumitted, did not they remain with Colonel Fraser of their own accord?—I am not sure about that; I know at the time it was a great scandal.

968. Sir

968. Sir *J. Hay*.] That was in the island of Zanzibar?—Yes.

969. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Does Wiseman's house trade with the interior of Africa?—I am not aware, but I know that a ship has just come home direct from Zanzibar for them; the chief trade between Zanzibar and Europe comes through a Hamburg house.

970. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] Independently of humane considerations, are not you of opinion that commercially it would be well worth our while to make an outlay for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade, and putting a stop to this depopulation of large tracts of country which is now going on?—I cannot speak too strongly upon that point; a great part of the East Coast of Africa is useless for any purposes of commerce at present. Of export you may say there is nothing except a few hides from the northern part, where the Somalis are in power, slaves, ivory, and a little gold dust; nothing else comes from the interior. I have no doubt were the slave trade stopped a very large trade with Europe might spring up at Zanzibar, because the produce from the eastern part of Africa must inevitably come through Zanzibar. Zanzibar would become a second Singapore or Kurrachee for that part of the world, more especially now the Suez Canal is opened; and, I think, it should be our policy on all considerations to try and get a stop put to this horrible loss of life; commercially it would be of the greatest importance to us. According to the accounts of the recent discoveries of Dr. Livingstone and others, we have in the interior of that part of Africa a country equal in resources to any part of India, and I believe more healthy as a rule; the sea-board and the rivers are unhealthy, but when you get some distance from the coast you rise to a lovely table land, and it is a country which, from what I saw, and from what I know from other men who have travelled there, is second in beauty to hardly any in the world, and it is also a most productive country. Iron abounds in all directions; in fact the Portuguese get all their iron from there. Coal is to be found; lead I have seen myself in large quantities, and cotton can be grown to any extent. I have seen very large quantities of cotton there.

971. In fact, apart from all humane considerations, you think it would be for our interest to make an outlay for the suppression of this trade?—Yes; but independently of our interest I think as Englishmen, as a people so blessed as we are, and as a people who profess to put down the slave trade in different parts of the world, our foremost duty is to stop this frightful loss of life, particularly when we consider that there are only a few treaties which have never been abided by in our way. The plainer we make things for the Arabs the better; hitherto there has been a vast amount of confusion; they do not know what we mean, and I candidly confess that such transactions as those I spoke of, in which Englishmen have had to do with the slave trade, give them cause to complain of us, and give rise to complications. I have seen a French ship lying at the Island of Johanna, crammed with slaves, with one of our men-of-war within a cable's length of her, and the poor creatures jumping overboard and swimming to us to protect them; and the Arabs would say to us, there is a Frenchman there full of slaves, if it was one of our ships you would burn her directly; why do not you go and

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take her? All these things lead to complications, and the sooner they are simplified by action *pur et simple* the better.

972. Mr. *Gilpin*.] Have you yourself seen the dhows going down the river laden with slaves?—Not dhows, but canoes. I have seen 20 or more in a day, laden with slaves, going down the River Shiré into the Portuguese dominions.

973. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] When was that?—In 1864.

974. As to the healthiness of the coast, does not it depend principally upon the habits of the European settlers there; would not a man who was tolerably sober and correct in his habits have a better chance of keeping himself in health than a man of intemperate habits?—It used to be said on the West Coast that a stock of tombstones should be kept at Sierra Leone for the use of those that died there, and that one sentence would describe all their deaths, "brandy and water." That really has a good deal to do with it, but I must state this, that a man who lives in an unhealthy place very soon becomes demoralised in mind and body, and he is very likely to take to an unwholesome way of living. I think it would not be safe for a man to stay there long; but, in connection with your question, I should like to state from information I have received from Dr. Kirk recently, that he is decidedly of opinion that a station might be found on the mainland near to Zanzibar, where Europeans could live in perfect health, and where, if it were necessary, liberated slaves could be sent to be kept under safe supervision.

975. *Chairman*.] What place is that?—Near to Dar Seelam; Dr. Steere will be before you to-morrow, and he will be able to give you more information upon that subject than I can.

976. Mr. *Gilpin*.] To what extent were British subjects and British protected subjects in the habit of holding slaves when you were in Zanzibar?—I was not in Zanzibar, and I am not able to answer that question.

977. You have probably not seen that paper with reference to British protected subjects (*handing to the Witness the Draft Report of the Foreign Office Committee, vide Appendix*)?—I know that the question of the status of British protected subjects at Zanzibar is a very vital question; they are now, owing to our very lax treatment of the question, throwing off their allegiance to the British Government in order that they may claim that of the Arabs, and so engage in the slave trade and be slaveholders.

978. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] With regard to the depopulated country between the coast and Lake Nyassa, which you say is like a desert, you think it could be again made very productive?—Of course it must take some time for the remnants of those tribes which have been driven north, south, east, and west to come back to their old country.

979. Do you think that there is still population sufficient in that part of Africa to re-inhabit that country and to re-cultivate it?—Without doubt there is population sufficient in the neighbourhood of the lakes; I may state this, as a peculiar feature of the depopulation going on in that part of the country, that when destruction and disturbance come, the natives are obliged to make for either a lake or a river, because, as I have stated, no corn can be sown except during the wet season in the highlands; but

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there is always a certain amount of swamp land available in the neighbourhood of lakes and rivers, in which corn can be grown at all times of the year. When we were in the highlands, in 1863 and 1864, in the neighbourhood of the Shiré, all the population which was not swept off accumulated at the river; and it was a very frightful state of things there, because the people flocked to the river, perfectly famished and perfectly mad with hunger, and they risked their lives for the sake of a few heads of corn. The river all day long was carrying down the dead bodies of those who had been fighting amongst themselves, like starving dogs quarrelling over a bone. The population is very dense indeed on Lake Nyassa at present.

980. Some of that population would, in the course of time, spread over the depopulated district?—Yes, if there was anything like peace.

981. Mr. Fowler.] Is not the water on the coast very dangerous to drink?—I do not believe it has the effect attributed to it; I have drunk the vilest water possible, and yet remained in most perfect health; if a man in bad health drinks bad water, or bad beer, or anything else, it may kill him; I do not believe as some people do, that a draught of bad water will be sure to bring on fever or dysentery.

982. Sir R. Anstruther.] With regard to the probability of the depopulated district becoming again inhabited, the fertility of the soil, and the salubrity of the climate, which induced people to go there, and cultivate the soil in time past, would operate as inducements to people to go there again, would they not?—Yes; this part of the country is full of little streams; in fact, it

was some time before I knew what the native word for thirst was, though you may hear the word for hunger from morning to night. I never saw a better watered country in my life (when you get on the low lands, in fact, you have too much water), and where you have water, you are sure to have plenty of cultivation. We hear of African deserts, but that term only applies to the extreme South and the extreme North of Africa; there is not an approach to a desert in the interior at all, it is a very fertile country throughout.

983. Mr. Kinnaird.] You referred just now to the suggestion that a European settlement might be established at some point near the coast?—I referred to a suggestion in a letter I recently received from Dr. Kirk; he found it necessary to make a journey for one or two days into the interior of the country to push on some of the porters who were conveying provisions to Dr. Livingstone, and he then passed through a part of the country, which he found exceedingly healthy and fertile, and which he thought could be very well inhabited by any Europeans.

984. You have no suggestion to make to the Committee further than you have made, as to the policy of establishing a coast settlement for Europeans?—Seeing that it must be obvious to all of us, that it would help us out of a difficulty if we could provide for these liberated slaves, it would be a most important thing if a European settlement could be established near Zanzibar, where they could be carefully looked after; and I consider it most fortunate that Dr. Kirk has, in his opinion, discovered a place recently where such a settlement could be formed.

Tuesday, 25th July 1871.

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir Robert Anstruther.  
Lord Frederick Cavendish.  
Mr. Crum-Ewing.  
Mr. Robert Fowler.  
Mr. Gilpin.  
Mr. Russell Gurney.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Kennaway.  
Mr. Kinnaird.  
Mr. Shaw Lefevre.  
Mr. O'Connor.  
Mr. John Talbot.

RIGHT HONOURABLE RUSSELL GURNEY, IN THE CHAIR.

Rev. EDWARD STEERE, LL.D., called in; and Examined.

985. Mr. *J. Talbot.*] I THINK you were resident in Zanzibar for some time?—For four years.

986. You went out with the Universities Mission, did you not?—Yes; immediately after Bishop Mackenzie's death.

987. In what position were you in whilst you were resident in Zanzibar?—I was a missionary chaplain to Bishop Tozer; I was one of the missionaries, in fact.

988. Bishop Tozer succeeded Bishop Mackenzie?—Yes.

989. And he changed the field of the mission from the Zambezi River to the town of Zanzibar?—Yes.

990. Before you went to Zanzibar, you had been in the Portuguese territory?—Yes; we first went to the Zambezi, and then finding that the original title of the mission was desolate, we looked out for the natural centre of the country, and we moved to Zanzibar with the remnant of the mission.

991. How are the slaves obtained which are brought to Zanzibar?—I know very little of the way in which slaves are obtained in the interior, but my impression is, that they are almost always bought, and that the desolation in the interior does not arise directly from the slave trade, nor is it occasioned with the view to supply slaves; but it is not an uncommon occurrence in Africa to have a marauding tribe sweeping over a large district, and practically destroying the district for the time being. The slaves I have talked to in Zanzibar have almost all been sold by their relations, or by their masters in the interior. The great hardships caused by the trade seem to lie first of all in the march down, and then in the passage at sea. I have been told several times of whole caravans of 200 or 300 having died between the place where they were bought in the interior and the coast; and as regards the passage by sea, even between Kilwa and Zanzibar, there was a dhow very lately lost a third of the slaves on board; there were 90 thrown overboard, either dead or dying, between Kilwa and Zanzibar.

992. Sir *R. Anstruther.*] How many days voyage is it from Kilwa to Zanzibar?—Between 0.116.

one and three. If a dhow is kept out three days a very large proportion of the slaves invariably die; it is not customary to give any food on the voyage except a little uncooked rice.

993. Mr. *J. Talbot.*] We have heard some very dreadful descriptions of the sufferings which the slaves undergo in their land journey from the place where they are captured to the port where they are exported; do you confirm those statements?—Yes, entirely. The great difficulty is to get them to the coast at all.

994. I understand that you do not agree entirely with what has been stated by former witnesses, that the country has been depopulated in order to obtain those slaves?—No.

995. But you think that the country has been depopulated by wars, and that the result of those wars has been the capture of slaves?—Sometimes, but not always. Very often the effect of wars has been, that no slaves have come from the country. Till lately more than half the slaves in Zanzibar came from the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa; and since the country has been desolated, no slaves have come from it. When the country was at peace there was a large exportation of slaves, but when the war and desolation began the exportation of slaves ceased.

996. Do you confirm the statement that was made yesterday, that the country between Lake Nyassa and the sea is almost entirely depopulated?—Yes, I have heard that stated over and over again. Marauders, whom Dr. Livingstone calls Mazitu, and the people of Zanzibar call Maviti, have spread over the whole country, one chief only having stood against them. Those marauders came even to Kilwa, upon which the Sultan of Zanzibar sent an armed force to defend Kilwa; a part of the Sultan of Zanzibar's force went out against them, and many were killed, a few only escaping back to Kilwa. Some of the town's people were then sent out to treat with them, and they were sent back without an answer, and with their hands cut off.

997. Are you able to confirm the statements which have been made to us as to the great fertility

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tility of that country between Lake Nyassa and the sea?—I have never traversed the country.

998. With regard to the state of things in Zanzibar itself, which is the part of the country you are most acquainted with, what is the condition of the emancipated slaves who are living at Zanzibar?—They are exactly in the position of free men anywhere; they get their living by trading and work.

999. Is there any attempt made to re-enslave them?—Not generally; they run some risk if they are imprudent and incautious; sometimes a man will sell himself, but, as a rule, they get their living in one way or other, and no one molests them.

1000. Is their condition very much better as freed men than it was as slaves?—As to eating and drinking I should think not much better.

1001. It is only in having their liberty that they are better off?—Only in having their liberty. The greatest evil of the state of slavery is the moral degradation.

1002. With regard to the children, you took some interest in the condition of the slaves in Zanzibar, I believe?—Yes, we had some children handed over to us who had been taken out of a slave dhow. The education of those children was our first work in Zanzibar, seven or eight years ago. We began with five and have now nearly ninety. The first five all came from the borders of Lake Nyassa, and they were very intelligent. Our difficulty at starting was in regard to the language, and it took some time to get over that. We began with the ordinary instruction which is given in a national school in England, and we found them take it with very great rapidity; they were much more acute than our English children would be in a rural school, and their moral character was excellent. Since I have come back I hear that they have gone on acquiring more and more knowledge, and the best possible accounts are given of them; some of them are now 20 years of age.

1003. They have grown up into intelligent men and women, able to take care of themselves and able to earn an honest living?—Yes. We have had one or two cases which turned out badly, but, as a rule, we have been very satisfied with the results.

1004. Is there any demoralisation amongst the young female slaves?—You may say that in Zanzibar morality is unknown, and that, for the most part, the slaves are not married at all.

1005. With regard to those whom you educated, some were girls and some were boys?—Some were girls and some were boys.

1006. With regard to the girls, do you think you instilled into their minds a proper feeling in that respect?—I think so. I think they have a strong moral feeling. I do not think there is in them any lack of original morality, but, I think, owing to the existence of slavery in Zanzibar, the general state of morality among the natives is extremely low, so that if you only look outside your own house you find every kind of evil going on.

1007. You knew the late Sultan of Zanzibar?—Yes; and the present Sultan of Zanzibar also.

1008. The late Sultan was really anxious to put down the slave trade, was he not?—No, I should think not. I should think the present Sultan much more trustworthy than the last was. Seyyid Majid was an effete voluptuary himself, a man entirely given up to his pleasures and worn

out by them, and he was always willing to pay money for the sake of putting an end to any trouble.

1009. You think that the present Sultan, if properly approached, would be willing to co-operate with us in suppressing the slave trade?—I think with regard to the foreign slave trade probably he would.

1010. Is it, or not, the case that a great part of his revenue is derived from the tax on slaves?—The customs duty on slaves forms a material part of the customs duties.

1011. Would you propose to compensate him for the loss of that duty?—He does not ostensibly receive any duty upon slaves going to Arabia, but only upon the slaves carried from place to place within his own dominions.

1012. On the slaves landed in Zanzibar?—On the slaves landed in Zanzibar and on those exported from Zanzibar, exported in a dhow supposed to be going to one of his own ports.

1013. So that he does not openly encourage the slave trade?—Not in the least; he professes to put it down. Every now and then he burns a dhow, and imprisons the master of the dhow, and takes away all the slaves. Seyyid Majid used to divide the slaves so taken amongst his friends.

1014. Had you any opportunity of forming an opinion as to the energy of our naval force with regard to the suppression of the slave trade when you were in Zanzibar?—Yes; there are exceptions, but, generally speaking, I think the navy did all they could, but I do not think they were at all able to do what they might have done; I think large vessels are wholly unfitted for the work of chasing those dhows; then when a young officer is sent out with some seamen in a boat, nobody ever knows exactly what is done, and many tales are told among the natives as to what is done, which are simply incredible, but there is little doubt that when a boat's crew goes away they follow their own devices very much indeed, and, no doubt, they harrass legitimate commerce very much.

1015. That is, they take possession of vessels that are in legitimate trade?—Yes; they stop, and search, and detain, and sometimes burnt them.

1016. Under the supposition that they are slave dhows?—Yes.

1017. Could you suggest any means of improving that state of things for the future?—My impression is that small vessels of light draft should be employed, which could follow the dhows into the shallows, and they ought to be very fast sailers, because now the dhows can always outsail our boats; if you could follow them into the shallows with small vessels I have no doubt a great deal of the trade might be stopped.

1018. Generally, do you look forward with hope to the suppression of the slave trade in its worst form on the East Coast of Africa?—I think it may be done if the English Government is minded to do it.

1019. If the English Government is minded to do it, you think no material opposition would be offered by the native princes?—No.

1020. *Chairman.*] What would you suggest that the English Government should do, supposing they had a mind to do it?—It is a question for a naval man what means should be taken; I think, probably, the best way would be to watch the Arabian

Arabian coast, and take the slavers as they arrived; then as regards liberated slaves, I think that the slaves that are landed should be landed in Zanzibar rather than any other place, because, if you take a freed slave and put him in any other country, you put him amongst strangers in a country the climate of which will probably not agree with him, and where, at first, he will be utterly useless to those he lands amongst; but if you put him down at Zanzibar you put him where he will find a number of men of his own nation, who understand him and live in the way that he has been used to, and you put him in a place where he will be able to get a living.

1021. As to the disposition of the ships, you say you would have them watch the Arab ports?—I think that would be the best arrangement with a view to suppressing the trade.

1022. Large vessels would do that?—Possibly they would do that better than small ones.

1023. And the small vessels you spoke of would be best adapted for pursuing the dhows in the shallows?—Yes, on the African coast.

1024. Is there anything else which you think might be done by the Government in order to show their determination to put an end to the trade?—It would be a very great thing if the treaty that was talked of at one time, were made with the Sultan to prohibit the export of slaves within the Sultan's dominions, except within a narrow compass; I think between Mombas and Dar Selam, or some such district, because the slaves that go to Arabia, are almost always shipped for Lamoo; a great number are shipped from Zanzibar for Lamoo, and what I understand to be the course is that they pay the customs duty upon the slaves to go to Lamoo, and they get passes, which they show till they reach the latitude of Lamoo, and then they make the best of their way to Arabia.

1025. Under the treaty is there a power of exporting slaves from Zanzibar to Lamoo?—Yes, it was so in my time; it was, generally speaking, the rule that no slave went from anywhere but Zanzibar, and as a rule they had been brought from Kilwa to Zanzibar; some going from Kilwa to Madagascar, and to the Comoro Islands.

1026. What is the change now?—At present Kilwa is not the great port, because the country has been ravaged behind it by the Maviti; they come more from Bagamoyo opposite Zanzibar.

1027. Sir J. Hay.] Do I rightly understand you to say that the slaves from Zanzibar bound for Arabia are cleared at the Zanzibar custom-house as being bound for Lamoo?—Yes

1028. And with that false destination they evade the cruisers as far north as Lamoo, and then go to the open sea and steer for the coast of Arabia?—Yes.

1029. *Chairman.*] Do you think the appointment of vice-consuls at one or two of those ports along the coast would tend to facilitate the suppression of the trade?—I think it would be useful; I do not think it is at all a matter of first necessity.

1030. Do you not think that the appointment of those vice-consuls would be very useful as a means of obtaining influence along the coast and as a means of furnishing information to the naval officers?—The difficulty would be as to who should be the vice-consuls. Persons now living in those towns would be more likely to mislead than to help.

1031. If we could get honest and efficient  
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vice-consuls, do you think their agency would be very important?—It would be very valuable.

1032. Is there any difficulty with respect to obtaining proper interpreters upon whom naval officers can depend?—The greatest possible difficulty. The interpreters I knew when I was in Zanzibar were all of them men who would not hesitate to take a bribe from the commander of a slave dhow and mislead the cruisers. It was universally said that one man, Juma, who is now dead, and who was one of the chief interpreters, was in the habit of communicating with slave dhows, and arranging that a certain number should be taken and that the rest should escape.

1033. The naval officers are very much dependent on the interpreters?—Entirely, because very few of them understand Arabic, and you may say none of them understand the Suaheli language, the language of the coast.

1034. Does any mode of supplying that want occur to you?—I have published a Suaheli vocabulary by which, perhaps, officers might acquire some knowledge of that dialect.

1035. You have spoken of the depopulation as being caused by war, which has not been originated for the sake of obtaining slaves; have you any reason to doubt the evidence we have had as to wars being provoked by the slave dealers for the purpose of getting those slaves?—I do not know what the evidence is, but I never heard of such a war.

1036. You have not heard of arms being supplied to some of the tribes, in order to give them success in war for that purpose?—This kind of thing will happen, as happened in the Nyamwezi country; there was a dispute there as to the succession, and the Arabs sided with one party; there was then a great desolation of country, but the number of slaves procured by that means was very small; as to supplying muskets, the sale of arms is part of the regular trade of a caravan.

1037. You do not agree with those accounts which we have heard, that the course to which I have referred is the ordinary course by which slaves are obtained?—No, I doubt it very much; when first I went up the Zambezi, I was surprised to find that the direction of the slave trade was into the interior, and not down to the coast, and then, again, I was surprised to find that the slaves found (by Dr. Livingstone) in the hands of the traders during a desolating war did not belong to the conquered tribe, but to the victorious one; they had been in many instances sold by their own relations.

1038. That would not account for the large number of slaves brought to the coast?—There are an enormous number of slaves in the interior; the trade has been going on for a thousand years.

1039. If 20,000 arrive at the coast, something like 100,000 must have been obtained, because it is estimated that about a fifth reach the coast?—There must be a very large number collected. The Turkish slave dealers Sir Samuel Baker met with are talked of in Zanzibar as men who do that, who stir up wars for the sake of carrying off slaves without buying them, and the Zanzibar men express their abhorrence of such proceedings.

1040. I am not referring so much to the Zanzibar men as to the northern Arabs, who come down with the monsoon for slaves?—All the trade goes through Zanzibar hands; the northern  
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Arabs who come in the monsoon time come to Zanzibar, and there stop.

1041. They do not negotiate with the dealers on the mainland?—Not with the people on the mainland; they kidnap slaves in Zanzibar, and sometimes take them off the plantations; they procure them by any means they can, in Zanzibar and immediately on the coast.

1042. What was your experience as to the healthiness of Zanzibar?—I was quite as well myself in Zanzibar as I should have been in England.

1043. You were in the town?—Yes.

1044. Can you speak to the healthiness of the country?—I have no reason to think that the climate of the country is worse; we all thought that the mainland opposite, particularly at Dar Seelam, was likely to be more healthy than Zanzibar itself. I have been at Dar Seelam, which is very finely situated; it has an excellent harbour, and there are some very fine buildings; but I am told that it is now to be abandoned. It was always thought that Seyyid Majid intended it as a place of security against his brother, the Imaum of Muscat, the town not being so accessible from the sea as Zanzibar is.

1045. What proportion of the slaves brought to Zanzibar are children?—Among the slaves I have seen landed from the dhows at Zanzibar there has not been a large proportion of children: I should think, taking one with another, you would get the ordinary proportion of children to grown people.

1046. What is the ordinary proportion?—A sixth, I would say, were children; but almost all the slaves are young people.

1047. I mean between the ages of six and ten?—About a sixth of the slaves I have seen landed in Zanzibar would be under 10, but of the cargoes I have seen taken from vessels going to Arabia, the proportion of children has been very much larger; in some cases they seemed to be almost all children.

1048. Did you see the boats in Zanzibar taking slaves on board for export?—I used to see the dhows coming from Kilwa with slaves; they used to go round our house close to our windows, the deck of the dhow would be entirely covered with slaves squatting side by side, so closely packed that it was impossible for them to move; there would be sometimes 200 to 300 in a large open boat.

1049. Would that be about the ordinary number carried in a dhow?—I think they always aim at getting as many as 200 into the dhow.

1050. Of course then there would be considerable mortality before they reached Arabia?—No doubt the mortality must be enormous.

1051. Did you see those dhows lying in wait in the harbour for a convenient opportunity of escaping our cruisers?—It was all done perfectly openly; the trade was legitimate to Mombaza and Lamoo, and there was not the slightest attempt at interfering with it.

1052. Have you any reason to suppose that any considerable proportion of those slaves that are taken to Lamoo are taken to remain there?—No, I should think a very small proportion indeed go to Lamoo to remain there.

1053. It is a mere blind?—It is a mere blind.

1054. As to nine-tenths would you say?—As to nine-tenths I should think. There is besides this, a slave trade which is illegitimate in the eyes

of the Arabs at Zanzibar; that is conducted chiefly by the northern Arabs that come from the Persian Gulf, who kidnap and steal their slaves, and who avoid paying the customs duties on them. The ordinary slave carriers are from Sur near Ras al Hadd; the northern Arabs or Shemali are Wahabees from Ras al Kheymah, near Cape Mussandum.

1055. How do they get off from Zanzibar?—They generally sail in the night; they have houses in the town; it is notorious in what parts of the town they make their stay while they are collecting their slaves, and in the back parts of those premises they gather the slaves; then when they have a good opportunity they slip them on board the dhows secretly at night and the dhow goes out to sea.

1056. Are there a large number of dhows engaged in that particular trade?—There have been generally a large number of them every season.

1057. Have you any idea of the number of dhows engaged in that trade in the course of a year?—There is so much secrecy about it that I do not think anybody can tell accurately; there is a certain build of dhow one knows, and one used to see eight or ten of them in the harbour at a time. I do not know how many of them there would be in the course of a year.

1058. You saw many dhows in the harbour at a time, which in the night would load their slaves and go away?—Dhows which everybody knew were there for piratical purposes if the opportunity offered.

1059. Would they carry off a great number of slaves?—They would carry as many as they could on board; there was one taken by the "Wasp" that had, I think, 380 on board.

1060. Do you look forward to any considerable increase of commercial intercourse at Zanzibar, supposing the slave trade were put down?—Yes, I think commerce will go on increasing, and I think commerce tends to suppress the slave trade; the legitimate commerce of Zanzibar is so large that the slave trade is being rather squeezed out by it.

1061. Do you think that the export of slaves is now decreasing rather than increasing?—Yes.

1062. For how long has that been the case?—It has been chiefly, I suppose, since cloves began to be planted in Zanzibar.

1063. That has given rise to a great trade?—To a very great trade.

1064. Does not that render it their interest rather to prevent the slave trade?—The Zanzibar people feel, as a rule, that the slave trade is a disreputable occupation, and they say among themselves "money made by the slave trade never prospers."

1065. They think it injurious to the interests of the state?—No, I do not say they think that, because the whole life of an Arab is bound up with the employment of slaves; all their domestic arrangements would be overthrown by the abolition of slavery.

1066. I am speaking of the slave trade, and not slavery?—You always find that the Arabs are anxious to supply their friends and relations with the slaves they want, and they consider it a laudable thing to do so; but they consider the slave trade generally to be disreputable.

1067. Is there any idea growing up in Zanzibar that they want the labour of the negroes themselves,

themselves, and that, therefore, it is inexpedient on that account to export them?—I think the number of slaves that have come into Zanzibar up to within the last few years has been so large, that any considerable want of labour has not been felt; but during the time I was in Zanzibar, the price of labour was constantly rising, and I have been told since I came away that it has increased very much. There has been an immense quantity of building going on in Zanzibar. The town was computed, some 10 years ago, to have 100,000 inhabitants in it, and everything that goes into and out of that part of Africa goes through it, so that the trade is enormous, and the number of men wanted for every kind of occupation is very great.

1068. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Following up the suggestion with regard to the establishment of vice-consuls along the coast, do you think that another good plan would be to purchase the sovereignty of Zanzibar; do you suppose that the Sultan would be disposed to sell the sovereignty?—No, I think not. I think it is possible that the late Seyyid Majid might have been so disposed, but I am certain that Syed Burghash would never entertain the idea for a moment.

1069. You do not think the cruisers do much good on the coast at present?—They certainly check the slave trade to a certain extent.

1070. You do not think they do as much good as they might do?—No; it does not appear to me that the navy has ever seriously given its mind to the suppression of the trade as a great object. I mean to include the authorities at home as well as the officers on the station.

1071. You mentioned that the young officers follow their own devices when they are sent out with the boats; do you mean that they amuse themselves?—They go on shore, and they certainly leave behind them the impression of having insulted the natives. They were accused in one case of carrying off slaves from the plantations, and bringing them down as having been taken out of a dhow; such things as these one does not believe at all; but I have very little doubt that when they land they sometimes get intoxicated, and that they then behave in a very rough and irregular way.

1072. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] Do you state that on hearsay or do you state it from your own knowledge?—I state it as what I was told by the natives; I do not state it as being within my own knowledge.

1073. Is it a statement in which you place any confidence yourself?—Yes, I thoroughly believe it.

1074. Sir *J. Hay*.] That does not apply to the officers?—Not to the officers generally.

1075. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] But to some of the young men?—Midshipmen or young lieutenants; the whole thing is sometimes treated as a lark. I believe that wrong and irregular things are done, partly because I know that leave to go on shore in Zanzibar at one time was forbidden on account of what men had done when on shore on leave.

1076. You lived in the town of Zanzibar?—Yes.

1077. Are there many factories in the island?—No.

1078. Is not there a sugar factory?—There was a large sugar establishment projected by Captain Fraser, who had a very fine plantation and very fine machinery, but up to the time I left they had produced a very small quantity

of sugar, if any at all; then in the town itself there was a cocoa-nut oil factory with a steam mill, also started by Captain Fraser.

1079. That was a more profitable concern than the other, was it not?—Yes, much more profitable, I think; I think it had every element of success about it, and the natives were found quite equal to working the machinery.

1080. A great many people were employed in those factories, I believe?—Yes, he employed a very large number.

1081. What was the status of those persons?—They were hired, I think; you cannot always tell in Zanzibar whether the labourers that you see in any particular employment are slaves or free men, because it is common for a man to pay his master two dollars a month, and to shift for himself, hiring himself out for whatever employment he can get; there are men every day sitting in the market to let themselves as labourers, a large number being free, and a large number being slaves; but the workmen on the sugar plantation were almost all slaves newly arrived, and there was a considerable question as to the propriety of their being so employed.

1082. Did not some orders go out from this country to manumit them?—I know that a great deal was done and said about them; what exact orders went out, I do not know; I know it was said, that Captain Fraser being in want of labour met some natives in the town, with whom he made a contract for labour, and paid them in advance, whereupon they went to the slave market, and bought slaves, which slaves were sent out to the plantation; I do not myself vouch for the accuracy of that statement.

1083. It is some time since you left Zanzibar?—Two and a half, or three years; I have had letters lately from Bishop Tozer, and also from Dr. Christie, a physician, practising in Zanzibar, in which they say, that they are very anxious that some provision should be made for sick slaves and children after they are liberated, and landed in the town; they think that something more than a certificate of freedom should be given to them. The certificate is a good security if the person is well known, but it is no security for a stranger.

1084. Have not liberated slaves been taken to the Mauritius?—Yes, a large number have been taken to the Mauritius; I know nothing of that myself, but it was commonly reported that they would not have any more there, that they could not employ them; they get much better labourers from India; an untaught savage is useless for years.

1085. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] What security could you give to a freed slave besides his certificate?—His certificate is a very good security if he is a known person.

1086. These freed slaves not being known persons, what security would you suggest in their case?—They might be protected if a kind of barracks or home were established where they could be lodged for a time, so that they might come under the eyes of the people belonging to the consulate, and be recognised.

1087. Would you recommend their being placed under the protection of the British Government?—Yes; they should certainly be under the protection of the British Government.

1088. You think precautions might be taken to provide for the safety of freed slaves in Zanzibar?—Yes; certainly.

1089. Do

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1089. Do you think it practicable for our cruisers to do anything against the foreign slave trade as long as the domestic slave trade is allowed?—I think by watching the Arabian coast, they could do a great deal.

1090. But you do not think they could do much by cruising off the African coast?—I heard just now, that the slave dhows had changed their usual course, but hitherto all the slave dhows used to hug the African coast all the way up from Zanzibar, so that if you watched a moderate section of sea on any part of the coast, you could stop the whole trade; then if you took it north of Lamoo, you could not be baffled by false passes.

1091. We have had two views presented to us of the Arab character; one, that they are men with whom it is possible to negotiate fairly, and who will abide by treaties; the other, that it is only possible to deal with them with a strong hand; what is your opinion upon that subject?—Speaking of the Arabs as the governing body in Zanzibar, I think you can treat with them as you can with any Eastern nation. Syed Burghash is a man who, if he openly pledged himself to anything, would carry it out.

1092. Should you recommend dealing with him on the basis of the remission of the subsidy to the Imaum of Muscat, and so endeavour to induce him to make further engagements against the slave trade, or should you use strong pressure?—I think the Muscat subsidy is felt to be a great hardship, and that he would be willing to co-operate with us if we procured him a remission of it.

1093. *Chairman.*] If we were to undertake to pay it for him as long as he complied with our requisitions and demands?—I should think that if we offered to do that it would be felt as a thing that really did call for *bonâ fide* exertion on his part.

1094. Do you think he would really honestly work in conjunction with us then?—Yes, I think he would; as a rule, the Muscat and Zanzibar governments have not been on good terms; the shipping of slaves to anywhere beyond Ras al Hadd or in the Persian Gulf is reckoned as an advantage to the Muscat people, and therefore the Zanzibar Government are rather inclined to hinder than to promote it.

1095. *Lord F. Cavendish.*] Do you think that the Sultan of Zanzibar could put a stop to the foreign trade if he wished?—Yes.

1096. In spite of the Northern Arabs?—Yes, they are no power to a brave man.

1097. We have been told that the Northern Arabs kidnap the Sultan's own slaves?—Yes. Syed Majid used to pay them a large number of dollars every year to keep quiet.

1098. You think Syed Burgash is not afraid of them?—I think he would not pay them; they do not go in such force that they could be formidable against an energetic opposition.

1099. *Mr. O'Conor.*] Do you know how many slaves are required for Zanzibar itself?—No; I know that the mortality is very large indeed, and the reproduction is almost nothing.

1100. Are those slaves easily obtained?—They used to come from Kilwa in very large numbers. I am told, since the trade from Kilwa has been stopped they are much dearer; they used to cost from 5 dollars to 20 dollars.

1101. You say they are well treated in Zanzibar itself?—As a rule; there are all kinds of

masters; some starve their slaves, and some beat them; but, as a rule, they fare very well.

1102. If there were a greater difficulty in obtaining them would not the masters treat them with greater care?—I do not think it would make much difference; when one sees the utter recklessness there is in merely taking slaves from Kilwa to Zanzibar, one has not much reason to think that any consideration of the value of the slaves would operate on their minds in their treatment of them.

1103. What would be the effect if the slave trade were suddenly abolished in Zanzibar altogether?—I think there would be a disposition to employ something else besides manual labour. I do not think it would have any great immediate effect.

1104. Would they be able to obtain free labourers to carry on their ordinary work?—A large part of the work is done by free labour now.

1105. One of the witnesses said that if the slave trade were suddenly abolished it would cause a revolution?—It would be very likely to cause a revolution in this way: that the leading men would feel that the Sultan was betraying them, and, therefore, probably he would lose his power, because the Sultan has no power as against his great men.

1106. *Mr. Kennaway.*] I see Dr. Livingstone, in a letter dated 11th June 1866, speaks of the utter powerlessness of the Sultan of Zanzibar to withstand the slaving propensities of the pirates and kidnappers who annually infest his island and seas?—I think that that might apply to Seyyid Majid. I should think it was rather exaggerated even in regard to him, but I do not think it would apply to the present Sultan at all. I think the Sultan of Zanzibar has the power to put a stop to it altogether.

1107. With regard to the depopulation of the district which has been referred to, I see Dr. Livingstone in a letter dated 20th August 1866, says, "that the coast Arabs come up with plenty of ammunition and calico to the tribe called Wayao, or Ajawa, and say that they want slaves. Marauding parties immediately start off to the Manganja or Wanyassa villages, and, having plenty of powder and guns, overpower and bring back the chief portion of the inhabitants?—That is not according to anything I have heard.

1108. Have you any reason to believe that that is not the case?—I have never heard anything to confirm it, and all I have heard has tended to contradict it.

1109. *Mr. J. Talbot.*] With regard to the healthiness of Zanzibar, you think the town itself is not unhealthy?—I think it is not more unhealthy than a low-lying tropical town generally will be.

1110. We have been told that the neighbourhood of the town is exceedingly unhealthy; you do not confirm that?—There are parts of it which are exceedingly unhealthy; if you choose your locality I do not think it is so.

1111. Was not there a sanitarium established a few miles out of Zanzibar, to which some of your missionaries were sent?—No; they were sent to the Seychelles; the Seychelles are the natural sanitarium of that part of the world; several Europeans went to Dari Salaam for the sake of their health, and found great benefit; but in certain stages of the fever any change is a benefit.

1112. With

1112. With regard to the freed slaves, you have no difficulty in finding labour for them?—I should think not in moderation. I should think several hundreds could be very well accommodated in the town of Zanzibar itself.

1113. There would be no danger of what is sometimes alleged as one of the difficulties in putting down the slave trade, that if you free a great many slaves you merely liberate them from slavery to something worse in reality, namely, starvation?—No; when a man had time to turn himself round at Zanzibar he would find abundant employment; as the slaves set free by their native masters do now.

1114. You would recommend that those that were freed should be, first of all, put under the protection of the British flag, so that they might have time to turn themselves round and find employment for themselves?—So that they might have an opportunity of seeing what they could do, and so that they might come under the eyes of the people belonging to the British consulate, and who might recognise them.

1115. You think they would have no difficulty in finding occupation for themselves after so remaining for a short time under the protection of the British flag?—I think not; when I was in Zanzibar there were almost always more labourers wanted than could be got.

1116. With regard to the upper classes in the town of Zanzibar, they are very well to do, are they not?—Yes, there are very rich people indeed in Zanzibar.

1117. And their needs are easily satisfied, are not they?—Yes.

1118. A very small income goes a long way?—Two dollars a month used to be said to be the regular pay for a slave to his master, and the master out of that is supposed to furnish him with food and lodging, and to get a profit.

1119. And even the master himself lives at a small cost?—Yes, except as to luxuries.

1120. Provisions are cheap?—Generally, a man has a piece of land in the country on which he grows his own provisions, and which his own slaves cultivate.

1121. His living costs him very little?—Very little.

1122. Mr. *Kennaway*.] Would not you say that Dr. Livingstone was likely to be correctly

informed on this slave traffic?—Yes, Dr. Livingstone ought to be an authority.

1123. Would not you say that the certainty of obtaining a market for the prisoners made in war tends generally to encourage wars between various tribes?—That would be the case if wars produced slaves, but I do not think that ordinary wars do produce slaves; I think they produce desolation.

1124. How do you think that the slaves that are brought to the coast are obtained?—I think most of them are born slaves; they are sold by their masters, and in some cases by their relations.

1125. Sir *R. Anstruther*.] How would you account for the depopulation that is admitted to have taken place between Lake Nyassa and the coast. Is it entirely owing to war?—War and plundering; the Maviti have come down and carried off everything eatable from the country, and the inhabitants have either fled or starved.

1126. *Chairman*.] You spoke of the ease with which some few hundreds of liberated slaves might be provided for in Zanzibar, but suppose the slave trade were to be entirely put down, the liberated slaves for the first year or two would amount to a great many thousands?—Yes; in that case it would be necessary to give them the means of cultivating land and getting a living from the land directly in that way.

1127. In Zanzibar could that be done?—Beyond all doubt. Dar Seelam would probably be the best spot.

1128. Could they be put under the protection of the British Consul there?—As much there as in Zanzibar, the intercourse is easy between the two places; it is about 40 miles from Zanzibar.

1129. It would be necessary to have some resident officer there for their protection, would it not?—There should be a superintendent; it would not be necessary to make a regular British settlement; it would be sufficient to have a superintendent with authority from the Arab Sultan.

1130. Mr. *Kennaway*.] If you look at page 53 of the Correspondence for 1870, Class B., you will see several statements made by slaves captured by a particular ship, from which it appears that the greater number of those slaves state that they were captured in war?—I should like to know more about those cases, perhaps an unusual proportion happened to have been taken in war

Rear Admiral CHARLES F. HILLYAR, C.B., called in; and Examined.

1131. Sir *J. Hay*.] YOU were for some time Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron on the East Indian Station?—I was.

1132. Between what dates?—From the early part of 1866 to July 1867; about 18 months.

1133. During that time your attention was directed to the suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa?—Almost entirely, so far as the duties of the station were concerned.

1134. You had had previous experience in the same sort of duty on the West Coast of Africa?—Very large experience having been in two successive flagships for a period of four years on the West Coast.

1135. You were at the capture of Lagos, were various strong measures were taken for the suppression of the slave trade?—Yes.

1136. Looking at the experience you had in the service on the West Coast of Africa, which

was eventually successful in suppressing the slave trade there, can you make any suggestions to the Committee as to the best mode of suppressing the trade on the East Coast, supposing the country were determined to put it down, and the duty were imposed upon you of suppressing it?—Firstly, I should largely increase the naval force on the coast, which was, during the period I commanded the station, quite inadequate for the duties it had to perform.

1137. What number of vessels had you for that special service?—Nominally five or six, besides the flagship; but two of them were under repair part of the time in 1867, so that really there were only from three to four on the coast.

1138. That was for blockading a coast of nearly 4,000 miles?—Yes.

1139. Did you conduct your operations in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar principally, or at the ports

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ports of arrival in the Persian Gulf and Arabia? — The force was so small at my disposal that I stationed the ships where they were most likely to stop the passage of the dhows.

1140. Where were they stationed? — One vessel was off Socotra, and another one along the coast of Arabia.

1141. The other three being near Zanzibar? — Two were in dock at Bombay, so that I had only three disposable vessels during the principal time of the slave trade, which is during March, April, and May.

1142. Have you any recollection of how many captures of dhows you effected? — It might easily be seen by my letters in the Blue Book of 1867; speaking from recollection, I should say we captured about 1,200 slaves in the twelvemonth.

1143. Had you very much difficulty in discriminating between dhows that were legally permitted to convey slaves for the home use of Zanzibar and its dependencies, and those which were bound to Arabia, and which you were entitled to capture? — The difficulty of course arising from our not being entitled to capture vessels employed on the coast within the limits within which the slave trade was allowed to be carried on. Captain Bedingfield wrote a very strong letter on the subject, and so did the senior officer at Zanzibar.

1144. During the part of the year when that trade was allowed it became extremely difficult for naval officers to suppress the illegal trade? — Yes.

1145. Those limits extended from Kilwa to Lamoo? — Yes.

1146. During your command within those waters, dhows may have nominally cleared at the custom house of Zanzibar for those ports, which were really intending to proceed on a longer voyage? — No, I do not think they could have proceeded on a longer voyage without laying in a stock of water or slave fittings on a more extensive scale.

1147. They would touch at the Port of Lamoo as the previous witness has said, and they would then proceed on? — Yes; they could not have proceeded on their voyage without touching at Lamoo or some other port.

1148. Vessels going to Lamoo and intending apparently, according to the custom-house clearance, to land the slaves there, intended really to lay in provisions at Lamoo and evade your squadron and proceed on a longer voyage? — Their great object was to evade the squadron; they are up to every dodge you can think of.

1149. Do you think that many vessels did evade the squadron in that way? — I should say for every one captured seven or eight escaped; I should say more, perhaps.

1150. I suppose, with your experience of the West Coast of Africa, you feel that the export of slaves there could hardly have been stopped by our squadron if it had not been for the treaties with Brazil and the operations on the coast of Cuba at the same time? — Certainly not without the treaty with the Brazils.

1151. Therefore, would it not seem to you that to enter into treaties with Persia and with Muscat would be the course to pursue to stop the slave trade, rather than the imperfect operations now carried on on the coast of Zanzibar? — No, I think the treaties which have been generally entered into have had very little effect in stopping the slave trade. I think the slave trade with

the Brazils has been mainly stopped by the voice of the country, the people disapproving of the importation of slaves; of course the difficulties attending the passage of the slaves and the shipping the slaves on the West Coast had something to do with it. The death blow to the slave trade on the West Coast of Africa was the capture and retention of Lagos.

1152. Looking to that, do you think that the occupation of Zanzibar, or some other arrangement that would give us the control there, would be the proper mode to stop the slave trade on the East Coast? — I have no doubt that the occupation of Zanzibar, or the cession of Zanzibar to the British Government, would very materially tend to suppress the slave trade on the East Coast. I think it is the focus of the slave trade on the East Coast much the same as Lagos was on the West Coast.

1153. You do not anticipate at present that any operations on our part will stop the slave trade so long as it is the interest of the Sultan of Zanzibar to continue it? — As long as the Sultan of Zanzibar derives his main revenue from the slave trade, I think he will encourage it, either openly or under the rose.

1154. With reference to the number of ships you would think it necessary to employ, if you were sent there for the special purpose of stopping the slave trade on the coast of Arabia and on the East Coast of Africa, will you indicate to the Committee what number of ships you would think necessary for that purpose, and the class of ship? — I should say a dozen ships of the class that are at present on the South East Coast, which have been highly reported on as efficient vessels; the same description of vessels that are at present employed.

1155. You think 12 would be enough? — Yes.

1156. Both for the coast of Africa and the coast of Arabia? — Yes, those vessels should be supplied with good boats, and should be specially fitted out for the suppression of the slave trade.

1157. *Chairman.*] With steam launches? — Steam launches are a most valuable auxiliary.

1158. *Sir J. Hay.*] Have you any suggestions to make to the Committee with reference to our future policy in carrying out the desire of this country to suppress the slave trade there? — I have every reason to believe from what I have heard, since I gave up the command of the squadron in the East Indies, that the slave trade has been on the decrease, and that it is not near so active at Zanzibar as it was in 1867, and 1866, when certainly the exportation of slaves could not have been less than 20,000 annually.

1159. Do you attribute that decrease to legitimate commerce, or to the operations of the squadron? — I should say to both, the squadron has been very active; there has been a more efficient force employed, and the vessels have been of a superior description.

1160. *Chairman.*] You spoke as if the receipts from slaves were the main revenue of the Sultan; we have had evidence to show that it is not above a sixth part of his whole revenue? — I am speaking of what it was, four years makes a great difference; there has been a rapid increase in trade, generally, in Zanzibar; I was alluding to my impression of what was the state of things four or five years ago, when I understood it was his principal source of revenue.

1161. *Sir R. Austruther.*] Evidence was given by the last witness as to the misconduct of men in

in charge of the boats; was that ever brought to your notice as commander of the station?—Certainly not; I should say that the officers in charge of the boats displayed great zeal, and wonderful perseverance in carrying out the duties they had to perform; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the captains under my command, as well as with the state of discipline of the different ships.

1162. It was given in evidence before, that many of those officers are engaged in very arduous duties away from their ships for many days in a severe climate?—Yes, most arduous duties; and they have many difficulties to contend against in the way of currents and breezes, in seas to which they are not accustomed; the monsoons are very strong sometimes on the coast. They certainly as a rule perform their duties very creditably to themselves.

1163. When you were in command did you have many complaints of the conduct of the men when on shore at Zanzibar?—None, to my recollection.

1164. You are not prepared to agree with the statement made by a former witness, that the conduct of the men while on shore at Zanzibar was so bad that they had to be prevented from going ashore at all?—The men were prevented from going ashore in Zanzibar, to the best of my recollection, for fear of their coming in contact with the Northern Arabs, who are a very wild, lawless race; to prevent collisions between the Northern Arabs and the men, it was not thought desirable to give the men leave to land on that coast, and they were sent to the Seychelles to spend their holidays and to have their leave. It was not on account of their misbehaviour on shore at all, but merely to prevent collisions between them and the Northern Arabs.

1165. Sir *J. Hay*.] The unhealthiness of Zanzibar also had something to do with the prohibition, I presume?—Yes.

1166. *Chairman*.] The Seychelles are healthy?—Yes.

1167. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Will you specify a little more particularly the tonnage of the dozen vessels which you think would be requisite?—The new class of corvette, from 1,000 to 1,200 tons.

1168. You would have steam launches attached to those corvettes?—Yes.

1169. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] Do you consider that the employment of such a fleet as you have recommended would absolutely put an end to the trade, or only diminish it?—It would diminish it so considerably that it would not be worth the while of the Northern Arabs to run the risk of capture. It is a regular trade, and if they were stopped in that way they would give it up.

1170. We have been told that it might be worth while to make a great effort, and that if the trade was once absolutely stopped it might never be renewed; is it your opinion that 12 vessels would so put an end to the trade as to hold out the prospect of this large fleet not being permanently required?—Wherever there is a demand there will always be a supply if the fleet is withdrawn, but I should hope that it would be found it would not be profitable to kidnap the slaves and send them to the beach with no prospect of sending them on.

1171. The present squadron of seven vessels only catch one out of 20; that being so, do you

think that 12 vessels would be likely to put an end entirely to the trade?—No, it would be impossible entirely to do so with such a large extent of coast.

1172. Was the health of the men under your command good?—The health of the men in the cruisers on the South East Coast was good; but in the flagship, the "Octavia," we suffered very severely from an epidemic of small-pox and fever.

1173. What would be the number of the crew which you would recommend for such a fleet?—About 2,000.

1174. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] Those steam launches would be able to go into the shallows?—Yes; the steam launches would go into the shallows where there would not be much sea; the steam launches could not be exposed to the severity of the monsoon.

1175. Do you agree with the last witness that large ships by themselves would not be efficacious in stopping the slave trade?—You require small ships; large ships consume more fuel than small ships, and a small ship would do the duty just as well as a large one.

1176. Did you have a proper proportion of those small ships?—They were all small.

1177. Were they small enough to go into shallow water?—No, they sent their boats in; most of their duties were conducted by their boats; I gave very strict orders that boats were on no account to land or to attack barracoons unless they had the support of the ships.

1178. No difficulty arose from your not being able to follow the slavers into shallow water?—We should surprise them in the shallow water if we could; it depended on the captains of the ships and the information they got; their endeavours were to surprise the slavers; if the slavers have the slightest hint of our coming, all the fittings are pitched overboard; it is only by taking them by surprise that we can capture them.

1179. Did you find any difficulty from the fact of your ships being so large that they were unable to leave deep water, in consequence of which the slavers got into shallow water, and so escaped from the large ship?—No, I think, as a rule, the slavers ran on shore; if they were chased by a cruiser along the coast of Arabia there would be a good deal of surf, and the ships could not stand in.

1180. A boat could follow them?—They were followed by the boats.

1181. You had enough boats in proportion to the ships?—Yes, every ship was supplied with her proportion of boats.

1182. *Chairman*.] Had you any steam launches?—I had one in the "Octavia."

1183. Sir *J. Hay*.] With regard to the disposition of the captured slaves when liberated, will you state what the process was when dhows were captured?—They were sent to be adjudicated at Aden, principally; some went to the Cape of Good Hope.

1184. And the slaves were sent from Aden to Bombay, were they not?—They were sent to the Seychelles.

1185. Do you think the Seychelles a good place in which to deposit liberated slaves?—Yes; the inhabitants appeared to wish that slaves should be continued to be sent there; they were found very useful labourers.

1186. *Chairman*.] Could they absorb any very large number of liberated slaves?—No, not a large

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Rear Adm. large number; the supply never exceeded the demand.  
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1187. Sir *J. Hay.*] Had you any difficulties with the French admiral or the officers of foreign nations in carrying on your duties there?—Never, quite the reverse.

1188. Was the French admiral supposed to be engaged in the same service; it has been said that he was rather supporting the slave trade than suppressing it; did you find that to be the case?—No; from the intercourse I had with both the French admiral and the officers, they were evidently bent on carrying out the suppression of the slave trade. I never met with anything approaching to misunderstanding.

1189. Mr. *Crum-Ewing.*] Does it ever happen that the dhows show fight?—They are a very plucky set indeed; they will fight where there is the slightest prospect of success. In one engagement with the "Highflyer's" boats, they very nearly succeeded in running over the pinnace; and if it had not been for the dash of one of the officers, who cut the halyards and lowered the

sails, it might have fared very badly with the attacking party.

1190. Do not you think that a much smaller class of vessels than corvettes of 1,000 tons would answer the same purpose as the larger ones, and cost much less?—A smaller vessel would not have the advantage of being able to send away boats cruising; small gun-boats would only be able to do the duty themselves, without the assistance of their boats.

1191. Sir *J. Hay.*] Had your squadron smokeless fuel when you were there?—Whenever we could get it.

1192. Did it make much difference whether you had it or had it not, in betraying the position of the ships?—I should say it would make a very material difference. It was always the object of the cruisers to have coal that would not show smoke. I recollect, in one instance, in the "Centaur," on the West Coast, chasing our own smoke, which had banked with the land breeze before daylight.

Major General CHRISTOPHER PALMER RIGBY, called in; and further Examined.

Major Gen. 1193. *Chairman.*] You told us that you were  
*C. P. Rigby.* four years in Zanzibar?—Yes.

1194. During that time did you have any complaints made to you respecting the conduct of any of the seamen?—None at all from any native of the country. On one or two occasions complaints, which were proved to be quite frivolous, were made by French shopkeepers there, but there never was one complaint from a native of the country; on the contrary, there was always the most friendly feeling towards the squadron, both in the Island of Zanzibar and on the coast. The natives showed it on many occasions. I remember one of the boats of the "Gorgon" was wrecked on the coast, and two of the crew, natives of the West Coast, were captured and sold into slavery for three bullocks a piece, and one of the native chiefs went and paid the ransom for them out of his own pocket, and took every care of them till the "Gorgon" came on the coast again, when he returned them. On another occasion the "Gorgon's" boats were at Mombaza, and a large number of northern piratical Arabs assembled to attack them, and the natives of the place, Africans and native inhabitants, assembled in such numbers to take the part of the boats' crew, that the piratical Arabs withdrew without attacking them.

1195. You were, from all you saw, perfectly satisfied with the conduct of the seamen on shore?—Yes; under the most trying circumstances the officers and men always behaved in an admirable manner. The officers had unusual hardships to undergo.

1196. Did you ever hear any reports of officers going on shore with their boats and capturing slaves?—Never.

1197. Mr. *Kennaway.*] Have you any reason to think that the statements made by Dr. Livingstone at various times about the horrors of the slave trade, and the depopulation of the country owing to it, are exaggerated?—Not at all; I have read Dr. Livingstone's letters and works with great interest, and, as far as my knowledge and experience go, I quite agree with all he has stated.

1198. As to the devastation of the country?—

Yes; I do not think he has exaggerated it in the least.

1199. *Chairman.*] Or as to the cause of the depopulation?—No.

1200. Mr. *Kennaway.*] Have you ever considered the propriety of establishing depôts of liberated slaves at the Seychelles; do you think that would be a suitable place?—I sent several large captures of slaves from Zanzibar to the Seychelles, and I afterwards visited the Seychelles myself, and found all the emancipated slaves thriving and in good condition; the climate and the food, and everything, seemed to suit them admirably.

1201. Was there room for a larger number?—At that time the inhabitants of the Seychelles were very anxious indeed to have a supply of emancipated slave labour. I went there in the "Gorgon", which took there about 80 emancipated slaves, and application were immediately made for 800; ten times the number we had brought.

1202. Are you aware whether the same demand for the labour of emancipated slaves continues there?—I have no recent information; but I have no doubt the Seychelles could absorb a very considerable number of free slaves; and in every respect it is the best place to send them to; the children could be protected there, and could be educated and brought up as Christians, which would be almost impossible on any part of the mainland of the East Coast of Africa.

1203. Mr. *Crum-Ewing.*] In what cultivation or manufacture is labour required there?—The Seychelles consist of 37 islands, which are wonderfully fertile; they can grow every variety of tropical produce in the greatest abundance, including tobacco, coffee, sugar, and spices of all kinds. The cloves are double the size they are in Zanzibar. The Seychelles have been very much neglected; they have been a dependency of the Mauritius, and the Mauritius grudges every shilling spent on them. On my first visit to the Seychelles I came from Bombay, and I had a good many Indian servants with me, and they called the islands Paradise; they said they had no idea that there was such a spot in the world.

1204. Are

1204. Are there any coffee plantations there?—They have been nearly all deserted; since slavery was put a stop to they have had no labour.

1205. *Chairman.*] All they want is labour then?—Yes, there are 37 islands of different sizes; some of them are large, and in those they could employ a great many emancipated slaves.

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Captain PHILIP COLOMB, R.N., called in; and Examined.

1206. Sir *J. Hay.*] You were employed for some considerable time on the East Coast of Africa in the suppression of the slave trade?—Yes.

1207. Will you state the dates between which you were so employed?—Between November 1868 and May 1870.

1208. Did you visit all the ports along the coast?—Not many ports on the African coast. I was employed on the African coast a little, and also on the Madagascar coast, but chiefly on the coast of Arabia.

1209. Did you capture many slavers?—I captured six.

1210. Where did you capture them?—One I captured in the Persian Gulf, which, I believe, was very rarely done, the remainder I captured on the coast of Arabia, near Ras Madraka, 700 miles from Aden.

1211. Were they all vessels which had come from the neighbourhood of Zanzibar?—All except the one captured in the Persian Gulf.

1212. Where had she come from?—She had come from the south-eastern corner of the gulf, and was crossing to the Persian coast.

1213. She had nothing to do with the East Coast of Africa slave trade?—No, except in so far as she was one of the local slave traders which carry slaves, originally from Africa, from the southern coast of the Persian Gulf to the northern coast.

1214. Have you any suggestions to make to the Committee with regard to the best mode of suppressing the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa?—The slaves come from various points along the coast of Africa, but they are all eventually concentrated at Ras el Hadd, and by having a sufficient force there to intercept them, it seems to me that the trade could be almost entirely stopped; to do that, it would be necessary to have a considerable force, some six or eight ships of probably from 1,000 to 1,200 tons, each ship being well supplied with steam pinnaces or steam launches. Large ships by themselves at that point would be of no avail whatever, because the slave vessels hug the shore as they come along, and long before any boat can reach them they run ashore and succeed in landing their slaves; they care nothing about the destruction of the dhow so long as they land their cargo. It would be necessary in intercepting the trade at that point, to keep your steam launches anchored or under weigh close in shore so as to interpose a belt between the beach and the vessels; then, in such a case, every dhow which appeared would simply lower her sail and give herself up without further trouble. That is the chief point as to the employment of the force, but one great disadvantage which the officers commanding the ships of the squadron labour under is this, that on going to the station they are not supplied with information as to what had gone before; you are placed in command of a ship with orders to suppress the slave trade, and you have no information whatever as to how to suppress it; you might of course have provided yourself with

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some of the Blue Books, but you were not supplied with them, and you were left to gather such hearsay information as you could get from your brother officers; in fact, about the time you were leaving the station you were beginning to acquire a knowledge of what you might do. Then the naval officers are entirely in the hands of their interpreters; they can do nothing without them; and, so far as I understand, the interpreters are not to be depended on; generally speaking, their knowledge of the language is imperfect, and it is only by examining and cross-examining them very diligently that you can really get correct information.

1215. Are better interpreters to be obtained?—I believe not at present, but no doubt in a very short time, if they were properly paid, we could obtain them.

1216. Am I right in taking the result of your evidence to be that you think it desirable that the officers should be employed on the station for a longer period, so that they might gain local experience?—No; because I do not think that most men can stand more than three years of that sort of work in that climate, but I think that they should have supplied to them the information which has been collected by their predecessors.

1217. You do not anticipate that more active measures or a more numerous squadron in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar would have any material effect in reducing the slave trade?—I do not think it would have so material an effect as dealing with the ports of debarkation. I would not say it would have no effect, but it would not have a material effect.

1218. Did you find great difficulty owing to the fact that the home trade in slaves at Zanzibar being legal, the foreign slave trade to the Persian Gulf, was able, under the cover of that, to evade the action of the cruisers?—I think that made the greatest difficulty. I think that threw a great barrier in the way of dealing with the trade about Zanzibar. I think the whole state of things would be altered if all slave trade to and from Zanzibar were made illegal.

1219. Do you think it possible to stop it altogether by naval operations so long as that mode of evading it is open to the Arab dhows?—No; but I should say that I doubt whether it would be possible to stop it altogether by any forcible measures. I think the stoppage of it altogether must be done by dealing with the authorities at the ports of embarkation and at the ports of debarkation by means of treaties.

1220. Would you anticipate any great advantage from treaties?—Yes, because I think when armed with a treaty the naval force can act more efficiently. The treaty does not act so much directly as indirectly by keeping the people in fear. I would not trust altogether to the moral force of treaties in those cases, but treaties give the naval officers a great deal more power than they otherwise would have.

1221. What did you do with those dhows which you captured?—We destroyed them immediately.

1222. All

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1222. All of them?—All of them.

1223. What did you do with the slaves?—The slaves were landed at Aden.

1224. In your own ship?—In my own ship.

1225. Had you to proceed to Aden on each occasion and leave your cruising ground for the purpose of landing the slaves?—No; I kept them on board till my cruising ground was no longer tenable, owing to the setting in of the monsoon.

1226. How many crews of captured slavers had you on board at once?—Not more than two crews, consisting of about 10 each, but five cargoes of slaves.

1227. Consisting altogether of many persons?—In three of them there was one slave in each, in the other two there were 60 and 113, that would be 176 slaves.

1228. Would it have been possible for you to have continued your active exertions, if you had been obliged to save the dhows?—Certainly not; if I had been obliged to save the dhows, I should simply have had to put a stop to my operations; I could not possibly have taken either of those dhows to the port of adjudication, I must have let her go.

1229. You think that any proposal to prevent the naval officers, engaged in this service, from destroying the captured dhows, would make it impossible for them to continue the service with any great advantage?—As regards dhows, where there was no question about their being slavers, by reason of their being full, you would, in any case, destroy them. But where you have to act on less direct evidence, and are for this reason called on not to destroy the vessel, but to convey her bodily to the port of adjudication, the practical result is that such vessel would be always let go.

1230. The distances to the ports of adjudication are too great?—Yes.

1231. The expenditure of fuel in towing her would make it quite impossible to take her to one of those ports?—Yes, if the dhow herself would stand the towing which she generally would not.

1232. Do you apprehend that difficulty will arise in carrying on the operations of the squadron from dhows being allowed to go free, which have a few slaves on board?—If the Arabs understand that vessels with two or three slaves on board are allowed to go free, they will simply give up carrying full cargoes of slaves, and every lawful trader will carry five or six as part of her cargo.

1233. Full dhows on being pursued would not hesitate to put to death a number of slaves in order to avoid capture?—I should think not.

1234. Mr. Fowler.] By throwing them into the sea?—It would depend on whether they had a valuable cargo besides their slaves; they certainly would sacrifice the slaves to save a valuable cargo, either by throwing them into the sea, or by knocking them on the head.

1235. Mr. Kinnaird.] They think nothing of knocking them on the head?—Nothing.

1236. Sir R. Anstruther.] In what condition were those 60 slaves which you captured?—As to the 60 some of them were in very good condition, but many of them were horribly emaciated, and in a terrible state; they had been 23 days at sea; the 113 which were in a dhow which I captured soon afterwards were all in a very excellent condition, they were as plump and as good humoured as possible; they had been only 14 days at sea from Zanzibar.

1237. How were they stowed?—Everybody in a dhow is stowed like cattle; there is no difference between the Arab master and the slaves; the Arab gentlemen and their wives and families going in dhows from Arabia to Zanzibar, have the same accommodation as the slaves have in coming up from Zanzibar.

1238. Are not the slaves bound on board?—Never.

1239. Sir J. Hay.] Are not they ironed or chained?—I never saw the slightest sign of force, and I never observed that there was the slightest likelihood of force being necessary.

1240. Sir R. Anstruther.] In the case of the Arab and his family coming down to Zanzibar, there is not the same crowding that there is in the case of the slaves being carried from Zanzibar?—No, still the difference would hardly strike one.

1241. Mr. Crum-Ewing.] What is the tonnage of the dhows?—They average about 80 tons; some run to a much larger size, and a great many are smaller, but I suppose the average would be about 80 tons.

1242. How are they armed?—With muskets and fowling pieces, and spears.

1243. Mr. Kinnaird.] Where are they built?—The great mass of them are built at Soor, a town near Ras el Hadd, in Arabia.

1244. Chairman.] Have you ever found any difficulty in distinguishing between domestic slaves and slaves for export?—I found none on the coast of Arabia. I was sometimes two or three days over the examination of the crew of the dhows; but I found when I took time over it, I could always get at the truth.

1245. You carefully examined those on board before you proceeded to destroy the dhow?—Always.

1246. With that examination, you found it perfectly easy to distinguish between legal traffic and illegal traffic?—Yes, quite easy.

1247. You spoke of placing your fleet on the Arabian coast; would not it be very desirable, if possible, to save these poor creatures the 40 days' voyage?—Yes, I think it would.

1248. Have you reason to suppose that there is a great loss of life between Zanzibar and the Arabian coast?—Nothing that has come under my own notice leads me to suppose so, but I can easily understand that it might be so.

1249. Of course, all the evidence of deaths on the passage would be removed from any dhow that you might capture?—Yes.

1250. Might not a good deal be done in watching the ports of departure?—Yes; I suppose it could.

1251. If there were a sufficiently large fleet to watch them?—I should think it might; but you might yourself form quite as good an opinion upon that point as I could.

1252. You spoke of the want of better interpreters; would not it be very desirable to have a trained body of interpreters for the use of each captain?—Most desirable.

1253. Would there be any difficulty in providing such interpreters at some small expense?—None whatever, I should think.

1254. You would then have persons upon whom you could depend?—Yes.

1255. Mr. Shaw Lefevre.] You said that in three of the vessels you captured, there were only three slaves?—One in each; those were very small vessels.

1256. Were

1256. Were they vessels engaged in trade?—Yes, in legal trade.

1257. Could you distinguish in those cases whether the one slave on board was a domestic slave or a slave for sale?—Yes.

1258. Would not the presumption be in such a case as that, that the slave was a domestic slave?—Yes; the first presumption is undoubtedly that the slave is a domestic slave; it is only on close examination that you come to a different conclusion.

1259. Were the dhows in those cases carrying a large cargo?—A small cargo.

1260. What was the kind of evidence tending to show that they were slaves for sale rather than domestic slaves?—I used generally to intimate to the captain before the examination began, that if one slave was found to be not a domestic slave, his vessel would be legally condemned, to which he always agreed. I used to have the captain on board first, and if from his replies, or from different circumstances, I had any suspicion, I used to send immediately for all the rest of the crew, and separate them from one another at once, and then, on examining them separately, I generally came at the history of the whole transaction. In the case of two of those single slaves, they had been both stolen at Zanzibar, and the masters of the dhows admitted the fact, and acknowledged that they were properly captured.

1261. Sir J. Hay.] In those cases, had there been any other slaves killed, do you think, who had been part of the cargo before?—I should think not.

1262. Mr. Shaw Lefevre.] Were any of the crew domestic slaves?—Yes, every dhow carries domestic slaves as part of the crew.

1263. Chairman.] Did you take any of the crew to the place where the dhow was condemned?—None.

1264. Mr. Kinnaird.] What became of the crew when you destroyed the dhow?—We gave them their choice whether they would be landed, or whether they should be transferred to some other vessel, and they generally chose to take a passage in some vessel going to their own place.

1265. Mr. Shaw Lefevre.] Did the domestic slaves in such cases leave their masters?—No.

1266. Mr. Kinnaird.] What class of people are these captains of dhows; are they superior men?—No, quite the reverse; in the small dhows they are the ordinary low class Arab.

1267. Have they any knowledge of navigation?—None; they follow the land the whole way up from Zanzibar.

1268. You state that on arriving at the station you had no Blue Books placed in your hand, was that the case with the squadron generally?—Yes.

1269. Mr. Shaw Lefevre.] Looking to the inefficiency of the interpreters, do not you think there is considerable danger in condemning a vessel for having one slave on board?—No, I do not think there is if it is carefully done.

1270. Looking to the little reliance which can be placed on the interpreters, do not you think that injustice may be done in many cases?—I think it is very probable in a small minority of cases.

1271. Particularly looking at the fact that all the crew are domestic slaves as a rule?—Yes; but a violent disease requires a violent remedy.

1272. Mr. Kinnaird.] Was any request made

to the commandant of the squadron there to furnish to the captains of the vessels information as to what had been done before their arrival at the station?—I do not know that any official request was made to him

1273. You found it a very great drawback that you had no information, and that you had to buy your experience from day to day?—An immense drawback. Every officer on the East Indian station was ordered to make a report every six months on the slave trade as to what he had been doing, and those reports were sent home; but I am not aware of their having been communicated to succeeding officers of the squadron.

1274. Was there any commendation for, or special notice taken of, activity on the part of any of the officers commanding the cruisers?—My own experience is that it was a little the other way.

1275. You thought that no encouragement was given you?—I speak, of course, of what happened to myself; I had one or two letters from the Foreign Office which were not commendatory, but the reverse.

1276. So that there was rather discouragement than encouragement, in putting down the slave trade?—So far as my own experience goes.

1277. Practically you believe that our officers, generally speaking, do exercise a very wise discretion, and it is your impression that there has been no unnecessary act of cruelty on their part, or any unnecessary destruction of dhows?—None whatever, so far as I could judge, while I was on the station. I thought there was quite as much discretion used as could be; that when mistakes were made they were mistakes of ignorance, and nothing else, and that there was no want of zeal or want of proper care.

1278. Did you ever trace the fate of those slaves which you landed at Aden?—I never traced the fate of individuals, but hearsay evidence goes to show that slaves landed at Aden really find their way into Arabia as slaves; at Aden there is no means of disposing of them. They are sent from time to time to Bombay, but the feeling in India was very strong against that step being taken.

1279. Do I rightly gather that your impression is, that there is an utter want of system in the whole arrangements for putting down the slave trade, owing to our not giving proper instructions to the squadron?—I will not go so far as to say that there is an utter want of system; but I think the system might be improved.

1280. Have you any suggestions to make to the Committee with respect to those slaves that are landed at Aden, and which find their way back and are recaptured?—I have always thought that the worst thing that could happen to a slave was to be captured by one of Her Majesty's ships; because there is no opening for him after that. He spends a happy time on board the ship; but his after career is quite a doubtful one.

1281. Mr. Shaw Lefevre.] That would be an argument in favour of stopping the trade at the ports of embarkation, rather than at the ports of debarkation?—Yes, possibly.

1282. Having undergone the hardships of the 40 days' voyage, you think they are better off by remaining uncaptured?—Yes.

1283. You think that their lot as liberated slaves is rather worse than their lot as slaves in Arabia?—I think so.

1284. Mr. Kinnaird.] Suppose by treaty you secured

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secured only one port of embarkation for all slaves in the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions, would not that very much facilitate the suppression of the slave trade?—I should think it would.

1285. Lord *F. Cavendish*.] Do all dhows importing slaves into Arabia and Persia pass the point you mention, Ras el Hadd?—Yes.

1286. You think a tolerably strong fleet, stationed off that point, would absolutely stop the import into Arabia and Persia?—At first they would; then as it became known that the ships were stationed there it is not impossible that the slaves might be landed further down the coast.

1287. Are there ports where they could be landed?—They would be landed on the beach; but there is a considerable difficulty about that, because there is nothing like settled Government on that part of the coast, and I think the number so landed would be small.

1288. Of course if the trade were absolutely stopped, if it were known to the Northern Arab that all the slaves were certain to be seized, the trade would soon come to an end, because it would not pay; therefore though for a time the slaves might have to undergo the suffering caused by the 40 days' passage, yet it would diminish the suffering, on the whole?—You would have fewer slaves, but the trade might still remain brisk, because the demand remaining the same in Arabia, as you diminished the supply the price would rise.

1289. If they could not pass Ras el Hadd, where could they be landed?—You are fighting a sort of battle with people who have great interests at stake, and it is quite possible that they might find some means, after a little time, of evading you.

1290. Do you imagine that the ruler of Muscat could put an end to this trade if he wished?—So far as I know, and so far as I have heard, he is in the hands of his great men, and he cannot do very much.

1291. If we made it his interest to stop it could he do it?—I should think so.

1292. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] Are there many points where slaves could be landed along the coast of Arabia, or are they generally landed at one or two special points?—Nearly all the slaves are landed inside Ras el Hadd, and further up on the Arabian coast inside the Gulf.

1293. Supposing a slaver is pursued near the coast, could it land at any point and deposit its slaves?—If the slave vessel is between the ship, or the boat and the coast, the slave vessel will always land her slaves on the beach.

1294. Could the slaves be forwarded on to the port of destination from there?—Yes.

1295. There would be no difficulty in that?—There would be a difficulty, but it could be done.

1296. And is done?—Yes.

1297. So that in fact the whole coast is open to the dhows in that way?—No, it is not, because of the unsettled state of the country; if they landed their slaves further down the coast than somewhere close to Ras el Hadd, they would never be certain that their cargo would not be captured from them after it was landed.

1298. What is the extent of coast upon which they could land their slaves with safety?—Probably, 20 miles.

1299. It would only be necessary to watch

closely those 20 miles?—You would spread a larger circle to seaward than that, but the close watching of the coast would extend over that area.

1300. Are any slaves landed at Mokullah or Shera?—I think very few; there are no signs of slaving going on there of late, so far as our ships knew.

1301. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] Have you any reason to think that any slaves are shipped to Cuba?—No.

1302. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] Are you acquainted with Zanzibar itself?—Yes.

1303. What is your opinion as to the healthiness of Zanzibar?—I think it is very healthy.

1304. Do you think that occupation is to be found there for liberated slaves?—I think there would be if Zanzibar belonged to the English.

1305. If its capabilities were properly developed?—Yes; but I think that as things stand at present, liberated slaves there would simply be slaves under another name.

1306. Do you agree with a former witness that it would be very desirable if some place could be provided under the protection of the British flag, at which liberated slaves could be received prior to their being absorbed in free labour?—Certainly.

1307. You think that would be a very good way of providing for the gradual suppression of the trade?—Yes, I think that would be very desirable.

1308. Mr. *Fowler*.] Did you find your health suffer in your service on the coast?—Considerably; chiefly because it is very arduous work when you are actively engaged in the suppression of the trade. You have to chase vessels, and board them at the rate, perhaps, of 10, 12, 14, or 20 per day; you are obliged to be perpetually in the sun, and perpetually on the strain, and it tells upon you after a few weeks of it.

1309. It was on that ground you expressed the opinion that three years was long enough for any officer to remain on the station?—Speaking of the station generally, I think three years is enough.

1310. Sir *J. Hay*.] Is there anything further which you would wish to state to the Committee?—I should like to mention that there is a trade to Madagascar which is still in a more or less flourishing state; though we have suppressed it to a considerable extent by the treaty with Madagascar, there is still a regular trade from the southern part of Africa, a trade which does not pass through Zanzibar at all.

1311. In the Portuguese territory?—Yes, south of it.

1312. South of Cape Delgado?—Yes.

1313. Commander De Kantzow says, in a letter dated 1st October 1869, in Blue Book B. for 1871: "The whole coast has been searched by our ship and boats without observing a slave dhow, and it is but fair to add, without a sign of slave-trading"; do you concur in that statement?—That might be true, and yet the slave-trading might be going on, because, at the same time at Madagascar, the current report was that there were slaves in the interior waiting the departure of our ships to be sent over, and Captain de Kantzow mentions rumours of slave ships being heard of south of his station.

1314. You do not think the Portuguese Government has entirely suppressed the slave trade on their portion of Southern Africa?—We know

know for certain that slaves from that part of the coast have been imported quite recently into Madagascar.

1315. Then, in suggesting that 12 ships should be employed in suppressing the slave trade on the South East Coast of Africa, you did not take into consideration the slave trade carried on between the Portuguese territory and Madagascar?—No.

1316. You would contemplate an additional squadron for that?—That would require to be separately dealt with; but I should say I think the trade is clearly on the decrease.

1317. What number of ships would you think necessary to perform the service there?—I should suppose not more than two or three.

1318. Two or three, with steam launches, you think would be sufficient to suppress any trade that may exist between the South East Coast of Africa and Madagascar?—Yes, stationing those ships on the Madagascar coast.

1319. Does the importation of free labour into the French colony of Réunion add to your difficulties at all?—I do not think it does. One gathers that it gives a great impetus to the slave trade; that a certain number of men who are originally brought down as slaves, become converted into free negroes, by some process, finding their way into the French colonies.

1320. Have you had any diplomatic difficulties with the officers of other nations?—Never; our difficulties, I think, might be in some degree removed if encouragement was

given to legal traders in the Mozambique Channel, to fly English ensigns, and to carry English papers; at present the great majority of them carry French papers, and French ensigns, and, of course, there is more or less difficulty in dealing with any vessel carrying French colours; I believe the Arabs would gladly change their French colours for English if they could.

1321. Why do they bear the French National Flag?—They obtain French papers from the French Government at Nos Bel, and other settlements.

1322. Do you think their nationality might easily be converted from French into English?—I believe the great mass of those flying colours have nothing to say to the French nation.

1323. Mr. *Shaw Lefevre*.] By sailing under the French flag, they obtain immunity from search on the part of our cruisers?—Yes, it has always been said, and no doubt it is true, that the search after the illegal trade does embarrass the legal traders considerably, so that the legal trader protects himself by flying the French colours, and the illegal trader, of course, follows suit.

1324. *Chairman*.] Do you think we could induce them to carry English colours instead of French, seeing that they would then be liable to search?—Yes, they would rather have English colours than French. No illegal trader would dare to fly English colours, and there would consequently be even more immunity from search from the legal traders flying English colours. A *prima facie* suspicion attaches to all others.

Mr. CHARLES ALLINGTON, called in; and Examined.

1325. Mr. *Kennaway*.] WERE you in the vicinity of Lake Nyassa, in company with Bishop Tozer?—We were living on the banks of the Shiré river.

1326. Can you, from your own experience, give evidence to the forays made by slavers upon the peaceful villages in that district?—Yes, I can remember going into a native village near Mount Mollumbala. The slavers were there just before we got there, and on our approach they fired some shots and took to their heels, carrying away with them some men out of the village. When I got to the village there was an old chief in hiding in the bush, afraid to come back to the village on account of those slavers; however, after a little time he came back, and I made friends with him, and we walked about the village, and he told me the loss which had been inflicted upon him by the slavers. That is one instance in my mind at the present time.

1327. *Chairman*.] Have you any doubt that at the time you were in the country there were parties of slavers who attacked villages with the view of obtaining slaves?—I have not the slightest doubt of it.

1328. All the accounts you have received confirm you in that view?—Quite so.

1329. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] You have no doubt that the object of those raids was for the purpose of getting slaves?—Simply for the purpose of getting slaves, and nothing else.

1330. Mr. *Crum-Ewing*.] Some of the wit-

nesses have stated that the slave dealers go up the country and encourage war between two tribes, and then buy the captives as slaves; do you agree with that?—It is a common notion that that is done; I have no doubt that it is done; they want slaves at any price, and if they can get them by exciting war between two tribes they, no doubt, adopt that course.

1331. You do not know that of your own knowledge?—No, I have heard that it is done.

1332. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] You do not say that it is a common thing for slavers to go and stir up war for the purpose of getting slaves?—It is merely a thing I have heard; I have no knowledge of it myself.

1333. You have heard that it takes place, but you are not prepared to say that it often takes place?—No, I am not.

1334. *Chairman*.] But from the information you have received you come to the conclusion that it is not an uncommon thing for the slave traders to stir up war between two tribes for the purpose of obtaining slaves?—That is a statement I have heard made more frequently in England than anywhere else; but I could not speak to it from my own knowledge.

1335. Is the case you have mentioned the only case of the sort which came under your own observation?—That case is the one strongest in my mind at this moment. I do not think I could tell you any other; that is a case which I am perfectly clear about. I have no doubt the same thing is going on day after day.

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Mr. EDWARD HUTCHINSON, called in; and Examined.

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1336. *Chairman.*] You are one of the Secretaries of the Church Missionary Society?—I am.

1337. Has your society been instituting inquiries with respect to the suitability of Seychelles as a place to which to send liberated slaves?—I may say shortly that the whole of this matter has been before our committee for the last four years; we have been investigating it thoroughly for that time, and we arrived at this conclusion, that the Seychelles was the most suitable place at which a depôt for liberated slaves could be established; and, in anticipation of the Government agreeing with our view, we sent a missionary there with instructions to purchase a property there, and commence a training institution; we did not do that till we had ascertained from the fullest evidence we could collect upon the subject, that Seychelles was the best place for the purpose. We sent a gentleman from the Mauritius to the Seychelles who sent us a report, an epitome of which I have here, and he also procured for us a report by Mr. Swinburne Ward, the Government Commissioner at the Seychelles, speaking in the most favourable terms of the Seychelles as being suitable for a depôt for liberated slaves.

1338. Would your society be prepared to send agents to the Seychelles for the instruction and civilisation of liberated slaves who might be sent there?—We have an agent there now, and he was quite ready to set to work, but a stop was put to the whole matter by the Government refusing to send any more slaves to the Seychelles. If any number of liberated slaves had been sent to the Seychelles we were prepared to have applied for a sufficient number of lads and children to train and teach, with the hope, at some future time, of their returning to Africa. And I say this because the Committee may perhaps not be aware that Dr. Livingstone, when he last went to Africa, took with him nine lads from our institution in Bombay; that is the institution to which the Government of Bombay sent slave children captured in the Indian Ocean; and from that institution Dr. Livingstone selected nine lads to accompany him in his travels into the interior of Africa, and who are now with him; and in a Report in 1866, by Dr. Livingstone, which is to be found in the papers before the Committee, he mentions that one of those lads met his own uncle at the very village from which he had been torn as a child, and the uncle, finding the value that this lad would be to him, having been taught agriculture and carpentry at Nassick, proposed that he should stay with him, but the lad's answer was, "No," he preferred staying with his master, Dr. Livingstone.

1338\*. Will you hand in the epitome of the Reports respecting the Seychelles?—(*The Witness handed in the same, vide Appendix.*)

1339. Is there anything else which you wish to state to the Committee?—I should like to say that we have given this subject very careful consideration, and we believe that the recommendations contained in the Report of the Committee which sat at the Foreign Office are very valuable, but there is one particular in which we dissent from them, and that is, the recommendation contained in paragraph 64. We dissent entirely from the proposal that those children should be

liberated at the Island of Zanzibar, and there handed over to any master from whom they might take wages; it is a proposal which we think is entirely opposed to the whole policy that our Government have hitherto adopted in dealing with the slave trade.

1340. It was your society principally which drew the attention of the Government to this matter, was it not?—We have pressed this matter upon the Government at various times. Two years ago we went on a deputation to the India Office, which resulted in the appointment of the Foreign Office Committee.

1341. The Bishop of Mauritius brought the matter before you?—He brought the matter before us in 1867, and since that time we have been perpetually working to bring public opinion to bear upon it.

1342. *Mr. Kinnaird.*] Is there any other place besides the Seychelles which would be suitable for the establishment of schools for the liberated slave children?—I might say at the Mauritius itself there is a large establishment, which has been superintended by our missionaries, and there the Mauritius government have done what the Government did at Sierra Leone, namely, they have given 6*d.* a-head per diem for every child we would take and train. That has been carried on for a long time very successfully indeed; and Governor Barclay, in one of his letters, says, if we could establish a similar institution at the Seychelles, he has no doubt that the Mauritius government would make a grant for the purpose.

1343. *Mr. Kennaway.*] You would prefer that any settlement of slaves should be under the British flag?—We take that position, because a liberated slave is a British subject; the present Act of Parliament requires that slaves shall be liberated in British dominions; that is the point from which we start.

1344. Do you think, supposing the liberated slaves were congregated at the Seychelles, you would be able to isolate them from the immorality of the place; it has a bad character at present, has it not?—It has a bad character; the Seychelles consists of a group of seven islands, and the evidence we have rather leads to the conclusion that Mahi would be the best for our operations; but we have no doubt that we should be able so to train the emancipated slaves as to prevent them from being affected by any immorality there may be in the place; and, moreover, they are only children; and it is a point which it is important to bear in mind that a large majority of the slaves captured are children.

1345. *Mr. Kinnaird.*] The Church Missionary Society are willing to undertake that work?—Yes.

1346. You only ask the Government to contribute a small payment?—Six-pence per head per diem would completely cover the expense; that is what the Government have given us at Sierra Leone.

1347. *Mr. J. Talbot.*] Why would not such a settlement at Zanzibar be satisfactory?—There seems to be very little evidence as to the power the Sultan could bring to bear to protect liberated slaves there. Besides, from what I have read I should say that Zanzibar is a very unhealthy place; the only place where a depôt could

could be established would be in the interior of the island, which General Rigby has told us is extremely unhealthy.

1348. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] If the depôt were established in Zanzibar, would not you be afraid that they might be taken as slaves again?—That would depend on the measures that might be taken with a view to their protection; if ample measures were taken, and the place became civilised, then the children might be secure, but at present the children would be as likely to be kidnapped as not.

1349. Mr. *Fowler*.] Have you any mission at Zanzibar?—No.

1350. Mr. *J. Talbot*.] If they were put under the protection of the British flag at Zanzibar, what objection would there be to their being kept there?—It is an open question; if the Government decide on Zanzibar for a depôt, no doubt our committee would consider the propriety of going to Zanzibar.

1351. Mr. *Kinnaird*.] The experiment at Nas-sick has answered thoroughly, has not it?—It has been most satisfactory.

Mr. *E. Hutchinson*.  
—  
25 July  
1871.

REV. HORACE WALLER, called in; and further Examined.

1352. *Chairman*.] YOU have a letter from Dr. Livingstone, from which you wish to read some extracts to the Committee?—Yes; this letter is dated 1st February 1867; he is writing from the country of the Chipéta, which he describes to be five days march from Lake Nyassa on the east of it, and he says, “I am a perfect bugbear to these Coast Arab slave traders. Party after party, on hearing that the English were coming along the road, skedaddled away through bush and brake and across pathless forests; one wise old party, who had about 800 slaves, and was just entering on a depopulated district of 10 days’ march with them, finding that I had lighted on him, came forward and presented an ox and big bag of flour. This man and brother added a dish of cooked meat on seeing that we were really famishing. We had pretty hard lines for 150 miles; could not get food for either love or money; and then the depopulated part! I accomplished it on the morning of the eighth day with four companions; our food was all expended on the sixth day, and it was in hard plight that this good Samaritan slave trader became a friend indeed.” He afterwards says, “Near the sea coast the country is covered with dense forest. Further inland the forest is more open, but you seldom see the horizon; then the country becomes undulating, and, from the crests of the earthen waves you may see mountains all about. The country about Mataka is Magomero magnified; a perfect rush of running rills

flowing southwards and northwards, forming the Liendi and Rovuma, which unite at Ngomano. I counted 15 of these burns in one day’s march.” Further on, speaking of the slave traders, he says, “Instead of a steamer, which I did my best to get on the lake, two Arab dhows ply their calling as slavers. The owner of one has swept a large tract on the western side of people; at least, so say his own people. They kept their craft out of my way lest I should burn them.” In another part of his letter, he says, “Some Arabs were fleeing from the resentment of Manganja, who resented their bringing arms and ammunition into the country for their destruction.” He is there referring to the plan adopted by the slave dealers of bringing arms and ammunition to set one tribe against the other. I can speak distinctly to the fact of its being the chief aim of the slave traders to set one tribe against the other, in order that they may bring war and the consequent destruction into the country which produces just the state of things that makes slaves cheapest. Then further on, speaking of travelling with the Africans, he says, “With them we crossed Kirk’s range, and got among Manganja in the primitive state, working in iron, and spinning buaze, and sowing grain extensively.” Buaze is a fibre used for nets. He is speaking there of a population which had not been visited by the slave traders.

Rev. *H. Waller*.  
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# A P P E N D I X.

## Appendix, No. 1.

PAPER handed in by the Honourable *C. Vivian*, 13 July 1871.

### INSTRUCTIONS for the Guidance of NAVAL OFFICERS employed in the Suppression of the SLAVE TRADE. Appendix, No. 1.

Admiralty, 6 November 1869.

THE attention of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having been called to serious irregularities and mistakes committed by officers commanding Her Majesty's ships, employed in the suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa, their Lordships are pleased to issue the following Order.

It is not intended by this Order to alter the slave trade instructions which are now furnished to Her Majesty's ships, but merely to point out and explain to officers, in the most marked manner, certain provisions of those instructions which, on some occasions, have been misunderstood or neglected, and to bring to the notice of officers the provisions of the recent Statute, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 75.

#### 1.—*As to what Vessels are liable to Capture.*

Articles 50, 51, and 388.

The 50th Article of the General Instructions gives the general rule as follows:—

“If in the course of the search you are satisfied that the vessel is engaged in or equipped for the slave trade, and that she is subject to your authority, you will proceed to detain her.”

The 51st Article gives ancillary rules:—You will be justified in concluding that a vessel is engaged in or equipped for the slave trade:—

“I. If you find any slaves on board.

“II. If you find in her outfit any of the equipments hereinafter mentioned” [then follows an enumeration of the equipments taken from the Statute 2 & 3 Vict. c. 73, s. 4].

In construing the words in this Article, “if you find any slaves on board,” reference must be had to the general scope of the instructions, and particularly to the language of the preceding Article, which speaks of the vessel being “engaged in or equipped for the slave trade.”

Slave trade must, for this purpose, be carefully distinguished from slavery; with which, as existing in foreign States, or on board foreign ships, not being in British territorial waters, Her Majesty's Government does not claim, either by treaty or otherwise, to interfere. As a fact, slavery, as a legal institution, exists in several States (amongst them Zanzibar) with which Great Britain has treaties for the suppression of slave trade. The mere finding, therefore, of slaves on board a vessel will not justify an officer in detaining her if there are other circumstances which show that these persons are slaves by the law of the country from which the ship has sailed, or to which she belongs, and that they are not being transported for the purpose of being sold as slaves. Thus, for instance, where the slaves found on board are very few in number, are unconfined, and appear to be on board for the purpose of loading or working the ship, or attending upon the master or the passengers, and there is no other evidence that the vessel is engaged in or equipped for the slave trade.

Appendix, No. 1.

It is quite otherwise where the slaves are found crowded and chained together, and are obviously being carried as cargo to be sold as slaves.

Between these two classes of cases there are intermediate cases; some of a doubtful character. It must rest with the officer to distinguish to what class any particular case belongs by a careful consideration of all the circumstances; bearing in mind always this, that it is his duty to detain the vessel if he is reasonably satisfied that she is engaged in or equipped for the slave trade, but not otherwise.

Officers must further observe that by the 388th Article of the Instructions, a right is reserved to the subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar of transporting slaves within certain limits therein specified. That right, however, has by a special order of the Sultan, dated 1863, been waived during the months of January, February, March, and April.

## 2.—As to Documents found on Board the detained Ships.

Articles 58, 69, 85.

These Articles which prescribe measures for the preservation and final delivery to the Court of Adjudication of all papers and documents found on board the detained vessels, are to be carried out with perfect fidelity and scrupulous care.

The unexplained loss of any such document, and still more its destruction, on any pretext whatsoever, will lay the officer open to very serious imputation.

## 3.—As to the Destruction of Vessels.

Articles 60, 61.

These Articles give authority to the officer to destroy a vessel which, on search, he considers to be engaged in or equipped for the slave trade, if, after survey held, it appears that she is not in a sufficiently sea-worthy condition to be sent to a port of adjudication. My Lords cannot, however, too strongly insist that such destruction of a vessel is only to be resorted to as an extreme measure. Nothing will excuse the officer in not sending in the vessel to a port of adjudication, except facts showing satisfactorily that doing so would have involved serious danger to the lives of the prize crew.

In addition to this, the 390th Article is to be strictly observed as to Zanzibar vessels:—

“If you have detained a Zanzibar vessel upon suspicion, and are unable to send her into the proper port of adjudication, you will not destroy her without (if practicable) having first ascertained at the nearest Zanzibar port, by inquiries from Her Majesty’s consul and others, that she was engaged in or equipped for the slave trade.”

You are also strictly to observe all similar articles, with respect to vessels of other nationalities, to be found in the Special Instructions.

## 4.—As to the Port of Adjudication.

Articles 63, 65, 389.

The two first named of these articles prescribe the general duty of forwarding the detained vessel with as little delay as possible to the port of adjudication, and direct the officer to refer to the special instructions to ascertain the proper port.

The 389th Article, referring to Zanzibar vessels only, is as follows:—

“The proper port of adjudication for a Zanzibar vessel is the nearest or most accessible port at which a British Admiralty, or Vice Admiralty Court, is established.”

Since the issuing of these instructions, certain powers have been conferred on Her Majesty’s consul at Zanzibar, by Order in Council of 9th August 1866, and the statute 32 & 33 Vict. c. 75.

The 29th section of the Order in Council is in these words:—

“And it is further ordered that Her Majesty’s consul within the dominion of the Sultan of Zanzibar shall, for and within the said dominions, and for vessels and persons coming within those dominions, and in regard to vessels captured on suspicion of being engaged in the slave trade within those dominions, have all such jurisdiction as for the time being ordinarily belongs to Courts of Vice Admiralty in Her Majesty’s possessions abroad.”

The Act of Parliament extends the consul’s power; for the 2nd section is in these terms:—

“Her Majesty’s consul at Zanzibar for the time being shall have, and shall be deemed to have always since the commencement of the said Order in Council had, all

all such jurisdiction as ordinarily belongs to Vice Admiralty Courts in Her Majesty's possessions abroad in regard to vessels captured on suspicion of being engaged in or equipped for the slave trade, in the following cases:—

“1. Where a Zanzibar vessel shall have been captured in pursuance of any treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar, either within or beyond the dominions of Zanzibar.

“2. Where the vessel captured shall not be entitled to claim the protection of the flag of any State or Nation.”

Officers will therefore observe that—

1. All vessels captured in Zanzibar dominions are to be taken for adjudication to Zanzibar.

2. All Zanzibar vessels, wheresoever captured, and all vessels, wheresoever captured, which shall not be entitled to claim the protection of the flag of any State or Nation, are to be sent for adjudication to Zanzibar, if that be the nearest or most accessible port at which a British Admiralty or Vice Admiralty Court is established.

In cases where the vessel is run on shore and wrecked, or is destroyed as unseaworthy, the same port of adjudication is—excepting in very special circumstances—to be resorted to for procuring the decree of Court, as that to which the vessel ought to have been sent if in a seaworthy condition when captured. More especially is this to be observed where persons are found on board the vessel.

5.—*As to Persons and Property found on Board the Vessel.*

Articles 66, 67, 77, 78.

These Articles prescribe that wherever practicable all persons and things found on board the vessel shall be sent, with as little delay as possible, to the port of adjudication, and, if possible, in the vessel herself.

Nothing short of necessity will justify any officer in landing any such persons on the coast, at random, near the place of capture, or in taking them to any port other than the port of adjudication.

Their Lordships regret to be obliged to remind naval officers of this simple duty, so clearly imposed upon them, and to have to state that the purpose of taking the captured vessel to the proper port of adjudication is not to procure, as a matter of form, a decree of condemnation, but to obtain a full and fair trial of the case; at which trial those concerned in the property may have all reasonable facilities to defend their interest.

6.—*As to Reporting Captures.*

Articles 48, 49.

Officers commanding Her Majesty's ships are required by these Articles to furnish a detailed report of every capture, and especially of any circumstances which may have induced them to depart from the appointed course of conduct.

In conclusion, their Lordships are most anxious to assist and protect officers in the right performance of their duties in suppressing the slave trade, but they must warn all such officers that if they transgress the instructions on this subject they will fall under their Lordships' serious displeasure, and that they will also be liable to be called upon to pay heavy costs and damages.

By command of their Lordships,

(signed) V. Lushington.

Appendix, No. 2.

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PAPER handed in by the Honourable C. Vivian, 20 July 1871.

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EXTRACT from LETTER from Dr. Kirk to Mr. Vivian, dated 10 June 1871.

Appendix, No. 2.

I GET the oddest rumours from the native house here of Jairam Seiojee. At one time it is that Toorki is to be permitted to take the subsidy, and, if refused, take Zanzibar; when, for having been allowed to do our dirty work, he is somehow to abolish the slave trade for nothing. Natives laugh at the idea that Bombay is likely to carry it out; Burgash laughs, and says that he can offer Toorki better terms. In this Burgash is quite mistaken; we can offer Toorki Zanzibar, and I can secure it to him if he comes with one hundred men; but we must before then have his written bond to sign our new Treaty, and, more than all, we must have a ship of war, and on his hesitation to ratify, at once present our claims for indemnity under the Commercial Treaty, and remove him if he then longer hesitates. But this is a nasty roundabout and Oriental mode of dealing, and Toorki, who hates us quite as much and loves us quite as little as Burgash or any other one of the family, would feel that he had been made a tool of.

My idea is, we had better go boldly at it ourselves; inform Burgash he acts in bad faith, and that his past behaviour is not such as should induce us to spare him; that he simply must accede, and that when he does to the total abolition of the slave trade, we will see that the Arabs are quiet. The same day that this is demanded it will be necessary to follow it up by enforcing the Commercial Treaty which, duly carried out, will cut off about two-thirds of his income.

Burgash's fanaticism was all assumed; his national tendencies will give way also when he sees the choice between the Throne and bankruptcy.

I do trust that soon we may have orders to do something, for it were better to withdraw from the struggle than carry it on as now.

There is a very false idea as to the paramount claim of Bombay to the guidance of matters here. True, there are many Kutchees here, but Kutchees at best are not British Indians, and I presume, under the new Naturalization Acts, that even British Indians may become Arabs when they please. We hold fully two-thirds of our nominal subjects here against their will; that is under our jurisdiction, but not under our protection, for they refuse to register. This state of things cannot long continue, for Indians get on so much better here than at home, that none of the Mussulman sects return to their land. Their children, when over 21, even now become Arabs. To the wealthy man, British protection is a thing worth having, but to poor men the Arab régime is better. If, therefore, the Naturalization Acts apply here to Indian and Kutchees, our Bombay interest here is not much, and even now it seems that it is but matter of detail, not of policy, it is a branch that had better be done by a junior officer, and a glance at past history for 10 years will satisfy anyone that England's policy with the Zanzibar state must all emanate direct from home.

Every year other nations are gaining greater interests here, and soon, whatever is done will be closely criticised by Germany and the States, with which Zanzibar is as closely related by treaty as with us.

Excuse this long letter, but my wish is, if possible, to urge the necessity of immediate action; we cannot afford to delay.

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## Appendix, No. 3.

PAPER handed in by the Honourable C. Vivian, 24 July 1871.

DRAFT REPORT upon the Questions regarding the KUTCHEES in Zanzibar, submitted to the Committee upon the East African Slave Trade.

Appendix, No. 3.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 1870.

By your Lordship's directions we have considered the Papers which have been referred to us as to the right of jurisdiction possessed by Her Majesty's Government over certain natives of Kutch, resident in Zanzibar, as well over those who have, as over those who have not enrolled themselves on the British Consular Register, in accordance with the provisions of Her Majesty's Order in Council of the 9th of August 1866.

The Order in Council states that "A Register shall be kept by Her Majesty's Consul of all British subjects, and of all natives of British-protected States in India who may claim British protection, residing within the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar;" and that "any British subject who shall refuse or neglect to be so enrolled, and who shall not excuse such refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of the Consul, shall not be entitled to be recognised or protected as a British subject in respect to any suit, dispute, or difficulty in which he may have been, or may be, engaged or involved within the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, at any time when he shall not have been or shall not be so enrolled."

The Kutchees seem to have thought that by neglecting to inscribe themselves on the consular register they were at liberty to elect the Sultan's protection in lieu of that of Her Majesty's Government, and so to accomplish their object of placing themselves under the laws of Zanzibar, which permit the acquiring and holding of slaves; and we observe, from the Papers submitted to us, that the Governments of Bombay and of India, and the political agents at Zanzibar, have taken different views of the question.

In 1860, before the Order in Council was passed, Colonel Rigby, after giving a month's notice of his intention, emancipated without further notice or difficulty all the slaves in the Island of Zanzibar belonging to natives of India under British protection, and he induced the Sultan to issue orders that all slaves belonging to natives of India on the mainland should be at once freed, and that no slaves should in future be sold to them.

Colonel Rigby's proceedings were at that time entirely sanctioned and approved by the Bombay Government. Subsequently to the departure of Colonel Rigby from Zanzibar in 1862, and before the arrival of Mr. Churchill in 1867, a distinction was made between Kutchees who had registered themselves at the consulate and those who had not done so, the latter being allowed to place themselves under the Sultan's protection, and to hold slaves.

Mr. Churchill, however, soon after his arrival at Zanzibar, brought the matter to the notice of the Government of Bombay, in a Despatch of 22nd December 1867, in which he says;—

"I learn from an attentive perusal of the instructions, 1st, That up to Colonel Rigby's departure from Zanzibar, no native of India dared to possess a slave.

"2. That Colonel Rigby had received the approval of Government in all his proceedings with regard to the emancipation of the slaves above alluded to.

"3. That it was after Colonel Rigby's departure that natives of India were allowed to place themselves under the Sultan's protection."

Mr. Churchill was in doubt as to the course he should pursue with respect to the slave-holding natives of India who had declined to avail themselves of the British protectorate, while the Sultan of Zanzibar held "that had not Mr. Churchill's predecessors allowed it, no native of India would be holding slaves in his dominions, but that having been told that Kutchees and other subjects of British protected States in India might be looked upon in the same light as his Arab subjects, he had allowed them to purchase slaves, and that it was not fair to punish them for having innocently done what they did not know to be wrong."

The opinion of the Bombay Government upon this question was that Her Majesty's Government had no right to interfere with those subjects of the Rao of Kutch who had not availed themselves of the option of registering their names as entitled to British protection, or, at all events that, if we could interfere, it must be by agreement with the Rao of Kutch, and after granting the owners compensation for the loss of their slaves, but they held that

British



Appendix, No. 3. British subjects, residing in Zanzibar, "could not exempt themselves from British law by taking service with the Sultan."

They thus drew a distinction between the position of non-registering Kutchees and non-registering British subjects.

The question was then referred to the Government of India, who stated their opinion that "the result of the permission to the subjects of Kutch to register themselves before the British Consul, though undoubtedly well meant, appears to have been unfortunate, as it would seem that the Kutchees, not registered, have conceived the notion that they are emancipated from all control and interference, and that the Sultan himself favours these pretensions.

"Mr. Churchill should be instructed to inform the Sultan that the Government of India by no means recognises such claims, and the traders from Kutch should be plainly told that, although the retention by them of domestic slaves in their households may for a time be tolerated, all attempts at purchasing, selling, or trafficking in slaves will be summarily put down, and that the Government will not entertain any claim for redress or compensation."

Acting upon these instructions, Mr. Churchill issued a public notice, that all Kutchees and natives of India in Zanzibar should present themselves at the British Consulate with lists of their slaves, under pain of punishment; and he actually punished a man who disregarded the notice by a fine of 500 dollars.

These proceedings gave offence to the Sultan, who protested that the non-registered natives of India were, by the admission of Mr. Churchill's predecessors, under his Highness's protection, and as such, screened from the interference of the British Government. The matter was temporarily compromised by Mr. Churchill undertaking not to interfere with the slaves then in the possession of the Kutchees, provided they were forbidden to buy or sell any more; and the Sultan thereupon referred the question for the authoritative decision of Her Majesty's Government, and thus the matter stands at present.

We have reviewed the case at length for the purpose of showing why doubts have arisen as to the powers of Her Majesty's Government, and our reasons for recommending, as we shall do, that while the Kutchees should not be permitted to hold slaves in future, due consideration should be shown and allowance made, for the circumstances under which they have conceived themselves justified in acquiring their slaves. We think that the case resolves itself into the following simple questions:—

1. Has Her Majesty's Government the right to exercise jurisdiction over British subjects resident in Zanzibar?
2. Is it necessary to the exercise of such jurisdiction that they should have enrolled themselves on the British Consular register?
3. Is there any distinction to be drawn in respect of such jurisdiction between British born subjects and natives of Indian States under the protection of the British Government, such as Kutch?

As regards the first and second questions, it seems clear that whether by treaty, usage, or sufferance, Her Majesty has, and exercises with the consent of the Sovereign of Zanzibar, jurisdiction over all British subjects resident in Zanzibar; and we do not think that the provisions of the Order in Council requiring all British subjects to register themselves at the British Consulate under certain penalties can be held to entitle those who do not so enrol themselves to withdraw themselves entirely from British protection, or to deprive Her Majesty of all jurisdiction over them.

Our opinion upon the third question is influenced by the proclamation of the Rao of Kutch to his subjects of the 24th April 1869, which states, "It is therefore hereby ordered, that if you persist in the traffic in slaves, the British Government will, by virtue of my aforesaid permission, treating you who reside at Zanzibar as its own subjects, liberate all slaves from your possession, &c.;" and we consider that in view of this proclamation, natives of Kutch must, so far as regards slave traffic, be regarded as British subjects.

As it is clearly unlawful for a British subject to hold or traffic in slaves, either in Zanzibar or in any other country, it is consequently unlawful for a Kutchee to do so.

If we are right in assuming that Her Majesty's Government have jurisdiction over all British subjects or natives of Kutch under British protection, whether registered or not, it follows that they have the power, if they chose to exercise it, of at once insisting on the liberation of all slaves held by such persons, without previous notice of compensation; and also, under the powers given by the Order in Council of 1866, and its accompanying rules and regulations, of punishing in Zanzibar itself any such person for refusing to obey the Consul's order to release their slaves. But, looking to the fact that the Kutchees have, with the implied sanction of the British Authorities, been permitted to hold slaves for domestic service since the year 1862, it would in our opinion be a harsh measure to order the immediate release of all their slaves without compensation to their owners.

In our opinion it would be only fair to give the Kutchees a reasonable time, say three years, to make their preparations. The period might be left to the discretion of the Indian Government, and proper notice should be given accordingly; but if at the end of such term as may be decided upon, any Kutchee should be found holding slaves, they should be immediately emancipated without compensation, and the Kutchee punished for holding them. In the meantime no Kutchee should be allowed on any pretence whatever to acquire any fresh slaves, but only to hold those they already possess.

We also think that, as the British Consul enforces his orders upon British subjects within the territories of Zanzibar by the process and officers of the Consular Court, under the regulations attached to Her Majesty's Order in Council, he is entitled to enforce his orders upon Kutchees by the same means, and in the same manner, and we think that the same considerations apply to any other natives of India who may be in precisely the same position as the Kutchees.

This authority, however, can in our opinion only be exercised over British subjects and over Kutchees and other Indian subjects who are placed in the same position as British subjects, but not over those who have legally become subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar.

We recommend that instructions in this sense should be sent to Her Majesty's Consul in Zanzibar, and that he should be told to inform the Sultan of the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon the question ; but as it appears that his Highness has been misled as to the position of the non-registering Kutchees, and has acquired the conviction that they are under his protection, and not amenable to the jurisdiction of the British Government, we would recommend that the measures which we have suggested should, if possible, be put in force with his consent and sanction, and that he should be invited to initiate them, or to co-operate with Her Majesty's Consul in carrying them into effect.

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## Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS handed in by the Honourable C. Vivian, 24 July 1871.

Appendix, No. 4.

## TREATIES, &amp;c.

## PERSIA.

FIRMAN issued by the Shah to *Hoossein Khan*, Governor of Fars.

(Translation.)

June 1848.

To the high in rank, the pillar of nobility, Hoossein Khan, the Comptroller of State Affairs and Governor of Fars, who has been exalted and supported by the distinguished favours of his Majesty the Shah, &c., be it known, that it is a long time since a request for the abolition of the importation of negroes by sea has been made on the part of the ministers of the British Government to the ministers and authorities of this kingdom. But their request during this long period has not met with an answer or our consent.

But in consequence of the favour entertained by our august Sovereign towards the high in rank, the sincere well-wisher of the State, the chosen among Christian nobles, &c., Colonel Farrant, Chargé d'Affaires of the English Government, on account of the respectful conduct and manner of proceeding which he has made manifest, and purely for the regard we entertain for him, we have accepted and complied with his request. We have ordained that hereafter that high in rank shall warn all merchants and persons passing to and fro, to discontinue to bring negroes by sea alone, and that they shall not export or import negroes except by land, which is by no means forbidden.

That high in rank will be held responsible for the fulfilment of the orders contained in this communication.

Written in the month of Rejjeb 1264. June 1848.  
Hoossein Khan.

*The Shah.*

FIRMAN issued by the Shah to the Governor of Ispahan and Persian Arabia.

(Translation.)

June 1848.

To the high in rank, the superior of generals, the esteemed of the Sovereign, Meerza Nebbee Khan, Chief of the Civil Law Court, and Governor of Ispahan, who has been honoured by the favour of the pure mind of the King of kings.

Be it known that at this time the high in rank, the noble and exalted, possessed of dignity, the pillar of the Christian nobles, the cream of the great men of Christendom, the undoubted well-wisher of the State, Colonel Farrant, Chargé d'Affaires of the exalted Government of England, who enjoys the unbounded favour of his Majesty the Shah, whose resplendent mind is desirous to gratify him, having made a friendly request on the part of the ministers of his exalted Government to the ministers of his Majesty the Shah, that with a view to preserve the existing friendship between the two exalted States, a decree should be issued from the source of magnificence, the Shah, that hereafter the importation of the negro tribes by sea should be forbidden, and this traffic be abolished.

In consequence of this, it is ordered and ordained that, that high in rank, after perusing this firman, which is equal to a decree of fate, will feel it incumbent on him to issue positive and strict injunctions to the whole of the dealers in slaves who trade by sea, that henceforth

forth by sea alone the importation and exportation of negroes into the Persian dominions is entirely forbidden, but not by land. Not a single individual will be permitted to bring negroes by sea without being subjected to severe punishment.

That high in rank must in this matter give peremptory orders throughout his Government, and not be remiss.

Written in the month of Rejjeb 1264. June 1848.

¶ Meerza Nebbee Khan.

*The Shah.*

CONVENTION for the Detention and Search of Persian Vessels by British and East India Company's Cruisers.

(Translation.)

Shevval 1267 (August 1851).

THE Persian Government agrees that the ships of war of the British Government and of the East India Company shall, in order to prevent the chance of negro slaves, male and female, being imported, be permitted, for the period of 11 years, to search Persian merchant vessels, in the manner detailed in this document, with the exception of Persian Government vessels, not being vessels the property of merchants or the property of Persian subjects; with those Government vessels there is to be no interference whatsoever. The Persian Government agrees that in no manner whatever shall any negro slave be imported in the vessels of the Persian Government.

The agreement is this :

I. That in giving this permission to search mercantile vessels and those of subjects, the search shall, from the first to the last, be effected with the co-operation, intervention, and knowledge of Persian officers, who are to be on board vessels of the English Government.

II. The merchant vessels shall not be detained longer than is necessary to effect the search for slaves. If slaves should be found in any of those vessels, the British authorities are to take possession of them and carry them away, without detaining or causing them (that is, the people of the ship importing slaves) any other damage besides that of depriving them of the slaves. The vessel itself (in which the slaves have been imported) shall, by the co-operation and knowledge of the officers of the Persian Government who are on board of the British cruisers, be delivered to the authorities of the Persian ports, who are there on the part of the Persian Government, and the authorities of this (the Persian) Government are to punish and fine in a manner suitable to the crime he has committed, the owner of that slaving vessel who has acted in contravention of the commands of his Majesty the King of Persia, by importing slaves.

The British ships of war are not in any manner to interfere with the Persian trading vessels, without the co-operation of the Persian Government officers: but the Persian Government officers also must not, on their part, be remiss in the duty committed to them.

This convention is to be in force for a period of 11 years, and after these 11 years have expired and the stipulated period has elapsed, if the Persian vessels shall be interfered with for even a single day beyond the 11 years, it will be opposed to the course of friendship with the Persian Government and to the maintenance of her rights, and this Government will make a demand for satisfaction.

III. If the slaves who have been heretofore in Persia, and are now there, should from the present date and henceforward wish to proceed by sea on a pilgrimage to Mecca or to India, or travel by sea, they must, with the knowledge of the British Resident in Bushire, procure a passport from the officer at the head of the Persian passport office in Bushire, and no exceptions shall thereafter be taken to any slave holding a passport. The passport (regulation) obtained with the knowledge of the British Resident at Bushire, is, like the other stipulations written above, to be for a period of 11 years.

This agreement of [the right of] search, and the appointment of the Persian Government officers (to be on board the British cruisers) will first come in force on the 1st of Rebbe-ool-evvel, 1268 = 1 January 1852.

From the date of this document to the above date, there is no right of search.

The articles written in this document have, from first to last, been agreed to by both parties, and confirmed by the Ministers of both Governments, and nothing is to be done in contravention thereof.

Written in the month of Shevval 1267 (August 1851).

*Justin Sheil,*

Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and  
Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of Persia.

*Meerza Tekkee Khan,*

Ameer-i-Nizam of the Persian Government.

Appendix, No. 4.

XIII. THE high contracting parties hereby renew the agreement entered into by them in the month of August 1851\* (Shawal 1267), for the suppression of the slave trade in the Persian Gulf, and engage further that the said agreement shall continue in force after the date at which it expires, that is, after the month of August 1862, for the further space of 10 years, and for so long afterwards as neither of the high contracting parties shall, by a formal declaration, annul it; such declaration not to take effect until one year after it is made.

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PERSIAN GULF.

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EXTRACT TREATIES, &c. between *Great Britain* and Arab Chieftains of the *Persian Gulf*, relative to Piracy, the Slave Trade, &c., 1820.

(Translation.)

IX. The carrying off of slaves, men, women, or children, from the coast of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy; and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

X. The vessels of the friendly Arabs bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports, and into the ports of the allies of the British, so far as they shall be able to effect it, and they shall buy and sell therein; and if any shall attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it.

XI. These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons who shall hereafter adhere thereto, in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present.

Issued at Ras ul Khyma, in triplicate, at mid-day, on Saturday the 22nd of the month, of Rebi-ul-Awal, in the year of the Hegira, 1235 (corresponding to the 8th of January 1820), and signed by the contracting parties.

W. Grant Keir, Major General.

(L.S.) of Arab Chiefs.

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TREATIES, &c. between *Great Britain* and Arab Chieftains of the *Persian Gulf*, relative to Piracy, Slave Trade, &c.—1838, 1839.\*

No. 1.—AGREEMENT with Shaikh Sultan Bin Suggur, Chief of Ras-ool-Khymah.—  
Slave Trade.

Shargah, 17 April 1838.

In the event of vessels connected with my ports, or belonging to my subjects, coming under the suspicion of being employed in the carrying off (literally "stealing") and embarkation of slaves, men, women, or children, I, Sultan bin Suggur, Shaikh of the Joasmee tribe, do hereby agree to their being detained and searched whenever and wherever they may be fallen in with on the seas by the cruisers of the British Government, and further, that upon its being ascertained that the crews have carried off (literally "stolen") and embarked slaves, their vessels shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by the aforesaid cruisers.

Dated Shargah, 17th April 1838, A.D., corresponding with the 22nd Mohorrum A.H. 1254, Mahomedamera.

(L.S.) Sultan bin Suggur.

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\* Presented to the House of Lords, 1852; and to the House of Commons, 1856.

No. 2.—AGREEMENT with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Ras-ool-Khymah.—  
Slave Trade.

Appendix, No. 4.

Ras-ool-Khymah, 3 July 1839.

I, SULTAN BIN SUGGUR, Shaikh of the Joasmee tribe, do hereby declare that I bind and pledge myself to the British Government in the following engagements:—

1st. That the Government cruisers, whenever they meet any vessels belonging to myself, or my subjects, beyond a direct line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socotra, and ending at Cape Guadel, and shall suspect that such vessel is engaged in the slave trade, the said cruisers are permitted to detain and search it.

2nd. Should it, on examination, be proved that any vessel belonging to myself, or my subjects, is carrying slaves, whether men, women, or children, for sale beyond the aforesaid line, then the Government cruisers shall seize and confiscate such vessel and her cargo; but if the aforesaid vessel shall pass beyond the aforesaid line, owing to stress of weather, or other case of necessity not under control, then she shall not be seized.

3rd. As the selling of males and females, whether grown up or young, who are "horr," or free, is contrary to the Mahomedan religion, and whereas the Soomalee tribe is included in the "ahrar," or free, I, Sultan bin Suggur, do hereby agree that the sale of males and females, whether young or old, of the Soomalee tribe, shall be considered as piracy, and that after four months from this date all those of my people convicted as being concerned in such an act shall be punished the same as pirates.

(L.s.) *Sultan bin Suggur.*

A similar agreement to the above was entered into by Shaikh Khalifa bin Shukhboot, on the 1st July 1839, and by Shaikh Mukhtoom of Debaye, and Shaikh Abdoolah bin Rashid of Amulgaveen, on the 2nd of the same month.

ENGAGEMENT entered into by Sheik Sultan ben Suggur, Chief of Ras el Khyma and Chargah, for the Abolition of the African Slave Trade in his Ports.

(Translation.)

30 April 1847.

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident of the Persian Gulf, that certain conventions have lately been entered into by his Highness the Inaam of Muscat, and other Powers, with the British Government, for the purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves from the coasts of Africa and elsewhere; and it having, moreover, been explained to me, that in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid conventions, the concurrence and co-operation of the chiefs of the several ports situated on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf are required: accordingly, I, Sheik Sultan ben Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee tribe, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the coast of Africa and elsewhere, on board of my vessels and those belonging to my subjects or dependents, such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Moharrem, 1264, A.H. (10th December 1847, A.D.)

And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated the engagements, by the exportation of slaves from the coast of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

Dated this 14th day of Jemadee-ul-evvel 1263, A.H., or 30th day of April 1847, A.D.

(L.s.) Seal of *Sheik Sultan ben Suggur.*

*Debaye.*—Sheik Moukhtoom's engagement is dated 14 Jemadee-ul-evvel 1263, or 30 April 1847.

*Ejnan.*—Sheik Abdool Azeez's engagement is dated 15 Jemadee-ul-evvel 1263, or 1 May 1847.

*Amulgaveen.*—Sheik Abdoolah ben Rashid's engagement is dated 15 Jemadee-ul-evvel 1263, or 1 May 1847.

*Aboothabee.*—Sheik Saeed ben Zahnon's engagement is dated 17 Jemadee-ul-evvel 1263, or 3 May 1847.

*Bahrain.*—Sheik Mahomed ben Khaleefa's engagement is dated 22 Jemadee-ul-evvel or 8 May 1847.

## S O M A L E E S.

AGREEMENT between *Great Britain* and the Habr Gerhagis, the Habr Taljala, and other Tribes of *Somalees*, prohibiting the Exportation of Slaves.—Signed at Hour, 14 October 1855.

IN the name of the Most Merciful God, and Him we implore.

The reason of writing this bond is, that influenced by motives of humanity, and by a desire to conform to the principle on which the Great English Government is conducted, we lend a willing ear to the proposals of our sincere friend Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, Governor of Aden, that we shall covenant with him and with each other to abolish and prohibit the exportation of slaves from any part of Africa to any other place in Africa or Asia, or elsewhere, under our authority.

We, whose names and seals are set to this bond, do therefore, in the sight of God and of men, solemnly proclaim our intentions to prohibit the exportation of slaves from Africa by every means in our power; we will export none ourselves, nor will we permit our subjects to do so, and any vessel found carrying slaves shall be seized and confiscated, and the slaves shall be released.

*Peace.**Signatures.*

Witnessed by Syud Mahomed bin Abder Rahman el Tifferi.	{	Sultan Manasir bin Boo Bekr bin Mehdi, the Oulaki, done at Hour, dated 14th October 1855.
		Sultan Aboo Bekr bin Ab.oola bin Mehdi, the Oulaki; same date and place.
Witnessed by Omar bin Ahmed bin Syud Ba-Shitioh.	{	Similar engagements entered into by Ali Mahomed Zaid, elder of Habr Gerhagis, tribe of Soomalees, at Mait; the 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 17th October 1855.
		Hirse Ali Mahomed, elder of the Habr Gerhagis, tribe of Soomalees, at Mait; done the 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 17th October 1855.

Mahmood Mahomed, elder of the Habr Taljala tribe, at Hais; 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 17th October 1855.

Aboo Bekr bin Mahomed, elder of the Habr Taljala tribe, at Racooda; done the 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 17th October 1855.

Abdoo Omar, elder of the Habr Taljala tribe, at Unkor; done the 6th day of Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 18th October 1855.

Ali Ahmed, elder of the Habr Taljala tribe, at Unkor; done the 6th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 18th October 1855.

Hassun Yousef, elder of the Habr Taljala tribe, at Kurrum; done the 6th day of Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 18th October 1855.

Mahomed Leban, Chief of the Habr Taljala tribe, at Kurrum; done the 6th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 18th October 1855.

Yousef Othman, elder of the Habr Toljala tribe, at Ain Tarad; done the 7th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 19th October 1855.

Ahmed Aboo Bekr Mahomed Leban, elder of the Habr Taljala tribe, at Ain Tarad; done the 7th Suffer 1272, corresponding with 19th October 1855.

EXTRACT AGREEMENT of Peace, Friendship, Slave Trade, &c., between *Great Britain* and the Sheiks of the Habr Owul Tribe of *Somalees*.—Signed at Berbera, 7th November 1856.

IV. The traffic in slaves throughout the Habr Owul territories, including the port of Berbera, shall cease for ever, and any slave or slaves who, contrary to this engagement, shall be introduced into the said territories, shall be delivered up to the British, and the Commander of any vessel of Her Majesty's or the Honourable East India Company's Navy shall have the power of demanding the surrender of such slave or slaves, and of supporting the demand by force of arms if necessary.

V. The Political Resident at Aden shall have the power to send an Agent to reside at Berbera during the season of the fair, should he deem such a course necessary, to see that the provisions of this Agreement are observed, and such Agent shall be treated with the respect and consideration due to the representative of the British Government.

VI. That

VI. That on a solemn promise being given by the elders of the Habr Owul faithfully to abide by the Articles of this Agreement, and to cause the rest of the tribe to do so likewise, and to deliver up to the Political Resident at Aden any party who may violate it, the blockade of the Habr Owul coast shall be raised, and perpetual friendship shall exist between the British and the Habr Owul. Appendix, No. 4.

Done at Berbera this 7th day of November 1856, of the Christian era, corresponding with the 8th day of Rubee-ool-Awul, 1272 of the Hegira.

Their		
+	<i>Mahomed Arraleh,</i>	} Ayal Yoonus.
+	<i>Ahmed Ali Bookeri,</i>	
+	<i>Noor Farrah,</i>	
+	<i>Ahmed Ghalid,</i>	} Ayal Ahmed.
+	<i>Mahomed Wais,</i>	
+	<i>Muggan Mahomed,</i>	
+	<i>Robbie Hassah,</i>	} Makahil.
+	<i>Ateyah Hilder,</i>	
+	<i>Farrah Benin,</i>	
+	<i>Awauth Shermarki,</i>	Ayal Hamood.
	marks.	

Signed in my presence, at Berbera, on the 7th November 1856,

*R. L. Playfair,*  
Assistant Political Resident, Ader.

W. M. Coghlan, Political Resident,  
Aden, 9 November 1856.

Ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, at Fort William, this 23rd day of January 1857.

*Canning.*  
*Geo. Anson.*  
*J. Dorin.*  
*J. Low.*  
*J. P. Grant.*  
*B. Peacock.*

By order,

*G. F. Edmonstone,*  
Secretary to the Government of India.

## MUSCAT AND ZANZIBAR.

AGREEMENT with the Sultan of Muscat. 2 October 1845.

AGREEMENT between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and his Highness Saeed Saeed bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muscat, for the termination of the export of slaves from the African dominions of his Highness the Sultan of Muscat.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland being earnestly desirous that the export of slaves from the African dominions of his Highness the Sultan of Muscat should cease, and his Highness the Sultan of Muscat, in deference to the wishes of Her Majesty and of the British nation, and in furtherance of the dictates of humanity, which have heretofore induced him to enter into engagements with Great Britain to restrict the export of slaves from his dominions, being willing to put an end to that trade; and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and his Highness the Sultan of Muscat having resolved to record with due form and solemnity this further restriction of the export of slaves, and Her Majesty having given due authority to Captain Hamerton, her representative at the Court of the Sultan of Muscat, to conclude an agreement with his Highness accordingly, his Highness Saeed Saeed bin Sultan, for himself, his heirs, and successors, and Captain Hamerton on behalf of the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, her heirs and successors, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles.

ART. I. His Highness the Sultan of Muscat hereby engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the export of slaves from his African dominions, and to issue orders to his officers to prevent and suppress such trade.

II. His Highness the Sultan of Muscat further engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, and to use his utmost influence with all the chiefs of Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, in like manner to prevent the introduction of slaves from Africa into their respective territories.



## Appendix, No. 4.

III. His Highness the Sultan of Muscat grants to the ships of Her Majesty's navy, as well as those of the East India Company, permission to seize and confiscate any vessels the property of his Highness or of his subjects carrying on slave trade, excepting such only as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one part to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kuyhoo Island, in  $1^{\circ} 57'$  south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Songa Manara, or Pagoda Point, in  $9^{\circ} 2'$  south latitude, including the Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea.

IV. This agreement to commence and have effect from the 1st day of January 1847 of the year of Christ, and the 15th day of the month of Mohunum 1283 of the Hejira.

Done at Zanzibar, this 2nd day of October 1845 of the year of Christ, and 29th day of Ramzan 1261 of the Hejira.

*Saeed Saeed Bin Sultan,*  
Imaum of Muscat.

*Atkins Hamerton,* Captain,  
On behalf of Her Majesty the Queen  
of Great Britain and Ireland, Her  
heirs and successors.

The Imaum of Muscat to Consul Hamerton, dated 6th May 1870.

CONFIDING in the Almighty.

6 May 1850.

From the confiding slave of God's mercy, Saeed Ben Sultan.

To the dignified and exalted, and true friend, the kind and respected Major Hamerton, Her Majesty the Queen of England's Consul, may God preserve him, and render his times fortunate and happy.

Your excellent letter has reached, and your friend understood all you have mentioned, and with reference to the people of that quarter (place) from Songa Manara to Tonghe, you say you wish permission for the ships of war of Her Majesty the Queen of England to enter the creeks, rivers, and harbours in which slaves are sold in violation of orders.

My dear friend, we, and all belonging to us, even our countries, are at the disposal of Her Majesty, and should the men-of-war of Her Majesty the Queen of England require to enter the creeks, rivers, and ports, we are willing they should enter; we object not; and all ships or vessels found in those places to whomsoever belonging, if engaged in the slave trade, may be seized, and all barracoons or places erected for carrying on the slave trade, may be burned or destroyed. We have no wish to the contrary of yours, and with respect to the Banyan, we will send and have him seized. Whatever you require of us we are ready. The sign is with you.

Dated 23rd day of Jamadee-ul-Akhir, 1266 (6 May 1850).

The humble and weak  
*Fakir Saeed* (with his own hand).

DECLARATION between *Great Britain* and *France*, engaging reciprocally to respect the Independence of the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar.\*—Signed at Paris, 10th March 1862.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, taking into consideration the importance of maintaining the independence of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, have thought it right to engage reciprocally to respect the independence of these Sovereigns.

The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of France, and the Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being furnished with the necessary powers, hereby declare, in consequence, that their said Majesties take reciprocally that engagement.

In witness whereof, the undersigned have signed the present Declaration, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at Paris, the 10th March 1862.

(L.S.) *Cowley.*  
(L.S.) *E. Thouvenel.*

\* Signed also in the French language.

## Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Commerce (and Slave Trade), between Her Majesty and the Queen of Madagascar.

Signed, in the English and Malagasy Languages, at Antananarivo, 27 June 1865.

[Ratifications exchanged at Antananarivo, 5 July 1866.]


(Extract).

ARTICLE XVI.—Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar hereby engage to use every means in their power for the suppression of piracy within the seas, straits, and rivers subject to their respective control or influence; and Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar engages not to grant either asylum or protection to any persons or vessels engaged in piratical pursuits; and in no case will she permit ships, slaves, or merchandise captured by pirates to be introduced into her dominions, or to be exposed therein for sale. And Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar concedes to Her Britannic Majesty the right of investing her officers and other duly constituted authorities with the power of entering at all times, with her vessels of war, or other vessels duly empowered, the ports, rivers, and creeks within the dominions of Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar, in order to capture all vessels engaged in piracy, and to seize and to reserve for the judgment of the proper authorities, all persons offending against the two contracting powers in this respect.

ARTICLE XVII.—Her Britannic Majesty and Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar being greatly desirous of effecting the total abolition of the trade in slaves, Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar engages to do all in her power to prevent all such traffic on the part of her subjects, and to prohibit all persons residing within her dominions, or subject to her, from countenancing or taking any share in such trade. No persons from beyond sea shall be landed, purchased, or sold as slaves in any part of Madagascar. And Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar consents that British cruisers shall have the right of searching any Malagash or Arab vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, whether under sail or at anchor in the waters of Madagascar. Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar further consents, that if any such vessels shall prove to be engaged in the slave trade, such vessels and their crews shall be dealt with by the cruisers of Her Britannic Majesty as if such persons and their vessels had been engaged in a piratical undertaking.

(L.S.) *T. C. Pakenham,*  
Her Majesty's Consul for  
Madagascar.

*Rainimaharavo,*  
Chief Secretary of State,  
16 Vtra.  
*Andriantsitohaina,*  
16 Vtra.  
*Ravahatra,*  
Lehibeny Andby.  
*Rafaralahibemalo,*  
Leholona lehibe.



Seal of  
the Queen of  
Madagascar.

## Appendix, No. 5.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPERS handed in by Mr. *Edward Hutchinson*, 25 July 1871.Reverend S. *Hobbs* to *E. Hutchinson*, Esq.

(Extract.)

Mahé, 19 May 1869.

1. THE opinion I formerly expressed as to the eligibility of these islands for missionary efforts on behalf of the liberated slaves was only partially favourable, but what I have seen and heard since coming here inclines me to recommend this locality much more strongly than I anticipated.

3. It is about six years since the cargoes of rescued slaves began to be deposited at Seychelles, and the number brought here from that time to the present is, within a few more or less, 2,000. In most instances the mortality on the first arrival of a cargo has been large, the unhappy creatures being in a diseased and emaciated condition, but after the first few weeks they become healthy and strong, and no more liable to sickness than the rest of the population. I cannot ascertain the precise number now on the island, but judge from what Dr. Brooks says, that 20 per cent. is the very maximum to be deducted on account of mortality, so that the present total must be 1,600 at the lowest estimate.

4. It was lately rumoured in Mauritius that the people of Seychelles were complaining that the rescued Africans were more troublesome than profitable, on account of their indolence and their propensity to stealing. These reports prove to be unfounded. About 180 were brought here last month by the "Nymph," and all are already disposed of, the inhabitants readily paying 30 s. a head to reimburse the Government for clothing and provisions, and other expenses incurred on their account on their arrival. The last importation before this was one of nearly 300 brought by the "Daphne" in December last, who had to be kept 80 days in quarantine, and being in consequence both more expensive and also less able-bodied, were not applied for so readily, whence probably arose the rumour I have just mentioned. Mr. Ward anticipates the arrival, before long, of much larger numbers than hitherto.

5. Mr. Ward said his instructions were, in the event of more coming here than sufficient for the wants of employers, to send the surplus on to Mauritius. Then I gave him a brief sketch of what I understood to have been the system pursued at Sierra Leone 40 or 50 years ago, viz., the formation of little townships, which were placed under the direction of missionaries, when the negroes, after a short time, supported themselves by their independent labour. At first he seemed to think that serious difficulties would stand in the way of such an experiment here, but he appears to have been reflecting upon it since, and to be now more inclined to look upon it as practicable.

8. Both Mr. Ward and Dr. Brooks expressed an opinion that the society would do wisely in adopting Mahé as the basis of their work, more especially because of the perfect salubrity of these islands, and the insalubrity of Mombas. The temperature at present is very agreeable, this being the beginning of the cool season. At other times the heat is severe, but all seasons are considered to be equally healthy. Sufferers from fever coming here from Mauritius for change are almost without exception speedily and completely cured.

9. The expense of boarding for school children might, I believe, be made very light from the beginning, and after a short time reduced almost to nil. There is no necessity to give rice, which the Indians in Mauritius require, and which is a very heavy expense, being all imported. Here the rations served out to labourers consist almost exclusively of maize, manive, and other productions of the country, which can be produced in any quantity, if sufficient land be secured, and a few adult labourers kept for its cultivation. The school children should be trained from the first to assist, and soon might do all the work that has to be done.

11. When a cargo arrives the adults are all hired out on contract for three or five years, according to the wish of the employer, who is bound to keep them until the expiration of the period, paying them wages on a rising scale according to age, the highest rate being 14 s. per mensem, besides rations. I have no doubt they could be made over to a missionary on modified terms, especially if application from the inhabitants should fail. Much would depend upon the disposition of the Civil Commissioner, and that of Mr. Ward is in the highest degree favourable to the scheme.

12. I think

12. I think the cost of a property sufficiently extensive for all purposes, if it were not purchased in haste, would be so moderate as to render it needless to concern ourselves about free grants from the Government. I am not prepared to point out the exact locality most suitable for our purpose, but I think there would be many advantages in fixing it at a distance of four or five miles at least from Port Victoria, and that the western side of the island may be more suitable than the eastern.

13. You are aware that two or three cargoes of rescued slaves were discharged at Mauritius seven or eight years ago, and the children sent to Powder Mills Asylum. A very large proportion of them soon died, and many were afterwards carried off by the epidemic. I think some of the survivors might be sent over here as soon as the mission is begun and would be very useful in helping to teach English to the African children, and in assisting the new missionaries to acquire their respective languages. I will confer with Anson on my return to Mauritius, and ask him to point out any whom he may be able to recommend for this service, so as to have them in readiness when they are wanted.

14. A fact that offers great promise of success in the endeavour to form the Africans into a settled and orderly little community, is that the males and females hitherto brought here are about equal. Mr. Vandin has solemnized some few marriages and baptized several infants born in the island. Amongst other happy results to be hoped for, from the labours of a missionary amongst them, it may reasonably be expected that their settlement in families will become much more general than it will be if they are left to themselves, like "sheep without a shepherd."

15. The communication between Seychelles and Zanzibar is at present very uncertain and irregular.

*S. Ward, Esq., to the Reverend S. Hobbs.*

(Extract.)

Seychelles, 22 May 1869.

2. THE number of Africans who have been brought here by Her Majesty's cruisers amounts to nearly 2,000, quite sufficient for the local demand for labour. The increase of the African population cannot well be ascertained, as no distinction has been made by the civil status between Creoles and Africans. The latter, once distributed, are classed as British subjects, and absorbed into the general population. But there is no doubt that the Africans brought here have increased and multiplied to a very considerable extent. This, however, does not affect the question in which the society is interested, except so far as showing that the climate of these islands is very healthy, and peculiarly well adapted to the African constitution. At Zanzibar, the African races do not reproduce themselves at all. From what I have heard respecting the East Coast, there appears to be no spot at which it would be either desirable or practicable that an establishment for the regeneration and education of captured Africans could be set on foot. These islands present every advantage with respect to proximity, climate, and power of control, and should the society determine upon trying the experiment here, I think that it would be eminently successful.

3. It is, of course, impossible to give any idea of the number of slaves likely to be brought here, but I cannot look forward to any reduction in the amount of captured dhows. More have been taken by our cruisers during the past 12 months than in any previous year, partly owing to the withdrawal of the whole East African squadron during the Abyssinian war, and partly owing to the limited number of ships in the squadron, a quite inadequate number for the proper protection of the coast, and for anything approaching to the suppression of the slave trade. On an average four dhows out of five run their cargoes successfully, so that, judging by the numerous captures, the amount of slaves exported to Arabia and Persia must be very large indeed. During the last five months, 451 slaves have been brought here by Her Majesty's ships "Daphne" and "Nymph," and a considerable quantity have been taken to Aden.

4. From the southern limits of the "soi-disant" Portuguese Settlement, slave trade is always carried on to the fullest extent, permission to trade in slaves being always, I am given to understand, considered a part of the salary of a Portuguese official. Most of that infamous traffic is now in the hands of the Arabs, and a very considerable trade is carried on with Magotte, Nossibé, and Madagascar, in which latter country almost any number of slaves can be absorbed. The major portion of these Africans are conveyed in dhows under French colours, and carrying French papers issued from Magotte or Nossibé. Our cruisers cannot touch these French dhows, although when overhauled they may be found full of unmistakable slaves. One, with several slaves on board, was boarded by the "Nymph." The papers were French, given for one year, during which time many trips might be made, but no one on board spoke a word of the language, or could read the papers.

5. The above remarks, however, only refer to the main question of slave trade on the East Coast generally, and I have offered them only with a view to show the society that in all probability very many more Africans will be brought to these islands, and that any arrangements

Appendix, No. 5. arrangements made for their culture and amelioration will be most beneficial. I cannot foresee any difficulty with respect to such arrangements, beyond time and money, the usual essentials. With funds, there will be no difficulty in purchasing a property in this island which will perfectly answer the desired purpose. This property, if properly looked after, will pay itself, so that no loss can accrue to the society.

6. Land in Seychelles is almost daily increasing in value, more especially land situated within a reasonable distance of the harbour and town. Plots that six years ago would not have brought a dollar per acre are now selling, owing to the road being carried through them, at 30 £. per acre, and every year the value is increasing. A cocoanut plantation, though slow, is very sure, the oil being absolutely necessary for soap manufactories, and the price unaffected by the introduction of mineral oils. An estate in full bearing, if well managed, gives 3 s. per tree profit per annum.

7. A considerable tract of land (for Seychelles, where the only flat land is on the small plateau at the base of the mountains) is now at the disposition of the Government, a flat portion bordered by the sea, and watered by two streams, in all about 25 or 30 acres, at a distance of about a mile and a-half from the town. This is almost the only spot where the establishment of a missionary town for Africans could be carried out without a heavy outlay; but this land will be in the market very shortly, many applications having been received already for portions of it.

8. A great many people have come here during the past two years from Mauritius and Réunion, driven from the former island by the fever, and from the latter by the collapse of commerce. They are all anxious to buy properties and settle here, and their advent necessarily raises the price of land. When the Suez Canal is opened, there is no doubt that the Seychelles will assume a much more important geographical aspect than they have ever hitherto arrived at. I have already heard of a proposed French East African Company anxious to establish its head quarters here, and there is no doubt that for brevity of transit the direct line from Australia, overland, should pass by Seychelles.

9. I have pointed out these matters for the consideration of the society in order to show that not only may we expect large numbers of liberated Africans at almost any moment, but that, if any arrangements are going to be made it would be advisable to make them with as little delay as possible, on economical grounds, so far as the requisition of land is concerned. The suppression of the slave trade on the East Coast is further off than ever. The power of the Sultan of Zanzibar is becoming annually less, and he has now no control at all over the northern Arabs, who periodically resort to Zanzibar for the avowed purpose of dealing in slaves. By the last advices there were over 3,000 of them in that island.

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Reverend *S. Hobbs* to *E. Hutchinson*, Esq.

(Extract.)

Mauritius, 29 June 1869.

8. SINCE my return I have seen the Governor, who enters very cordially into the subject of your plans for the re-captured Africans. I was under the impression that I had explained to his Excellency before I went away the object of my journey, but I find I omitted to do so, and he sent a despatch to the authorities at home by last mail, representing that there appeared to be no more demand for labourers at Seychelles, and that some other place must be found to set down future captures. He expressed regret that he had been in ignorance of our society's intentions, but said he would write again by this mail to inform the Home Government about them. So everything really appears ready for us to begin operations. After I had finished my report, I accompanied Mr. Vandin on a visit to "the Praslin," about 20 miles from Mahé, and there saw a deserted property which appeared to me pre-eminently suitable for our purpose.

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Reverend *S. Hobbs* to *E. Hutchinson*, Esq.

(Extract.)

Mauritius, 28 July 1869.

I AM not yet able to give you any further information about the property "Pasquier," mentioned in my last letter. We may however perhaps obtain from the Government a grant of the whole of "Ile Carieuse," which is two or three miles distant from Praslin, and forms the other side of a beautiful and well-sheltered bay, where the cruisers could anchor and land their cargoes in perfect security. I have just seen a gentleman who was lately for a short time acting magistrate at Seychelles, and he tells me he believes the Government will soon discontinue to make use of that island. It has been used for many years as an asylum for lepers. There are only two or three now remaining there, and it is at present used for paupers in general, for whom the Government will probably appoint a more convenient locality. I sent your letter for the perusal of the Governor, and a few days afterwards received it back with a kind note, which I have the pleasure of enclosing, in which his Excellency replies to your inquiries. I believe that almost any number of Africans would find employment here, provided they were previously trained to habits of industry as field labourers, or were expert workmen in any other branches of skill.

Governor *Barkly* to the Reverend *S. Hobbs*.

Appendix, No. 5.

(Extract.)

16 July 1869.

I AM glad to see that the Church Missionary Society are disposed to take into serious consideration the transfer of their stations from the East Coast of Africa to Seychelles. With regard to assistance from the Mauritius Government, you are aware that I have already written home to urge that the expense occasioned by these captured slaves ought to be borne by Imperial funds. This Government, however, would do anything in its power as to a grant of land, and if a school were started, it would of course be entitled to the usual grant-in-aid.

As respecting the scope for trained labour on this island, it is as you know practically unlimited, though of late Indian labourers have been very much preferred by the planters to such Africans as were brought here. I may however mention that one gentleman has applied for a permission to bring down from Aden by the mail steamers some of the slaves who have been just liberated there from the dhows captured by the "Daphne" and "Nymph." Since these captures I learn from Mr. Ward that the former vessel has landed 52 more rescued slaves at Mahé, who were on his hands when he wrote. You will thus see that an ample field is likely to be presented for the benevolent efforts of the society.

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Appendix, No. 6.

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LETTER from the Vicar of *Bradford*, late Bishop of *Mauritius*, to the Chairman  
(handed in by the Chairman), dated 27 July 1871.

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Appendix, No. 6.

Vicarage, Bradford, York,  
27 July 1871.

My dear Sir,

I HAVE been so deeply impressed with the proofs of the misery and loss of human life inflicted by the East African slave trade which were brought before me in various ways during nearly 13 years of residence in Mauritius, and visits to the Seychelles and other islands in the Indian Ocean, that I feel constrained to address you on the subject, in your connection with the Committee of the House of Commons, appointed to consider it.

Personal intercourse with ex-slaves in all parts of Mauritius, and the Seychelles Islands, brought out evidence of the most startling character of the atrocities perpetrated by those who conducted the slave trade before the abolition of slavery. One old man had carried with him through life the burden of the recollection, that when torn away from his mother as a child, he did not cry, because those who cried were killed; but that in his heart he had cried a great deal; and with some variety of detail the account generally given of the manner and circumstances of their capture, and of the number of those who were slain was sadly similar in most cases. Until 1860, I and those who laboured with me for their good derived comfort from the thought that we were ministering to the wants and sorrows of a generation which was passing away, leaving their places to be filled up by those who had been born in a land of freedom.

But on returning to Mauritius early in 1861 I found that a large number of rescued slaves, between 400 and 500, had been landed there, taken from the brigantine "Immanuel," and from that time until the close of 1867, when I left the Colony, there was a repetition of such arrivals at Port Louis, and at Port Victoria in the Seychelles, which revived the memory of the traffic in slaves of former times, and supplied proof, as painful as it was emphatic, that the atrocities of former years were re-enacted on the eastern side of the Continent of Africa, the merchants being chiefly Arabs, whose principal emporium for the sale of their victims was Makhedah.

From minute and repeated conversations with the rescued slaves I find that the accounts given in a book published by Sir Fowell Buxton, 32 years ago, can be paralleled in almost every respect.

The description of the sudden attack on the villages by night; the capture of the inhabitants; the slaughter of those who were too old to be of use; and the ruthless tearing away of the children and young people, is too generally given, and is too consistent with the fact of the arrival of large cargoes, mostly of children or very young persons, to admit of doubt on the matter.

Then the miseries of the downward march, described so fully by Dr. Livingstone, and confirmed by the revolting account published in the Blue Book, in 1867. While the intolerable sufferings of the fold or pen into which they are put have been described in a published pamphlet as they were told to me by its author, whose views on the slave trade differed widely from mine.

"Then they were as naked as on the day of their birth; some of them with a long fork attached to their neck, so arranged that it was impossible for them to step forward . . . others were chained together in parcels of 20 . . . The keeper of this den utters a hoarse cry; it is the order for the merchandise to stand up; but many do not obey. The chains are too short; the dead and the dying prevent the living from rising. The dead can say nothing, but what do the dying say? They say that they are dying of hunger. Let us look at some of the details: Who is the creature that holds tightly in her arms a shapeless object, covered with filthy leaves? On looking close you see it is a woman holding to her dried-up breast the child of which she has just been delivered . . . And the man who is working with his hands a piece of mud, which he is continually putting to his eye, what is the matter with him? Our guide tells us 'He is a troublesome fellow who set a bad example by throwing himself at my feet this morning, and saying with a loud voice, "I am dying of hunger!" I gave him a blow which burst his eye; he is henceforth good for nothing;' and he added, with a sinister look, 'He won't be hungry long.'"

But one of the most touching proofs of the misery attending this iniquitous traffic is supplied by the fact of the large number of deaths which often take place among the liberated children and youths of both sexes, even after they have had the kind treatment which is given them on board British men-of-war; and, notwithstanding every attention given them, after their landing, in the Government asylum, or by the masters to whom they become engaged as domestic servants. A gentleman residing near me in Mauritius

lost

lost, within a few weeks, four boys, whom he had engaged as servants in his house and grounds; another lost three out of four; and from one set of 83, no less than 47 were dead in three weeks at the Powder Mills Asylum; the most affecting circumstance in their sorrow being that as they lay upon their dying beds the one word which they uttered with plaintive wailings was the word "Mother, mother!" Their mothers either being many thousand miles away, or having been put to death when their children had been stolen from them. When, at a subsequent period, the cholera attacked the inmates there was a perfect panic among the Africans; because while many of the Indian inmates survived, the Africans almost invariably succumbed to the attack. The extent to which this fearful traffic is carried on; the depopulation which it causes; and the wide-spread desolation of fertile lands, must be well known to you from other testimony. But there is one point on which abundant proof has been given me from the rescued Africans in Mauritius, viz., their being brought from places near to a sea of fresh water, with mountains beyond it, and their having to travel a very long way before they reached the sea; a plain corroboration of the statements of General Rigby and others as to the depopulation and consequent desolation, caused mainly, if not entirely, to the operations of the slave trade. It is evident that in the state of utter uncertainty and confusion caused by the raids of the slave dealers any powerful tribe would have the opportunity of attacking and plundering weaker neighbours for purposes of its own; and, though in some cases the depredations committed by such a tribe may not be directly connected with the slave trade, yet those who persistently carry on that traffic year after year are responsible for the utterly demoralised and weakened condition of other tribes which invites such predatory aggression by its inability to withstand them.

With reference to the measures to be adopted for the benefit of the captured slave, I can testify from personal observation to the humanising, civilising, and Christianising effects of the industrial schools established in connection with the Church of England in Mauritius, and very especially the Powder Mills Asylum, a Government establishment under that superintendence. Any extension of that system would lead to a proportionate increase in the number of skilled artizans, respectable domestic servants, teachers, and catechists, and to a preparation of men who might return to the Continent of Africa as some of the most efficient helpers in the work of civilising the people and stimulating lawful trade.

The beneficial results obtained by the labours of the Church Missionary Society on the western coasts supply the strongest encouragement for the application of the same benevolent principles and methods of action on the east.

The proposition to make Zanzibar the *depôt* is one which I would respectfully but earnestly deprecate for the following reasons. In the first place, because of the impracticability of upholding an institution containing liberated negroes in the midst of a population of slaves of the same race, brought in most instances from the same localities. Secondly, from the difficulty which would be raised in the way of all efforts to evangelise those whose rescue by a Christian nation involves the obligation to endeavour to impart to them the knowledge of Christianity. Thirdly, because the establishment of a *depôt* for free labour at Zanzibar, providing a regular supply of natives to work in Réunion and elsewhere, would directly lead to the very same operations in the interior of Africa, against which the late Earl of Clarendon, as Foreign Secretary, remonstrated so strongly some years ago. The system of the "*libres engagés*" led to most of the bad consequences of the slave trade in the interior of Africa itself. An Arab chief on being told that it was not slavery but free labour, replied to this effect:

"All same ting to me. Old time you call it slavery; now you call it free labour; I go catch men, sell; you give the money; all right." And it surely would be a strange result of British interference for supplying the slave trade that the plantations should be worked by labourers procured by us from the hold of slave ships, and then placed beyond the reach of our protection.

About 60 natives of the Kingsmill group of islands to the north-east of Sydney, were disposed of as free labourers in 1857, in Bourbon, realising to the kidnappers about 40 *l.* each, for a *soi-disant* engagement of five or seven years; but to the best of my knowledge no trace of them has been obtainable since.

The correspondence on the subject is most probably at the Foreign Office.

One important item in all consideration of repressive measures is the fact that such immense profit is made on every slave landed in Arabia. In one case of capture by the boats of the "Highflyer," it was ascertained that the cost of each slave landed at Makedar would be from seven to nine dollars, while the price realised for the sale would be from 60 to 90 dollars. Such a fact proves the necessity of peremptory measures of repression.

I remain, &c.  
(signed) Vincent W. Ryan,  
Bishop.

Right Hon. Russell Gurney.



## Appendix, No. 7.

## Appendix, No. 7. [PAPERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE ON THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA.

(Secret Department.—No. 14 of 1860.)

## MUSCAT-ZANZIBAR COMMISSION.

From Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, in charge, Muscat Zanzibar Commission, to *H. L. Anderson*, Esquire, Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay; dated Aden, 1 November 1860.

Sir,

HAVING been directed by Government to avail myself of the opportunities which would be afforded me, while in charge of the Muscat Zanzibar Commission, to inquire into the actual state of the slave trade on the East Coast of Africa, and if possible to suggest some more effectual means for its extirpation than those now in force, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council, the following general report on the subject, comprising therein the result of my recent inquiries at Muscat, and of those lately instituted at Zanzibar.

Slave trade in the Portuguese Settlement of East Africa.

2. Whether owing to a falling off in the supply of slaves on the West Coast of Africa, or to the vigilance of Her Majesty's cruisers on that station, or to the comparative immunity with which it has been found that the traffic can be pursued on the opposite side of the continent, it is unquestionable that the exportation of slaves from the Portuguese territories on the East Coast of Africa has greatly increased within the last few years.

3. According to an extract published in the "Anti-Slavery Reporter (Supplement)," 1 July 1859, the senior naval officer on that station had reported that, "he has reason to believe no slaver has been fitted out on the East Coast, or taken away slaves round the Cape of Good Hope for the last three years." Such an assurance of the extinction of the traffic, if correctly quoted, may have justified a less watchful surveillance. I am not able to state that any such relaxation has actually occurred; but I believe that until within the last three months no slaver has been captured on the East Coast of Africa for the last six years, and the impression has become general that the traffic on this side may be carried on with perfect safety. An American merchant, who had resided long at Zanzibar, published his opinion to that effect in one of the United States journals; and the captain of the Spanish slaver, captured two months ago by Her Majesty's ship "Lyra," off the Island of Monfea, stated that he had received the strongest assurance of there being no British cruisers stationed on the East Coast of Africa to interfere with his proceedings.

4. The official reports of Mr. M'Leod, late British Consul, will have apprised Her Majesty's Government of the extent to which the slave trade was being prosecuted between the Portuguese settlements on that coast and different ports of South America during his residence at Mozambique, and also of a similar traffic, which under the title of "French Free Labour Emigration" was being carried on simultaneously between those settlements and La Réunion.

5. The information since obtained by Colonel Rigby, Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar, fully corroborates Mr. M'Leod's statements. In September, of last year, he reported that "an extensive trade was being carried on at Eboo, situated on the East Coast of Africa within the Portuguese territories, in about 12° south latitude, with the full knowledge of the Portuguese authorities at that port." And in proof thereof he adduces the fact of at least four large vessels being engaged at the time in embarking cargoes of slaves from that vicinity.

6. As further evidence bearing on the same point, I may adduce the capture of two large clipper-built vessels, under Spanish colours, within the last four months; one taken by Her Majesty's ship "Brisk," in the Mozambique Channel, with 864 slaves on board, obtained from the Portuguese territories, and the other (already referred to), captured by Her Majesty's ship "Lyra," fully fitted out and provisioned as a slaver. In all probability this vessel, having found some difficulty in securing a ready cargo within the Portuguese settlements, had come up as high as the Island of Monfea, confident of obtaining as many slavers as were required from the African territories dependent on Zanzibar.

7. Difficult as it is, owing to the absence of any British agents on the coast, to secure accurate information of the full extent to which this nefarious traffic prevails within the Portuguese settlements, the foregoing facts are sufficient to prove that it has long been carried on without risk, and that, emboldened by impunity, its agents have within the last few years greatly increased their slave transactions in those parts.

8. Further,

8. Further, it is equally certain, considering the penalties attached by the Portuguese Government to any participation in the foreign slave trade, that such transactions could not be carried on in their African territories without the countenance of the local authorities. Their connivance is fully known to all the Arab and other traders on the coast, and I found the concurrent testimony in perfect accord with the statement of Colonel Rigby, that at the "Portuguese settlements the slave trade is carried on in the most shameless manner, all the Portuguese authorities aiding and abetting it, and dividing their nefarious gains."

9. Moreover, by all accounts, the cruelties of the traffic in the hands of the Portuguese equal in atrocity those so well known to accompany it on the Western Coast, and its late increase among them is fast destroying the last faint traces of civilisation left in their once prosperous settlements on the East Coast of Africa. Large tracts of fertile country are becoming depopulated, and the remains of the semi-barbarous tribes in the neighbourhood are being driven to a state of desperation, which threatens at no distant period to be the scourge and ruin of their degenerate and inhuman masters.

10. It will be for Her Majesty's Ministers to decide on the propriety of bringing to the notice of the Portuguese Government the culpable conduct of its representatives on the East Coast of Africa in thus fostering the slave trade. But if, as is to be feared, no permanently favourable result is likely to follow any such intervention, owing to the weakness of the Imperial Government, and the utter disorganisation of its East African settlements, I venture to urge that no time be lost in strengthening the Cape squadron with a sufficient number of steam vessels, specially adapted for the service, to watch the Portuguese coast from Delagoa Bay to Cape Delgado. The fertile and salubrious island of Johanna, three degrees south of Delgado, with its secure anchorage, and its reigning sultan decidedly favourable to our interests, would form an eligible haven for the cruisers on the north; whilst the hitherto neglected British possession of the southern portion of Delagoa Bay might constitute a convenient station for those destined to watch the line of Portuguese coast from that point to the mouths of the Zambesi.

11. I believe the opinion is gaining ground that the notorious insalubrity of the Portuguese town of Lorenzo Marques, near Delagoa Bay, is not so much owing to the climate of that portion of Africa as to its ill-chosen site. On the other hand Iniack Island, forming the southern arm of the bay, and within British limits, is represented as being a very healthy spot, entirely beyond the poisonous miasmata of the adjacent rivers, and frequently resorted to by the natives as a sanatorium. It appears to me desirable, independently of the suggestion contained in the foregoing paragraph, that a fair trial should be made of the climate of this locality. The position is admirably adapted for trade, whilst the two navigable rivers in its immediate neighbourhood, the Mapoota and the Manice, are said to give access to the Zula country and to the territories of the Transvaal Republic. Should the result be favourable, Iniack Island would bid fair to become an important commercial emporium, whilst the adjoining country of Tembe (also British territory), might afford an eligible settlement whereon to locate the slaves captured by our cruisers on the coast. In short, the healthiness of the climate once proved, a British station in Delagoa Bay might occupy, on this side of Africa, a position analogous to that of Sierra Leone on the Western Coast; and should the scheme proposed be found feasible, benevolent societies at home would not be backward to crown the humane efforts of the Government, in behalf of the liberated Africans, by corresponding endeavours to impart to them the blessings of a christian civilisation.

12. In the event, however, of Delagoa Bay being found unadapted for the object here suggested, there are fortunately several other British settlements in these seas where any number of liberated slaves might find a ready asylum, together with the means of obtaining their own livelihood, as well as of being at the same time within the reach of Christian instruction. Natal, 250 miles to the south, is in urgent want of labourers. The Seychelles, with their rich soil, are comparatively waste from the same cause; and the Mauritius, where the 800 slaves lately captured by Her Majesty's ship "Brisk" were gladly received, could find remunerative employment for some additional thousands of workmen on the prosperous sugar plantations of that island.

13. If I hesitate to apologise for the foregoing suggestions touching the disposal of slaves captured by our cruisers on the east coast of Africa, it is owing to the conviction that they will not be regarded as superfluous, and that Her Majesty's Government is as deeply interested in the after condition and welfare of such as acquire their freedom by British intervention, as it is in rescuing them, in the first instance, from the miseries of an inhuman bondage.

14. But if the suppression of slavery in the Portuguese settlements is an object most desirable in itself, its importance is enhanced in view of any attempt on our part to abolish the traffic in the adjoining African territories dependent on Zanzibar. The fact of a neighbouring Christian people, known to be extensively engaged in the trade, is at once a precedent and a strong ground of apology to the slave-dealing Mahomedans. No formal argument, indeed, is based on that plea; but hints as to our consistency in so strongly urging them to forego the practice, and doubts as to the disinterestedness of our motives in the solicitation, whilst our co-religionists are allowed to pursue the same course with comparative

Appendix, No. 7. rative impunity, are frequently dropped by Mussulmans of those parts in all discussions regarding the abolition of the slave trade. Submitting this remark as an additional argument in support of the energetic measures recommended for the suppression of the traffic in the Portuguese settlements, I pass on to consider the slave trade as it now prevails at Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

Slave trade at Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

15. The African dominions of his late Highness Syud Saeed extend from Mukdeesha, on the north, to Cape Delgado on the south, at which latter point they are conterminous with the Portuguese territories. According to Article I. of the existing Treaty, made with the late Imam in October 1845, "His Highness the Sultan of Muscat engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, and to use his utmost influence with all the chiefs of Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, in like manner to prevent the introduction of slaves from Africa into their respective territories." But by the tenor of Article III. the prohibition contained in the first Article is virtually considerably modified. Thereby "His Highness the Sultan of Muscat grants to the ships of Her Majesty's Navy, as well as to those of the East India Company, permission to seize and confiscate any vessels the property of his Highness or of his subjects carrying on slave trade, excepting only such as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kanghoo Island, in  $1^{\circ} 57''$  south latitude, and the port of Kilwa to the south and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Longa Munara, or Pagoda Point, in  $9^{\circ} 2''$  south latitude, including the Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea."

16. In spite of the provisions of this Treaty, which restrict the trade to the transport of slaves within certain limits, and forbid all export beyond them, Dr. Krapf writes, that in 1853 he saw 20 Arab ships at Mukdeesha engaged in smuggling slaves to Arabia. Colonel Rigby also, as late as March last, reports that large numbers of boats and buttelas belonging to the piratical tribes of Omán and the Persian Gulf are in the habit of visiting Zanzibar and the East Coast of Africa for the purpose of purchasing or kidnapping slaves; and he estimates that 4,000 are yearly carried away and landed at different places on the shores of Arabia and the Persian Gulf. These boats are represented as carrying an armed crew, who land on any part of the coast and seize indiscriminately the domestic or other slaves belonging to the inhabitants. Even Zanzibar itself is subject to these forays. During the period of their annual visits, extending from November to March, Colonel Rigby describes Zanzibar as resembling "a city with a hostile army encamped in its neighbourhood. Every person who is able to do so sends his children and young slaves into the interior of the island for security. People are afraid to stir out of their houses after dark, and reports are daily made of children and slaves kidnapped; and in the suburbs of the town they even enter the houses, and take the children away by force." So much with regard to the export of slaves to the northward, through the agency of the Arabs.

17. But in addition to the foregoing, there is reason to believe that a considerable trade in slaves has been carried on clandestinely for some time past by square-rigged vessels under foreign colours, both at Zanzibar and within its African dependencies. In 1857 the brig "Venus," hoisting the Spanish flag, arrived at Zanzibar, and from thence proceeded to Lamoo, where she embarked from 500 to 800 slaves for Havannah. The principal agent employed in this transaction was a Spaniard named Buonaventura Mass, who a year later was engaged in securing another cargo of slaves for exportation. Documentary proofs of this fact have already been submitted to Government by Colonel Rigby, and it would appear from the evidence adduced on the occasion that out of 424 slaves obtained at Kilwa, no less than 225 died from exposure and other sufferings on their way to Lamoo, to which place they were sent to be resold, owing to the non-arrival of the vessel expected to embark them. It appears that these slaves had been destined for La Réunion, since in one of his letters to the Arab agent employed by him in collecting them at Kilwa, Mr. Mass says, "Of the 600 slaves to be purchased 60 must be females; for the Government of Bourbon insist that 10 of every 100 shall be females, or they will not accept them."

18. Again, in February 1858 Colonel Rigby reports that the French ship "Pallas" succeeded in embarking 600 slaves from Zanzibar. The slaves were conveyed secretly in boats to the south parts of the island, and there received on board the "Pallas." Two hundred of these slaves were supplied to Mass by an Arab named Suleiman bin Abdallah, and the remainder, he has reason to suspect, were provided conjointly by a brother of Sultan Majeed, and by his Vizier, Syud Suleiman bin Hamed.

19. Further, as late as July last, another vessel named the "Formosa Estrella," from Havannah, under Spanish colours, anchored off the eastern side of Zanzibar, and on being visited by the commander of one of his Highness's ships of war, who had proceeded thither in the French war steamer "La Somme," he reported that the ship was completely equipped as a slaver, having on board, besides provisions, a supply of irons, chains, tin plates, &c. There can be no doubt that the object of this vessel was to secure a cargo of slaves from Zanzibar; for a Spaniard from Cuba had lately joined Mr. Mass on the island, and a large number of slaves were being purchased for them by different Arab agents, both at Zanzibar and at Kilwa, many of whom were subsequently emancipated by his Highness Syud Majeed, on the representation made to him by Colonel Rigby of their destination. Colonel Rigby attributes the ultimate escape of this vessel to the extraordinary conduct of the French consul

consul in warning her of the presence of Her Majesty's ship "Lyra;" otherwise it is more than probable that she would have been captured by the "Lyra," in the same manner that another vessel, also under Spanish colours, was taken by her a few days after off the Island of Monfea. In this latter case, likewise, the charterparty found on board was signed by Mass, who engaged to supply the vessel with a cargo of slaves.

20. Mr. Mass and his coadjutor have quitted Zanzibar, but it is reported that the former has proceeded to Lamoo to carry on his slave speculations there, and it is rumoured that no less than five foreign slavers consigned to him are expected to visit this coast during the approaching season.

21. The foregoing facts will suffice to convey to the Government a tolerably correct idea of the extent to which the foreign slave trade is being prosecuted within the territories dependent on Zanzibar. Independently of the energetic exertions of Colonel Rigby to arrest it, there are absolutely no restrictions whatever on the infamous traffic; and it is much to be regretted that instead of co-operating with him in his praiseworthy endeavours, the representatives of France at Zanzibar have hitherto seemed disposed to countenance, if not to protect, the foreign agents engaged in the inhuman trade.

22. I proceed, in the next place, to lay before Government several details regarding what may be called the domestic slavery of Zanzibar and its African dependencies. The evident scope of the treaty made with the late Imâm Syud Saeed, was to confine the slave trade within certain limits. The facts recorded in the foregoing remarks prove incontestibly that the provisions of the treaty in that respect are a dead letter; and, further, that the limits within which domestic slavery was still permitted have become the principal source of an extensive supply of slaves for foreign exportation.

23. Colonel Rigby reckons the annual import of slaves into Zanzibar, ostensibly for the supply of the domestic market, at 19,000. His Highness Syud Majeed estimates the number at between 25,000 and 30,000. Add to this 4,000 sent direct from the coast towards Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and as many more from the same quarter to South America and other foreign ports, either direct or through the Portuguese territories, and the result will give a yearly average export of no less than 30,000 slaves from the African territories dependent on Zanzibar, the principal places of export being Lamoo on the north, and Kilwa on the south.

24. So great has been the demand of late years that the slave resources on the coast have been quite exhausted, and regular forays are made into the interior by armed bands of Arabs and Sowahilis to collect supplies, and the tribes are bribed to co-operate with them against each other. Dr. Krapf, the eminent African missionary, thus describes the process: "To the south of the Pangani is the territory of the heathen Wasegua tribe, and the great centre of the slave trade. The Arabs of Zanzibar come here and promise the Wasegua chiefs a number of muskets and shot for a certain number of slaves; so when a chief has entered into the contract, he suddenly falls on a hostile village, sets it on fire, and carries off the inhabitants. Among these tribes the slave trade has hitherto flourished to a frightful extent, chiefly owing to the encouragement of the Arabs of Zanzibar. From 10,000 to 12,000 slaves are said to pass yearly through Kilwa on their way to the various ports of the Sowahili coast and to Arabia, and we saw many gangs of from six to ten slaves chained to each other, and obliged to carry burdens on their heads." Later still, Captain Burton writes that the slaves from the interior "are collected like ivories throughout the length and breadth of the land. They are driven down from the principal depôts to the coast by the Arab and Wasawahili merchants, who afterwards sell them in retail at the great mart of Zanzibar." The Rev. Mr. Rebmann, also, whom I had an opportunity of consulting on the voyage from Zanzibar, spoke of slavery as a curse which was fast depopulating that side of the continent, barbarizing the residents on the coast, carrying de-olation and death far into the interior, and effectually neutralising every attempt to introduce Christianity into the country. An isolated residence of 14 years among the natives of the main land gives the weight of experience to Mr. Rebmann's opinions, and his conviction is, that whilst slavery continues to be so profitable a speculation to the ruling party, and such a fell scourge to the aboriginal tribes, the civilisation of Eastern Africa is impossible. Mr. Rebmann's readiness to supply me with any information on the state of affairs in that quarter calls for my sincere thanks, and I gladly avail myself of the same opportunity of testifying to the great respect with which his exemplary and self-denying character was spoken of, as well by his Highness Syud Majeed, as by all classes of the native population.

25. These statements are fully confirmed by the reports of Colonel Rigby, who has spared no pains to collect the most authentic information on the subject. Writing in March last, he says: "It appears that the tribes near the coast have been seized and sold to such an extent that the supply is exhausted. The M'do tribe, which some years ago furnished most of the slaves brought to Zanzibar, is said to be quite extinct. The slave trade is every year being carried further into the interior amongst tribes where it had been previously unknown. The great Mizan tribe, which occupied a vast extent of rich country, producing cotton in abundance, is now nearly exhausted; and districts which a few years ago were populous and productive, are now entirely destitute of inhabitants. This traffic is now carried on even beyond the Lake of Nyassa, and is depopulating the rich valleys inhabited by the Manganza tribe, where cotton is so abundant that it might soon  
"become  
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Appendix, No. 7. "become a great article of export, were the Portuguese to put a stop to the export of slaves. Natives of India, who have resided many years at Kilwa, the chief slave mart on the coast, state, that it is only within the last 10 or 12 years that the Arabs go into the interior with large numbers of armed followers on purpose to procure slaves, and that whole districts are systematically hunted to procure them, the cupidity of the native chiefs being excited by the muskets, guns, powder, and cotton cloth, they receive from the Arabs in payment. They also state, that districts near Kilwa, extending to 10 or 12 days' journey, which a few years ago were thickly populated, are now entirely uninhabited; and an Arab, who has lately returned from Lake Nyassa, informed me that he travelled for 17 days through a country covered with ruined towns and villages, which a few years ago were inhabited by the Mijana and Mijan tribes, and where now no living soul is seen."

26. It would be an easy task to depict, from such facts, the atrocities which must be perpetrated in the interior by the slave hunters, and the cruelties and indignities suffered by their unwarlike and inoffensive prey. Such, indeed, appears to be the almost universal testimony to their character, and from personal observations at Zanzibar, I believe there can be no doubt on the subject. Unfortunately the miseries of the wretched negroes do not cease with their capture, and the trader is deemed lucky who succeeds in reaching the coast with only the loss of one-third of his booty. Colonel Rigby thus describes the arrival of a cargo of slaves at Zanzibar, and it may fairly be inferred that their treatment, while detained on the coast, is equally cruel and repulsive. Premising that the slaves of both sexes on first arrival are in a state of almost complete nudity, Colonel Rigby writes: "It is impossible to conceive a more revolting sight than the landing of the slaves coming from Kilwa; they are brought in open boats, packed so closely that they are exposed day and night to sun, wind, and rain, with only sufficient grain to keep them from starvation. If the boats meet with contrary winds, they generally run short of water, and thirst is added to the other miseries which these poor creatures endure. On arriving at Zanzibar they are frequently in the last stage of lingering starvation, and are unable to stand; some drop dead in the custom-house and in the streets, and others who are not likely to recover are left on board to die, in order that the master may avoid paying the duty which is levied on those landed. After being brought on the shore the slaves are kept some time in the dealers' houses until they gain flesh and strength, when they are sold by auction in the slave market. The Arab regards the slaves as cattle; not the slightest attention is paid to their sufferings; they are too cheap and numerous to be cared for. This year slaves have been sold in the interior for half a dollar a head, or five slaves given in exchange for a cow or bullock." It is true that the slaves on the island plantations lead a comparatively easy life, and that once in the possession of masters whose interest it is to care for them, they are for the most part humanely treated; but much as the after condition of slaves in Mahomedan countries has been vaunted of when compared with the lot of such as are taken to America, the antecedents and concomitants of the trade are as barbarous in the one case as in the other, and the degrading results to those who engage in it, and its ruinous consequences in retarding the civilisation of this part of the African continent, are not one whit behind the worst phases of West African slavery.

27. Turning in the next place to a consideration of the best remedy for this deplorable state of things, I beg to observe at the outset, that at present the traffic is carried on without any restriction whatever. The provisions of the Treaty whereby his late Highness engaged to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the export of slaves from his African dominions, and their import into his possessions in Asia, and to issue orders to his officers to suppress such trade, are a dead letter, as the foregoing facts have abundantly proved. Moreover, I am unable to perceive the most distant prospect for the better without some radical reform in the system of the native Government, or without a more decided policy on our part. The Arabs to a man are more or less mixed up with the traffic; his Highness's chief advisers draw a profit from it; his own household, police, and army, are recruited principally from the same source; and the banyan, who farms the entire customs of the Zanzibar and African territories, deriving as he does two dollars per head on every imported slave, must be interested in the prosperity of the trade. Educated as he has been, it is not surprising that his Highness Syud Majeed cannot view the subject of slavery in any other light than that of a time-honoured institution, profitable in its immediate results, and permitted, if not actually sanctioned, by the precepts of his religion. Nevertheless, I have reason to believe his Highness, from political motives, is by no means personally indisposed to co-operate in suppressing the traffic, at all events to the extent contemplated by the Treaty, and Colonel Rigby has never had to complain of any reticency on his part when called upon to interfere in isolated cases of infraction brought to his notice. But with a population to govern wholly devoted to the trade, and an executive equally involved in it, Syud Majeed may be said to hold the reins of power by sufferance, and is therefore absolutely unable, without extraneous support, to carry out the provisions of the existing Treaty. If his officials on the coast connive at the exportation of slaves to foreign parts, he cannot supersede them by others who would not follow their example; and even at Zanzibar, under his immediate inspection, the same course is pursued, almost with impunity, despite any orders which he may issue to arrest it. As an instance in point, Colonel Rigby gives the case of a Turkish Jemadar, who was placed in charge of a body of soldiers to patrol the streets at night, and who was subsequently known to have sold sixty-two children to the Northern Arabs while engaged on that duty.

28. Nevertheless,

28. Nevertheless, as by the Treaty of 1845, all ships of Her Majesty's Royal and Indian Navies have permission to seize and confiscate any vessels the property of His Highness, or of his subjects carrying on slave trade, excepting only such as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own African dominions between Kilwa on the south, and Lamoo on the north, we already possess a right to interfere, which, if adequately used, might be very effectual in arresting, if not in abolishing, a considerable branch of the trade. In the first place, most of the export to the northward might be suppressed. I confess that I heard with surprise Colonel Rigby's statement that four thousand slaves are still annually taken to the shores of Arabia and the Persian Gulf, there being generally a squadron at the latter place specially commissioned to stop such importation. It seems, moreover, a comparatively easy task, considering that almost all the chiefs of the gulf have formally given our ships the right of seizing them, to prevent any number of boats from landing a cargo of slaves if our measures were wisely concerted to that end; and yet I believe that very few captures have been made within the last ten or fifteen years. A small steamer, or two schooners, stationed between Rasel Hadd and Muzeira island, and a similar guard at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, during the season when the Arab boats usually return from their African trip (namely, from March to June), ought to suffice to render the chance of escape so precarious, that few boats would venture to carry slaves.

29. I am not aware that any relaxation has actually taken place in our efforts to arrest the traffic in the Persian Gulf; but in view of the number of slaves now reported to be conveyed in that direction, I venture to suggest the propriety of an inquiry being instituted into the subject.\* Further, I believe that the efforts made would be much more effectual if each vessel was provided with an officer, conversant with the native languages, and capable to communicate directly with the persons found on board the coasting craft. At present that task is generally left to common native interpreters, who, as a class, are open to bribery, and by no means disposed to discriminate between the real crew and the slaves who are often falsely represented to belong to it. And, perhaps it would still further add to the efficiency of the Gulf squadron, and inspire the officers in command with greater zeal in the duty, if some more speedy mode of adjudicating on slave prizes could be adopted. I profess myself quite unable to pronounce a judgment on the legal bearings of this suggestion; nevertheless, I am fully persuaded that the delay which frequently occurs in such cases, sometimes extending over two years, is a great cause of discouragement to the officers of the Indian Navy engaged in suppressing the slave trade.

30. In addition to the above, I would strongly recommend the adoption of Colonel Rigby's suggestion that a steam gun-boat of light draught be stationed at Zanzibar during the months of January and February, and March, to act in concert with the cruisers in the Persian Gulf in arresting the northern slave trade. The principal duty of such a vessel would be to prevent the shipment of any slaves on board the boats of the Northern Arabs, and if possible to seize such as succeeded in obtaining a cargo before they finally left the African coast. The knowledge that such a vessel was at hand would deter many from embarking slaves; it would encourage the subjects and soldiers of His Highness, who are now represented as standing in great dread of the warlike Northern Arabs, to resist them; and it would tend to lessen the chances, which unfortunately accompany all our efforts to suppress the traffic, of the miserable victims being drowned by their captors in order to avoid seizure and confiscation. On this subject Colonel Rigby writes: "I am of opinion that all possible activity of British cruisers towards the Persian Gulf and the coast of Arabia will have little effect in checking these piratical tribes. Their boats being of light draught, and most of them propelled by oars in addition to sails, creep close to the shore where they know that it would be unsafe for ships to cruise; and if chased by a ship of war, they think no more of throwing slaves overboard than if they were brute animals."

31. But another advantage which would follow the presence of such a steam gun-boat at Zanzibar, would be to arrest the foreign trade in slaves as it has lately been carried on in square-rigged vessels by European agents. I have already described this branch of the traffic; and the seizure of a large slaver off the island of Monfea by Her Majesty's steamer *Lyra*, and the arrival of another shortly after on the eastern side of Zanzibar, prove the necessity of some prompt measures being taken to put a stop to the growing system. It is further reported that five other foreign ships are to visit the coast during the present season to take in slaves. Were a British steamer stationed at Zanzibar it is highly probable that the attempt would not be made, or if made, that it would result in failure, or in the seizure of the contraband vessels.

32. But though considerable beneficial results would doubtless follow the energetic adoption of the measures above recommended, those measures, at best, deal rather with the details of the slave trade as prevailing at Zanzibar and its African dependencies, than with the most fruitful source of the evil. Viewing, indeed, the extent to which the permission to transport slaves between certain limits of his late Highness's dominions has been abused

\* Perhaps it would be advisable that the vessels specially intended to suppress the slave trade should be detached from the Gulf squadron, and made a temporary separate command from March to June of each year.

Appendix, No. 7. abused to foster and supply an increasing external traffic, and believing that no efforts on our part will avail effectually to prevent it whilst that permission exists, I venture to suggest that an attempt should be made by the British Government to obtain a revision of the existing Treaty on the subject, whereby the present restricted legality of the trade should be rescinded, and all export and import of slaves within his Highness's territories be strictly prohibited.

33. It has already been pointed out that from nineteen to thirty thousand slaves are annually imported into Zanzibar. This number is immensely beyond the requirements of the Island, making every allowance for the fact noted by Colonel Rigby, that the females seldom bear many children; added to this large numbers are exported from Kilwa and other places on the coast to foreign ports as well as to the adjacent islands: but all ostensibly for the domestic supply. This transport is incessant, and is carried on in detail at all seasons of the year by numerous small boats plying between every point of the coast and the islands; inasmuch that whilst the present exemption lasts it is practically impossible to stop it. Every boat overhauled would have the ready excuse, which it would be difficult to dispute, that the slaves on board were destined for some place within the legalised limits; and in like manner it would require quite a fleet of vessels to guard against any export beyond those limits, whilst the same plea is available to escape the penalty of violating the Treaty. But let the ground for this pretext be entirely removed, and all transport of slaves beyond sea be declared illegal, and with no more than ordinary efforts on our part to see such a provision carried into effect, a blow would be struck against the slave trade in the African dependencies of Zanzibar which would go a great way to compass its eventual abolition.

34. There are several plausible objections, however, which may be urged against the measure here suggested. The stoppage of all importation of slaves from the coast, viewed in connection with the fact recorded by Colonel Rigby, that the females bear few offspring, might prove a serious drawback to the prosperity of Zanzibar, especially to the clove and other plantations on the Island. In reply to this it may fairly be premised that once convinced that all extraneous supply was cut off, the Arabs would take more care of the slaves already in their possession, and the result would be a correction of those causes which at present contribute to arrest the natural increase. Besides which, according to Colonel Rigby, "there is abundant free labour procurable at Zanzibar. The European and American merchants generally have several hundred labourers in their employ, cleaning gum copal, cowries, curing hide, &c.; and hundreds of Arabs from Hadramant come here, who work as porters, loading and unloading ships, &c.;" and further, there can be no doubt that many Africans would voluntarily seek a livelihood at Zanzibar if they were assured of enjoying their freedom there, and of receiving adequate remuneration for their labour.

35. The objection to the ulterior intervention suggested on the ground that it would be an unjustifiable interference with the religious privileges of the Arabs, scarcely deserves notice. The prohibition by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and by the Viceroy of Egypt, of any fresh importation of slaves within the Ottoman dominions, constitutes a satisfactory precedent more than sufficient to remove all scruples on that score. Besides which, it is notorious that the Arabs of these parts never affect to adduce the sanction of religion in defence of a system which is obviously pursued from no other motive than that of secular profit.

36. But a much more serious objection is the opposition on the part of the Arab population, and of other interested parties among his subjects, which the proposed measure would most probably occasion to the ruler at Zanzibar, whether that state be eventually re-joined to Muscat or continue independent. The system of Arab rule is so precarious, and the Sovereign, though in some respects absolute, has so little power to control the popular will when adverse to his wishes, that his acquiescence in such a measure might perchance imperil his authority. Luckily any opposition of this nature is really so contemptible, that one British man of war at Zanzibar would suffice, by the moral effect of its presence alone, to restrain the disaffected. Nevertheless, should the British Government eventually decide to adopt the suggestions now made, I would recommend that a period of three years be allowed before the prohibition is enforced. That would afford the Arabs abundant time to familiarize themselves with the necessity, give them ample space to make suitable provision against its consequences, and thereby tend to render them less inimical to the enactment when it finally came into operation.

37. When conferring with Syud Thoweynee at Muscat, I understood his Highness's remark, that this further restriction of the slave trade might be effected by the ruler at Zanzibar, "if backed by the influence of the British Government" (*vide* my Report on Muscat, No. 10, of 1860) to refer solely to a support such as is described in the foregoing paragraph; but I have now reason to believe that something beyond that was intended. I find, on examination, that about one-sixth of the entire amount for which the customs of Zanzibar and its African dependencies are farmed is derived from the duty levied on slaves. Hitherto the duty has been one dollar per head, but his Highness Syud Majeed has lately raised it to two dollars, in lieu of paying interest on the large debt which he owes to the banyan who farms the customs. Hence, if the present limitation were removed, and all transport and importation of slaves be declared illegal, the income of the State, which is derived almost exclusively from the customs, would suffer to the extent of from five to eight thousand

thousand pounds sterling per annum, a sum which, in the present condition of the Zanzibar finances, would reduce the State to hopeless insolvency. Appendix, No. 7.

38. This consideration forms, in my opinion, the most serious obstacle to the suggestion proposed, and it will be for Her Majesty's Government to decide on the propriety of removing it by offering to compensate the native Sovereign for the loss, on condition that he formally gave his consent to the measure through a revised Treaty, and sanctioned our further interference to see it carried into effect. I notice in the "Persian Gulf" Government selections, that on the occasion of our first proposals to the late Sultan Syud Saeed to abolish the slave trade, his Highness strongly objected, on the ground that "the traffic in slaves was a lucrative one, and without full compensation he could not dream of prohibiting it." However, he was informed in reply that Her Britannic Majesty was fully aware of the sacrifice he would make by the adoption of Her Majesty's views, and was ready, in the event of his Highness's concurrence in the abolition, to afford him any pecuniary concession in reason. This announcement had the desired effect." The discussion resulted in the existing Treaty of 1845. I am not aware what amount was to have been paid to his Highness; but I have been given to understand that he eventually declined to receive any remuneration on that score.

39. I adduce this extract to show that the idea suggested in the foregoing paragraph has already been entertained by Her Majesty's Government, and I certainly deem it advisable that a similar offer should accompany any further proposal to abolish the slave trade in the Zanzibar territories. Situated as Syud Majeed is at present, the dispute betwixt him and his brother regarding the succession not yet decided, I hesitated from prudential motives, and lest the proposal might be construed into a covert bribe, to obtain from him any explicit opinion on the subject; nevertheless I feel fully persuaded that nothing is needed beyond an insistent urgency, coupled with an offer of reasonable indemnification, and our support to insure them against any overt acts of their subjects in consequence of the concession, to obtain the consent either of Syud Thoweynee or Syud Majeed to the measure here suggested for the more effectual abolition of the slave trade. In my report from Muscat I communicated to Government what Syud Thoweynee's views were; and the following extract from statement of his claims and grievances, delivered to me by Syud Majeed at Zanzibar, sets forth what his Highness has been pleased, of his own accord, to write on the same subject. "Those commissioned by you have had some conversation with me about curtailing the limits within which it is still lawful to transport slaves, and also about abolishing the transport altogether, and whether any aid would be required thereto. I replied that I would never oppose the wishes of the high (British) Government; nevertheless your lordship is not ignorant of the condition of these countries, and you are doubtless aware that the prosperity of the subjects of these countries is derived chiefly from ploughing and sowing, and that such prosperity cannot be maintained without slaves. But your opinion is best." The objection is a natural one; but the drift of the quotation suffices to show that there is no chance of its being persevered in contrary to the wishes of the British Government.

40. I take it for granted that the offer originally made to the late Syud Saeed did not imply that our payment of an indemnity should be perpetual. In like manner I would limit any such offer in the present instance to a term of 10 or 20 years. The commerce of the country, and the revenues of the Zanzibar state, have quadrupled since the Treaty of 1845, and with prudent foresight and proper Government, a corresponding increase may be anticipated hereafter, more especially if the further abolition of slavery now proposed is carried into effect. Besides, there is no lesson which the Arabs need so much to learn as that of self-reliance; and the prospect of a perpetual subsidy from the British, would only send to foster a moral weakness which is the bane of their native rulers.

41. In the event of Her Majesty's Government deeming it advisable to adopt the recommendations now made for the further suppression of slavery in the Zanzibar dominions, I trust that it will be found practicable to secure the co-operation of France and of the United States of America in the benevolent enterprise. Situated as the ruler of Zanzibar is, he is scrupulously anxious to be on the best terms with foreign powers generally, and when the views of the latter are not in unison, the want of accord begets a vacillating line of conduct on his part injurious to his own character as an independent sovereign, and prejudicial to all improvement among his people. More especially is unanimity desirable where the object is to suppress a popular institution which, though justly reprobated by all Christian powers, is regarded by the Arabs as a national privilege, and the chief source of their wealth and prosperity on the East Coast of Africa. In fact, were they not fully convinced of their own utter inability, unsupported by extraneous aid, to resist any such demand on our part, the Arabs would never consent to the imposition of any additional restrictions on the slave trade within their territories. Hence, although the knowledge that one or more of the foreign powers had declined to co-operate with the British to that end might not deter the Arabs from yielding to our exclusive solicitation, nevertheless it is easy to foresee that they would avail themselves of the countenance which that fact would seemingly afford them, to neutralise, as far as possible, our every effort for the more effectual abolition of slavery; nothing more, however, is required to frustrate such an evasive policy on their part, and to prevent the international misunderstandings which may be engendered thereby, than that the two Governments above named should join with Great Britain in decreasing the abolition of slavery on the East Coast of Africa. I presume that the consent of the United States



Appendix, No. 7. would be given without hesitation; but it is possible that the concurrence of France would be less readily obtained. Government is aware of the attempts made about two years ago by the French authorities at Bourbon to secure a large number of free labourers for that island from the east coast of Africa. The undertaking had obviously received the imperial sanction, but although the rules laid down for obtaining the required supply, and for regulating the after condition of the negroes, were unexceptionable; yet the result proved that practically, the scheme was a mere modification of the slave trade; Lieutenant Colonel Rigby's letters to Government, noted in the margin, with their several enclosures, place that conclusion beyond doubt; and it was probably owing to a similar conviction that his Imperial Majesty was induced to suspend, if not to rescind, the questionable "Free Labour Emigration Trade." It is to be hoped that the concession lately granted by the British Government for a limited number of Indian coolies to be engaged for Bourbon, will obviate a recurrence to the former system; but as a rumour is current to the contrary, I trust that Her Majesty's ministers will succeed in concluding a joint convention with France and the United States of America, whereby any such attempts will be provided against hereafter by a general law for the total suppression of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa. The extent to which it has long prevailed in that quarter, its frightful increase for some years past, the utter inadequacy of the measures hitherto taken to arrest it, the dire effects which have already followed it, and the still worse consequences which must inevitably result from a continuance of the nefarious traffic, these considerations combined constitute a claim on humanity which it is devoutly to be hoped will be duly recognised and vindicated by the concurrence of the three powers in some regularly organised effort for its speedy abolition.

No. 10 of 1858.  
 " 15 "  
 " 21 "  
 " 25 "  
 " 39 "  
 No. 20 of 1859.

42. I attach in an appendix Lieutenant Colonel Rigby's replies to a series of questions which I submitted to him regarding the slave trade in the Portuguese settlements on the east coast of Africa, as also on its prevalence at Zanzibar and its African dependencies. I am pleased to perceive that his opinions on that subject generally, as well as on the best means for suppressing the traffic, are in unison with the views expressed in the foregoing pages.

43. In conclusion I have to acknowledge my great obligation to the Reverend Mr. Badger, associated with me in the Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, for his able assistance in drawing up this report, and I desire to bring the same to the favourable notice of Government.

I have, &c.  
 (signed) *W. M. Coghlan*, Brigadier,  
 In charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

## APPENDIX.

[The Queries in this Paper were submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel *Rigby*, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at *Zanzibar*, by Brigadier *Coghlan*, on his transmitting Letter No. 12, dated *Zanzibar*, 1st October 1860. The Replies are by Lieutenant Colonel *Rigby*.]

*Query 1.*—ARE you aware to what extent the slave trade prevails in the Portuguese settlements, and in other parts of the eastern coast of Africa, not comprehended within the limits of the territory dependent on *Zanzibar*?

*Answer.*—I am aware that a very extensive and increasing export of slaves is carried on from the Portuguese territories in East Africa. I do not think that any export of slaves is carried on from any parts of the East Coast except those within the Portuguese and *Zanzibar* territories.

*Query 2.*—What parties are generally engaged in the traffic, and to what places are the slaves usually exported?

*Answer.*—At present the traffic is chiefly carried on by Spaniards in large fast-sailing American clipper-built ships, and the slaves are conveyed to Cuba or the coast of America. I believe that French ships are also engaged in this traffic. About two months ago a slave-ship named the "*Formosa Estrella*" anchored in a bay on the east side of the Island of *Zanzibar*. She hoisted Spanish colours, but was consigned to the agent of *Vidal Frères*, who are French merchants at *Marseilles*. I understand that this vessel is known to be owned by *Vidal Frères*, and she has been since seen on the coast under the French flag.

*Query 3.*—Can you inform me what efforts are made to suppress this traffic, and with what success?

*Answer.*—By the Portuguese authorities, absolutely none. The Sultan of *Zanzibar* endeavours to check it as much as possible, but his ships are never ready for sea; and I do not think a single individual in his service would do anything to check the shipment of slaves unless urged to do so by representations made by the British Consul. The British cruisers employed on the east coast for the suppression of the slave traffic are utterly inadequate to the duty, and are not at all adapted to cope with the swift-sailing clipper-ships now employed in transporting slaves.

*Query 4.*—

*Query 4.*—Has the so-called French “Free-labour Emigration Trade” ceased to carry on its operations on the east coast of Africa? I have been given to understand that the scheme was abolished by order of the French Government; have you received any official intimation of the fact?

*Answer.*—For about a year past I have only heard of one French vessel being engaged in the so-called “Free Labour Emigration Trade.” When Her Majesty’s ship “Brisk” was at Johanna, in the month of December last, a French vessel arrived there filled with negroes which were being conveyed to La Réunion. Within the last few days I have received information that French vessels are again engaging labourers at Mozambique; but as it is only from native reports, I do not yet know whether the information is correct. I have not received any official intimation of the abolition by order of the French Government of the so-called “free-labour” system. I saw in the public journals the order of the French minister of Algeria and the Colonies, dated the 6th January 1859, directing the Governor of La Réunion to adopt the most stringent measures to forbid any engagement of labourers either on the eastern coast of Africa or at Madagascar, or at the Comoros, as well as the importation into La Réunion of immigrants from those places, or from Sainte Marie, Mayotte, and Nossi Beh.

*Query 5.*—What measures would you deem advisable and most effectual for arresting the trade in slaves on the line of coast above referred to?

*Answer.*—In the Portuguese territories on the east coast the export of slaves is carried on in direct violation of the treaties, and contrary to the laws of Portugal. Its causes are, the dishonesty of the officials and the demoralised state of the half-caste inhabitants; they set the laws and orders of the sovereign at defiance. I understand that the Home Government of Portugal affords no pecuniary support to its East African possessions, and that all the *employés*, including the Governor General, are dependent on the colonial treasury for their salaries. The treasury is under the control of a council, and the Governor General is very much dependent on it. The blighting rule of the Portuguese has almost entirely destroyed all legitimate trade, and they are therefore very much dependent on the slave trade for their support. Until an entire change of system takes place in the mode of government of these possessions, no hope exists of the slightest effort being made by the Portuguese colonial authorities to check the slave traffic, for they all connive at it, and receive large bribes for doing so. The position of the Governor General of the Mozambique with regard to this traffic is very similar to that of the Sultan of Zanzibar; both are surrounded by such unprincipled rogues, that however they may themselves desire to suppress it, they could not depend upon a single individual to carry out their orders or act honestly: thus, so far as regards the line of coast belonging to Portugal, the only hope of any successful efforts being made for the suppression of this cruel traffic rests upon the British cruisers. I state an opinion that I have heard expressed by many officers of Her Majesty’s navy employed on the east coast, that the class of vessels at present employed in cruising for slavers is not at all adapted to the service now that the slaves are generally exported in very swift sailing clipper-built ships. The proof of this is found in the fact that no square-rigged vessel engaged in the slave trade on the east coast of Africa has been captured by one of Her Majesty’s cruisers during six years preceding the last few months, since which Her Majesty’s ship “Lyra” has captured two, and the “Brisk” one slaver. As far as I am competent to form an opinion on such a subject, it appears to me that a few fast screw gun-boats of light draught, under active officers, would soon render the slave trade on this coast an unprofitable speculation, and lead to its abandonment by the Cuban Spaniards, who are chiefly engaged in it. Should this subject engage the attention of Her Majesty’s Government, I believe no officer is more capable of forming a correct opinion on the best means to be adopted than Commander Oldfield, R. N., commanding Her Majesty’s ship “Lyra,” who has had more experience and been more successful in making captures than any other officer.

With respect to the export of slaves from the Zanzibar dominions, daily experience more and more convinces me of the utter impotence of the Sultan to stop it, and that the treaties for the suppression of the slave trade entered into by the late Imâm and the British Government are now, and always have been, practically null and void. I have arrived at this opinion by slow conviction. When I first came to Zanzibar the consulate had been closed for 14 months, and every soul in the country was interested in concealing the slave traffic from me. Shortly after disturbances commenced which lasted for several months, and during this time I made every allowance for the many instances of illegal slave dealing which came to my notice. But subsequent experience has fully proved to me that a very extensive export of slaves from the Zanzibar territories still is, and always has been, carried on, not only in dhows and coasting craft to the Persian Gulf and coast of Arabia, but also in French and American built ships, under the Spanish and Mexican flags, to Cuba and other places. However desirous the Sultan may be to fulfil his treaty engagements and put a stop to this traffic, he has in reality no power. No one in his service will carry out any orders he may give on the subject. The public opinion of the Arabs is too strong in favour of it, and almost all the chief people in his dominions are either directly or indirectly concerned in it. Soon after my arrival in Zanzibar the French consul showed me the copy of a Despatch which he had forwarded to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated, as a proof of all the Zanzibar chiefs being in favour of the foreign slave trade, that Prince Abdool Wahâb, the younger brother of the Sultan, and Syud Suleiman bin Hamed, the wealthy Governor of the town of Zanzibar, had recently sold 300 slaves each to a French ship. I afterwards discovered that the ship to which he alluded was the “Pallas,”

Appendix, No. 7.

and that there was no doubt his statement was correct so far as regards Syud Suleiman bin Hamed.

As a further proof how powerless the Sultan is to check this traffic, during last north-east monsoon, in March, I observed almost every morning whilst out in my boat, dhows, belonging to the Persian Gulf and the coast of Arabia, sailing, or about to sail, full of slaves. Many of these were re-landed on my representations to his highness; and one day when he paid me a visit, accompanied by all the principal chiefs, I introduced the subject, and urged his highness to take more vigorous measures to stop this illegal traffic.

I told his highness that I had never seen a boat from any of his ships visiting these dhows prior to their quitting the harbour, and suggested that he should direct guard-boats to row round in turns by day and night. Upon this his highness called the commander of his new corvette, "Iskunder Shah," and gave him strict orders to do so in turns with boats from his other ships. A few days after the commander, who had been educated in England, called on me, and stated that on pulling alongside a dhow that morning which was full of slaves, the Arabs on board had pelted him with billets of wood, that he then returned to the shore and obtained 30 Belooch soldiers, and on returning with them the crew of the dhow fired on his boat, and that during the confusion which ensued the boat was upset, and all on board it swam on shore, and that he had had enough of visiting slave dhows, and should not do so again.

I think the only way to put a stop to the foreign slave trade in the Zanzibar dominions, is to keep a light screw-gunboat stationed at Zanzibar to watch the coast as far as Cape Delgado to the south and Lamoo on the north. Information of slavers being on the coast generally reaches the British consulate by some means, and, as in the recent case of Her Majesty's ship "Lyra," a light gunboat can slip out at any hour and effect their capture.

*Query 6.* Are you aware of any modifications having been made in our Treaty with the late Imâm for the suppression of slavery, dated 2nd October 1845 :

*Answer.* I am not.

*Query 7.* That Treaty sanctions the transport of slaves (tantamount to the traffic) from one port to another of the late Imâm's African territories, between Lamoo on the north and Kilwa on the south, including the Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Moufea.

It is evident, however, that the traffic is still carried on to a large extent in the said territories *beyond* those boundaries; and, further, it is equally clear from your reports lately submitted to Government, that whereas the Treaty of 1845 contemplated the restriction of the trade to a limited space within the dominions of the late Imâm, several places within that district continue to supply large numbers of slaves for foreign exportation. Thus, in your letter to Government, No. 108 of 1859, you report that two years back the brig "Venus," under Spanish colours, succeeded in embarking 500 slaves from the port of Lamoo. Also, that not long since 600 slaves were taken from Zanzibar in the French ship "Pallas," and again, that 424 were exported from Kilwa. Further, it would appear from your letter, No. 23 of 1860, that the trade is still carried on clandestinely at Zanzibar to a considerable extent.

Your reports on the prevalence of the slave trade, foreign as well as domestic, throughout the African territories of the late Imâm, are fully confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Krapf and Captain Burton, as will be seen by the following quotations:—

Dr. Krapf states,

"In 1853, I saw 20 Arab ships at Mukdeesha engaged in smuggling slaves to Arabia."

"To the south of the Pangani is the territory of the Wasegua tribe, and the great centre of the slave trade."

"Among these tribes [the Wasegua] the slave trade has hitherto flourished to a frightful extent, chiefly owing to the encouragement of the Arabs of Zanzibar."

"From 10,000 to 12,000 slaves are said to pass yearly through Kilwa on their way to the various ports of the Sowahili coast, and to Arabia."

"Although the Sultan of Zanzibar has prohibited the slave trade with Arabia, yet many slave ships proceed there annually, starting from Kilwa, and sailing round Zanzibar, on the eastern side of the island, to evade the Sultan's police, and slaves are often smuggled to Arabia by the aid of a declaration that they are sailors."

Captain Burton states that in East Africa "there are two forms of this traffic, the *export* and the *internal* trade. For the former, slaves are collected like ivories throughout the length and breadth of the land. They are driven down from the principal depôts

\* \* \* \* \* to the coast by the  
"Arabs and Wasawahili merchants, who afterwards sell them in retail at the great mart  
"of Zanzibar."

The same gentleman, on the authority of Colonel Hamerton, computes the average yearly import of slaves into Zanzibar at 14,000, the extremes being 9,000 and 20,000.

Now, as the export of slaves from the late Imâm's African dominions is prohibited under the severest penalties, can you inform me how the prohibition is evaded? Could the trade be carried on without the connivance of the local authorities on the coast, and elsewhere? If not, does his highness, the ruler of Zanzibar, take any measures to arrest it, by punishing such of his officers as are known to countenance it? With regard to the case of the "Venus," referred to in your letter above quoted, Mr. M'Leod, in his "Travels in Eastern  
"Africa,"

"Africa," states that on hearing how she had succeeded in obtaining a cargo of slaves at Lamoo, "the young Imâm of Muskat sent for the Governor of that place to give an explanation of the affair, with which he appeared satisfied, for he returned him to his government "in one of his ships of war." Can you inform me whether this is a true statement of the case, and on what plea the Governor of Lamoo excused himself?

However, it is evident from the foregoing testimonies, that the means hitherto adopted to suppress this traffic have signally failed; and, further, that one great cause of its prevalence is attributable to the article in the Treaty of 1845, which legalises the transport of slaves within certain limits of the late Imâm's African territories.

Under this conviction I am induced to ask your opinion on the expediency of our seeking a revision of the existing treaty, whereby the present limited immunity should be wholly abolished, and the transport of slaves between any ports of the late Imâm's territories be altogether prohibited.

It appears to me that such a law, coupled with your suggestion that a steam gun-boat of light draught should be stationed at Zanzibar, for several months in the year, to watch the coast, would be the most effectual means of suppressing the traffic in that quarter.

Willing as the ruler at Zanzibar might be, at the solicitation of the British Government to sanction such a revision of the treaty, it is not improbable that the concession might create serious opposition on the part of his people, and perhaps endanger his authority. Hence, before making any attempt to bring the suggestion to the notice of Syud Majeed, I shall await your opinion of its feasibility.

*Answer.* The prohibition to export slaves to foreign countries from the late Imâm's African dominions is evaded, as I have already stated, by the whole of the Arab population being in favour of it, and by the Sultan not having a single individual in his service who would shrink from taking bribes to connive at it.

With regard to the Spanish ship "Venus," which I reported to Government as having taken 500 slaves from the port of Lamoo, I was afterwards informed by a Sawahili, by name Khamees bin Wuttanee, who was agent at Zanzibar for the Government of Mauritius before the establishment of the British Consulate, that he was at Lamoo at the time, and that the number of slaves embarked in the "Venus" was 700; also that the Governor of Lamoo, by name Ali bin Nassir, remonstrated against their being shipped; but as the "Venus" had a strong crew, well armed, the few Belooch soldiers at the disposal of the Governor were afraid to act. The customs master informs me that Ali bin Nassir was, in consequence, summoned to Zanzibar to account for his conduct, and that he did not return to Lamoo, and has since resided at Mombassa, where he is at present.

I consider that the statements of Mr. McLeod, late Her Majesty's consul at Mozambique, of Dr. Krapf, and of Captain Burton, on the authority of the late Colonel Hamerton, relative to the slave traffic on the East Coast of Africa, to be substantially correct. The export of slaves from the port of Kilwa has greatly increased since the date of Dr. Krapf's visit.

I have long anxiously considered the expediency and possibility of obtaining a revision of the existing treaties, whereby the transport of slaves between any parts of the late Imâm's territories should be altogether prohibited. The treaties for its suppression have been constantly evaded from the time they were made, and they will continue to be so until the transport from every part of the coast is entirely prohibited. I do not think that the Arabs of Zanzibar can plead any right to go into the interior of Africa, and steal men for the purpose of selling them into slavery. The cause of humanity demands that this atrocious system, which is every year on the increase, and which is rendering vast and fertile districts of Africa uninhabited wastes, should, if possible, cease. Its abolition would doubtless cause a great deal of ill-feeling on the part of the Zanzibar Arabs, until they became reconciled to the change, and it would be a very invidious task for the British Government to undertake alone. If the French and United States Governments could be induced to co-operate with the British Government in putting a stop to the traffic in slaves on the east coast, as they already have done the West Coast of Africa, it would prove to the Arabs that the Christian nations are animated with equal sentiments of humanity, and they would submit to the change as inevitable.

In a Despatch to the address of the late Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton, dated 18th December 1846, Viscount Palmerston gives directions as follows: "You will take every opportunity of impressing upon these Arabs that the nations of Europe are destined to put an end to the African slave trade, and that Great Britain is the main instrument, in the hands of Providence, for the accomplishment of this purpose; that it is vain for these Arabs to endeavour to resist the consummation of that which is written in the book of fate; and that they ought to bow to superior power, to leave off a pursuit which is doomed to annihilation, and a perseverance in which will only involve them in pecuniary losses, and in various other evils; and that they should hasten to betake themselves to the cultivation of their soil, and to lawful and innocent commerce."

I think that the abolition of the traffic should be enforced on these grounds. Now that the transport of African slaves by sea is prohibited in every country in the world, except the state of Zanzibar, I see no reason why the Arabs should be permitted to perpetuate a system which entails such great evils. The recent emancipation of upwards of 5,500 slaves in the Zanzibar dominions, who were in the possession of British Indian subjects, has tended very much to shake the faith of the Arabs in the continuation of slavery, and prepared them to expect its prohibition. When conversing on the subject with Arabs, I have always told them that I do not think the Governments of Europe would permit its continuance, were the evils and atrocities connected with it more generally known.

Appendix, No. 7. The returns of the Zanzibar custom house show the import of slaves during the year 1859 to have amounted to 19,000. The duty levied is now two dollars per head; so that the loss the abolition of the traffic would cause to the revenue of the Sultan would amount to about 38,000 crowns, or 8,500*l.* sterling per annum.

(signed) *C. P. Rigby*, Lieut. Colonel,  
Her Majesty's Consul, Zanzibar.

British Consulate, Zanzibar,  
5 October 1860.

RESOLUTION by the Honourable Board, dated the 28th March 1861.

Resolved,

BRIGADIER COGHLAN sent a copy of this interesting report to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India before he sent the original to this Government. The subjects to which Brigadier Coghlan has drawn attention involve questions which are for the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and the Honourable the Governor in Council feels confident that the complete and lucid statement submitted by that officer will obtain an earnest consideration. It is merely as a matter of form that this Government records any observations on this report.

2. The Honourable the Governor in Council is certain that the details furnished by Brigadier Coghlan, as to the extent to which the slave trade is carried on, on the east coast of Africa, will convince the British Government, which has ever been the chief instrument by which Providence has curbed this inhuman traffic, that its work is not yet completed, and that a great evil has still to be encountered and subdued.

3. Brigadier Coghlan places one fact prominently before the British Government, that however much the ruler of Zanzibar may be disposed to fall in with the views of modern civilization on the subject of the slave trade, he is almost entirely unable to resist the influences around him. It is too much to expect a chief with a disputed title, who must therefore endeavour to conciliate his subjects, sternly to oppose a system from which he derives a considerable portion of his revenue, when every man around him is a slave crimp or a slave broker. Advice and remonstrance are excellent instruments for good, in proper times and places, but they are of singular feebleness, when addressed to one in the helpless position of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The British Government must be prepared to support the Sultan by its ships and by its money, the strengthening of the Cape fleet, and the frequent extension of its surveillance to Zanzibar and the adjacent African coast, the stationing of gun-boats at Zanzibar, and the grant of compensation to the Sultan for the revenue he will sacrifice, are measures which it would be presumptuous in this Government to advocate. The Honourable the Governor in Council, cannot for a moment doubt that if the horrors described by an officer so cautious as Brigadier Coghlan, were made known to the British nation, not a voice would be raised against so small an acknowledgment to Zanzibar as 8,500*l.* per annum, for the attainment of so noble an object as the extinction of the East African slave trade.

5. The Honourable the Governor in Council, fully concurs with Brigadier Coghlan as to the propriety of obtaining a revision of the treaty, by which all export and import of slaves within the Zanzibar dominions should be prohibited. The permission which now exists for the transport of slaves from one portion of Her Majesty's territories to another, in a great measure deprives the restrictions on the trade of all their value.

6. With respect to the Persian Gulf, the Honourable the Governor in Council believes that the defect in the action of the squadron for the suppression of the slave trade, has been that operations have been carried on too much within the Gulf, instead of at the mouth, and that the proper time for operations has not been chosen with sufficient care. The squadron is small, and many duties are imposed on it, and the Honourable the Governor in Council fears that the Resident detaches vessels from it on political missions, at the time when every vessel that can be spared should be on the look out for slavers returning from Africa at the mouth of the Gulf. The Honourable the Governor in Council will not, however, at present issue orders on this subject, as from a recent telegram, it would appear that Her Majesty's Government has determined to relieve the Indian navy from the duty of suppressing the slave trade. His Excellency in Council has no doubt that the evil, though now it appears so formidable, would in a very few years succumb to the vigorous exertions of an organisation directed expressly against it, under the guidance of a carefully selected officer.

7. The Honourable the Governor in Council concurs with Brigadier Coghlan in considering that if the prohibition of transport of slaves from one portion of the Zanzibar dominions to another is insisted on, three years' warning should be given before the prohibition is enforced.

28 March 1861.

(signed) *G. Clerk.*  
*H. W. Reeves.*  
*W. E. Frere.*

## Appendix, No. 8.

PAPERS RELATING TO BRITISH ARBITRATION BETWEEN  
MUSCAT AND ZANZIBAR.

Appendix, No. 8.

(No. 67 of 1860.—Secret Department.)

From *H. L. Anderson*, Esq., Secretary to Government, *Bombay*, to Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, Political Resident at *Aden*; dated 1st March 1860.

Sir,

It being of the utmost consequence to our maritime interests that an impartial officer should be appointed to inquire into, and report on, the merits of a dispute existing between his Highness Syud Thoweynee, the ruler of Muscat, and his Highness Syud Majeed, the ruler of Zanzibar, I am directed to intimate to you that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council has been pleased to entrust to you this important duty.

2. With this view, I am desired to forward to you the accompanying copies of proceedings, which will place you in possession of the grounds of dispute between the parties; the political occurrences which have arisen out of them; and the measures adopted by this Government for effecting an adjustment of the matters at issue.

3. You will perceive from these proceedings that both the rulers have agreed to accept an arbitration by the Governor General between them, and that the formal consent of the ruler of Muscat has been obtained to abide by the decision of that authority.

4. To facilitate your inquiries, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers it desirable that Mr. Rassam should be deputed to Muscat to act as British Agent at that place. In announcing this appointment, I am desired to intimate that it is only temporary, and that the question of remuneration to that officer will be settled hereafter. In the meantime Mr. Rassam will be permitted to draw, in addition to his salary of rupees (300) three hundred per mensem as your assistant, rupees (150) one hundred and fifty per mensem as British agent, and a further sum of rupees (50) fifty per mensem for a writer and boat hire.

5. With Colonel Rigby at Zanzibar and Mr. Rassam at Muscat, and the aid of telegraphic communication with the latter officer, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council doubts not that you will be able to complete the duty entrusted to you in a short time.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) *H. L. Anderson*,  
Secretary to Government.

(No. 46 of 1860.—Secret Department.)

(No. 180 of 1860.)

From Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, Political Resident and Commandant, *Aden*, to *H. L. Anderson*, Esq., Secretary to Government, *Bombay*; dated 3rd April 1860.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 67 of 1860, in the Secret Department), apprising me that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council had been pleased to appoint me to the duty of examining into, and reporting on, the merits of a dispute existing between Syud Thoweynee, of Muscat, and Syud Majeed, of Zanzibar.

2. A careful perusal of the correspondence which accompanied the letter under reply has suggested a difficulty to my mind, in connection with the investigation thus entrusted to me, which I deemed it important to submit without delay for authoritative solution.

3. I cannot better describe the nature of this difficulty than by quoting several passages from the correspondence referred to.

4. In the opening letter from the British Agent at Zanzibar, dated 17th February (No. 19 of 1859), he evidently regards Syud Majeed as the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* sovereign of that island and its African dependencies. Speaking of the causes which led Syud Thoweynee to undertake hostilities against the territories of Zanzibar, he asserts the claim of Syud Majeed to the absolute sovereignty of those possessions in these words:—“After he (Majeed) has ruled them with undisputed right since his father’s death.” In the Resolution of the Honourable Board on this letter, dated 22nd April 1859, the basis for an arrangement is suggested: “If the ruler of Muscat could be induced to abandon his pretensions on receiving an annual subsidy from his brother.”

0.116.

5. Further:

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5. Further: in a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, dated 27th July 1859, it is ordered that Syud Thoweynee should be informed "that it recognises no pretension on his part to be the superior or suzerain of Syud Majeed." And again, in the same letter, referring to the payment of forty thousand (40,000) crowns annually as the possible basis of an amicable arrangement between the two brothers, it is added, "But the arrangement should not bear the character of a subsidy from a subordinate Government to a superior one."

6. Captain Cruttenden, who was commissioned to impart the foregoing decision to Syud Thoweynee, in his letter (No. 3 of 1859), thus describes the effect which it produced on that ruler, "His being told by me, in the words of his Excellency the Governor General that he was in no way recognised as his brother's superior or suzerain, appeared to cause him both pain and annoyance, as he feels that, on this point, the opinion of his Excellency is already formed, and that he cannot hope to see it altered after the arbitration has been completed." Again, "Now that Syud Thoweynee knows the opinion of his Excellency the Governor General as to his having no authority over his brother, he fears that the result of any arbitration must be fatal to his ambitious views;" and again, "his two principal claims against his brother, namely, his suzerainty over him, and his right to an annual payment, have already been decided by his Excellency." The latter appears to be Captain Cruttenden's own inference from the terms of the decision which he was ordered to communicate to the Ruler of Muscat.

7. Further, in a Resolution of the Honourable Board, dated 19th November 1859, the following passage occurs: "Syud Majeed will act wisely if he obtain a recognition of his own rights from Syud Thoweynee, by the payment of an annual subsidy, not a tribute, of forty thousand (40,000) crowns."

8. The tenor of the foregoing extracts, unmodified as it is by any subsequent decision of Government, will be sufficiently obvious to enable his Lordship in Council to appreciate the difficulty which it has suggested to my mind, and which I venture to submit for solution in the form of an inquiry. In attempting to carry out the instructions of Government in this matter, am I to consider the claims of Syud Thoweynee to the sovereignty of Zanzibar, and to the annual payment of tribute by his brother, as points definitively disposed of by the foregoing Resolutions of Government? The language of those Resolutions is, in some cases, so plain and authoritative, that I should hardly hold myself excused for propounding such a question, were it not that the decisions conveyed thereby may be intended to apply no further than *pending the arbitration, and until the final award of the Governor General has been made.*

9. His Lordship in Council will readily perceive that definite instructions on this head are indispensably necessary for my guidance in executing the commission which has been entrusted to me. In the former case, namely, that of the two points above named being already decided on, the basis of an accommodation between the two brothers must be sought for on some other ground which, on inquiry, may be deemed best calculated to secure the permanent welfare of the separated States, and to prevent any future misunderstanding between their respective rulers.

10. Government has repeatedly suggested that the payment of forty thousand (40,000) crowns as a subsidy from Syud Majeed to Syud Thoweynee might form the basis for such adjustment of existing differences. Information obtained on the spot may enable me to report favourably or otherwise on this point. At the same time, I cannot withhold expressing my apprehensions, formed from a perusal of the past correspondence, coupled with the opinions of several intelligent Arabs well acquainted with the affairs of the Imâmship, that unless Syud Thoweynee is guaranteed in the sovereignty of the late Imâm's Arabian possessions, the severance of Zanzibar from Muscat will raise up a host of competitors for the supremacy in that quarter, and be the signal for civil war in Oman.

11. With such contingencies in prospect, it is important that I should be apprised whether the ultimate decision of Government is likely to be influenced by these or similar considerations; and if not, to what extent it is prepared to afford its countenance to Syud Thoweynee in the exercise of his sovereignty over the Arabian possessions of the late Imâm. And lastly, whether, in order to prevent, as far as may be, the apprehended disasters (should the severance of Zanzibar from Muscat be decided on), I may seek interviews with the most influential chiefs, and use my best efforts, in a friendly spirit, to ensure their future tranquillity.

12. On the other hand, if it is the design of Government that the claims of Syud Thoweynee to the suzerainty of Zanzibar, and to the payment of tribute by his brother, the present ruler of that island and its African dependencies, should be regarded as open questions to be settled hereafter by the arbitrement of the Governor General, it will be my duty to institute inquiries, and to obtain reliable opinions with regard to the succession in the Imâmship, such as may enable his Lordship the Viceroy to decide between the contending opinions now prevailing on that subject, and to apportion to the rival claimants what is justly due to each.

13. It may also be practicable, by discreet and amicable conferences with the different members of the late Imâm's family, and with the principal Arab chiefs at Muscat and Zanzibar,

Zanzibar, to induce them to establish a standing rule as to the right of succession either to the separate or the conjoined States. Such a law, enacted by general consent of the representatives of the late Imâm's family, and of the more influential tribes, might be an effectual means of preventing in future those intestine broils which have hitherto attended the demise of every successive Imâm of Oman. It will be for the Government to decide whether any such attempt should be comprised within the scope of my present commission.

14. I have been led to regard some definite instructions on the foregoing points as so indispensable to the successful accomplishment of the duty lately entrusted to me, that, in order to save time, I had purposed seeking a personal interview with his Lordship in Council before proceeding to Zanzibar. As there was no steamer available on the station to take Mr. Rassam to Muscat, it was my intention, on the arrival of a steamer from Bombay, to accompany him thither, and formally to introduce him to Syud Thoweynee as the agent specially appointed to convey to him the assurance that the British Government would be impartial in its judgment, and otherwise to influence his Highness to rely implicitly on the justice of its mediation.

15. Besides the insight which such a visit, however short, would give me into the affairs of Muscat, I deemed that, without raising any unwarrantable expectations in the mind of Syud Thoweynee, the official courtesy might tend to counteract the impression which he has evidently received, that the Government has already decided against him, and thereby prepare him to accept, in a proper spirit, the final result of the Governor General's arbitration. Moreover, the presence of the Reverend Mr. Badger with me (should that gentleman be able to accompany me) would be an additional assurance to him that the investigation to be instituted at Zanzibar would be carried on through an independent medium.

16. After a day or two spent at Muscat in effecting these objects, I contemplated proceeding direct to Bombay for the purpose of consulting his Lordship in Council on what I was to consider as the basis of my ulterior inquiries. As the south-west monsoon approaches, the voyage from Bombay to Zanzibar will, I believe, be more feasible than from Muscat or Aden. Even time, therefore may be saved by this course; and in view of the importance of my being made acquainted with the opinion of Government on the several points set forth in this letter, I beg that I may be informed, either by telegraph or by the steamer which is to convey me from Aden, whether his Lordship in Council approves of the arrangement above suggested.

17. But considering that the fair season is rapidly passing away, and that the Government seems for the moment hard pressed for ships, I venture to suggest further, whether, in the expectation that a steamer will be available for the Zanzibar Commission a fortnight or three weeks hence, I may be permitted to proceed to Bombay, accompanied by the gentlemen associated with me, by the next Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer which will leave Aden about the 18th of this month. After consulting with his Lordship in Council the Commission might proceed direct for Muscat and Zanzibar in the Government steamer which, by that time, may be available for the purpose at Bombay. You will, perhaps, be good enough to inform me, by electric telegraph, whether I am authorised to adopt this course.

18. On the other hand, if it is considered that detailed and definite instructions on the points submitted for consideration may be satisfactorily conveyed by telegraph either to Aden or to Muscat, and that the season will not be so far advanced as to render the voyage from either of those places to Zanzibar impracticable, the necessity for my proceeding to Bombay will thereby be obviated.

19. Trusting that the emergent consideration attached to the case on hand will be deemed an ample apology for the foregoing suggestions,

I have &c.  
(signed) *W. M. Coghlan*, Brigadier,  
Political Resident and Commandant.

RESOLUTION by the Honourable Board (Bombay), dated the 16th April 1860.

*Resolved*, That the Political Resident be informed that this Government unreservedly grants to him authority to investigate and report for the information of the Supreme Government, on the relative positions of the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar. It will be the duty of the Political Resident to ascertain what are the exact rights of the one in relation to the other, by religious law, family custom, specific instrument, or force of circumstances. Having arrived at a conclusion on this question, it will remain for the Political Resident to consider whether it is actually necessary that exact rights should be recognised, whether peace and tranquillity may not more effectually be secured by inducing the antagonist parties to make mutual concessions, whether judicious compromise will not be of more real benefit to the interests of all concerned, both rulers and subjects, than any rigid



Appendix, No. 8.

rigid adherence to pretensions based on exact rights. In other words, it will be for the Political Resident to ascertain what is right and what is expedient, and whether the parties can be induced partially to concede the one for the purpose of permanently securing the other.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers that the whole question is open to the investigation and discussion of the political resident; that it is the sole desire of the Supreme Government to administer justice between the contending parties, and that that high authority will gladly avail itself of any facts or considerations which Brigadier Coghlan may be able to contribute towards the solution of existing complications.

The question of guaranteeing to the Imam his Arabian possessions is one on which the Right Honourable the Governor in Council would wish to be favoured with the Political Resident's opinion. The Right Honourable the Governor in Council is not aware whether any necessity exists for the grant of such guarantee, but the Political Resident may be requested to examine and report on the general question, and also on the specific political relation of Syud Toorkee, the ruler of Sohar (who, it is believed, has agreed to transfer his territory to the ruler of the Wahabees) to his brother the Imâm. The correspondence on the latter subject may be forwarded to the political resident.

With respect to the Political Resident's movements, that officer will learn from another letter that the Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy is unable at present to place a vessel at Brigadier Coghlan's disposal to enable him to visit Zanzibar before the monsoon. The Right Honourable the Governor in Council thinks, then, that the Political Resident should now proceed with Mr. Rassam and the Reverend Mr. Badger to Muscat, and commence his inquiries there on the two complications, that between Muscat and Zanzibar, and that between Muscat and Sohar.

The duty to be performed is one of great labour and responsibility, but the Right Honourable the Governor in Council feels that it could be entrusted to no more judicious agency than that of Brigadier Coghlan.

(signed) *Elphinstone.*  
*H. W. Reeves.*  
*W. E. Frere.*

RESOLUTION by the Honourable Board, dated the 14th May 1860.

*Resolved*—The Reverend Mr. Badger and Mr. H. Rassam having arrived in Bombay by the last mail, the question is now presented of how Brigadier Coghlan shall be enabled to commence his investigation of the disputes between the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar. The only vessel of the Indian Navy which is now, or will immediately be available, is the "Punjaub." The Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy has pointed out the great expense which would be incurred in sending this vessel to Zanzibar, and his opinion has received the concurrence of Government. But the Honourable the Governor in Council is disposed, on account of the urgent necessity which exists for obtaining an arrangement of the dispute, to treat the subject as one of special importance, and to consider that the Indian Navy steamer "Punjaub" should be detached for the duty of conveying Brigadier Coghlan on his mission. The course which the Honourable the Governor in Council thinks should be adopted is the following: On the return of the "Punjaub" to Bombay, Brigadier Coghlan, with his suite, should proceed in her to Muscat. He should then introduce Mr. Rassam to his Highness the Imâm as the future agent of the British Government; and should inform his Highness that he has himself been deputed to investigate the claim of Muscat to sovereignty over Zanzibar. It is of great importance that the Commissioner should visit Muscat before he visits Zanzibar, in order that the impression which now exists (that the British Government is prejudiced in favour of the pretensions of Syud Majeed to complete independence of Muscat) may be removed. The Commissioner can receive such proofs as the ruler of Muscat may be able to submit; he can also confer with him as to the adoption of some effective measures for the prevention of the slave trade; and finally, endeavour to procure some settlement of the dispute with Sohar. It is very probable that all these duties will not occupy the Commissioner for more than three weeks, and by the time of his return to Bombay the Government may have a smaller steamer than the "Punjaub" at its disposal, in which he can proceed to Zanzibar. But the Honourable the Governor in Council is so fully impressed with the important character of the complications which have arisen in connection with the succession to the sovereignty of Zanzibar, that he is clearly of opinion no time should be lost in enabling Brigadier Coghlan to investigate and submit the whole case, through this Government, to the Government of India for final settlement.

14 May 1860.

(signed) *G. Clerk.*  
*H. W. Reeves.*  
*W. E. Frere.*

(No. 165 of 1860.—Secret Department.)

From *H. L. Anderson, Esq., Acting Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay, to Brigadier Coghlan, Resident at Aden.*

Sir,

Bombay, 29 May 1860.

I AM directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council to transmit to you copies of the additional correspondence\* possessed by this Government relative to the affairs of Muscat and Zanzibar.

\* Forwarded with Secret Despatch from this Government, dated the 7th June, No. 24 of 1860.

I also enclose a letter from the Honourable the Governor in Council to the address of Syud Thoweynee of Muscat, accrediting you to his Highness as charged with the duty of inquiring into the disputes pending between the actual rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar, and also of installing Mr. Hormuzd Rassam as British agent at the former place, until further orders.

The Honourable the Governor in Council desires me to state that the annexed translation of the letter referred to, will furnish you with a general idea of the principles on which your inquiries are to be based, as also of the objects contemplated by the Right Honourable the Governor General, in acceding to the request of the contending parties to mediate between them by arbitration.

Those objects have respect mainly to securing the permanent peace, prosperity, and independence of the territories comprehended within the dominions of the late Imaum Syud Saeed, and to the maintenance of that legitimate influence therein to which our long friendly relations with the Muscat state fairly entitle the British Government.

The Honourable the Governor in Council considers it superfluous to add any further instructions for your guidance in conducting this investigation; but your experience will enable you to estimate fairly the value of the rival claims to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its dependencies, and to suggest such an adjustment of existing disputes on that important point, as may be satisfactory to both parties, most conducive to the general welfare of the people and tribes hitherto subject to the Imâmship of Muscat, and withal, best calculated to maintain peace and to ensure the furtherance of our just interests in Oman, and along the Eastern Coast of Africa, dependent on Zanzibar. You are accordingly requested to associate with the report of your inquiries whatever arrangement you may deem most effectual towards the attainment of those desirable results, stating explicitly and in detail the ground on which your opinions are formed.

The Honourable the Governor in Council has to regret that the latest intelligence received *via* the Persian Gulf represents Syud Toorkee of Sohar, as engaged in negotiations for eventually disposing of that principality to the Ameer of the Wahabees. Considering that Syud Toorkee's rule over Sohar during the lifetime of his father, the late Imâm, was merely that of a local governor appointed to administer the affairs of that province in behalf of the souzerain, it is fairly questionable whether he possesses any valid right to be independent of Muscat, much less to effect such a transfer of Sohar as he is reported to be meditating.

It is to be presumed that Syud Toorkee rests his claim on grounds analagous to those put forward by Syud Majeed as entitling him to the sovereignty of Zanzibar, and as these latter are to be made the subject of investigation in order to the final arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General, it is most desirable that the district of Sohar should not be alineated until his Lordship's decision has been made. Moreover, such an alineation might endanger the security of Muscat and its other dependencies, and the ascendancy of the Wahabees would inevitably be followed by the most disastrous results throughout Oman, destructive alike of the peace of that province, and of the maritime security of the Persian Gulf.

On arriving at Muscat you will be able to ascertain what Syud Toorkee's real intentions are in this respect, and you are hereby authorised by the Honourable the Governor in Council, to take such steps as you may deem most effectual for arresting the projected transfer of Sohar to the Wahabees. A letter of counsel and expostulation may suffice; but in case of persistency, you will make known to that chief that the British Government will regard with displeasure any course of action on his part which threatens to disturb the present peace, and to involve the country of Oman in civil war and bloodshed.

Frequent opportunities will be afforded you during the existence of the Commission for inquiring into the actual state of the slave trade on the Eastern Coast of Africa, and the knowledge thus acquired will enable you to suggest some more effectual means for its extirpation than those now in force. The extent to which it is still carried on in that quarter, shows that a revision of the existing treaties with the late Imaum is imperatively called for, before this nefarious traffic can be suppressed; but the Honourable the Governor in Council is of opinion that until the question relative to the sovereignty of Zanzibar has been finally settled by the arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General, it is not desirable that you should initiate any measures to that effect. Moreover, recent proceedings on the coast indicated, render it more and more obvious to the Honourable the Governor in Council that any separate treaty on our part for the suppression of

Appendix, No. 8. the slave trade in that quarter, might lose much of its efficacy through the jealousy of foreign Powers; whereas, by inducing those Powers to join with us in a general scheme to that end, no such obstacles would arise, and the benevolent object in view might be realised. It will be for Her Majesty's Home Government to decide whether the coalition here suggested is practicable, and, if not, to direct what ulterior measures on our part should be adopted for rendering more effectual the provisions of existing treaties. In the meantime, you will have opportunities during your mission for eliciting further information on all particulars of the slave trade, and report the same direct to the Secretary of State for India, as well as to this Government, together with any recommendations for its suppression, which from acquired local experience, you may deem practicable and efficacious.

Bombay Castle, 29 May 1860.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *W. L. Anderson,*  
Acting Chief Secretary.

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(Persian Department.)

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from His Excellency the Honourable Sir *George Russell Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of *Bombay*, to his Highness *Syud Thoweynee*, Ruler of *Muscat*, dated 31st May 1860.

A. C.

I HAVE much pleasure in apprising your Highness, that arrangements have now been made for instituting the inquiries into the unfortunate differences which have arisen between yourself and his Highness your brother *Syud Majeed* at *Zanzibar*, which are to precede the arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India.

Those inquiries have been entrusted to Brigadier *Coghlan*, our Resident at *Aden*, an officer in whom I place the highest confidence, and whom I have commissioned to report to this Government the result of his investigations.

Your Highness will perceive in this appointment a satisfactory proof of the anxious desire of the British Government that its intervention should be exercised with perfect fairness and justice. As having been hitherto unconnected with the disputes pending between your Highness and his Highness *Syud Majeed*, Brigadier *Coghlan*'s investigations will be carried on with strict impartiality towards both parties; moreover, his past experience of the Arab tribes at *Aden*, and the co-operation of the officers who have been associated with him in this commission, well versed as they are in the language, laws, and customs of the Arabs; will be an additional assurance to your Highness that every precaution has been taken to elicit such informations as shall enable the Right Honourable the Governor General to decide with justice on your respective claims.

Brigadier *Coghlan* proceeds immediately to *Muscat*, on this duty, and I commend him to your Highness as our commissioner, assured that you will not fail to receive him with the honour and respect due to his rank and office. Brigadier *Coghlan* on his arrival will install Mr. *Hormuzd Rassam*, an esteemed and trusted servant of this Government, as British agent to your Highness at *Muscat*, an appointment, which I am persuaded, will be highly acceptable to you, and during his residence there in that capacity, I anticipate your cordial co-operation with him in all matters connected with the interests of the British Government and its subjects within your territories. Brigadier *Coghlan* will then confer with your Highness on the object of his mission, and I would strongly urge on you the importance of placing implicit confidence in him in all your communications, reserving no information which may aid the Right Honourable the Governor General in forming such a decision as may not only be in accordance with justice, but which in its results may tend to the re-establishment of peace between contending parties, and to the increased prosperity of all the subjects of his Highness the late *Imâm*.

Assuring your Highness that the British Government is now, as it has ever been, most solicitous to promote those objects throughout *Oman* and *Zanzibar*, I conclude with the usual salutations of respect.

For the rest, &c. &c. &c.

(True Copy.)

(signed) *Venayek Wassoodew,*  
Oriental Translator to Government.

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(No. 38 of 1860.—Political Department.)

(Office No. 2547.)

From *H. L. Anderson, Esq.*, Chief Secretary to Government, *Bombay*, to the Secretary to the Government of *India* in the Foreign Department, Fort William; dated 14th June 1860.

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter from the Under Secretary with the Governor General, dated Kurnaul, the 12th ultimo, and previous correspondence relative to the affairs of Sohar and Muscat, I am directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council to report, for the information of the Government of India, that Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, the Political Resident at Aden, associated with the officers named in the margin, proceeded to Muscat in Her Majesty's Indian Navy steamer "Punjaub" on the 31st ultimo, for the purpose of investigating and reporting, for the information of the Government of India, on the complications existing between Muscat and Zanzibar on the one hand, and Muscat and Sohar on the other.

The Rev. P. Badger,  
Assistant Surgeon  
J. Welsh, and Mr.  
Hormuzd Rassam.

2. The Honourable the Governor in Council deemed it of great importance that Brigadier Coghlan should visit Muscat before he visits Zanzibar, in order that the impression which apparently exists, that the British Government is prejudiced in favour of the pretensions of Syud Majeed, the ruler of Zanzibar, to complete independence of Muscat, should be removed.

3. The accompanying copies of the proceedings of this Government will place his Excellency the Governor General in Council in possession of the instructions which have been furnished to Brigadier Coghlan for his guidance in the conduct of the important duty entrusted to him.

4. I am instructed to state that, with the view of facilitating the objects of the mission, and of adequately representing British interests at Muscat at the present time, the Honourable the Governor in Council has appointed Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, Assistant to the Political Resident at Aden, to act as British Agent at Muscat, as a temporary measure.

5. The question of remuneration to Mr. Rassam, and the other officers of Brigadier Coghlan's suite, will be submitted for consideration in a separate letter.

Bombay Castle, 14 June 1860.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *H. L. Anderson,*  
Chief Secretary.

(No. 35, of 1860.—Secret Department.)

(Office No. 217.)

From *H. L. Anderson, Esq.*, Chief Secretary to Government, *Bombay*, to the Secretary to the Government of *India* in the Foreign Department, Fort William; dated 30 July 1860.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter, No. 38, dated the 14th ultimo, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to transmit to you, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, the accompanying copy of a Report and its several Appendices, from Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, No. 10, dated the 4th instant, describing his proceedings on the occasion of his recent visit to Muscat, and the result of inquiries instituted by him at that place.

2. In forwarding this Report, I am desired to state that his Excellency in Council feels certain that the Government of India will consider that satisfactory progress has been made by Brigadier Coghlan in this important investigation.

3. In order that the Commission may, at as early a date as shall be practicable, proceed to Zanzibar, arrangements are in progress for the dispatch of the steamer "Punjaub" to that place.

4. As this vessel is the only one of the Indian Navy available for the proposed duty, it has been found necessary, during the strength of the present south-west monsoon, to engage freight for the conveyance to Zanzibar of a sufficient quantity of coal for supplying the requirements of the "Punjaub" on her return voyage.

5. I am desired to append to Brigadier Coghlan's Report copy of a letter from Assistant Surgeon Welsh, the medical officer associated with the Muscat-Zanzibar Mission, accompanied by a set of photographic views of the town and harbour of Muscat.

Appendix A. (2)

I have, &c.  
(signed) *H. L. Anderson,*  
Chief Secretary.

(Secret Department.—No. 10 of 1860.)

## MUSCAT-ZANZIBAR COMMISSION.

BRIGADIER  
COGHLAN'S  
REPORT.

From Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, Political Resident at *Aden*, to *H. L. Anderson, Esq.*, Acting Chief Secretary to Government, *Bombay*; dated *Bombay*, 4 July 1860.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report of my inquiries and proceedings at Muscat for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council.

2. After touching at the Island of Hallania, where the "Punjaub" remained two days, she proceeded to Muscat, and arrived there on the morning of the 12th ultimo. Hadji Ahmed, the Vizier of his Highness, Syud Thoweynee, came on board shortly after, and to him I entrusted the two letters addressed to his Highness by the Honourable the Governor of Bombay. Arrangements were made at the same time for our complimentary visit, which took place the same afternoon.

3. Syud Thoweynee was extremely gratified with the tenor of Sir George Clerk's letter setting forth the object of the Commission. He was also much pleased with the appointment of Mr. Rassam to the Acting British Agency at Muscat, and expressed his gratitude towards the Government for the arrangement which had thus been made for settling the long-pending differences between himself and his brother Syud Majeed at Zanzibar. His Highness's reply to the Honourable the Governor, which was forwarded with my letter, No. 7, of the 25th June, dwells on these points so fully that further notice of them is superfluous.

4. In the course of seven subsequent interviews, extending over our stay of nine days at Muscat, every effort was made to elicit information which might tend to throw light on the points in dispute, and Syud Thoweynee was repeatedly urged to state the grounds on which he rested his claim to the suzerainty of Zanzibar, and to the payment of tribute by his brother Majeed. I further deemed it fair to give his Highness an opportunity of exculpating himself from the various charges which had been brought against him in the official correspondence already submitted to Government on the Muscat-Zanzibar question.

5. Until corresponding inquiries have been made at Zanzibar, I am necessarily unable to form a decisive judgment on the opposing claims of the two parties; I shall, therefore, confine myself, at present, to a statement of Syud Thoweynee's case, as represented by himself, merely adding thereto occasional remarks in elucidation of the same, and confirmatory, or otherwise, of the arguments adduced by him. The documentary evidence obtained has been thrown together in an Appendix, and will be referred to as occasion may require. The translations were made by the Rev. Mr. Badger from correct copies duly collated with the original papers.

6. I was glad to find the question regarding succession simplified by the repeated admission of Syud Thoweynee, that whatever claims are, theoretically, attached to primogeniture, practically, and more especially in the case of his ancestry of the reigning family, such claims have generally been disregarded. This coincides with the opinion of Colonel Hamilton,\* that "primogeniture, amongst Arabs, is not acknowledged as giving "any *bonâ fide* right to succession," and corroborates a similar statement made by Colonel Rigby,† "that the rights of primogeniture have never been recognised among the Imams "of Omân."

7. Further, I find on inquiry that Syud Thoweynee does not found his claim to supremacy on the bare fact that he was nominated by his late father to succeed to the government of his Arabian possessions; but insists rather on his position as the actual ruler of Omân, which, in his opinion, constitutes him the rightful sovereign over all the dependencies of the parent State. He meets the argument adduced to prove that the late Imâm possessed the right of disposing of his dominions at will, by inquiring in what other organised State, whatever the form of Government may be, the sovereign is endowed with any such prerogative. And he finally contends that no such disposal of his territories was ever made by his late father, either by will or otherwise. The only will extant is in his own possession, and he maintains that the bequests comprised therein have reference solely to the personal property of the testator, except the clause which directs that "his two "ships, the 'Caroline' and 'Feidh Alim,' be given after his death to the treasury of the "Mussulmans, as a legacy from him." Syud Thoweynee considers this latter bequest as a virtual recognition of one public exchequer, and that the Treasury of Muscat (Muscat being the parent State) is indicated thereby. With regard to the letter addressed by his father, Syud Saeed, to the Earl of Aberdeen, dated Zanzibar, 23rd July 1844, and a letter from Colonel Hamerton to his Lordship, dated the 31st of the same month, which appears to have accompanied it (copies of which from Colonel Rigby's letter, No. 46, of 1859, are given in Appendix A.), Syud Thoweynee argues, in the first place, that the appointment of his elder brother, Khaled, to the Governorship of his father's African possessions,

\* Government records, Persian Gulf, p. 237.  
† Letter, No. 47 of 1859.

possessions, and of himself to that of his Arabian possessions, does not necessarily imply the independence of either brother, and that therefore the right of the Muscat State to the general sovereignty is unaffected by the arrangement contemplated by his father, which had reference merely to the *Governorships* of the two territories, and not to the supreme rule over them. That supremacy, he contends, belongs of right to the candidate who succeeds to the parent State, and who is recognised as ruler over it by the tribes of Omân; consequently, if his father intended anything beyond what he conceives to have been his meaning when writing to Lord Aberdeen, he assumed a prerogative which is disallowed by the laws and customs of the people, and, as such, cannot justly be regarded as legal. Syud Thoweynee further maintains that as the rightful sovereign, recognised by the tribes of Omân, he was quite justified, as well by the custom of his predecessors as by his position, in attempting to coerce his brother Majeed into an acknowledgment of his supremacy. Such, he alleges, has always been the course hitherto pursued in similar cases; and had he not, at the instance of the British, relinquished the expedition prepared to that end, he fully believes that Syud Majeed would have been forced to yield the recognition which was justly demanded of him.

8. The foregoing arguments advanced by Syud Thoweynee call for the most careful attention, as the several points dwelt upon may be said to comprise the important question of *right* as connected with the succession to the sovereignty over the dominions of his late Highness Syud Saeed.

9. I find, then, on examination, that among the Arabs of Omân there is no recognised law determining the succession to the Imamship (by which I mean the supremacy or sovereignty). Primogeniture gives no claim to succession; and, further, in retracing the history of the rulers of Omân for the last two centuries and a half, it will be seen that the brother, uncle, or cousin of a deceased sovereign, succeeded to the sovereignty as frequently as any of his own children. The succession was generally confined to the same family or dynasty; but even that restriction appears to have been the result of the influence which its members had acquired over the people, and the candidate who was strongest in that respect usually attained the supremacy. In no one instance, indeed, do we find that a successor has been able to maintain his position without the suffrages of the chiefs of the principal tribes; and, in every case recorded, such a concurrence is noted as confirming the newly appointed sovereign in his authority. I may here observe that the testimony of Syud Hilâl as given by Colonel Rigby in his letter, No. 46, of 1859, dated April 14th, is strikingly confirmative of the preceding opinion. Colonel Rigby writes:—  
 “On my questioning Syud Hilâl regarding the customs of the Chiefs of Omân regarding succession, he stated that no law of primogeniture is recognised; that might, coupled with the election by the tribes, is the only right; that, generally, on the death of a chief, his sons disputed the succession, and that the one who had the most influence with the tribe, or who gave the greatest hopes of being an efficient leader, was elected. That it was on this principle the late Imâm was himself elected, to the exclusion of his elder brother.”

10. From the above statements regarding the succession, as it has hitherto prevailed in the kingdom of Omân, it is apparent that the ruling sovereign did not possess the right of naming his successor, and not one instance is to be found of any attempt to exercise that prerogative. During their lifetime the sovereigns of Omân, either of their own free will, or for political purposes, or because the parties so advanced were too powerful for them, were accustomed to appoint different members of their family and others to the governorships of certain districts, and in some cases to grant them the same, with the implied understanding that it was in perpetuity; but such concessions as the latter were generally forced from them; nevertheless, the districts so transferred were still regarded as fiefs of the kingdom, and only independent of it in what concerned their internal administration. The governors were removable at the will of the sovereign, and the feudal chiefs or lords, in case of becoming obnoxious to the suzerain, were enjoined or forced into obedience, unless they were powerful enough to resist his mandates.

11. Such I believe to be a correct statement of the custom with regard to succession, as it has prevailed among the people of Omân, and of the prerogatives of their sovereigns over the territories comprehended within their dominions. The account is mainly based on a masterly paper given in Appendix (B.), and drawn up by the Reverend Mr. Badger from an Arabic History of the Kings and Imâms of Omân. I submit the Paper to the careful perusal of the Honourable the Governor in Council as a document of the utmost importance bearing on the Muscat-Zanzibar question now before the Government.

12. I am next called on to notice Syud Thoweynee's plea that the late Syud Saeed did not partition his territories, as has been asserted, either by will or otherwise. At first sight the letter addressed by Syud Saeed to the Earl of Aberdeen, dated 23rd July 1844 (see Appendix A.), seems conclusive that his Highness did intend that his African and Arabian possessions respectively should be given in full sovereignty to his sons, Khaled and Thoweynee. It is equally clear, however, that, according to the custom which had heretofore prevailed among the sovereigns of Omân, Syud Saeed did not legitimately possess the right either of nominating a successor or of partitioning his territories.

13. But I think it is fairly open to question whether, in the arrangement submitted to the

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the Earl of Aberdeen, Syud Saeed did mean that the nomination of his two sons was to the *full sovereignty* of the respective territories assigned to them. Viewed in connection with the appointment of governors by his predecessors, and what the position of his two sons was at the time, Khaled being then Governor of Zanzibar, and Thoweynee Governor of Muscat, which offices it was most probable they would hold at and after his death, Syud Saeed may have referred merely to such governorships, without designing, in any way, to interfere with the succession or supremacy to which the precedents of his predecessors gave him no legitimate right to nominate, and which, after his death, might have devolved on either of his two sons, Khaled and Thoweynee.

14. As having an inferential bearing on this point, I beg to notice here a passage from Colonel Rigby's Letter, No. 46 of 1859, dated 14th April. He writes: "From his (Syud Saeed) having appointed his second son (Khaled) to inherit the African dominions, and his third son (Thoweynee) to succeed him in the Arabian possessions, it was evidently not the intention of his Highness that Zanzibar should be tributary to Muscat, but that the two states should be independent of each other." The force of the argument thus adduced in favour of the independency of Zanzibar, on the ground of the seniority of Khaled, is entirely destroyed by Colonel Rigby himself, in his continuation of the foregoing quotation. He subjoins: "The Prince Khaled was installed as ruler of the African dominions during his father's absence at Muscat, and on his death, which occurred on 7th November 1854, his Highness passed over two of his sons, and appointed his fourth son, Prince Majeed, to succeed his deceased brother in the government of the African dominions, and it was proclaimed to all the Chief Arabs in open Durbar that he was to be regarded exactly in the same position as Prince Khaled had held." Whereon I beg to remark that, as Syud Saeed, in this case, passed over two of his sons, and appointed Majeed to Zanzibar, leaving his *elder* brother, Thoweynee, at Muscat, the argument adduced in the former part of the above quotations in favour of the independency of Zanzibar, on the score of the seniority of Khaled, falls to the ground.

15. I come next to the will of the late Syud Saeed, a revised translation of which is given in Appendix C. This document, it appears, was found in a box belonging to Bint Seif, wife of his late Highness, one of the executors, who died at Zanzibar, and it subsequently came into the possession of her daughter Azza, residing at present at Muscat. The document bears the tokens of authenticity.

16. This will, as may be seen from the tenor of its several bequests, refers almost exclusively to the private property of the testator; and, although drawn up 10 years subsequent to the date of the late Syud Saeed's letter to the Earl of Aberdeen, no intimation is contained therein of the arrangement which had been submitted to his Lordship. Had Syud Saeed deemed himself to possess the right of nominating a successor, or of dividing his territories by will, it seems hardly credible that he should have been so minute in disposing of his personal property, and yet have omitted all notice of his wishes in those other more important particulars.

17. The only public legacy bequeathed in the will under consideration, is that of two ships, "to the Treasury of the Mussulmans." I subjoin some remarks by the Rev. Mr. Badger on this subject:—

"The term 'Mussulmans,' as here employed, is simply equivalent to that of 'subjects,' or rather 'citizens.' It occurs frequently in the history of the Kings and Imâms of Omân in that sense; as, for example, 'the pious Mussulmans met together to deliberate,' referring to the councils of the inhabitants of a town or district. The use of the designation owes its origin to the religious type of Mohammedan political administration. The phrase 'Treasury of the Mussulmans' doubtless designates the public exchequer. It occurs in the following extract from the history just referred to: 'My father went to Sultan (who was then virtually the Imâm), and said to him, My lord, I have examined to see whether Mohammed bin Khalfân has any houses or magazines belonging to him entered in the books of the kingdom; but I find that he has not; the houses and magazines which he had belong to the Treasury, and you are now master of the Treasury.'

18. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the legacy under consideration was made to the public treasury. Only one such treasury is named, and from thence it may be argued, with some degree of plausibility, that at the time the bequest was made Syud Saeed only recognised one conjoined independent state.

19. The next point to be noticed is the claim adduced on behalf of Syud Saeed's right to dispose of his African possessions by will on the ground that several of them were his by conquest, and that it was chiefly owing to his administration that the whole was consolidated into one dominion.

20. The able historical summary given by Colonel Rigby, in his letter already referred to, of the original settlement of the Arabs on the coast of Africa, and the subsequent extension, together with the conquest of Zanzibar and the adjacent islands, leaves nothing for me to add on that subject. His account coincides in the main with the native records comprised in the history of the Kings and Imâms of Omân. Seif bin Sultan, according to the latter, at the opening of the 18th century, took Zanzibar, Mombasa, the Green Island (?), Kilwa, and other places on the coast of Africa from the Portuguese. These possessions

possessions formed thereafter a dependency of the kingdom, and succeeding Imâms ruled over them, either wholly or in part, according as they were successful against the different attempts made by the inhabitants under their native chiefs to shake off all subjection to the Arab Sovereigns of Omân. It was in this way that the late Syud Saeed obtained the sovereignty of Zanzibar and a few of the settlements on the coast. They became his in virtue of his succession to the Imâmship. True, he extended the empire in that direction and consolidated it; but it appears very questionable whether on such grounds alone he can be fairly held to have possessed the power of disposing of the same either by will or otherwise to his sons or to anyone else. As he himself became master of Zanzibar, and of other places which from time to time had been added to the dependency, when he was recognised as Sovereign of Omân, so, in like manner, it seems to follow as a matter of right that his successor in the sovereignty should succeed to the same privilege, unless on other more valid grounds he possessed the power of alienating the territories of the state, which, to say the least, is very doubtful. Judging, indeed, from the limited prerogative in such matters exercised by his predecessors, the inference would be decidedly against him.

21. I must now notice in the last place Syud Thoweynee's plea, that under the circumstances of his position, and agreeably with the custom of his predecessors in similar cases, he was fully justified in attempting to coerce his brother Syud Majeed into an acknowledgement of his supremacy.

22. His Highness here assumes that his title to the supremacy is unquestionable, and if that point could be admitted, I presume that few would dispute the inference. His object in the foregoing allegation is designed to prove that, in imitation of the almost uniform example of his predecessors for ages past, he was free to establish his *right* by the additional argument of *might*; and as the success of the latter has always prevailed to confirm the former, his claim would not have come short in that respect.

23. Apart from all considerations of the enlightened motives which led the Government to intervene, in order to prevent hostilities between Syud Thoweynee and his brother Syud Majeed, and regarding the matter simply in the light which custom immemorial leads the Arabs of Omân to regard it, the sanctions of so many precedents among their rulers whose titles to the sovereignty were established chiefly on the ground of their success against other competitors, give a plausibility to the argument of Syud Thoweynee which should not be overlooked.

24. It is perhaps difficult to say what the result would have been had the two parties come into collision on the occasion of Syud Thoweynee's expedition to Zanzibar in the early part of last year. Colonel Rigby,\* in his account of the preparations made by Syud Majeed to resist the expected invasion, represents the means at the disposal of the latter as ample to destroy any force brought against him, dwelling especially on the enthusiasm of the people in his cause. Subsequently, however, and long after the expedition of Syud Thoweynee had returned to Muscat, his report of the state of affairs at Zanzibar led the Government to conclude that "the position of Syud Majeed at Zanzibar was not secure."† And later still, on the occasion of the outbreak, when the El-Harth Arabs rose in support of Syud Barghâsh, all the force which Syud Majeed could bring against them was ineffectual, and the rising was not suppressed until assistance from three British men-of-war had been sent to co-operate with them,‡ when, as it is averred, the Arabs yielded because they would not fight against the English.

\* Letter, No. 19 of 1859.

† Resolution of Honourable Board, 16th November 1859.

‡ Letter, No. 98, 21st October 1859.

25. I have deemed it desirable, in giving Syud Thoweynee's arguments in his own behalf, to explain and illustrate them with the foregoing remarks. As some of the latter, however, may be open to modification hereafter, I abstain at present from any final expression of opinion on the general subject. Nevertheless, as what has already been advanced may have an important bearing on that opinion, I submit the same without delay to the careful consideration of Government.

#### Sohâr.

26. Before entering upon the merits of the question relative to the agreement alleged to have been made between Syud Thoweynee and Majeed for the payment of 40,000 dollars annually by the latter to the former, I consider this the most fit place in my Report to discuss the claim which has been set up in favour of the independence of Syud Toorkee, another of the sons of the late Imâm, who is at present located at Sohâr.

27. No documentary evidence whatever exists to support this claim. Colonel Hamerton, in a letter to the Earl of Clarendon,§ dated 10th November 1856, writes as follows: "I am fully aware what his Highness's (Syud Saeed's) intentions regarding the succession were; that Syud Thoweynee at Muscat should succeed to the government of his Arabian possessions, provision being made for certain of his sons as governors of certain places in his Arabian possessions; and that the Prince Majeed, whom his Highness considered in the place of his deceased son Khaled, should succeed to the government of his African possessions, provision being made for others of his sons as governors of various places in his African possessions." It is obvious that by the term "governor" in the above quotation nothing more is meant than a deputy with

§ Quoted by Colonel Rigby, Letter No. 19 of 1859, dated 17th February 1859.



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\* Letter, No. 46 of 1859.

† Letter, No. 19 of 1859.

‡ No. 47 of 1859.

delegated powers from the ruling sovereign "Wali," the Arabic term generally applied to such officers, aptly expresses the same idea. Colonel Rigby\* speaks of one Syud Sooliman as being at present "Governor of Zanzibar."

28. Colonel Rigby, indeed, seems to draw a somewhat different conclusion, and introduces Syud Toorkee by name. He writes,† "After the death of the late Syud Saeed "no will was found, but his Highness's intention with respect to the succession to his "various territories were so well known to all his subjects, he having during his lifetime "placed Syud Thoweynee in the government of Muscat, and his possessions in the "Persian Gulf, Syud Toorkee in possession of Sohâr, and Syud Majeed in possession "of Zanzibar and his African dominions, that no dispute was expected." The only evidence adduced in support of this nomination of Syud Toorkee is the quotation already given from Colonel Hamerton's letter.

29. In a subsequent Despatch‡ Colonel Rigby, after stating how the late Syud Saeed obtained possession of Sohâr, adds, that his Highness "then assigned it to his son "Syud Toorkee;" and further on he gives the testimony of Syud Hilâl in these words: "Syud Saeed being anxious to avert the disputes which he foresaw would "otherwise occur amongst his numerous sons after his death, had, during his own lifetime, "divided his dominions amongst his three sons, the Princes Thoweynee, Toorkee, and "Majeed, leaving all the details of administration in their hands, with the full understand- "ing that they were to succeed to the full sovereignty of each after his own death. That "the late Imâm considered this so plainly settled, that he did not consider any written "will on the subject necessary. That he had long previously notified to the Foreign "Governments in alliance with him his intention to divide his dominions between the "Princes Thoweynee and Khaled, and that on the death of the latter Prince Syud "Majeed was appointed his successor."

30. The foregoing extracts comprise absolutely all the arguments which have been advanced in behalf of the independence of Syud Toorkee as the ruler of Sohâr. In my opinion they are inconclusive, apart from the reflection that they are, moreover, open to complete refutation if the more general question of the right of the late Syud Saeed to divide his territories is decided in the negative.

31. But, further, it does not appear that Syud Toorkee himself ever urged his claim to be independent of Muscat until very lately; and even now his pretensions are shown more in the attempts which he is making to throw off all subjection to Seyyed Thoweynee than in any express declaration of independency: Sohâr, in fact, could not maintain that position. It yields a revenue which barely suffices for the support of the Governor and garrison, and for the entertainment of public guests. During the lifetime of the late Syud Saeed an allowance was made to Syud Toorkee of 120 dollars per mensem for the maintenance of a small body of horse, and Syud Thoweynee added 100 dollars to that sum for general purposes, which was paid out of the Customs of Muscat. The attempts made ever and anon by Syud Toorkee to form a coalition against Syud Thoweynee have more than once led to the suspension of the stipend, and it has lately been withdrawn in consequence of the more overt steps taken by Syud Toorkee to undermine his authority. These have already been detailed in my letter, No. 8, of the 27th ultimo. I may here add, however, that Syud Thoweynee has lately intercepted a letter written by Syud Majeed, of Zanzibar, to Syud Toorkee, at Sohâr, informing the latter that he had sent him 2,000 dollars, and a supply of powder and lead, by one Merhoon. The letter, I was informed, had been given to Captain Jones, who will doubtless bring it to the notice of Government.

32. Moreover, by the tenor of a letter addressed to Syud Thoweynee by Syud Toorkee about 20 months ago (*See Appendix D.*), it will be seen that the latter refers to the former as his superior; and as recently as the 2nd of September of last year, Hezekiel bin Yoosuf,§ then Acting British Agent at Muscat, reports that a compact had been entered into by the two brothers, "when it was agreed that he (Syud Toorkee) should "always obey the commands of his Highness (Syud Thoweynee) in everything im- "portant or trifling, and that his Highness should pay him the allowance which he used "to receive during the lifetime of his father." The above was confirmed by my own inquiries at Muscat.

33. The foregoing considerations taken together, form, in my opinion, a mass of evidence decidedly adverse to the claim set forth in behalf of the independence of Syud Toorkee. Further, it is equally apparent to me that, considered politically, and in its bearings on the welfare of the Muscat State, and the general peace of Omân, it is most undesirable that any such claim should be countenanced. Sohâr, as has been already stated, could not maintain its independence, and the almost inevitable result of such a claim being allowed, would tend to foster the intrigues for extraneous support, which Syud Toorkee is now active in fomenting. It does not appear certain that the Wahabees have absolutely withdrawn from their late compact with that chief. The importance of the position in a strategical point of view, has always excited their cupidity. As far back as 1836,|| Syud Saeed, who had called in the assistance of the Wahabee Agent to expel Hamood from Sohâr, abandoned the siege of that place on learning that the Agent designed to keep possession of it for Fysul, the Wahabee Ameer. And again, in 1851,¶ after Syud Saeed

§ No. 686 of 1859. Persian Department.

|| Government Records, Persian Gulf, p. 208.

¶ *Idem*, p. 232.

Saeed had taken Sohâr, a demand was made by the same chief for its immediate cession to him.

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34. Incorporated with the Muscat State, and under its support, Sohâr may be able to resist any such encroachments; separated, therefore, it is certain to fall into the hands of the Wahabees, or to become the focus of revolutionary movements throughout Omân. I trust, therefore, that the Government will deem it right to disallow the pretensions lately set up in behalf of the independency of Syud Toorkee, and by countenancing the just claims of Syud Thoweynee to the sovereignty over the district of Sohâr, strengthen the latter in securing it from foreign occupation, and in preventing the other evils which its alienation from the Muscat State would inevitably engender.

35. Reverting to the dispute pending between Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed, I proceed in the next place to examine into the agreement made between the two parties, whereby the latter engaged to pay to the former the sum of 40,000 dollars per annum.

36. Colonel Rigby's account of this transaction is as follows: \* "I am informed that \* Letter, No. 19, of 1859.  
"soon after the death of the late Imam, Syud Thoweynee sent his cousin, by name  
"Mahomed bin Salem, from Muscat to Zanzibar to represent to Syud Majeed, that as the  
"revenues of Muscat are much less than those of Zanzibar, and as their father had been  
"in the habit of assisting the Muscat treasury with remittances from Zanzibar, he hoped  
"his brother would likewise continue to afford him pecuniary aid. In consequence  
"Syud Majeed agreed to remit Syud Thoweynee the sum of 40,000 German crowns  
"annually, of which sum 10,000 crowns were for the payment to the Wahabees, 10,000  
"crowns to their mutual brother Syud Toorkee, who had been put in possession, by their  
"father, of the territories of Sohâr, and the remaining 20,000 crowns were for Syud  
"Thoweynee himself; but it was stipulated that the payment of the entire amount should  
"be conditional on Syud Thoweynee refraining from hostilities with his brother Syud  
"Toorkee; and as Syud Thoweynee has broken this agreement, and undertaken hostilities  
"against Syud Toorkee, the money for the past year has not been remitted to Muscat.

"After the return of Syud Mahomed bin Salem to Muscat, Syud Thoweynee agreed to  
"the arrangement made by him, and wrote to the Customs Master here to receive the  
"money and remit it to him. There appears to have been no formal written agreement  
"on the subject, as the payment was not to be considered as a tribute, or in any way as  
"acknowledging the dependency of Zanzibar upon the Sultans of Muscat; but it was as  
"a free gift from one brother to the other, subject to the condition of his not doing any  
"injury to a third brother."

37. In a subsequent Despatch (No. 46, of 1859) Colonel Rigby repeats verbatim the foregoing statement, adding that his informant was Syud Majeed himself, who is confirmed by Syud Soliman, Syud Hilâl, and all the principal Arabs.

38. Another repetition of the above occurs in Colonel Rigby's letter (No. 116, of 1859) with the following additional details: "On his leaving for Muscat, Mahomed bin Salem  
"was paid the first half-year's allowance, viz. 20,000 crowns, of which 5,000 crowns were  
"for Syud Toorkee, to enable him to pay the tribute due to the Wahabee Chief from the  
"Sohar State. Syud Thoweynee kept the whole of this money, and engaged in hostilities  
"against Syud Toorkee."

39. In juxta-position to the above, I proceed to give Syud Thoweynee's account of the transaction. His statement is as follows: "On the death of Syud Saeed, I sent Mahomed Bin Salem and Mahomed Bin Saeed to Zanzibar, to make arrangements with  
"Syud Majeed for the division of our father's property. When that was done, the  
"subject was discussed as to what position Zanzibar was to occupy hereafter; my two  
"agents pointed out to Syud Majeed, that he could only hold it as tributary to Omân.  
"It was accordingly agreed that Majeed should remit 40,000 dollars annually, as tribute  
"to the Muscat treasury." He denies *in toto* that any conditions whatever, such as are stated by the opposite party were attached to this agreement, or that any division of the sum stipulated for formed part of the compact. He meets the statement regarding the portion which it is alleged that Syud Toorkee was to receive of the 40,000 crowns by asking, "Why, if it was intended for Toorkee, was the amount to be paid to me?" "Was it an admission of his subjection to me? If so," he remarked, addressing the Rev. Mr. Badger, "please to note the concession. If not, "why was it stipulated that the money should be paid through me instead of being paid "to Syud Toorkee direct?" "My brother Majeed is not at a loss for means of sending money to Toorkee, as his  
"later gifts remitted to Sohâr abundantly prove. And as to the statement that the 5,000  
"crowns were for Toorkee, to enable him to pay the tribute to "the Wahabee Chief  
"from the Sohâr State, it is notorious to every one that the tribute for Sohâr has always  
"been paid by Muscat, and is so paid still."

40. In reply to the inquiry whether any written document existed relative to this transaction, Syud Thoweynee could not speak with absolute certainty. He himself had not seen it, though he has an impression that one exists, and that it may still be in the possession of Mahomed bin Salem. The latter informed him of all that had passed at Zanzibar on his return to Muscat, and as he (Thoweynee) had shortly after received a part of the tribute, he considered that the affair had been finally settled, and that no difficulty would arise in future respecting it. Mahomed bin Salem having long since retired to Mecca, a reference to him on this subject was impracticable; but Syud

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Howeynee is assured that the agreement, in the sense in which he regards it, was known to the late Colonel Hamerton; that it was made with his cognizance; and that the French and American Consuls at Zanzibar were privy to the same.

41. In the course of our inquiries on this subject, Syud Thoweynee mentioned a circumstance which may afford a clew to its elucidation. He informed me (adding that the fact was too notorious to be denied) that on accomplishing his mission to Zanzibar, Mahomed bin Salem had succeeded in inducing Syud Majeed to make him an allowance of 12,000 crowns per annum. That the first year the entire sum was paid, and the second year only half, after which it was discontinued altogether. The money was remitted to Mecca through a Muscat merchant named Kdheyyed.

42. Supposing this statement to be true, it occurs to me as very probable that the agent, Mahomed bin Salem, for his own private ends, deceived both parties. (Syud Thoweynee did not mention what reward he had received from him, but there can be no doubt that he was adequately paid for his services.) At Zanzibar he was willing to accept the 40,000 crowns as a fraternal gift from Majeed to Thoweynee, while at Muscat he represented that the stipulated sum was tribute from Zanzibar to the Muscat State.

43. Further inquiries at Zanzibar may throw additional light on the foregoing transaction. The matter may have been recorded at the French and American Consulates, and a reference to them, in a prudential way, may be desirable. The point, however, whether Zanzibar in future should be tributary or not to Muscat will, I presume, depend on the decision arrived at on the more general and important questions regarding the succession and the respective claims of Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed to the sovereignty of Muscat and Zanzibar respectively.

44. I now proceed to notice Syud Thoweynee's vindication of himself from a number of charges brought against him in the course of the official correspondence which has taken place on the foregoing subjects. I do so, in the first place, because I candidly believe that statements have been made to the prejudice of his cause, which the explanations given will tend in some degree to remove; and, secondly, because the said explanations will serve to throw additional light on the untoward disturbances which occurred at Zanzibar, after the return of Syud Thoweynee's expedition to Muscat.

45. The first charge occurs in Colonel Rigby's letter, No. 34, of 1859, and is to the following effect: "His Highness (Syud Majeed) some months ago sent one of his trading ships to Muscat, and instructed the Commander to sell it if he got a good offer. The ship was sold at Muscat for 11,000 dollars, and Syud Thoweynee has forced the agent "to pay him this money."

46. In reply, Seyud Thoweynee admits the charge, but justifies the act on the grounds that Syud Majeed had seized his portion of the inheritance of his two younger brothers, Jemsheed and Hamadan, who had lately died at Zanzibar. Also that Majeed had prevented the proceeds of a house belonging to him, which had been sold at Zanzibar for 12,000 dollars, from being transmitted to him. The house in question had been the property of Bint Seif, the wife of the late Imâm, on whose death it fell to her sister, who made it over to Seyud Thoweynee. It was eventually bought by Aysha bint Saeed, daughter of the late Imâm, but Syud Majeed has forbidden her to transmit the purchase money. The seizure of the price of the ship, therefore, Syud Thoweynee regards as a just act of retaliation.

47. As indirectly connected with this subject, I may here notice Syud Thoweynee's justification of himself for having made a demand on Syud Majeed, in behalf of the late Imâm's younger children, for which he appears to have incurred some blame. Colonel Rigby, in his letter, No. 59, of 1859, says that he, Syud Thoweynee, had demanded (of Majeed) "the renunciation of the custody, as his father's executor, of the property of "the younger children of the late Imâm." Syud Thoweynee admits having done so, but refers to the Imâm's will as a proof that Syud Majeed was not nominated one of the executors. He further adds that his demand was coupled with a request that the property should be committed to the safe custody of a third and disinterested party. This, he maintains, was a necessary precaution, and adduced, in proof, a letter addressed to him by six of the surviving children, showing the abject state of want to which they were reduced through the neglect of Syud Majeed. A translation of this letter is given in Appendix E.

\* Letter, No. 40, of 1859.

48. The next charge mentioned by Colonel Rigby is,\* that Abdallah bin Salem and others of the El Harth tribe had "been writing to Syud Thoweynee, inviting him to "dethrone his brother, and promising him the aid of their tribe and their slaves." Syud Thoweynee does not deny that, prior to his expedition to Zanzibar, several of the El Harth tribe did correspond with him on the subject, but he denies ever having encouraged them to any act of insubordination. He maintains that it was quite natural for the El Harth tribe, who regarded Omân as their native country, and who were ill affected towards Majeed, to endeavour to enlist his sympathies in their behalf."

49. With regard to Syud Barghash and his confederacy with the El Harth at Zanzibar, Syud Thoweynee denies ever having held any correspondence with him on the subject. "Think you," said he, "that I would correspond with a lackbrain; such "he

“ he is?” To this charge generally Syud Thoweynee sent me the following vindication in writing: “ Whatever may have taken place between the brothers Majeed and Barghâsh is no affair of mine. I know nothing about it, neither did I interfere in any way between them after I had referred the matter to the British Government. How comes it, then, that Majeed ruins my houses (at Zanzibar) and destroys what they contain; so much so that even the windows and doors are carried away? Can matters ever be made straight with him while he continues to act in this way? As yet the British Government knows nothing of these things, but I state them to you in order that you may prove their truth.”

50. In a subsequent letter from Colonel Rigby,\* Syud Thoweynee is charged with not acting “ in good faith.” Firstly, he states (in a letter to Lord Elphinstone), “ that he had sent orders to Hamed bin Salem to prevent hostilities, and to bring the army back, and that he had charged him to refrain from all communication with Syud Majeed; whereas Syud Majeed sent for my perusal a letter written to him by Syud Thoweynee, just after his return with his expedition to Muscat, informing him that he was about to send Hamed bin Salem to Zanzibar in his ship ‘ Caroline ’ to arrange all differences between them. This, too, was just after he had agreed to refer those differences to the arbitration of his Lordship the Viceroy and Governor General of India.”

\* No. 46, of 1859.

51. As the foregoing charge called forth a severe censure on Syud Thoweynee from the Government of India,† it is but fair that his explanation should be recorded. It is to the following effect: After receiving the communication from Government, through Colonel Russell, which induced him to abandon the expedition, and to submit his case to the arbitration of the Governor General, he understood that an officer would be sent to Zanzibar to institute the necessary inquiries; and as he deemed it desirable to have an agent on the spot to represent him, he decided to send Hamed bin Salem in that capacity. He states further, that his intention in this respect was communicated to Colonel Russell. He does not deny having written the letter alluded to above, but declares that it was one of friendship merely, and that any overtures which might have been made by Hamed bin Salem, in consequence of that letter, were by no means designed to set aside the final arbitration of the Governor General. His intentions were, by previously establishing a more friendly understanding with Syud Majeed, to render the work of arbitration easier, and the result more satisfactory to both parties.

† Letter, No. 4590. Foreign Department.

52. In the same letter Colonel Rigby states, “ It has since been discovered (that Syud Thoweynee) sent 40,000 dollars to Zanzibar, to be expended in exciting the people to revolt against his brother.” And again, in his letter (No. 103, of 1859) it is stated, “ Syud Barghâsh had been provided with a large sum of money by the ruler of Muscat purposely to stir up a revolution.” Syud Thoweynee, in explanation, says that a month before sailing he had sent 1,000 doubloons to Zanzibar for the payment of his troops, and for the general purposes of the expedition after it should arrive there. The remittance had been sent to Barghâsh, but he denies altogether that it was for the objects above attributed to him.

53. Further, in Colonel Rigby’s Letter, No. 94 of 1859, Syud Thoweynee is accused of having “ seized and confiscated a large new Cochin-built ship belonging to Abdallah bin Salem, the principal Chief of El-Harth tribe, and one of those still in confinement.” This act of Syud Thoweynee is attributed to a report which had reached him that the El-Harth had “ appropriated among themselves the money he had sent there for the purpose of exciting a revolution.” In confutation of this, Syud Thoweynee has produced two letters from the owner of the said ship (translations of which will be found in Appendix F.), from which it appears that the owner, fearing that his vessel might be confiscated by Syud Majeed, had, of his own accord, made it over to Syud Thoweynee, begging that he would undertake to look after his interest therein.

54. In reply to the many charges brought against his agent, Hamed bin Salem, as being “ a very intriguing and unscrupulous person,” as “ active in fomenting rebellion,” and as having “ bribed with three thousand dollars a confidential albamair jemadar, in the household of his Highness (Syud Majeed), to assassinate his Highness.”‡ Syud Thoweynee adduces three notes written by Syud Majeed to Hamed bin Salem, then on the point of returning to Muscat, wherein the latter is addressed in the most friendly terms, and his pardon asked for any seeming harshness which he may have shown towards him. Translations of these notes will be found in Appendix (G).

‡ Rigby letter, No. 94, of 1859.

55. Syud Thoweynee, indeed, most emphatically denies having taken any part whatever in exciting the disturbances which arose at Zanzibar several months after the return of his expedition to Muscat, and he complains bitterly of the numerous misrepresentations which have been sent in against him to Government by Her Majesty’s consul at Zanzibar, whilst the British agency at Muscat was left in the hands of an illiterate Jew who could neither read nor write. Further, he does not hesitate to express his persuasion that the rising at Zanzibar was mainly owing to the persistency of the British representative in a course of uncalled-for harshness towards Syud Barghâsh and the chiefs of the El-Harth tribe. In confirmation of which, he handed me a letter addressed to him a few months ago by Suleiman bin Hamed, the vizier of his Highness Syud Majeed. Without venturing

## Appendix, No. 8.

venturing to express any opinion on the foregoing statement, I have deemed it my duty to report it, and in Appendix (H.) have given a translation of the vizier's letter above referred to.

\* Letter, No. 46, of 1859.

† Letter, No. 53, of 1859.

‡ Letter, No. 59, of 1859.

56. I come lastly to the numerous charges made against Syud Thoweynee of acting under French influence. Colonel Rigby\* "believes that the French Government have had some secret negotiations with Syud Thoweynee, and will strongly endeavour to have Zanzibar declared a dependency of Muscat, and then obtain the cession of a port on the African coast, within the dominions of Zanzibar, from Syud Thoweynee." Again, he writes:† "I have strong grounds for believing that Syud Thoweynee is acting entirely under French instigation for the furtherance of their aggressive designs on the Zanzibar dominions." And again:‡ "I have a strong impression that Syud Thoweynee's only object in wishing to obtain possession of the port of Mombasa, is to make it over to the French in some form." Lieutenant Chester also, late British agent at Muscat, in a letter to Government (copy of which was supplied to Mr. Rassam) reports the circumstance of the Viscomte Fleuriot de Langle, commodore commanding the corvette "Cordeliere," having had several private interviews with his Highness Syud Thoweynee, and notices the suspicious rumour of a paper which had been submitted to him by the Commodore, having been secretly signed by the former.

57. To all the foregoing motives attributed to him in his occasional relations with the French, Syud Thoweynee gives the most solemn denial; and he further denies that any proposition was ever made to him by them for the cession or occupation on any part of the territories either of Muscat or Zanzibar. His correspondence with the French Government, he avers, has been confined to announcing the death of his father, Syud Saeed, and the very few letters which have passed between himself and the French Consul at Zanzibar, have been letters of official courtesy, and nothing more. In proof of this, he submitted to me the originals of three letters from the last-named official, copies of which I have annexed in Appendix I.

58. The origin of the rumour connected with the paper said to have been submitted for his signature, he explains as follows: The paper, he said, was drawn up either by Syud Majeed, or at his dictation. It set forth Syud Majeed's view of the agreement respecting the 40,000 dollars, and how he had intended that it should be divided, precisely as had been represented by him to the British Government." "After reading this paper," said Syud Thoweynee, "the Commodore offered to mediate between me and my brother. To which I replied that the British Government had already tendered their good offices in that respect which I had accepted. That the case was still in their hands, where I was satisfied to leave it; but if they should hereafter decline to proceed in the matter, I might then avail myself of his (the Commodore's) offer."

*Slave Trade.*

Slave Trade.

59. Having thus noticed the principal charges alleged against Syud Thoweynee, and his vindication of himself from the same, I pass on to the subject of slavery, respecting which Government had directed me to institute such inquiries as might be suggestive of some more effectual means for its suppression.

60. Circumstanced as Syud Thoweynee is at present, an expectant of the favour of the British Government through the final arbitration of the Governor General of India, his professions of readiness to co-operate heartily in this cause must be received with caution, though for the same reason his suggestions may be the more worthy of attention. His idea is that the traffic will continue to flourish, in spite of every attempt made to arrest it, unless the limitations within which it is still lawful to prosecute it, are removed. By the terms of the last treaty with the late Imâm of Muscat, "such as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island in 1° 57' south latitude, and the point of Keelwa on the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is Longa Munara or Pagoda Point in 9° 2' south latitude, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pembea, and Menfea," are exempted from all restriction. Here is a line of coast, 420 miles in extent, within which the transport of slaves may still be carried on with impunity, and affording many facilities for the transport to be converted into traffic. Moreover, as far as my knowledge extends, these are the principal limits within which the slave trade is prosecuted on the eastern coast of Africa.

61. Syud Thoweynee's idea, therefore, that these facilities for evading the provisions of existing treaties should be removed, seems deserving of consideration. He believes that, backed by the influence of the British Government, the ruler of Zanzibar might be equal to the task of carrying into effect a law which should prohibit his subjects from transporting slaves from one point to another of his dominions. That effected, the next point would be for the British Government to intimate to the independent maritime chiefs of Arabia, including those bordering on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, that they were determined to suppress altogether the purchase and sale of human beings on the coast of Africa; and that, therefore, any of their vessels or subjects found engaged in such traffic should be subject to seizure and punishment.

punishment. This, as Syud Thoweynee admits, would be a stretch of legitimate authority on our part; but he maintains that anything short of it will fail; and, moreover, that to render the scheme effectual, British agencies should be established along the coast, and British steamers employed there, who should act in concert with the local authorities to carry out its provisions.

62. The foregoing suggestions are not devoid of plausibility, but the policy of adopting the arbitrary measures proposed is fairly open to question, especially at the present juncture when the idea prevails that the chief of Bahrein has sought the protection of the Persian flag, partly with a view of ridding himself and his people of the restriction imposed upon him, with regard to the slave trade, by his treaty with the British.

63. It is obvious, moreover, that foreign European governments would hesitate unless their concurrence was first secured, to grant to the ruler of Zanzibar, or to his officials on the coast, the authority requisite for effectually carrying out the provisions of this scheme towards their subjects, or towards vessels sailing under their flags, and any attempt to execute the same, without such concurrence, might lead to serious complications, and eventually, perhaps, to measures subversive of the existing native sovereignty. Therefore, as at present advised, I deem it prudent to withhold any decided opinion on the subject of slavery on the eastern coast of Africa until by personal inquiries at Zanzibar, I shall be better able to judge of the feasibility of the foregoing and of other suggestions which have been advanced for its suppression. Much, doubtless, will depend on the temper of those foreign powers who have commercial and other interests in that quarter, and their concurrence is most likely to be enlisted by our propounding measures, which, whilst conducive to the attainment of the benevolent object contemplated by the British Government, will be devoid of every feature calculated to wound their national sensibilities. Such a concert secured, the ruler of Zanzibar might, without fear of the consequences, carry into execution, within his own territories, the recognised prohibitive laws towards any of the subjects of those Eastern States, or chiefdoms bordering on the Persian Gulf, whose rulers have hitherto declined to co-operate in any effectual measures for the suppression of the slave trade.

64. The importance of the topics discussed will, I trust, be deemed an ample apology for the length of the foregoing Report. I conclude by submitting the same to the favourable consideration of Government.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *W. M. Coghlan,*  
Brigadier.  
In charge Muscat Zanzibar Commission.

#### APPENDIX (A.)

[COPY of a LETTER from Lieutenant Colonel *Hamerton*, to the Right Honourable the Earl of *Aberdeen*.]

My Lord,

Zanzibar, 31 July 1844.

WITH reference to the communication from his Highness the Imâm to your Lordship's address, under date the 23rd instant, relative to his Highness's intention to appoint his sons Syud Khaled and Syud Thoweynee to succeed on the death of his Highness to the government of his African and Arabian possessions respectively, I beg leave to represent, for the information of your Lordship, that the object his Highness has in view in making this communication, is to ascertain whether he may look to Her Majesty's Government to guarantee the succession to his sons Khaled and Thoweynee, as it is the intention of his Highness to set aside his eldest son, Syud Hilal, and disinherit him altogether, but in doing which, considerable difficulty is likely to arise. His Highness's eldest son, Syud Hilal, being the greatest favourite of the Imâm's Arab subjects; but who has lately fallen under the displeasure of his father the Imâm, he has been deprived of all his confidential followers, and is closely watched by the Imâm. His Highness well knowing the feeling of the people towards him, could not permit him to reside in any part of his dominions where his Highness himself is not present. This prince, Syud Hilal, is the most shrewd and energetic of all the Imâm's sons, and has the good will and sympathy of all his Highness's Arab subjects; they always say, in talking of him, that he is the model of what his father was.

The prince, Syud Khaled, the Imâm's second son, who his Highness wishes to succeed to his African possessions, is unfortunately not esteemed by the Imâm's Arab subjects; he is penurious and grasping to a degree which will always prevent his being beloved or respected by the Arabs.

The prince, Syud Thoweynee, the Imâm's third son, who his Highness wishes to succeed to his Arabian possessions, is in every way superior to his brother Syud Khaled; but it is not supposed he could maintain his position in Arabia in opposition to his brother Syud Hilal.

[The copy, which is in the handwriting of the late Lieutenant Colonel *Hamerton*, here ends abruptly.]

## Appendix, No. 8.

TRANSLATION of a Communication from his Highness the Imâm of *Muscat*, to the Right Honourable the Earl of *Aberdeen*; dated Zanzibar, 23rd July 1844, 6th Rujeeb 1260.

A.C.,

BE it known to your Lordship that we are always grateful for, and sensible of, the kindness of the British Government. We are, as it were, overwhelmed with a sense of received favours.

2. In the treaty between us and Her Majesty Queen Victoria of England, concluded and signed at Muscat, on the 22nd July 1840, it is mentioned that the obligations are binding on us, and our posterity, and for which we all feel happy; please God, during our lifetime, all will be duly fulfilled on our parts, we will abide by it.

3. And after us (on our death), we constitute and appoint our son Syud Khaled to be the ruler of all our African possessions; that is to say, all places on the continent of Africa, between Magadosha, situated in about 2° 10' north latitude, and Cape Delgado, situated in in about 10° 42' south latitude, together with the adjacent islands, now subject to our rule, and under our dominion. And in like manner our son, Syud Thoweynee, to be ruler over all our possessions in Oman, in Arabia, in the Persian Gulf, and on the coast of Persia. And please God the two before mentioned, our sons, Syud Khaled and Syud Thoweynee, will strictly conform to the stipulations of the treaty, and, furthermore, do all things in conformity with the wishes of the British Government; and our hope and desire is, that the British Government may be favourably disposed towards these our sons, Syud Khaled and Syud Thoweynee. And we feel certain that the Government will not withhold its friendship from them.

Whatever you require of us, it is for you to signify.

From the expectant of God's mercy.

(signed) *Saeed bin Sultan.*

(True Translation.)

British Consulate, Zanzibar,  
14 April 1859.

(signed) *Atkins Hamerton.*

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APPENDIX (B.)

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THE quotations in the following paper are taken from a recent Arabic work on the Kings and Imâm's of Omân, written by Sheikh Hameed bin Mohammed bin Razeek about two years ago. It is extremely valuable in this inquiry on account of the information which it affords on the question of the succession. Therefrom it will be perceived that primogeniture has hardly ever been regarded by the Arabs of Omân as conferring a claim to the succession; and, further, that election or recognition by the tribes has heretofore been deemed essential to confirm a successor in the Sovereignty. Moreover, among all the Sovereigns given in the following list not one occurs who is recorded to have assumed or exercised the right of nominating a successor, or of disposing of his territories by will or otherwise. On the death of a ruler, the member of his family who happened to exercise the greatest influence at the time, either put himself forward, or was put forward by the people, to succeed to the sovereignty. The claim was frequently disputed by other of the relatives of the deceased, and intestine family wars followed, the strongest ultimately gaining the ascendancy; but even in such cases the right to the sovereignty does not appear to have been regarded as valid without the concurrence of the principal tribes.

I have deemed it unnecessary to retrace the succession further back than the beginning of the seventeenth century. "At that period," writes the historian under notice, "there had been great dissensions among the people of Rastak [then the capital of the kingdom] on divers matters, their king at the time being Mâlik bin Ali el Arab. So the learned Mussulmans met together, men upright in their religion, and consulted about appointing an Imâm, who, in ruling, should order what was lawful and forbid what was unlawful. Their choice fell on Mâsir bin Moorshid, and they proposed the thing to him. There were seventy present, he being one of the members, and after considerable hesitation he finally agreed to accept the office, and they appointed him Imâm."\*

Nasir bin Moorshid ruled for 26 years, and on his death "the learned Mussulmans met together, and deemed it fit to confer the Imâmship on his cousin Sultan bin Seif, with the concurrence of the people of Oman."

Belarab

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\* Considerable misapprehension has arisen about the meaning of this title. As applied to the rulers of Omân, the word must not be understood to imply any special *authority* in religious matters, but merely a moral or religious *fitness* for the office, which was regarded as being quite as necessary, in a ruler over pious Mussulmans, as any other qualification. The title appears to have signified originally a "presiding sovereign," *i.e.*, one having supreme authority over the minor kings, sheikhs, &c. In the history of Sheikh Hameed, it is applied to all the predecessors of the late Syud Saeed except to that ruler, and at the present day no one of his sons is generally styled "Imâm" by the Arabs. They are usually addressed and designated as "Syuds," *i.e.*, lords or chiefs, according to the literal signification of the word, and not in the sense in which the same term is more commonly used to designate one descended from the family of Mohammed.

Belarab bin Sultan, son of the preceding, succeeded his father, "after the *Imâmship* had been confirmed to him." On this occasion also "great dissensions arose between Belarab and his brother, Seif bin Sultan, and many sided with the latter." Ultimately, "the majority of the people of Omân met together to confer the *Imâmship* on Seif bin Sultan," who had prevailed against his brother, and besieged him in one of his forts, where he died.

Seif bin Sultan ruled over all Omân, and on his death the *Imâmship* was given to Sultan bin Seif bin Sultan. When the latter died "grave disputes arose among the people of Omân; some of the unlearned were for setting up his son, Seif bin Sultan bin Seif, as the successor to his father; but at that time he was under age, and had not attained to years of discretion. Others, again, and these were the wise and learned, were for preferring Mohenna bin Sultan, another brother, who was in every way fit for the office. They deemed the *Imâmship* of a child improper in every way. It was not lawful in prayer (reference is here made to the one who leads in the Mohammedan services, and who is also styled '*Imâm*'), how then could he administer the Government, have the control of the finance, and exercise the power of life and death? . . . But as the people appeared intent on this matter, the Sheikh, Ada bin Soleiman, in order to quell the disturbances which had arisen, pro-claimed Seif bin Sultan as their *Imâm*. Subsequently, however, Mohenna bin Sultan, his brother, was introduced into the citadel, and the *Imâmship* was conferred on him."

On the accession of Mohenna bin Sultan the people of Rastak urged his cousin Yaarab bin Belarab bin Sultan to dispute the sovereignty with him. They were so far successful that Mohenna bin Sultan was treacherously killed. Yaarab bin Belarab ruled at first as regent for his cousin Seif bin Sultan, but the tribes subsequently absolved him from his treachery, and "confirmed him in the *Imâmship*."

This arrangement, however, gave dissatisfaction to the people of Rastak, who adhered to Seif bin Sultan, and the latter was eventually proclaimed *Imâm*, his uncle, Belarab bin Nasir, acting as Regent. Mohammed bin Nasir, another uncle, took part against Belarab, and, after many battles, overcame him. "Then Mohammed bin Nasir sent for the chiefs of the tribes, and for the learned men of Omân, and requested them to appoint a Regent with Seif bin Sultan. The council was held with closed doors, Mohammed bin Nasir himself being with them. They proposed that he should succeed to the *Imâmship*, which he at first refused, but, being urged thereto, he at length consented, they taking oath to obey him."

Mohammed bin Nasir was killed at the siege of Sohâr about A.D. 1724, when his nephew, Seif bin Sultan, succeeded him. Hearing of this, his other uncle, Belarab bin Nasir, laid claim to the sovereignty, and was recognised as *Imâm* by several of the tribes. Intestine wars followed, and Seif bin Sultan called for the assistance of the Persians, and was present with them at a later siege of Sohâr, then ably defended by Ahmed Bin Saeed, the grandfather of the late Seyyed Saeed. Alienated from the cause of Seif bin Sultan on account of his confederacy with the Persians, and regarding him as the cause of all the disasters which the foreign troops had brought upon Omân, "the learned men of Nehla, Nezwa, and Ozha, with the chiefs of the Beni Ghafer and those of Maawel, met together, and conferred the *Imâmship* on Sultan bin Moorshid" (who also appears to have been an uncle to Seif bin Sultan).

Sultan bin Moorshid effectually checked the advance of the Persians, and was recognised as *Imâm* by most of the tribes of Oman. On his death, which occurred at the siege of Sahâr, Ahmed bin Saeed followed up his successes, eventually expelling the Persians, and reducing the entire country to obedience. "Then the chief men of Oman assembled together, and conferred the *Imâmship* on Ahmed bin Saeed." This occurred about A.D. 1738.

On the death of Ahmed, "the chiefs of Rastak and others of Oman chose Saeed bin Ahmed (second son) as his successor. They wished to elect Hilâl, as being the eldest and wisest, but he suffered from a cataract in his eye, and proceeded to Scinde to have it cured, and died there."

Saeed bin Ahmed soon became obnoxious to his subjects, and they consulted together to remove him, and to appoint Kees bin Ahmed (his next brother) in his stead. The usual disturbances followed, some of the brothers siding with one party, and some with the other. Saeed bin Ahmed eventually triumphed, chiefly through the energy of his fourth son, Hamed Saeed, who virtually became the ruler of the kingdom. "After Hamed bin Saeed had taken Muscat (from the opposite party), and his father, Saeed bin Ahmed, had made over to him all the forts which he possessed in Omân the chiefs of Omân recognised him."

Hamed bin Saeed was opposed by his uncle, Seif bin Ahmed, until the latter died. Then his uncle, Sultan bin Ahmed, disputed the sovereignty with him, and civil wars continued till the death of Hamed bin Saeed by small-pox, about A.D. 1790. At this time Saeed bin Ahmed, the father of Hamed, was still living at Rastak, and again assumed the *Imâmship*. He confided Muscat to the governorship of his eldest son, Ahmed bin Saeed, and the province of Burka to his nephew, Ali bin Hilâl, retiring himself to Rastak, and so far "neglecting the Government and the people that the kingdom was transferred to Sultan bin Ahmed" (his fifth brother).

Sultan bin Ahmed reigned about 14 years, and was killed in one of his expeditions to the Persian Gulf. He left three sons, viz. :—

Salim bin Sultan.  
Saeed bin Sultan.  
Hamed bin Sultan.



Appendix, No. 8.

“On the death of their father,” writes the historian, “there was great attachment between the brothers Salim and Saeed.” This continued during the lifetime of the former, and for several years the two brothers appear to have ruled conjointly, and to have acted in concert against the many attempts made by other members of the family to wrest the sovereignty from them. “The cause why Saeed was preferred to his brother Salim,” says the author quoted, “was as follows: first, such was the wish of the daughter of the Imâm, and his brother Salim consented thereto.” Saeed then “sent for the chiefs of Omân, and bound them to aid him against all enemies. To this they agreed, all being well pleased with him.”

Recapitulating the names of the sovereigns enumerated in the foregoing list, from about A.D. 1618 to the accession of his late Highness Syud Saeed, we find the order of the succession to have been as follows:—

1. Nâsir bin Moorshid.
2. Sultan bin Seif, cousin to the above.
3. Belarab bin Sultan, son of preceding, who is displaced by his brother.
4. Seif bin Sultan.
5. Sultan bin Seif, son of preceding.
6. Seif bin Sultan bin Seif (a child) proclaimed, but his elder brother
7. Mohenna bin Sultan succeeds.
8. Yaarab bin Belarab bin Sultan, cousin to preceding.
9. Seif bin Sultan (6) again proclaimed Imâm, his uncle, Belarab bin Nasir, being Regent.
10. Mahomed bin Nâsir, another uncle to preceding, elected Imâm. Dies, and
11. Seif bin Sultan (6 and 9) again proclaimed, but some of the tribes acknowledge his uncle, Belarab bin Nasir.
12. Mohammed, another uncle of preceding, is made Imâm while his nephew is living. Is killed at Sohâr, and is succeeded by
13. Ahmed bin Saeed, Governor of Sohâr, the first of a new dynasty.
14. Saeed bin Ahmed, second son to preceding, the eldest being afflicted with cataract.
15. Hamed bin Saeed, fourth son of preceding, is recognised as joint ruler with his father; Hamed dies, and his father rules alone for a short time, but is eventually displaced by his brother.
16. Sultan bin Ahmed, the fifth son of Ahmed bin Saeed (13). On his death, his sons
17. Salim bin Sooltan and Saeed bin Sultan conjointly, until, with the consent of the former, Saeed, the late Imâm, succeeded to the individual sovereignty.

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

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#### APPENDIX (C.)

#### TRANSLATION of the WILL of his late Highness *Syud Saeed.*

*In the name of the Most Merciful God,*

SYUD SAEED bin Sultan bin el Imam Ahmed bin Saeed, Al boo Saeedy, wills, with regard to what is incumbent upon him, from his property, after his decease, in respect of all the funeral rites after his death until his burial, 500 dollars of his property, after his death, to whoever washes his body with the washing of the departed, and to whoever digs the grave in which he is interred after his death. Also 500 dollars of his property, after his death, to his relatives who do not inherit anything from him. Also 1,000 expiatory prayers, each expiatory prayer (to be of the value of) what will feed 60 poor people. Also remuneration to whoever shall fast for him for the space of 50 months, in lieu of what was incumbent on himself for his transgression of the fast of the months of Ramadhân; and the remuneration is to be defrayed from his property, after his death, at the discretion of his executors. Also remuneration to whoever shall perform in his stead the pilgrimage of the Mussulmans to the Holy House of God, which is in the renowned (city of) Mecca, and shall visit in his stead the Tomb of our Prophet Mohammed (upon whom be peace), which is at the Medinah of Yathrib, and shall in his stead offer up the salutations of peace to him and to his two companions, the faithful Aboobekr and Omar ibn-el Khattâb (God be gracious

gracious to them), and shall perform in his stead in such pilgrimage and visitation the proper duties and ceremonies, and whatever God has ordained as well-pleasing (to Him); the remuneration for this is to be defrayed from his property, after his death, at the discretion of his executors. And whatever arms or weapons of war he possesses he bequeaths to his male children. And his two ships, the "Feidh Alim" and "Caroline," he gives, after his death, as a legacy to the treasury of the Mussulmans. And whatever other ships he possesses, besides those two ships, are to be sold after his death, and their value to be divided among all his heirs, according to what God has ordained in His law, to each one his share of the inheritance. And the said Syud Saeed declares to be free all the male and female slaves which shall remain in his possession after his death, excepting those who are at his plantation, for the sake of Almighty God, and in hope of His mercy. And he bequeaths to each one of them whatever each may possess, it is to be theirs. And he bequeaths to every Abyssinian male or female slave 50 dollars, out of his property, after his death. And to each of his concubines 100 dollars out of his property after his death, and whatever she may possess, it is to be hers. And the said Syud Saeed has constituted all his houses at Bunder Muscat, and all which are at Bunder Zanzibar, and at the Watiyyah, an endowment for ever to his heirs collectively as a bequest from him. The said Syud Saeed bequeaths whatever shall remain of his apparel, after his death, to his male children. And he has forbidden the sale of whatever furniture or utensils his houses may contain; but they are to be divided among his heirs, according to what God has ordained in His law, to each one his share of the inheritance. And the said Syud Saeed has appointed his wife, the daughter of Seif bin Ali, and his nephew, Mahomed bin Salem bin Sultan, and his son Khaled bin Saeed, his executors in regard to whatever he may possess or owe; he appoints them his executors therein to execute this will which he has willed. And he confirms all that he has directed to be placed to his account, and directs that it be done and carried into effect out of his property, after his death, whether the same be obligatory upon him or not. He has made it obligatory upon himself hoping that his executors will duly execute the same, and that his heirs will be satisfied therewith. God is the witness over all. Done on Monday the 26th day of Ramadhân of the months of the year of the Hegira of the Prophet 1266, and written for him, at his direction, by the hand of his servant, the poor towards God, Saeed bin Nasir bin Khalf, il Maooly.

The following, in the Original, is in the Handwriting of the late *Syud Saeed*, the Testator.

What is written in this will is true, and it was (written) of my own free will, and in my sight. This is written by the hand of the vile Saeed.

Codicil.--And I bequeath to the liberated slaves, Georgians and Abyssinians, who have no children, or whose children are not grown up, as also to the Abyssinians, eunuchs, the produce of the plantation of Showein; all its proceeds are for their subsistence, except the female slaves who may marry, such are to have nothing; and if any shall separate from their husbands, those are not to have anything. Salâm.

Written by the vile Saeed, with his own hand.

Codicil.—The male slaves at the plantation of Showein are also to share in the plantation for their subsistence.

True translation.

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

#### APPENDIX (D.)

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from *Syud Toorkee* to *Syud Thowéynee*.

A. C.

UNDER your auspices there is nothing but good to report of these parts. We pray God to continue the same. Furthermore, brother, a letter has reached us from the consul of Bushire regarding the affair which has taken place against the Shehiyeen whilst we were at the village of Mijiz of the Al Waheeba. I have already informed you, brother, of the act done by the Naem\* of Kabil. They were not subjects, so that I could not restrain them. They came to me of their good will. Now, it is for you to decide, for you are the father, and I am like your son Salem, and you can restrain all. The fact is not hidden from anyone that the act complained of was committed by the people of the Edh-Dhâhara [subject to the Wahabee Ameer]. We cherish the best thoughts of you, and whatever you may require, a hint will suffice. Be in safety, peace, 8 Rebia el Awwal, 1275.

True translation.

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

\* Naem is a tribe subject to Fysul bin Saood, the Wahabee Ameer. They were in the service of Syud Toorkee until very lately, when the Wahabees left him, or were dismissed.

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## APPENDIX (E).

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from Six of the younger Children of the late *Syud Saeed* at Zanzibar, to *Syud Thoweynee* at Muscat.

A. C.

We inform you, dear father (brother), that our dependence is on God first, then on you, to relieve us from the cruelty with which Majeed is treating us. We were wretched after the death of our father Saeed, and Majeed took no care of us whatever, neither did he notice us either for good or for evil, so that we were abandoned, and had no one to sympathise with us. For a whole year Majeed has forsaken us, he neither visits us nor inquires after us, whether we be dead or alive. Hence we are perplexed, knowing no one, and possessing nothing. All this, in reality, comes through Mahomed bin Salem, who left us here with Majeed, may God not forgive him for leaving us with Majeed, who does not fear God, for if he feared God he would not have neglected us; but he does not fear God. For a month he has cut off our supply of food, and we have nothing to eat, and he has treated us with cruelty such as no one would be guilty of. When our brother Barghâsh was in Zanzibar, though he was poor like ourselves, yet we bore it patiently; now, however, that our brother Barghâsh has been expelled Zanzibar, we can remain here no longer. Our reliance, therefore, is on God and on you to take us away from Zanzibar, for you are now in the place of our father Saeed. Moreover, when they stopped the water from our brother Barghâsh, it was also ordered that no water should be brought to us, and we were three days without water. Is all this agreeable to God's will? But were we to relate all the cruelty we have received from Majeed this sheet would not contain it. If such things are pleasing (to God) and all the cruelty which we have received from Majeed, then we refer the matter to Him, for He alone is sufficient for it. Barghâsh used to pity us, and was kind to us, but now he has been taken away from Zanzibar and we are desolate. We make this known to you that you may take cognisance thereof. From Khaleefa, and Meneen, and Sheneen, and Nâsir and Abder-Rabb and Bedrân, to Syud Thoweynee, 25 Rebiaa-ool-awal, 1276.

(True translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

## APPENDIX (F.)

TRANSLATION of EXTRACTS of two LETTERS from Abdallah bin Salem at Zanzibar to Syud Thoweynee.

A. C.,

Your servant Abdallah bin Suleiman (Nakhoda) has informed me that on his return, and after his safe arrival at Muscat, he purpces coming to Zanzibar to visit his relations; but if you can detain him in the ship for another year, that is what I desire; but, if not, be good enough to find a man who will be useful to me, and apt for the business, (*i.e.*, to take care of the vessel); I leave everything in your hands.

7 Jamad-el-Awwal, 1275.

A. C.,

We entreat you not to cease taking an interest in your servant Abdallah bin Suleiman (the Nakhoda), in the matter of your ship the "El Harethy," doing whatever you may deem best by the same. I make over the case to God and to you. Please to excite your servant to be diligent therein, and to return from Calcutta to Muscat (*i.e.*, to sail between the two places). Salâm.

10 Sefer 1276.

From your servant and slave,  
(signed) *Abdallah bin Salem.*

(True translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

## APPENDIX (G.)

TRANSLATION of LETTERS from *Syud Majeed* to *Hamed bin Salem*, at Zanzibar.

YOUR esteemed letter has reached, and your brother (Majeed) understands what you have said. The intelligence with which you enjoined me when leaving for the plantation has also reached. The French vessel which we sent to Sohâr has arrived. She comes back from Bombay after a voyage of 32 days. The people of Bombay report that the English Government take the side of our brother Thoweynee; but as yet no information has been received

received from the Kingdom (England), and it is believed that none will come for five years. No certain intelligence had been received at Bombay from Muscat for three months. Beloved friend, your servant Mahomed Khamees was to sail (from Bombay?) six days after the (French) vessel, which has now arrived. He was busy getting the soldiers and guns on board, and the English Government took a great interest in the matter. They saluted the ship with 21 guns from the fort as she was moved into the sea, and a steamer was made to tow her. And it is reported that there are great disturbances in the (European) Kingdom, and the English are sending 20,000 sailors for the ships, besides those that have already gone, and material of war in large quantities. The French are doing the same; they have already despatched about 50,000, and God only knows what the result will be. Whatever you may require, only give me a hint thereof. Peace.—From your loving brother,

*Majeed.*

YOUR esteemed letter, brother and lord, has reached, and your brother understands what you have stated. What has been done by you and by me was not on your account; but what has occurred has been on account of another from whom you have come. Brother, I ask you to excuse and pardon me. In what has taken place, I trust you will escape any accusation from the people of Muscat, for, as regards yourself, I call God to witness, on my soul, that we have only good to say of you. To-morrow the "Clive" will pass by you, should she be in time; but you had better sail before her, that intelligence may go that you have left Zanzibar. Whatever you may require, a hint will suffice.—Your loving brother,

*Majeed,*  
(in his own hand.)

Safar 1276.

YOUR esteemed letter, brother and lord, has reached us. Be good enough to weigh for this place and anchor before Showeynee, that we may not always appear to lie to him (Rigby), and though our face may appear pinched towards you, yet you are of those who forgive. Salâm.—Written by the hand of your loving brother,

*Majeed.*

(True Translations.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

#### APPENDIX (H.)

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from *Suleiman bin Hamed*, Vizier of *Syud Majeed*, to *Syud Thoweynee*.

AFTER the departure of your brother, Syud bin Salem, the Consul began to oblige your brother, Syud Majeed bin Saeed to rise against Syud Barghâsh, to make him leave Zanzibar, on the ground that, if the said Syud Barghâsh remained at Zanzibar, there would be no end of sedition, for he misleads the people. So he sent me to Syud Barghâsh, and I went to him and spoke to him, and counselled him, on account of my love for the children of the late Syud Saeed. I said to him, "Syud Barghâsh, this affair is mixed up with the English, and they have sent this steamer (the "Assaye") in order to expel the El-Harth Arabs from Zanzibar, and to expel you also." But Syud Barghâsh would not believe my words, so I reiterated my advice, saying, "Syud Majeed bids you to embark on board the ship "Piedmontse," and he will disburse to you your past salary, and the same for the future, and give you, besides the allowance, something additional, and go you to Muscat and remain there for a year, and after that remove your relatives and return to Zanzibar in safety. He would not consent to this; so I returned to Syud Majeed with the reply, that his brother Syud Barghâsh asked to delay his departure till the monsoon opened. To this Syud Majeed would not consent, so he said to me, tell him to go in any vessel he pleases, seeing that he does not wish to leave in one of my ships; but go he must, otherwise we must confine him. So I went again to Syud Barghâsh and told him that unless he sailed he would be confined. He replied: No doubt I have deserved what my brother Majeed is doing to me! So he was confined. Afterwards I went to Syud Barghâsh and remonstrated with him, so that he consented to leave, asking a month's delay, after which he would depart. I returned to Syud Majeed who gave him the month's delay to prepare; and Syud Barghâsh wanted money from your servant Ludda, the agent of your servant Zirâin; but Ludda, as would appear, refused and consulted me, whereon I told him I would obtain something for him from his brother Majeed, so I went to Syud Majeed and asked for something from him for his brother, and he gave me 10,000 dollars. After which I went to Syud Majeed again, and took from him the remainder of the inheritance still due to him,

## Appendix, No. 8.

viz., 2,200 dollars, as also the remainder of the portion of his sister Khola, 1,560 dollars, and we gave it to Syud Barghâsh, the total being 13,760 dollars, and I told Ludda to give him besides 240 dollars to make up the sum to 14,000 dollars, and I sent it to Syud Barghâsh, and he received the money and he paid Ludda the sum of 7,000 dollars, so that 7,000 remained to him. And Syud Barghâsh chartered the ship belonging to Ahmed bin Moobarek of the chief of Ras-el-Hadd, and put his baggage on board, and we were assured that Syud Barghâsh was about to leave. And the consul used to send your servant Ahmed bin Naamân every day to urge Syud Majeed not to allow his brother Syud Barghâsh to remain in the country; that he must go. They replied that he was to go; and on the 10th he removed to the plantation belonging to your brother Syud Khaled, where there is a strong stone house, and fortified himself therein, and distributed money among the El-Harth Arabs, and the Arabs all removed from the town, so that not one Harethy remained in it except Hussein bin Mahomed and a few other men, and they were in reality all on his side. When we perceived this we sent first Seif el Waly and Ahmed bin Moobarek, the chief of El-Hadd, but they effected nothing. Afterwards we sent Sheikh Hussein bin Mahomed and Saleh bin Ali, and Hamood bin Seif Moosselim, and Seif, and Khamees Walad Khalfan bin Kadeeh, and Seif el Wâli, and Ahmed bin Moobarek, to confer with the El-Harth, in order to induce them to separate themselves from Syud Barghâsh, and to let him depart. The ship which he had chartered had come near the plantation of Hamood bin Hamed at Boo-Boo-Boo; but the Arabs would not listen, for they had attached themselves heart and soul to Syud Barghâsh. When the above-named returned, your brother Syud Majeed bin Saeed collected his troops, those which remained in the town, Arabs and Sowahilis and also soldiers, and went against his brother on the 17th of Rabiaa el Awwal. They arrived at 3 p.m., and there was an engagement, and the El-Harth Arabs only stood half-an-hour, when they fled and left Syud Barghâsh alone in the house, and he asked for quarter, and it was conceded. And Syud Majeed and his troops returned to the plantation of Et Taif, and the army began to attack the plantations of the El-Harth, destroying, burning, and plundering, so that nothing remained to them, whilst the Arabs of the El-Harth were scattered in the uncultivated districts. After this, we asked your brother to give them quarter, seeing they were his servants and subjects, and no sovereign can stand without them. So he gave them quarter, and at this date most of them have come back, and have visited Syud Majeed, so that they have saved themselves, but lost their property. My Lord, the Consul and the English have bewildered us in this affair of Syud Barghâsh. Whenever we spoke to Syud Majeed in behalf of his brother, the Consul set at nought our words, and it is needless for me to enlarge on this matter to you, as you will hear all from the lips of Syud Barghâsh. And the Consul went in person to the Beiter Ras belonging to Syud Saeed to escort his friends (the officers) on their departure on the same day that Majeed went to see Syud Barghâsh off. Whatever you may require a hint will suffice.

26 Rabia-el-awal 1276.

From your servant and slave,

(signed) *Suleimen bin Hamed.*

(True Translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

## APPENDIX (I.)

COPIES of LETTERS addressed by the Consul of France at Zanzibar to Syud Thoweynee at Muscat.

Consulat de France à Zanzibar à son Altesse le Sultan de Muscate.

Très illustre et très magnifique Seigneur,

Je profite du départ pour Muscat du navire du commerce Français la Gironde pour accuser réception à votre Altesse de la lettre qu'elle ma fait l'honneur de m'écrire, et pour la remercier des affaires obligeantes qui y sont contenus.

Je suis heureux de savoir que la paix n'est point troublée à Muscate et je fais des vœux ardents pour que les états de votre Altesse en jouissent le plus long temps.

Zanzibar a été dans ces derniers temps cruellement éprouvée, deux fléaux, la petite vérole et la choléra, ont exercé de terribles ravages, et parmi les nombreuses personnes qui eu ont été victimes, nous déplorons particulièrement la perte de Sèid Djemchir et de Sèid Hamdan. En ce moment ces deux épidémies ont presque entièrement disparu de la ville, et c'est avec joie que je viens en informer votre Altesse.

Je ne finirai pas cette lettre sans assurer votre Altesse du plaisir que j'aurai toujours à recevoir ses nouvelles, et sans lui offrir mes services empressés pour tout ce qui lui sera agréable.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, etc.

Le Consul de France,  
(signed) *Ladislav Cochet.*

L. S.

Zanzibar, le 27 Fevrier 1859.

## Consulat de France à Zanzibar.

Très illustre et très Magnifique Seigneur.

J'ai l'honneur de renvoyer à votre Altesse la lettre qu'elle adressait à Sèid Bargash, et qui m'est parvenue après son départ. Je la remercie en même temps de tout mon coeur de l'intention qu'elle a de m'envoyer un nouveau cheval, et je la prie instamment de n'en rien faire, car il m'est expressément interdit de recevoir des cadeaux. Je prie toute fois votre Altesse de croire que je suis extrêmement sensible à cette nouvelle marque de la bienveillance dont je conserverai un éternel souvenir.

Je renouvelle encore ici à votre Altesse mes offres de service en tout ce qui sera compatible avec la position officielle que j'occupe ici. Je prie seulement votre Altesse de ne pas mettre dans les lettres qu'elle me fera l'honneur d'écrire d'autres pour les Arabes de Zanzibar, attendu qu'il ne m'est pas permis de m'en charger.

L. S.

Je suis, etc.  
Le Consul de France:  
(signed) *Ladislas Cochet.*

A son Altesse Sèid Toveni, Sultan de Muscate,  
Zanzibar, le 28 Decembre 1859.

## Consulat de France à Zanzibar.

Très Illustre et très Magnifique Seigneur.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser cette lettre à votre Altesse par Mr. le Vice Consul des états-unis, pour vous demander des nouvelles de votre santé et de celle de tous les vôtres qui, j'espère sont en bonne état; puis pour remercier votre Altesse de la lettre qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire par le trois-mâts Americain "Imam," et que la Capitaine m'a remise en personne aussitôt après son arrivée ici.

Je ne puis faire à votre Altesse, très illustre et très magnifique seigneur, le plaisir qu'elle m'a causé en m'apprenant qu'elle avait espoir que les difficultés qui troublent la tranquillité du pays s'arrangeront bientôt; je ne cesse d'adresser au Tout Puissant de ferventes prières pour qu'il en soit ainsi, et que la paix rende à ce pays son ancien prospérité, et qu'elle le dégage, au plutôt, de la pression étrangère qui pèse aujourd'hui sur lui.\*

La Cordelière a du quitter Mascate, je me plais à croire que votre Altesse a pû s'entendre avec notre commandant dont la Mission, comme toute celle qui vient à votre Altesse de la part de mon august Souverain, était empreinté de l'amitié la plus désintéressé.

Je termine cette lettre en recommandant votre Altesse à la garde de Dieu, et en La priant de disposer en tout de mes services.

L. S.

Je suis, etc.  
Le Consul de France.  
(signed) *Ladislas Cochet.*

A son Altesse Séid Toveni, Sultan de Muscate,  
Zanzibar, le 28 Decembre 1859.

From Assistant Surgeon *James Welsh* to Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, in charge Muscat Zanzibar Commission.

Sir,

Bombay, 5 July 1860.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you four sets of the photographic views taken at Muscat, and request that you will be good enough to forward the same to Government. The views, as the result of my amateur attempts, are devoid of artistic merit; nevertheless, as being probably the first taken of Muscat and its harbour, they may prove acceptable, and, perhaps, useful.

2. I have also annexed, in a tabular form, an abstract of meteorological observations, made during our late trip to Muscat. These also may not be without interest, if no such observation, during the same season, and in the same localities, have hitherto been recorded.

3. Our

\* The Arabic transcript which accompanies this letter reads as follows: "and that peace may free the territories which are suffering from the heavy pressure of the foreigners who are now resident therein."—(Signed) *G. P. Badger.*

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3. Our stay at the island of Hallania, as well as at Muscat, was too short to enable me to form a reliable opinion on the climate of the two places. The temperature of Hallania was similar to that which generally prevails at Aden at the same period; the excessive heat being tempered by light breezes from the south-west. Two or more of the telegraph staff had been suffering from slight fevers of the intermittent type, but the use of quinine sufficed to remove the disease. Their isolation on this barren island, the total want of recreation, and, perhaps, the superadded impression of insecurity from attack by the Arabs of the mainland, form together a sufficient cause why the Europeans and Indo-Britons of the telegraph station are not as healthy as they might otherwise be. The few resident natives who are very poor, living mostly in caves, and migrating to different parts of the island, as the seasons change, for fishing purposes, fish being their principal, and often their only, food, seem a hardy race. If their testimony is to be relied on, Hallania is never subject to endemics of any kind.

There are several wells on the island, all of native construction, and some of the water obtainable, though slightly brackish, is generally considered very wholesome. Many Arab boats and bungalows touch here for a supply on their way from the southward towards Muscat and the Persian gulf.

4. The accompanying meteorological statistics suffice to prove that the heat of Muscat is excessive; and I may further add, that the range of the thermometer very inadequately indicates the degree of sensible heat experienced. Occasionally during the day the air was so intensely scorching that chairs became uncomfortable to sit upon, and glass-ware unpleasantly hot to the touch. In like manner, during the night, gusts of scorching wind prevailed for several hours, which seemed as if proceeding from the mouth of an open furnace.

According to the testimony of the natives this extreme heat would last till the beginning of July, after which the place would be cooled by light breezes from the north-east and south-west.

5. The only resident Europeans at Muscat are four gentlemen connected with the telegraph station there. As might reasonably be expected, they complained of the depressing influence of the climate at that season of the year, and one or more of them had been suffering from fever. The natives, who are by no means insensible to the heat, are, nevertheless, a healthy, sturdy-looking race, and I could not learn that any particular form of disease prevailed among them. Hoopingcough was very general among the children, and many fatal cases had occurred. Several of his Highness's Syud Thoweynee's younger children were suffering from it, and an infant grandchild of his had died of it the day before we arrived.

6. There being no sanatory laws in force at Muscat, and an entire absence of sewerage, it is surprising that the town should be so comparatively healthy, encircled as it is on three sides by high hills, with a population dense for a place of such limited extent. Viewed in connection with these drawbacks to salubrity and health, the rapid desiccation consequent on the excessive heat may be considered as the safeguard of the place.

7. The foregoing observations refer to the shore. The heat was not less felt afloat, but, as far as I could learn, no particular ill effects were produced by it beyond those of lassitude and prostration. The crew of the "Punjab" continued as healthy as before, except a few cases of old complaints which reappeared for a time; and the sick-lists of the "Elphinstone" and "Maké," (which vessels had been several days at Muscat before our arrival), did not show any marked increase attributable to the climate of the locality. All were indeed glad to get away, and it is by no means improbable that a protracted stay at that place, at this season of the year, might be deleterious to the health of Europeans confined together within the narrow limits of a ship.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *J. Welsh,*  
Assistant Surgeon.

ABSTRACT of METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS made on Board Her Majesty's Steamer "Punjab," Indian Navy, and on Shore at Muscat, from the 1st to the 24th June 1860, inclusive.

Date 1860.	Ship's Barometer.		Thermometer in the Air.		Wet Bulb.		Temperature of the Sea.	Rain.	Winds.		Latitude, North.	Longitude, West.	Course and Distance in Miles.	GENERAL REMARKS.
	10 a.m.	4 p.m.	6 a.m.	1 p.m.	6 a.m.	1 p.m.			Direction.	Force.				
June 1	29 87	29 77	86	90	78	80	86	none	Southerly	2	18 30	70 44	S. 79 30 W. 131	a.m. cloudy, with cirri and cirro-cumuli; 6 p.m. cloudless sky.
2	29 85	29 76	87	89	79	79	85	"	S. Westesly	3	18 06	68 10	W. 9 S. 164	a.m. as yesterday; swell from S. W. increasing.
3	29 82	29 76	86	92	79	80	83	Light showers	"	3 to 4	17 35	65 39	W. 12 S. 149	a.m. cloudy, with cirri, cirro-cumuli; 5 p.m. slight shower.
4	29 75	29 65	83	86	80	78	83	Showery	"	3	17 21	62 59	W. 5 S. 164	a.m. cloudy, as above; p.m. showery, with distant thunder.
5	29 72	29 65	83	87	77	78	83	Heavy shower	"	3 to 4	17 13	60 22	W. 3 S. 150	Clouded, several showers.
6	29 73	29 73	85	87	78	80	83	Showery	"	3	16 56	57 35	W. 6 S. 160	a.m. partially clouded and showery; 5.45 p.m. Kooria Moorria Islands in sight.
7	29 82	29 73	84	92	80	80	84	"	W. to N.W.	1 to 2	17 31	56 00	-	8 a.m. anchored at Hallania, in Telegraph Bay.
8	29 77	29 68	84	91	80	78	84	none	South	1 to 2	-	-	-	At anchor, moderate S. W. breeze, with swell.
9	29 70	29 63	84	92	78	80	84	"	S. Westesly	3 to 4	-	-	-	6 a.m. up anchor, and steered for Jibli Island; fresh breeze from S. W. with long swell.
10	29 75	29 65	83	91	78	81	84	"	"	2 to 3	19 28	58 54	N. 51 E. 188	Cloudy, with cirri and cirro-cumuli.
11	29 69	29 58	84	87	80	75	84	"	"	3 to 4	22 21	60 05	N. 21 E. 198	Partially clouded as yesterday; at noon hazy.
12	29 67	29 56	87	102	78	80	87	"	Variable	-	23 37	58 40	-	Light cumuli and cirri; hazy, with great mirage.
13	29 62	29 53	93	104	76	78	87	"	"	-	-	-	-	Sky clear; the air intensely dry and hot.
14	-	-	100	115	78	80	-	"	"	-	-	-	-	Sky cloudless; scorching hot wind at night, coming in gusts.
15	-	-	98	98	77	81	-	"	"	-	-	-	-	Clouded, with cirri and cirro-cumuli.
16	-	-	98	106	71	75	-	"	"	-	-	-	-	Hazy, without clouds, but with mirage; air intensely hot, and very dry.
17	-	-	98	101	71	78	-	"	"	-	-	-	-	Clouds, with light cirri. Sensibly as hot as yesterday.
18	-	-	94	99	70	81	-	"	"	-	-	-	-	Hazy. Light North-Easterly breeze blowing.
19	-	-	90	92	75	85	87	"	"	-	-	-	-	Fresh breeze from N.E.; partially clouded; much cooler.
20	-	29 63	88	95	74	84	-	"	"	-	-	-	-	Partially clouded and hazy. At 1 p.m. left for Bombay.
21	29 72	29 62	85	86	81	80	86	"	Southerly	3	22 25	60 48	-	Light cirri and cirro-cumuli. Moderate swell from S.W.
22	29 67	29 62	82	87	80	81	84	"	"	2 to 3	20 53	63 39	S. 59 47 E. 183	a.m. cloudy, with cirri and cirro-cumuli; sea moderate; evening with cloudless sky.
23	29 73	29 67	85	86	81	81	85	"	S. Westesly	1 to 3	19 39	67 27	S. 70 E. 225	a.m. partially clouded, with moderate sea. Light rain in afternoon. Cloudless evening.
24	29 71	29 63	83	86	80	82	85	Showery	"	1 to 4	18 53	71 02	S. 77 E. 206	a.m. cloudy, with cirri and cirro-cumuli; less swell; evening cloudy.
25	At 12 <sup>h</sup> 15 <sup>m</sup> a.m. anchored in Bombay Harbour.													

(signed) J. Welsh, Assistant Surgeon.



## RESOLUTION by the Honourable Board, dated the 17th July 1860.

*Resolved*, The Honourable the Governor in Council will defer his opinion on the various questions discussed in Brigadier Coghlan's report, until he shall have received the final statement of that officer's views on the respective pretensions of the members of the late Imam's family, after his intended visit to Zanzibar.

In the meantime copies of the Report and of its appendices, inclusive of the photographs, should be forwarded to the Government of India and to Her Majesty's Secretary of State. These authorities the Honourable the Governor in Council feels certain, will consider that satisfactory progress has been made in this important investigation.

Brigadier Coghlan may be requested to express to Assistant Surgeon Welsh the acknowledgments of Government for his interesting contributions to the Appendix of the Report.

The Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy should be requested to prepare the "Punjaub" for sea, in order that the Commission may, at as early a date as shall be practicable, proceed to Zanzibar. The Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy should also be instructed to engage freight to convey to Zanzibar a sufficient quantity of coals for supplying the "Punjaub" after reaching that place during the strength of this monsoon.

(signed) G. Clerk.  
W. Mansfield.  
H. W. Reeves.  
W. E. Freere.

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(No. 3767—Foreign Department.)

From the Under Secretary to the Government of *India* to the Acting Chief Secretary to Government, *Bombay*; dated Fort William, 31 August 1860.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter, No. 35, dated 30th ultimo, with which was submitted a Report from Brigadier Coghlan describing his proceedings on the occasion of his visit to Muscat, I am directed by the Governor General in Council to state that the decision of the Supreme Government will be deferred until Brigadier Coghlan completes his inquiries, and reports the result of his visit to Zanzibar.

I have, &c.  
(signed) C. U. Aitchison,  
Under Secretary to the Government of India.

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(No. 16, of 1860—Secret Department.)

## MUSCAT-ZANZIBAR COMMISSION.

From Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, in charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, to *H. L. Anson*, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, *Bombay*; dated *Bombay*, 19 November 1860.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council, my return to *Bombay* this day, the 19th of November, accompanied by the Rev. Mr. Badger and Dr. Welsh.

2. The "Punjaub" reached Zanzibar, *via* Galle and the Mauritius, on the 29th of September. The letter of the Honourable the Governor to Syud Majeed was delivered the same day; and after the usual interchange of compliments with his Highness, no time was lost in commencing the inquiries specially connected with the subject of this mission.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Rigby had accompanied Captains Speke and Grant to the African mainland to see them fairly started on their journey of exploration into the interior, but, on hearing of our arrival, he returned on the 5th of October. I take this early opportunity of recognising the ready aid afforded me by that officer in prosecuting my researches at Zanzibar.

4. Several days were occupied in private interviews with Syud Majeed, the conferences being conducted by the Rev. Mr. Badger in Arabic. Two of his Highness's secretaries were also present, who took notes of what passed on each occasion. A written statement of his claims and grievances was subsequently drawn up and presented to me by his Highness, at whose request it was forthwith translated into English by Mr. Badger. This, with numerous other documents bearing on the dispute pending between their Highnesses Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed, will be forwarded to Government in the course of a few days, attached to my Zanzibar Report.

5. Every opportunity was availed of, during our stay, to obtain reliable accounts of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa and the adjacent islands. In pursuance of the same inquiry, after leaving Zanzibar on the 18th ultimo, we touched at Mombasa on the mainland,

mainland, where I fortunately met the eminent African missionary and traveller, the Rev. Mr. Rebmaun, whose intimate acquaintance with the Sowahili and with the adjacent heathen tribes (among whom he has resided for 14 years, and by whom he is universally respected) enabled him to impart some valuable information on the slave-trade, as also on other matters connected with the social and political condition of the natives of those parts. In recognition of Mr. Rebmaun's kind offices, and knowing how acceptable such a gift would be to himself and wife, obliged as they are to live for months together on exclusively native food, I ordered a few supplies to be sent to him from the ship's stores, and added thereto a donation of 50 dollars. These grants will, I trust, be confirmed by the sanction of Government.

6. I have also to report that his Highness Syud Majeed, on learning that we intended visiting Mombasa, expressed a wish, through Colonel Rigby, that, as he likewise purposed going thither, the "Punjaub" might be allowed to tow him in his frigate the "Victoria." As the distance was short, and the commander of the "Punjaub" concurred in the arrangement, I readily acceded to the request. On reaching Mombasa the following morning, his Highness expressed his warmest thanks for the favour, declaring that he would ever retain a grateful remembrance of the honour thus conferred on him through one of the ships of Her Majesty's Indian Navy.

7. After leaving Mombasa we steamed to Aden, arriving there on the 26th ultimo. I deemed it desirable to make that short détour in order to carry out the instructions of the Honourable the Governor in Council, to forward by the earliest opportunity, direct to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India, the result of my inquiries regarding the slave-trade. The report was accordingly prepared, and a copy despatched on the 3rd instant, and I herewith enclose the original for the information of Government. Judging that a further delay of a week would be compensated by such an object, I detained the "Punjaub" at Aden until the arrival of the overland mail of the 26th ultimo, and taking on board the Post Office packets, proceeded forthwith to Bombay.

8. I also took the liberty of forwarding direct to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India a copy of the enclosed letter (No. 15), containing a few additional particulars relative to the loss of the ship "St. Abbs," in June 1855.

9. Dr. Welsh has succeeded in taking a number of photographs of the different places visited during the voyage. When printed, several copies of each, together with Dr. Welsh's notes, shall be duly forwarded to Government.

10. I enclose herewith the reply of Syud Majeed to the letter addressed to his Highness, through me, by the Honourable the Governor of Bombay.

11. Trusting that the foregoing general summary of my proceedings will receive the approval of Government,

I have, &c.  
(signed) *W. M. Coghlan*, Brigadier,  
In charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

(Office No. 49.)

(No. 6 of 1861.)

From *H. L. Anderson*, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, *Bombay*, to the Secretary to the Government of *India*, in the Foreign Department, *Fort William*.

Sir,

Secret Department, 15 February 1861.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 35, dated the 30th July 1860, I am directed to transmit to you, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council, the accompanying copy of a report and its several appendices (marked A to M) from Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, dated the 4th December last, submitting a detailed account of his inquiries regarding the dispute between his Highness Syud Thoweynee of Muscat and his Highness Syud Majeed of Zanzibar.

2. I am also desired to transmit, for the same purpose, the transcript of a resolution recorded by this Government on Brigadier Coghlan's report, reviewing the various points submitted for consideration by that officer in connection with the important inquiry entrusted to him.

3. In submitting the case for the final decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, I am instructed to solicit an early expression of the opinion of his Lordship in Council.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *H. L. Anderson*,  
Chief Secretary.

Appendix, No. 8.

(No. 17 of 1860.—Secret Department.)

## MUSCAT-ZANZIBAR COMMISSION.

From Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, in charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, to *H. L. Anderson, Esq.*, Chief Secretary to Government, *Bombay*; dated *Bombay*, 4th December 1860.

Sir,

BRIGADIER  
COGHLAN'S  
REPORT.

HAVING already in my letter (No. 16) of the 19th ultimo, forwarded to Government a general summary of the proceedings of this Commission during the recent voyage to Zanzibar, I proceed in the present report to submit, for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council, a detailed account of my inquiries there regarding the dispute pending between their Highnesses Syud Thoweynee of Muscat, and Syud Majeed of Zanzibar.

2. Deeming it a necessary precaution, before entering on the investigation entrusted to me, to secure Syud Majeed's formal consent to abide by the final arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, I requested Lieutenant Colonel Rigby to obtain a written paper from his Highness to that effect, similar in substance to the bond which had been required of Syud Thoweynee. I submitted to Colonel Rigby at the same time a series of questions touching the rival claims of the two brothers, and other matters connected with the pending dispute, requesting that he would, in reply, furnish me with all the information in his power. The correspondence, together with the bond executed by Syud Majeed, is attached in the accompanying Appendices, from A. to K., and in the two letters which precede them. An original statement of his claims and grievances by his Highness Syud Majeed, with an English translation, is also attached in Appendix L. As these documents throw considerable light on several important points in this inquiry, they will frequently be quoted in the succeeding remarks. To avoid confusion in the text, the references are noted in the margin.

3. I now proceed in the first place to state, as succinctly as possible, the various arguments adduced in support of the claims of his Highness Syud Majeed to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

4. In the year 1807, his late Highness Syud Saeed, second son of Syud Sultan, was elected by the principal tribes of Oman to succeed his father as Sultan, his elder brother Salim acquiescing in his promotion to the supreme power.\* During his lifetime, Syud Sultan had taken from the Portuguese the islands of Zanzibar, Mombasa, and Pemba, as also Kilwa and other places on the east coast of Africa.† These remote possessions fell to Syud Saeed, as forming part of the kingdom of Oman; and although the authority of his predecessor over several of them had been but nominal, or at least precarious,‡ and Syud Saeed may fairly be entitled to the merit of having extended and consolidated the empire in those parts, nevertheless it was undoubtedly in virtue of his election in succession to Syud Sultan that he acquired the right of sovereignty over the African dependencies of Oman.

5. Syud Saeed during his lifetime ruled over the conjoined dominions of Oman and Zanzibar. The seat of his government for many years was Muscat; but about the year 1840 his Highness selected Zanzibar as his permanent residence, committing the subordinate rule of Muscat and other provinces to his sons or relatives.

6. On the 24th of July, 1844, Syud Saeed addressed a letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of Aberdeen, then Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wherein his Highness thus expresses his wishes regarding his two elder sons Khaled and Thoweynee (Hilal, the eldest, being entirely overlooked in the projected arrangement):—"And after us (on our death), we constitute and appoint our son Khaled to be Ruler of all our African possessions; that is to say, all places on the continent of Africa between Magadosha, situated in about 2° 10' north latitude, and Cape Delgado, situated in about 10° 42' south latitude, with the adjacent islands now subject to our rule and under our dominion. And, in like manner, our son Syud Thoweynee to be Ruler over all our possessions in Oman, in Arabia, in the Persian Gulf, and on the coast of Persia."§ Syud Saeed's object in writing this letter, as stated by Colonel Hamerton, was "to ascertain whether he might look to Her Majesty's Government to guarantee the succession to his sons Khaled and Thoweynee."|| According to Colonel Rigby, no reply exists in the records of the Zanzibar Consulate either to Syud Saeed's letter above quoted, or to that from Colonel Hamerton, which appears to have accompanied it.¶

7. Syud Khaled died in 1854, and in a letter announcing the death of the late Syud Saeed to Lord Aberdeen, dated Zanzibar, November 10th, 1856, Colonel Hamerton writes:—"All things here at present are quiet, and the government in the African possessions administered by his son Prince Majeed, who has administered the government by order of his Highness since the death of Prince Khaled on the 7th November, 1854. I have been given to understand that his Highness left a will, and a written statement of his wishes regarding the succession. I am perfectly well aware what his Highness' intentions regarding the succession were; that Syud Thoweynee, at Muscat, should succeed to the

\* Muscat Report, No. 10 of 1860, Appendix B.

† Muscat Report, Appendix B, paragraph 20.

‡ Appendix B, reply to Query 22.

§ Muscat Report, Appendix A.

|| Idem.

¶ Appendix B, reply to Query 4.

the government of his Arabian possessions, provision being made for certain of his sons as governors of certain places in his Arabian possessions; and that the Prince Majeed, whom his Highness considered in the place of his deceased son Khaled, should succeed to the government of his African possessions, provision being made for others of his sons as governors of various places in his African possessions.\*

8. No written statement of the late Syud Saeed's wishes regarding the succession, as mentioned by Colonel Hamerton, has ever been found; and the only will hitherto forthcoming, as executed by his Highness, makes no provision whatever of that nature, but is confined almost exclusively to the disposal of his personal property.† Colonel Rigby, however, confirms Colonel Hamerton's statements regarding the promotion of Syud Majeed to the post which had become vacant by the death of his elder brother Khaled, in these words: "The Prince Khaled was installed as ruler of the African dominions during his father's absence at Muscat; and on his death, which occurred on the 7th November 1854, his Highness passed over two of his sons, and appointed his fourth son Prince Majeed to succeed his deceased brother in the government of the African dominions; and it was proclaimed to all the chief Arabs in open durbar that he was to be regarded exactly in the same position as Prince Khaled had held, and that he had succeeded to all his rights, and the future sovereignty of Zanzibar and the African dominions. The Prince Majeed thus continued to administer the government, acknowledged by all as the rightful heir to the sovereignty, by virtue of his father's act, as publicly proclaimed.‡

9. It does not appear, however, that this substitution of Syud Majeed in the place of Syud Khaled was ever officially notified by his Highness Syud Saeed, either to the British or to any other foreign Governments in alliance with him;§ and Syud Majeed was unable to produce any native records attesting the arrangement as the act of the late sovereign. But the death of the latter was communicated by his Highness to Great Britain, France, and the United States of America; and letters of condolence were received by him in return from Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French, and from the President of the United States.|| The two former contain no recognition of Syud Majeed's sovereignty; but in the reply of the Emperor of the French, and in that of the President of the United States, his Highness is congratulated on his accession to "the supreme power," and to "the throne of the sultany." As no special mention, however, is made either of Muscat or Zanzibar in these documents, and Syud Thoweynee's position and claims are entirely overlooked, it is highly probable that the two above-named Governments were unacquainted with the actual state of the case, and wrote under the impression that Syud Majeed was the sole, rightful, and acknowledged successor to the sovereignty of all the dominions of his deceased father, Syud Saeed.

10. The foregoing is a fair statement of the facts adduced from extraneous sources in support of Syud Majeed's right to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies. His Highness himself rests his pretensions on similar grounds,¶ namely, on the fact that, when his elder brother Khaled died, Syud Saeed appointed him *Governor of Zanzibar* in his stead, and notified the same to all the chiefs of Africa, as well as to the foreign consuls residing at Zanzibar; that he was duly recognised as such by them, and that he had occupied that position two years prior to the death of his father, which event occurred while on a voyage from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1856. His Highness then proceeds to establish his claim to the *sovereignty of Zanzibar* on the ground of his having been elected thereto by the people. He writes, "When I heard the report of my father's death, I called together my brothers and family (only those, of course, who were present at Zanzibar at the time), and all the people in these parts from Tink (Delgado) to Marbat, in order that they might recognise me. To this they all agreed, and they accordingly elected me to be ruler over them, and entrusted me with the direction of their affairs." He moreover considers that his sovereignty over Zanzibar and its African dependencies has already been acknowledged by the representatives of the different foreign powers who were in alliance with the late Syud Saeed, and he alleges that a similar recognition was virtually made by his brother Syud Thoweynee through his agent Mahomed bin Salem, who, on the death of their father, was sent from Muscat by the former fully empowered to treat with Syud Majeed on his behalf. The yearly grant which on that occasion he agreed to remit to his brother Thoweynee, Syud Majeed maintains was a purely friendly subsidy, and by no means a tribute recognising in any way the suzerainty of his brother Syud Thoweynee of Muscat.\*\*

11. Unfortunately no documentary proofs are forthcoming to decide the important question involved in the above transaction.†† Syud Thoweynee contends that the grant was given and received as tribute, and the two brothers (who nevertheless now join in representing Mahomed bin Salem as a villain) confidently appeal to his statements formerly made in support of their opposite assertions. My original impression therefore is confirmed, namely, that the agent, for his own private ends, deceived both parties, accepting the yearly grant at Zanzibar as a fraternal gift from Majeed to Thoweynee, and representing to the latter at Muscat that he had stipulated for it as a tribute involving the recognition by his brother of his suzerainty over Zanzibar and its African dependencies.‡‡ Two documents, however, indirectly bearing on this point, are attached in the Appendix.§§ The first is a letter from Mahomed bin Salem at Muscat to Luddah, the customs master at Zanzibar,

Appendix, No. 8.

\* Letter from Colonel Rigby, No. 19 of 1859.

† Muscat Report, Appendix C.

‡ Colonel Rigby's letter, No. 46 of 1859.

§ Appendix B, reply to Query 6.

|| Appendices C, D, E, F.

¶ Appendix I

\*\* Appendix L, paragraphs 2 and 5.

†† Appendix B.

‡‡ Muscat Report, paragraph 42.  
§§ Appendices G and H.

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Zanzibar, desiring him to pay to bearer the balance of the "Musaadeh;" that is, the aid or subsidy granted by Syud Majeed to his brother Thoweynee. The other contains the original order drawn up in Syud Majeed's own writing, authorising the said Luddah to pay his brother Thoweynee every year "a subsidy" of 40,000 crowns.

12. All the arguments adduced or adducible in favour of Syud Majeed's claims are, I believe, fully and fairly stated in the foregoing summary. They are based on the following grounds, viz.:—

1. The will, or rather wishes, of his late Highness Syud Saeed.
2. His recognition by foreign powers.
3. His virtual recognition by his rival brother Syud Thoweynee of Muscat.
4. His election as their Sovereign by the chiefs of Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

I shall now proceed to make a few remarks under these several heads.

13. Although the tenor of the late Syud Saeed's official communication to Lord Aberdeen, in 1844, is not absolutely conclusive that he contemplated dividing his empire by constituting Zanzibar and its African dependencies a separate kingdom under the sovereignty of his second son Khaled; and although there is still less certain ground for inferring that, on the death of Khaled, he purposed carrying out the same intention in behalf of his fourth son Majeed; nevertheless, I am of opinion that the evidence on that side outweighs the argument on the other,\* that his late Highness, in his arrangements actually made, or prospectively designed, had nothing more in view than to allot subordinate governorships to one or more of his sons under the paramount Sovereign of Oman.

\* Muscat Report, paragraph 7.

14. Thus much conceded however, the question arises whether the late Syud Saeed, in conformity with pre-existing usage, possessed the right of dividing his dominions, or of disposing of them at will. Syud Majeed, during one of the Rev. Mr. Badger's official interviews with him, attempted at first to maintain that he had; but on being requested to adduce one single corroborative instance in the past history of the rulers of Oman, or to explain how it fell out, if such was the recognised law on the subject, that the succession in the existing dynasty had so often been diverted from the direct line, and the supreme power successfully usurped, his Highness at once abandoned the argument as untenable, admitting that the sovereignty of Oman had hitherto depended on election, the principal tribes generally choosing the candidate who was either most beloved by them, or who possessed the greatest power to enforce his pretensions. His Highness's testimony in this respect is in exact accordance with the account given by Syud Hilal, as reported by Colonel Rigby, of the mode of succession to the sovereignty of Oman; "Might, coupled with election by the tribes, is the only right." And again, "The one who had most influence with the tribes was elected."†

† Colonel Rigby's letter, No. 46 of 1859.

15. Colonel Rigby seemingly admits the same; for in explaining his former use of the word "election," as applied to the succession of the late Syud Saeed, he says,—“By the term 'election,' I mean that he was proclaimed and accepted as their ruler by the Arabs of Oman, to the exclusion of his elder brother.” And further on,—“The late Imam evidently considered that he possessed the right to dispose of his dominions as he pleased, from having, during his lifetime, disinherited his eldest son Hilal. But if the successor thus nominated were not acceptable to the people, I think they would refuse to accept him.”‡ And again,—“I think, if a ruler of Oman were to appoint as his successor a person who was not acceptable to the Arab tribes and chiefs, that they would refuse to acknowledge him, and elect as their ruler a person who was more popular with them.§

‡ Appendix B, reply to Query 7.

§ Appendix B, reply to Query 11.

16. These admissions, however, are somewhat qualified by two or three examples adduced by the way in support of the opposite view. First, the case of Syud Hilal, just mentioned; but that instance proves nothing, even supposing that his being disinherited implied his exclusion from the succession, since, if the succession was ultimately by election, his father at best could only have nominated him to the sovereignty, and his confirmation in that dignity would have depended on the temper of the tribes.

17. The next case is that of Ahmed bin Saeed, grandfather of the late Syud Saeed, and the first of the reigning dynasty, who, according to Colonel Rigby, “divided his dominions during his own life, having appointed his son Kees to be chief of Sohar, and his seventh and youngest son to be chief of Suik.”|| Although it is true that in after years, owing to the incessant struggles for the sovereignty, and the fierce strife of parties in Oman, the two small provinces above-named did eventually attain a nominal independence, nevertheless it is highly improbable, from the peculiar circumstances of his own accession to the supreme power, that Ahmed's original concession either contemplated or sanctioned their detachment from the paramount state. They were most probably granted as appanages, but held on feudal tenure, their “syuds,” or lords, being bound to render military aid to the suzerain whenever called upon to do so.

|| Appendix B, reply to Query 7.

18. In another place, replying to a query whether the tribes of Oman, to whom the late Syud Saeed owed his election to the sovereignty, and who had co-operated with him in the extension and consolidation of the African dependencies of the kingdom, might not justly claim a voice in the disposal of those territories, Colonel Rigby writes,—“The late Imam

Imaum succeeded in establishing his power over the East Coast of Africa chiefly through the mutual jealousies and dissensions of the petty chiefs, who frequently sent envoys to Muscat to solicit his interference. I do not think that it would ever occur to any Arabs in Oman that they had any voice in the succession to the government of the African possessions on the ground supposed. I think they were regarded as being at the absolute disposal of the Imaum; and the fact that all the property of the State, such as ships of war, arms, &c., were considered as the private estate of the Imaum, strengthens this opinion.”\*

\* Appendix B, reply to Query 23.

19. To this I reply that the mutual jealousies of the native petty chiefs were undoubtedly availed of by the late Syud Saeed to extend his conquests in Eastern Africa; but it is equally certain that he acquired the sovereignty over Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mombasa, as also over several other localities on the African continent, in virtue of his having been elected to succeed his father Syud Sultan, who had conquered them from the Portuguese. Hence, as the suffrages of the tribes of Oman contributed to invest the late Syud Saeed with supreme authority over those dependencies, it is but reasonable to suppose that the tribes at the present day claim the same privilege still. And further, as Syud Sultan does not appear to have arrogated to himself the right to dispose of the foreign possessions of the kingdom, there is no valid ground for presuming that his son could legitimately exercise that prerogative. Moreover, the argument drawn from a comparison of the sovereign's right to dispose of the *sovereignty*, because *the property of the State* was considered to form part of his private estate, is fallacious. The sovereignty, as we have seen, depended on election, and, strictly speaking, the State property of Oman, was confined almost exclusively to the fortresses of the kingdom, which a successor generally inherited, though not unfrequently obliged to coerce some of the garrisons to recognise his supremacy. All other movable and immovable property, including what he originally possessed, as well as what he had added thereto during his reign from the public revenues, were held as belonging to the private estate of his predecessor. Such, undoubtedly is, and ever has been, the law of inheritance in the succession among the Imams and kings of Oman, and it serves to explain what otherwise seems most anomalous in the will of the late Sultan Syud Saeed. By that instrument the testator directs that, after the payment of certain legacies, all his property, including his ships of war (two only excepted, which are bequeathed to the “Treasury of the Mussulmans,” that is, to the State), his money, palaces, furniture, plantations, &c., shall be divided among his surviving children “according as God has ordained in His law;”† but no provision whatever is made for the succession, and no bequests devised from any property which, agreeably with pre-existing usage, was considered to be public, and therefore as belonging of right to his successor in the sovereignty. It was in accordance with this law that his Highness Syud Majeed (who nevertheless claims the sovereignty of the Zanzibar territories and all the rights appertaining thereto) only shared equally with his brothers in the inheritance left by their father. Thus Colonel Rigby says, “The ships of war, guns, stores of every description, even the arms in the possession or the troops, were set down at a valuation, and charged against the new ruler as a debt due to his father's estate.”‡

† Muscat Report, Appendix C.

‡ Appendix K, paragraph 11.

20. The only logical inference deducible from the foregoing considerations is in strict accordance with the conclusion arrived at by the Reverend Mr. Badger after a careful inquiry into the laws which have regulated the succession among the Imaums and Kings of Oman for several centuries. He writes—“Among all the sovereigns \* \* \* \* not one occurs who is recorded to have assumed or exercised the right of nominating a successor, or of disposing of his territories by will or otherwise. On the death of a ruler, the member of his family who happened to exercise the greatest influence at the time, either put himself forward, or was put forward by the people, to succeed to the sovereignty. The claim was frequently disputed by other of the relations of the deceased, and intestine family wars followed, the strongest ultimately gaining the ascendancy; but even in such cases the right to the sovereignty does not appear to have been regarded as valid without the concurrence of the principal tribes.”§

§ Muscat Report, Appendix B, paragraph 1.

21. Having thus, as I conceive, fairly answered all arguments adduced in support of the contrary view, and proved, as well by the admission of His Highness Syud Majeed and of Colonel Rigby as by historical evidence, that the sovereigns of Oman did not, in accordance with pre-established law or usage, possess the right of disposing of their dominions, it results that the claims of Syud Majeed to the sovereignty of the Zanzibar territories, as in any degree founded on the will or wishes of the late Syud Saeed, are invalid and nugatory.

22. I proceed, in the next place, to consider the argument adduced by Syud Majeed in behalf of his claims to the sovereignty, on the ground of his having been recognised as the ruler of Zanzibar and its African dependencies by several of the foreign powers which had previously been in alliance with his predecessor and father, the late Syud Saeed. It is unnecessary, however, to enlarge on that point, which has already been sufficiently discussed in paragraph 9 of this Report; for even admitting that the alleged recognition has actually been tendered by France and the United States of America, and subsequently by the Hanseatic Republic,|| after a full investigation into the merits of the dispute regarding the sovereignty still pending between Syud Majeed and Syud Thoweynee (which, at best, is very doubtful), the fact that the two brothers have voluntarily referred the settle-  
ment

|| Appendix B, replies to Queries 13 and 21.

Appendix, No. 8. ment of their differences in that respect to the Right honourable the Governor General, is a plain avowal of the existence of their rival claims, and effectually invalidates any such recognition unless eventually found to be in accordance with the final decision of the elected arbitrator.

\* Appendix L, paragraph 4.

23. The argument next adduced by Syud Majeed, on the ground of his having been acknowledged as sovereign by his elder brother Syud Thoweynee of Muscat, being based on one-sided evidence, is inadmissible. His Highness alleges\* that Mahomed bin Salem, the envoy of Syud Thoweynee, who was fully authorised to come to an understanding with him on all public as well as private matters connected with the death of their late father, did fully recognise that Zanzibar and its African dependencies belonged of right to him; on the other hand, Syud Thoweynee disavows that any such concession was ever authorised or made by or for him, and unhappily no documentary evidence is forthcoming to verify the assertion of either party. For a similar reason, no satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from the contradictory statements regarding the yearly grant of forty thousand crowns which Syud Majeed agreed to pay to Syud Thoweynee, the latter affirming that his agent accepted it in his behalf as *tribute*; whereas Syud Majeed insists that it was given and accepted as a *friendly gift*, and on the express condition that he should be recognised by his brother Thoweynee as the supreme ruler of Zanzibar and its dependencies. The only two documents produced by Syud Majeed in support of his assertions have already been described in paragraph 11. In the letter written by Mahomed bin Salem from Muscat to the Customs master at Zanzibar, he does, indeed, speak of the grant made by Majeed to Thoweynee as a "masaadeh"—that is, an aid or subsidy;† but, on the one hand, it is by no means apparent that Syud Thoweynee sanctioned such a definition of the money; and, on the other, it is just the style which Mahomed bin Salem might be expected to adopt in writing to Zanzibar, supposing, what I believe to be now generally believed, that the said agent, in his transactions between the two brothers, had managed to deceive both parties to his own advantage. The other document—namely, Syud Majeed's order to the customs master at Zanzibar to pay to his brother a "subsidy" of forty thousand crowns per annum—may go a certain way to indicate what His Highness's own views were in bestowing the grant; but it fails to prove in any degree that Syud Thoweynee had accepted it in that light. His Highness, in his written statement, also alludes to a declaration which Mahomed bin Salem had drawn up, previous to quitting Zanzibar, for presentation to Syud Thoweynee on his return to Muscat. According to him it was to the following effect:—"I, Mahomed bin Salem, ask of Majeed bin Saeed an annual subsidy of forty thousand crowns in behalf of his brother Thoweynee bin Saeed."‡ No such paper is forthcoming; and the circumstances under which it is stated to have been prepared are so improbable as to throw considerable doubt on His Highness's veracity.

‡ Appendix J, paragraph 5.

24. Summing up the foregoing considerations, I am led to conclude that Syud Majeed's claims to the independent sovereignty of Zanzibar, as based on his alleged recognition by Syud Thoweynee of Muscat, through the medium of his agent and plenipotentiary, Mahomed bin Salem, must be pronounced untenable.

§ Appendix B, reply to Query 14.

25. I shall now proceed to discuss the last argument urged in behalf of Syud Majeed's claims, namely, his election as their sovereign by the chiefs of Zanzibar and its African dependencies. His Highness's own statement to that effect, already quoted in paragraph 10, is fully confirmed by the testimony of Colonel Rigby, who believes that, if the suffrages of the principal chiefs were taken, the majority would undoubtedly elect Syud Majeed in preference to Syud Thoweynee.§ And again, referring to the meditated attack from Muscat in 1859, the same officer writes: "When the invasion of the Zanzibar dominions by Syud Thoweynee was expected, the inhabitants of the Sowahili rose *en masse* to support Syud Majeed. Many tribes under their own chiefs came over to Zanzibar; every accessible point on the coast was occupied; and when some of the dhows which had Syud Thoweynee's troops on board endeavoured to procure wood and water, they were driven from every point at which they attempted to land, and at length were obliged, in consequence, to surrender to Syud Majeed's ships-of-war. At Zanzibar the Sowahili population and the natives of the Comoro Isles were all in arms to support Syud Majeed, and I heard many of them state, as a reason for doing so, that the Muscat Arabs come here to kidnap their children and carry them away as slaves. The northern Arabs are feared and hated at Zanzibar.||

| Appendix B, reply to Query 16.

26. Without attempting to analyse the causes which led to this general preference of Syud Majeed to Syud Thoweynee, there is no good reason to doubt the fact of its existence. That being the case, the question naturally arises whether such recognition of his claims validly entitles Syud Majeed to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies.

27. I have already pointed out (paragraph 14) that the supreme power over Oman was conferred by election, and (paragraph 3) that, in virtue of that election, his late Highness Syud Saeed acquired the right of sovereignty over the African dependencies of the parent state. It does not appear, however (in fact, it is highly improbable), that the people of those dependencies enjoyed the privilege of sharing in the election of the sovereign. Up  
to

† The distinction between the import of the Arabic terms which I have throughout expressed by the English words "subsidy" and "tribute" is most explicit. The former denotes a gift accorded solely by the will of the giver; the latter implies obligation, and a proof of subjection to superior authority.

to the period referred to, they were doubtless regarded as a conquered race; as subjects, not citizens. They were ruled by local authorities generally sent from the seat of government at Muscat, and, as a people, were not allowed any part in the public administration. For obvious reasons, such must necessarily have been the state of those countries on the accession of the late Syud Saeed. Their conquest by his predecessor was of recent date, and their subjection to Oman was, in many instances, merely nominal. Moreover, their importance, both in a political and commercial point of view, was then inconsiderable, the Arabs valuing them more as a nursery from whence they could readily procure an abundant supply of slaves than for any other cause. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the people of Zanzibar and its African dependencies should have had no voice in the election of their sovereign.

28. But during the reign of his late Highness Syud Saeed, extending over a period of 50 years, the general condition of those countries underwent a surprising change: his sovereignty over them was firmly established; large numbers of Arabs from Oman settled on the African mainland and the adjacent islands; agriculture and commerce were extensively promoted; and Zanzibar, which in 1834 was described by the commander of Her Majesty's ship "Imogene" as having "little or no trade," possessed in 1859 an aggregate trade estimated at 1,664,577 *l.* sterling.\* Moreover, the revenue derivable from those dependencies has increased in the same rates. Colonel Rigby writes: "Twenty-five years ago the late Imaum did not receive more than 50,000 crowns of annual revenue from his African possessions. In 1847 it had increased to 145,000 crowns; and at present the revenue amounts to 206,000 crowns."† In 1840 Syud Saeed removed the seat of government from Muscat to Zanzibar, ruling Oman mostly through a deputy; and it was doubtless owing to the presence and energy of the sovereign that the African possessions of the kingdom made such remarkable and social commercial progress. Those possessions are actually more extensive, and far more fertile and valuable in every way, than the Arabian territories, and their annual revenue exceeds the revenue of the latter to the amount of 77,000 crowns, or about 16,000 *l.* sterling.

\* Colonel Rigby's letter, No. 39, of 1860.

† Appendix B, reply to Query 39.

29. Such being the altered condition and circumstances of the African dependencies, it seems consonant with reason and justice (considering the form of government which prevailed in Oman) that the people of those countries should have a voice in the election of the sovereign. They accordingly availed themselves of the prerogative on the death of the late Syud Saeed, and chose his son Syud Majeed to be their ruler in preference to Syud Thoweynee, who had succeeded to the sovereignty of the parent State. Regarded from one point of view, the Act may be characterised as a national revolution, and as such, Syud Thoweynee, the sovereign of Oman, was justified in counteracting it, and in attempting to establish his own claims by an appeal to arms if success was unattainable in any other way. Apart from all consideration of the alleged cause which eventually induced him to project an invasion of the Zanzibar territories for that purpose, namely, the non-payment by Syud Majeed of the stipulated sum of 40,000 crowns after the first year; the custom in similar cases which had invariably obtained, especially in the family of the reigning dynasty on the demise of the sovereign, fully warranted Syud Thoweynee in regarding the attitude assumed by Syud Majeed as an usurpation of the hereditary rights of the sovereigns of Oman.

30. Syud Thoweynee prepared accordingly to contest the sovereignty of the African dependencies with his brother Majeed. With that object in view, he probably resorted to every available stratagem to secure ultimate success; and there can be little doubt that, when his expedition sailed from Muscat, he had won over a party at Zanzibar, chiefly among the El-Harth tribe, who were ready co-operate with him. Syud Majeed, on the other hand, made corresponding preparations to repel the invasion, and it may fairly be presumed that he was equally active in the use of all the intrigues sanctioned by Arab warfare to thwart the schemes of his antagonist. There is every reason, indeed, to believe that to this end he took advantage of the misunderstanding which existed at the time between Syud Thoweynee and Syud Toorkee of Sohar, and by dint of persuasions and promises succeeded in enlisting the latter on his side.

31. Such was the attitude of the belligerent parties when the Government of Bombay interposed to prevent a collision between them. At the solicitation of the late Lord Elphinstone, Syud Thoweynee agreed to abandon the expedition to Zanzibar, and to refer his claims to the arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, Syud Majeed at Zanzibar consenting, through Colonel Rigby, to abide in like manner by his Lordship's decision.

32. The intrigues and counter-intrigues which followed this arrangement, and which, in October of last year, resulted in an insurrection of the El-Harth tribe at Zanzibar, headed by Syud Barghash, call for notice, chiefly with a view to determine the culpability of the respective parties in fomenting them. Under the plea of recalling a part of the expedition which had preceded him to Zanzibar, Syud Thoweynee is severely censured‡ for having attempted, through his agent Hamed bin Salem, to settle the differences subsisting between himself and his brother Syud Majeed, after he had consented to submit his claims to the arbitration of the Governor General of India. His Highness's explanation of that transaction is to the following effect:—"After receiving the communication from Government through Colonel Russell, which induced me to abandon the expedition and to submit my

‡ Letter from the Government of India, No. 4590, of 1859, Foreign Department.



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case to the arbitration of the Governor General, I understood that an officer would be sent to Zanzibar to institute the necessary inquiries, and as I deemed it desirable to have an agent on the spot to represent me, I decided to send Hamed bin Salem in that capacity. My intention in this respect was communicated to Colonel Russell. I do not deny having written the letter to Syud Majeed, but I declare that it was one of friendship merely, and that any overtures which might have been made by Hamed bin Salem, in consequence of that letter, were by no means designed to set aside the final arbitration of the Governor General. My intention was, by previously establishing a more friendly understanding with Syud Majeed, to render the task of arbitration easier, and the result more satisfactory to both parties.\* Allowing for a certain degree of native disingenuousness in this apology, it is not devoid of plausibility; and further, it is very questionable whether Syud Thoweynee fully appreciated the extent of restraint which he had voluntarily incurred by accepting the arbitration of a third party. On all such points of international law, Syud Majeed had the advantage of Colonel Rigby's constant advice and guidance; whereas the British agent at Muscat at the time was an illiterate Jew, who was as incapable of advising Syud Thoweynee as his Highness was naturally backward to consult him.

\* Muscat Report, paragraph 51.

† Muscat Report, paragraphs 44 and 45.

‡ Appendix B, reply to Query 14.

§ Muscat Report, paragraph 54, Appendix G.

| Muscat Report, Appendix H.

¶ Muscat Report, paragraphs 56, 57, and Appendix I.

\*\* Muscat Report, paragraph 58.

†† Appendix L, paragraph 14.

‡‡ Appendix B, reply to Query 32.

§§ Muscat Report, Appendix I.

|| Appendix B, reply to Query 33.

¶¶ Letter No. 8, Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

\*\*\* Colonel Rigby's letter, No. 116, of 1850.

††† Muscat Report, paragraph 31.

33. For the remaining charges brought against Syud Thoweynee, of having, through his agents and others, created disaffection at Zanzibar, and excited the El-Harth tribe to rebel against Syud Majeed, I must refer the Honourable the Governor in Council to my Muscat report, where his Highness's vindication of himself is also recorded.† On a careful review of the whole, it appears to me that, although Syud Thoweynee had not ceased to correspond directly with the disaffected at Zanzibar, and endeavoured to maintain a party there favourable to his ulterior views, nevertheless he is not justly chargeable with many of the acts alleged against his agents, nor with having instigated the rebellion of the El-Harth in October 1859. I am confirmed in this conclusion by the opinion of Colonel Rigby, who, in writing of that tribe, says—"Their rebellion last year was not intended to favour either Syud Thoweynee or Syud Barghâsh, but with the hope of getting rid of the whole family of the late Imam, and then obtaining possession of the government."‡ Moreover, the charges made against Hamed bin Salem, as Syud Thoweynee's principal agent, in fomenting the insurrection at Zanzibar, are considerably qualified by the friendly tenor of the letters addressed to that individual on his final departure for Muscat by Syud Majeed himself; § and Suleiman bin Hamed, his Highness' Vizier, in whose integrity Colonel Rigby formerly placed great confidence, but whom he has since had cause to regard as a most unprincipled man, did not hesitate, in a letter to Syud Thoweynee, to imply that Colonel Rigby was in some degree responsible for the rebellion of 1859, and for the subsequent conduct of Syud Barghâsh.||

34. The numerous charges made against Syud Thoweynee, of having acted throughout under French influence, were rebutted by his Highness in the manner already reported.¶ I am further able to confirm his account of the paper submitted to him by the French Commodore De Langle\*\* by the admission of Syud Majeed, who, in his written statement, †† relates that, on being appealed to by the former to do so, he had directed his vizier, Suleiman bin Hamed, to draw up a document of precisely the same import as that described by Syud Thoweynee as having been handed to him at Muscat by the French Commodore. Equally inconclusive in proof of this general imputation is the statement of Colonel Rigby that "the French Consul was known to be carrying on a very active correspondence with Syud Thoweynee. The letters from Muscat to the disaffected Arabs here (Zanzibar) were sent under cover to the French Consul."‡‡ That no collusion existed in this matter between the parties referred to is evident from the tenor of the French Consul's official despatch to Syud Thoweynee, wherein he specially requests His Highness "not to enclose any letters for the Arabs at Zanzibar in the letters which he may do him the honour to address to him."§§ Moreover, Syud Majeed frankly acknowledged that he had no evidence to prove that his brother had been acting under the influence of the French; and Colonel Rigby himself, who had framed several of his inferential charges against Syud Thoweynee, in that respect, on the assertions of the then French Consul at Zanzibar, now writes—"From subsequent experience, I have very little faith in anything the French Consul said on any subject."|||

35. But if Syud Thoweynee is justly chargeable in any degree with having intrigued against Syud Majeed after he had consented to refer the settlement of his claims to the arbitration of the Governor General of India, Syud Majeed is equally open to the imputation of having kept up a secret correspondence with Syud Toorkee of Sohar, who was well known to be disaffected towards his suzerain at Muscat, and was actively plotting with the tribes and with the Wahabees to undermine his authority over Oman.¶¶ The explanation given by Syud Majeed of the guns, money, and munitions of war, despatched by him to Syud Toorkee in March 1859, is undoubtedly very plausible;\*\*\* but under the circumstances of the case, it fails to carry conviction to the mind of anyone well versed in the sophistry and equivocation of the Arabs. The letter also written by Syud Majeed at the commencement of the current year to his brother at Sohar, advising him of a remittance of 2,000 dollars, which letter was intercepted by Syud Thoweynee,††† is another ground of suspicion against the former; and in a subsequent part of this report I shall have occasion to add some further considerations which will tend to confirm the opinion here expressed—that His Highness, Syud Majeed, chiefly with a view to strengthen his own position,

tion, was not less actively engaged against Syud Thoweynee through the medium of Syud Toorkee of Sohar, than was Syud Thoweynee, through his agent at Zanzibar, to weaken the authority of his brother Syud Majeed.

36. I have deemed it pertinent to enter into the foregoing discussion of the mutual attitude and conduct of the two rival brothers as a precaution against any unfair bias towards either. That done, it is of some importance to inquire what would have been the probable result had the two parties come into actual collision on the occasion of Syud Thoweynee's projected invasion of Zanzibar.

37. As regards the chances of Syud Thoweynee, I have already written as follows:—“Colonel Rigby,\* in his account of the preparation made by Syud Majeed to resist the expected invasion, represents the means at the disposal of the latter as ample to destroy any force brought against him, dwelling especially on the enthusiasm of the people in his cause. Subsequently, however, and long after the expedition of Syud Thoweynee had returned to Muscat, his report of the state of affairs at Zanzibar led the Government to conclude that the position of Syud Majeed at Zanzibar was not secure;† and later still, on the occasion of the outbreak, when the El-Harth Arabs rose in support of Syud Barghash, all the force which Syud Majeed could bring against them was ineffectual, and the rising was not suppressed until assistance from three British men-of-war had been sent to co-operate with them, when, as it is averred, the Arabs yielded because they would not fight against the British.”‡ Subsequent inquiry confirms me rather than otherwise in the obvious drift of the foregoing quotation. The elaborate account given by his Highness Syud Majeed§ of the insurrection at Zanzibar in October 1859, divested of its vain colouring, shows that he was hard pressed by the insurgents; and Colonel Rigby, in attempting to reconcile a former statement of his, that the faction opposed to Majeed was “utterly contemptible” with the position which that faction had secured on the occasion referred to, renders it highly probable that, without the opportune assistance of the British, the struggle would have been prolonged, and the final result at least doubtful. ||

38. On the other hand, however, it is by no means certain that the success of the insurgents would have placed Zanzibar in the hands of Syud Thoweynee. Colonel Rigby is of opinion that the El-Harth were actuated by private aims, and availed themselves of Syud Thoweynee's antagonism to Syud Majeed—not for his sake, but for their own, anxious, if possible, “to get rid of the whole family of the late Imam.”¶ Besides which (and the reflection is of considerable importance in this inquiry), there is strong reason for believing that, had Syud Thoweynee persisted in the invasion of Zanzibar, the tribes in Oman would have thrown off their allegiance to him, and elected another sovereign in his stead. This contingency was foreseen by the late Lord Elphinstone, and recorded by him in an able Minute, dated 10th August 1859. His Lordship writes—“When Colonel Russell was at Muscat, he heard it said openly that it was well for Syud Thoweynee that he had listened to the advice of this Government and returned to Muscat; for if he had not done so, Syud Toorkee would undoubtedly have attacked Muscat in his absence, and would probably have succeeded in making himself master of it, and of all the Imam's possessions in Oman. In grasping at the shadow of sovereignty in Zanzibar, Syud Thoweynee would have lost the substance in Muscat.” Considering that Muscat would have been almost denuded of ships and troops; that the restless and mercenary tribes of Oman have never failed to seize any promising opportunity for bartering their influence and acquiring gain; and that Syud Toorkee was on the spot quite prepared to avail himself of so favourable an occasion for promoting his own ambitious views—there is good ground for believing that a civil war would have followed the continued absence of Syud Thoweynee, and that the sovereignty of Oman would have been lost to him perhaps for ever. Syud Majeed was doubtless fully aware of these weak points in the position of his antagonist, and was not backward to take advantage of them. His strategy could best be carried out through his brother at Sohar, who was accordingly subsidised by him to that end. Under the circumstances of the case, “it was quite natural,” so writes Lord Elphinstone, “that Syud Majeed should send arms and ammunition to Syud Toorkee with the view of Syud Toorkee's creating a diversion in his favour at Muscat.”\*\*

39. To sum up:—Considering the fact that the people of Zanzibar and its African dependencies did, on the death of the late Syud Saeed, elect his son Syud Majeed to be their ruler in his stead;†† considering that the altered condition of those dependencies during the last half century fully entitled them to that privilege;‡‡ considering that, if Syud Thoweynee, the elected sovereign of the parent state, was justified in coercing them into submission, the people of the African dependencies, on the other hand, were equally justified in resisting him;§§ considering that it is very doubtful whether any such attempt on his part would have been successful;||| and considering the probability that, if persisted in by Syud Thoweynee, the projected invasion of Zanzibar would have led to the forfeiture of his supremacy over Oman, ¶¶ I arrive at the conclusion, on these grounds exclusively, that Syud Majeed's claims to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies are superior to any which can be adduced in favour of Syud Thoweynee.

40. But further, the argument on the score of expediency, involving the future prosperity of the Muscat as well as the Zanzibar state, preponderates unquestionably in favour of the foregoing conclusion. This is so forcibly pointed out by Colonel Rigby in reply to one of the queries submitted to him, that, to secure for his remarks the consideration which

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\* Letter No. 19 of 1859.

† Resolution of the Honourable Board, 16th November 1859.

‡ Muscat Report, paragraph 24.

§ Appendix L.

|| Appendix B, reply to Query 15.

¶ Appendix B, reply to Query 14.

\*\* Resolution of the Honourable Board, 16th November 1859.

†† Paragraphs 25 and 26.

‡‡ Paragraphs 28 and 29.

§§ Paragraph 30.

||| Paragraph 37.

¶¶ Paragraph 38.

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they merit, I reproduce them entire from the Appendix. That officer writes—"I consider that the connection which existed between Oman and a country so far remote as East Africa, was always an unnatural one, and ever prejudicial to the interests of both countries. This I mean with reference to the want of all system and regularity in the government of Arab states, in which everything depends on the personal influence and presence of the ruling chief. The selections from the records of the Bombay Government relating to the Persian Gulf abundantly prove the dangers and disorders which constantly threatened the late Imam's possessions in Oman in consequence of his absence at Zanzibar. On several occasions the danger was only averted by the influence and intervention of the British Government. Had the late Imam continued to reside at Muscat, it is probable that, with his energetic, shrewd character, he would have greatly extended his power, and firmly established it. In 1846 Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton writes to the Secretary to Government as follows:—'I brought to the notice of his Highness the injury which was occasioned to his interests in Arabia from his protracted stay at Zanzibar, and that the Government at Muscat was but ill-administered. His Highness replied that this had been a matter of much distress to him lately.' And in another letter during the same year, he writes to the Secretary to Government, Bombay—'I have, in obedience to instructions, most fully communicated to his Highness the Imam the state of his affairs in Arabia, as appears from the copies of the documents enclosed with the letter. His Highness was aware of everything, but did not appear to consider matters so serious as perhaps they are. The Imam has always appeared to me to care little for his Arabian possessions further than the seaports. His Highness's influence in the interior of Oman is irretrievably lost, from the feeble nature of his government; and he knows and feels it. His Highness last year deputed Sheikh Alli bin Massood to proceed to Oman from Zanzibar, to try to procure men from the different tribes in Oman to assist his Highness in the war he is now carrying on against the people of Sewee; but the Sheikh has returned without being able to procure a single sword from the tribes in Oman.'

"As an Arab chief, the late Imam was a very superior man; it may be many years before his equal is found among his successors. From his personal bravery, his wealth, and his long reign, he had far more influence amongst those by whom he was surrounded than is likely to be possessed by either of his sons. Nevertheless, his absence from Oman destroyed his influence with the tribes, and nearly caused him the loss of all his Arabian possessions.

"With respect to the Zanzibar dominions, I think their complete severance from Muscat would soon lead to the stoppage of the northern slave-trade. The ruler of Zanzibar would feel independent of the northern Arabs, who every year swarm at Zanzibar during the north-east monsoon, to prey upon him." The sum distributed by Syud Majeed amongst these people every year is a serious drain upon the Zanzibar Treasury. I imagine that the only reason why these Arabs are thus paid is with the idea that their aid may one day be required. If these payments were stopped, and vigorous measures were adopted for one or two seasons by an English gunboat to capture the boats of these piratical tribes when found carrying slaves, I think they would soon discontinue visiting this coast, and probably find some more honest occupation.

"I think, if Zanzibar is governed with prudence, it may perform a very important part in the future commerce and civilisation of East Africa. From Port Natal to Cape Gardafui, the only state from which any progress or stability can be hoped is Zanzibar. Its commerce has rapidly increased within the last few years, and it bids fair to become the chief emporium of trade on the east coast. Its population possesses valuable elements for commerce in the wealthy and numerous settlers from India, and the enterprising Arabs and Sowahilis who travel over Central Africa, distributing foreign goods in exchange for the products of the country. The Portuguese possessions on the east coast are in a hopeless state of decay, and there is not the slightest probability of the Portuguese ever advancing the civilisation or commerce of the interior. If Zanzibar should be an independent state, the dominions of its ruler would probably soon extend into the interior, and his power would be consolidated, and in time it might form a considerable African kingdom. But supposing that, from the non-residence of the ruling chief, from its being continually held as a dependency of Muscat, from neglect or feeble rule, such as Oman has suffered from for so many years in consequence of the late Imam being a non-resident, the Zanzibar state were gradually to lose its power over the territories of the mainland, the petty sultans and chiefs would soon become independent; the treaties for the suppression of the slave trade would be disregarded, foreign settlements would be established, and all hope of progress be destroyed."\*

Appendix B, reply to Query 36.

41. It would be superfluous to add anything to these considerations in favour of the independent sovereignty of Zanzibar. Fortunately the *expediency* on which they are based, and which alone would hardly suffice to justify the severance of that state from the parent state of Muscat, is adequately supported and confirmed by the arguments founded on *right*, which have already been discussed in the foregoing pages.

42. But if, notwithstanding these combined considerations, Syud Thoweynee, as the overign of Oman, may still be deemed to have some claim on the African territories of the kingdom, either in virtue of the relationship which has hitherto existed between those dependencies and the parent state, or by way of indemnity for any chance which, through having consented to forego his projected invasion of Zanzibar, he may consider that

that he has forfeited for himself and his successors, or in consideration of his recognition of the future independence of the Zanzibar state, I judge that the compensation offered on that behalf by Syud Majeed is a fair equivalent for such pretensions. The amount of that compensation is more than Syud Thoweynee is ever likely to gain from the revenues of Zanzibar, were it to continue a dependency of Muscat, and would, moreover, by enabling him to establish his authority over Oman, be of far greater use to him than the sovereignty over a distant possession, the population of which are notoriously ill-affected towards him. I should be less disposed to insist on this point, were it not that the obligation was acknowledged by Syud Majeed himself when he first volunteered to grant to Syud Thoweynee a yearly subsidy of 40,000 crowns. Colonel Rigby states that, during the lifetime of the late Imam, "10,000 crowns were annually sent from Zanzibar to Muscat on account of the tribute to the Wahabee Ameer, that this was a fixed payment. Other sums were sent as required; some years 10,000 crowns, and some years, if hostilities were going on in Oman, considerably more."\* On the death of his late Highness, Syud Majeed, according to his own statement, wrote to Syud Thoweynee offering to remit him this sum of 10,000 crowns to assist him in paying the Wahabees; (a) and further, in case of emergency, to assist him with his money, his influence, and his troops.† Subsequently, yielding to the arguments or solicitations of Mahomed bin Salem, Syud Majeed engaged to raise the amount to an annual subsidy of 40,000 crowns.‡

43. With regard to the conditions averred by Syud Majeed to have been insisted on by him in voting this grant, namely, first, that he should be recognised by Syud Thoweynee as his father's successor over the Zanzibar territories; and secondly, that Syud Thoweynee should abstain in future from all hostilities with their common brother Syud Toorkee,§ there is no evidence whatever to corroborate his Highness's allegation, and my firm conviction is that no such terms were attached to the concession. It is, moreover, worthy of note that Syud Majeed, in his written statement, entirely overlooks what he had before repeatedly declared, namely, that 10,000 of the stipulated sum of 40,000 crowns were to be transferred to Syud Toorkee, and that it was on account of Syud Thoweynee's infringement of that condition that he discontinued the payment of the subsidy to the latter. Colonel Rigby, who had formerly hazarded these statements on the authority of his Highness,|| now writes: "I consider it very unlikely that any stipulation was made relative to one-fourth of the promised subsidy being paid to Syud Toorkee. I have always had great doubts on this point, because Thoweynee and Toorkee were on bad terms with each other at the time the agreement with Mahomed bin Salem was made, and also because I was informed that the allowance made from the Muscat Treasury to Sohar during the life of the late Imam was only 1,200 crowns per annum. If the whole of the tribute to the Wahabee Chief is, and always has been, paid from the Muscat Treasury, it is, I consider, a strong confirmation of the doubts which I entertain, for Syud Toorkee could have no possible claim to such a payment from the Zanzibar Treasury."¶ These suspicions are confirmed by the tenor of Syud Majeed's note to the customs master at Zanzibar, wherein he states as follows:—"We have granted to our brother Thoweynee bin Saeed a subsidy of 40,000 crowns every year from the beginning of the year 1274, half (to be paid) during the south-west monsoon, and the other half during the north-east monsoon,"\*\*\* without hinting that the payment of the said gratuity was to be dependent on the observance of any condition by his Highness Syud Thoweynee.

44. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that Syud Majeed is bound to Syud Thoweynee in the sum of 40,000 crowns per annum; and further, considering that the existing variance between the two brothers originated in the non-fulfilment of that obligation by the former, under the false plea that the latter had violated the attached condition, I judge that it would be only fair that Syud Majeed should be called upon to make good his original promise, by disbursing to Syud Thoweynee the arrears of the stipulated subsidy due since the date when its payment was suspended.

45. A question of considerable importance, touching the duration of this subsidy, here suggests itself. The arrangement as it stands has respect to the two brothers only, no provision whatever being made that it should continue in force beyond their own lifetime. But although the strict letter of all we know of the mutual agreement might be held to sanction that limitation, the grounds upon which the subsidy was first offered by Syud Majeed, and the considerations which subsequently induced him to increase the amount to 40,000 crowns per annum,†† clearly imply that he was negotiating on the part of the Zanzibar state, and that the subsidy was to be a permanent charge on its revenues in behalf of the Sovereign of Muscat. The transaction indeed, as far as I can judge from the evidence adduced, was a family compact, entered into by Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed as the representatives of their brothers and of the subjects of the two states, whereby it was agreed to divide the sovereignty exercised by their late father into two nearly equal shares, the Zanzibar state engaging, through Syud Majeed, to compensate the Muscat state for the loss which it would sustain by the partition to the extent of 40,000 crowns per annum.

46. Recapitulating the conclusions arrived at through the foregoing discussions, I submit

(a) The annual tribute to the Wahabees, including presents, amounts to 12,000 crowns.

\* Appendix B, reply to Query 28.

† Appendix L, paragraph 3.

‡ Idem, paragraph 5.

§ Idem, paragraph 5.

|| Letter No. 116 of 1859.

¶ Appendix B, reply to Query 25.

\*\* Appendix H.

†† Appendix L, paragraph 5.

Appendix, No. 8. submit the following results as the most equitable terms for settling the existing dispute between the rival parties:—

*Terms of the Arbitration.*

1st. That Syud Majeed should be confirmed in the independent sovereignty over Zanzibar and its African territories.

2nd. That as regards the succession to that sovereignty, neither the ruler of Muscat, nor the tribes of Oman, shall have any right whatever to interfere; but the Sovereign of Zanzibar, or the sovereign in conjunction with the people, shall be left absolutely free to make whatever arrangements they may deem expedient for appointing future successors to Syud Majeed.

3rd. That in consideration of these concessions, Syud Majeed shall be bound to remit to Syud Thoweynee the stipulated yearly subsidy of 40,000 crowns; and further, to liquidate all the arrears due on that account since the payment was suspended.

4th. That this subsidy of 40,000 crowns per annum shall be a primary and permanent charge on the revenues of the Zanzibar state, payable by the Sovereign of that state to the ruling Sovereign of Muscat and Oman.

47. The liberty accorded me by the Honourable the Governor in Council, of recommending a fair adjustment of the differences existing between their Highnesses Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed, has warranted me in submitting these terms as, in my opinion, the best which can be proposed to that end. I do not feel authorised to exceed the limits of my commission by advising any precautionary measures for the due observance of those terms by the rival parties; nevertheless, as it does not appear that the Right Honourable the Governor General has undertaken to guarantee that his final arbitration shall be carried out, and as it is more than probable that pretexts will be constantly devised on both sides to evade the obligations imposed by his Lordship's decision, pretexts which, by re-opening the existing dispute, will entail the most disastrous consequences to the welfare of the two states, I venture with much diffidence to suggest whether the following subsidiary terms might not be insisted on as a safeguard against such evasions:—

5th. That no cause whatever, other than an open attempt on the part of Syud Thoweynee or his successors to infringe upon the independence of the Zanzibar sovereignty, shall be held to justify Syud Majeed or his successors in withholding the stipulated subsidy.

6th. That in the event of any such attempt being made by the ruler of Muscat, or, on the other hand, in the event of the Sovereign of the Zanzibar state failing, under any plea whatever, to pay the aforesaid subsidy, the aggrieved party shall submit the case to the Viceroy and Governor General of India before proceeding to settle the dispute by an appeal to arms.

48. I have deemed it desirable to insist on the payment of the subsidy agreed on between the two parties, because various excuses are urged by Syud Majeed to evade that obligation.\* The most reasonable of these is the actual condition of his Highness' finances. On this subject Colonel Rigby writes: "The difficulty arises from the embarrassed state of the Zanzibar treasury. Syud Majeed is entirely dependent on the will of his customs master for supplies of money, and were he now to bind himself to the payment of an annual sum, and the customs master subsequently refused to advance the amount, Syud Majeed might be compelled to break his engagement without any fault of his own." As an offset, however, against the difficulty, Colonel Rigby subjoins—"But if his Highness could be persuaded to establish a small force of disciplined troops, with a few light guns, in place of the useless rabble now in his pay, and would also get rid of most of the large ships which he now has, and which are of no use whatever, and in place of them keep two or three small vessels efficiently manned, it would be a great direct saving to him; and knowing that he had troops he could rely on, he would feel more independent of the Arabs from the north, and of the chiefs of tribes, amongst whom he squanders so much money."† Syud Majeed himself estimates the amount which he pays yearly in gratuities to the northern Arabs at 15,000 crowns;‡ and Colonel Rigby gives a list of several of the principal chiefs of Zanzibar who are subsidised by Syud Majeed, and whose aggregate incomes from his treasury exceed 10,000 crowns per annum.§ The saving of these sums alone (and there would certainly be no reason for their being continued when once the sovereignty of Zanzibar was secured to Syud Majeed) would suffice to cover more than one-half of the Muscat subsidy; and if, in addition thereto, his Highness would abstain from other useless expenditure, there can be no doubt that he would be able to meet the obligation with comparative ease. As regards his debts to the customs master, amounting to 327,000 crowns,|| and those to his orphan brothers, whose share of their father's inheritance he has borrowed to the extent of seven lacs of crowns,¶ Colonel Rigby, after reviewing Syud Majeed's financial position, comes to the conclusion that, "with prudence and care, his existing liabilities might soon be paid off."\*\*

49. But the finances of Syud Thoweynee are comparatively as much embarrassed as those of Syud Majeed, and the payment annually of 40,000 crowns by the latter, considering the capabilities of the Zanzibar territories, will still leave him in better circumstances than the

\* Appendix K, Enclosure.

† Appendix B, reply to Query 40.

‡ Appendix L, paragraph 6.

§ Appendix B, reply to Query 17.

|| Appendix K, Enclosure.

¶ Appendix K.

\*\* Appendix B, reply to Query 39.

the ruler of Muscat (a). In fact, without that aid I do not perceive how Syud Thoweynee can continue long to administer the government of Oman. Hence, as so many grave considerations are involved in the prompt and regular payment of the stipulated subsidy, I trust that the Right honourable the Governor General (should his Lordship coincide in the view here taken of the subject) will attach such sanctions as he may deem expedient to ensure the faithful discharge of that obligation by his Highness Syud Majeed.

50. I shall now proceed to notice briefly several collateral points connected with the main subject of this report. And first—Colonel Rigby's recommendation that some steps should be taken to provide for the future succession to the sovereignty of Zanzibar in the event of that state being permanently severed from Muscat. He writes thus—"I think it will be extremely advantageous to the future prosperity of the Zanzibar state, if some arrangement as to the future succession can be made in the event of Syud Majeed being declared its independent chief; for this prince has no male issue, and I think it not likely that he will have any. I think that it might be left to the choice of all the family of the late Imam, or Syud Majeed might nominate one of his brothers to succeed him, subject to the ratification of the principal chiefs at Zanzibar. If the members of the Syud's family could be induced always to admit in future the claims of primogeniture, I think it would be a very great advantage. At present the subject is always in doubt, and leads to quarrels and assassinations in the family."\* I fully concur with Colonel Rigby in believing that great advantages might reasonably be anticipated if any such arrangement could be made. In fact, I once entertained some hope of being able to effect it,† but increased experience of the peculiar political constitution (if it may be so called) of these petty sovereignties, and of the intractable temper and inveterate prejudices of the Arab tribes on all matters in any way connected with their inherited rights, to say nothing of their gross venality, has induced me, however reluctantly, to abandon the idea as impracticable. There would, indeed, be little difficulty in securing the consent of Syud Majeed's brothers at Zanzibar, and of the principal chiefs there, to almost any scheme for providing for the succession which might be proposed to them by us; but no such concurrence would be regarded on their part as depriving them of the privilege of acting in direct opposition to their most solemn obligations in a matter of this nature, or of bartering whatever influence they might possess in the election of a new sovereign to the highest bidder. Hence, unless the British Government undertook to guarantee the arrangement and enforce compliance with its provisions, no pre-organised scheme of the kind is likely to succeed better than the custom which has hitherto prevailed among the tribes of Oman. And as I do not conceive that Her Majesty's Government is disposed to entangle itself with responsibilities of that nature, I judge that it will be far more expedient to leave such questions to be settled by the people without any interference on our part. Failing male issue, Syud Majeed's present idea is, should the sovereignty be awarded to him, to associate one of his brothers with himself in the administration, so that, in the event of his death, the people, from having been accustomed to regard that brother as his successor, will be prepared to ratify his claim to the sovereignty. Under the peculiar circumstances of the government and people of the Zanzibar territories, his Highness' scheme is, in my opinion, as good as any other that could be adopted.

\* Appendix B, reply to Query 38.  
 † Letter No. 1 of 1860, paragraph 13.

51. Another point which I deem it desirable to notice is Syud Thoweynee's grievance, submitted by him to the late Lord Elphinstone, that Syud Majeed had wrongfully assumed the guardianship of the younger orphan children of the late Syud Saeed at Zanzibar, and had either appropriated, or taken into his hands, the management of their shares in their father's inheritance.‡ It is undoubtedly true that Syud Majeed has taken on himself the office of guardian to his younger brothers and sisters who are under age, and has so far appropriated their property as to borrow and use it; nevertheless, he openly acknowledges his liability to them to the extent of seven lacs of crowns.§ He, moreover, justifies this proceeding on the ground of having been appointed an executor of his father's will conjointly with Bint Seif and Mahomed bin Salem, and maintains that, as the former has since died, and the latter retired to Mecca, the entire responsibility of executing his father's will devolves on him. By the only will of the late Syud Saeed, hitherto forthcoming, and which is dated eleven years back, the testator nominates his son Khaled, Mahomed bin Salem, and his wife Bint Seif, as joint executors;|| and as Khaled and Bint Seif are dead, and Mahomed bin Salem has declined to act, Syud Thoweynee, as the eldest brother, demands that the "property of the orphans shall be given up by Majid and deposited with a trustworthy person, in whose custody all parties may feel satisfied that it will be safe.¶ On the other hand, Syud Majeed avers that, on the death of Khaled, his father appointed him a joint executor with Bint Seif and Mahomed bin Salem, and he promises to obtain the said will from the latter, and to have it forwarded, through the

‡ Letter No. 205 of 1859, Persian Department.

§ Appendix K, paragraph 10.

|| Muscat Report, Appendix C.

¶ Letter No. 205 of 1859, Persian Department.

British

(a) Zanzibar.		Crowns.
The revenue of Zanzibar is estimated at	-	206,000
Syud Majeed's outstanding liabilities, independent of seven lacs of crowns borrowed from his orphan brothers (for the greater part of which, however, he holds their shares of the movable and immovable property which fell to them by inheritance from their father), at	-	327,000
<i>Muscat.</i>		
The revenue of Muscat is estimated at	-	129,500
Syud Thoweynee's liabilities at	-	81,000

Appendix, No. 8.

\* Appendix L.

British Consul at Jeddah, to the Government of Bombay.\* Should such a document be found, it will put an end to this sore question between the rival brothers, whose only object is, I fear, to despoil their orphan relatives. Any interference therefore on our part may be postponed until the will referred to is produced; and in the event of the document not being forthcoming, and Syud Thoweynee persisting in his demand, the Government might then take such steps as may seem most expedient to prevent an open rupture between the two brothers, which this dispute is not unlikely to occasion.

† Colonel Rigby's letter, No. 108 of 1859.

‡ Appendix L, paragraphs 10, 11, 12.

52. I take it for granted that some opinion will be expected from me on the case of Syud Barghâsh, who has already been here nearly a year a pensioner on the bounty of the Government. His Excellency in Council is doubtless aware that he was expelled from Zanzibar on account of the leading part which he took in the rebellion against Syud Majeed in October 1859, and that before leaving he signed a formal engagement, swearing on the Koran to abide by the same, that he would quit Zanzibar for ever, and never attempt to return without the express permission of Syud Majeed.† There is every reason to believe that most of the charges urged against him by Colonel Rigby and confirmed by Syud Majeed,‡ of having conspired with the El-Harth tribe to overturn the Government, are substantially true. It is very probable, moreover, that, whereas he was in reality merely a tool in the hands of the El-Harth, he himself entertained the ambitious design of dethroning his brother and of ruling in his stead. It is equally clear that, before and throughout the disturbances, he wished to be guided by the counsels of the French party. The following extract from a letter written by him to the address of the French Consul at Zanzibar, and picked up in the fortified house which he had vacated on the second approach of Syud Majeed's troops, accompanied by a detachment of British sailors, leaves no doubt on that point:—"My brother Majeed's wish is to give the country to the English, and he has spoken thereof openly, not once, nor twice, but often. We, however, will not give our country either to the English or to the French, or to the Americans, or to any one else; but if we sell it, we shall do so only at the cost of our blood, and of war to the death. As to yourself be fully confident: if you are buying or selling in the plantations be not afraid, your transactions will be safe."

§ Muscat Report, paragraph 49.

53. The only excuse which can be urged in palliation of Syud Barghâsh's conduct (apart from Syud Thoweynee's estimate of his character when he styled him a lackbrain),§ is the complicated state of the political affairs which existed at Zanzibar at the period of the insurrection. Syud Majeed's right to the sovereignty was disputed by the powerful tribe of the El-Harth; and, on the other hand, Syud Thoweynee was endeavouring to secure what support he could to establish his own claim to the territories of Zanzibar. The commotion which ensued in consequence of this rivalry was a mere repetition of similar disturbances which, from time immemorial, have accompanied every fresh succession to the sovereignty of Oman, and generally speaking, even the ringleaders, as well as the abettors of the losing party, have uniformly been treated with the greatest lenity by the successful candidate on his confirmation in the sovereignty. Such has always been the normal mode of proceeding among the Arabs of Oman. Open rebellion in such cases has been considered an honour rather than a crime; so much so, indeed, that the popular voice would hardly be in favour of a new ruler who had attained the supremacy without a struggle with his competitors.

54. Should the independent sovereignty be awarded to Syud Majeed, I think that, under proper guarantees, he might with safety exercise a corresponding leniency by permitting Syud Barghâsh to return to his home and family at Zanzibar. His Highness has apparently succeeded in reducing the disaffected among the El-Harth to subjection; and the principal chiefs of that tribe who headed the insurrection are still in confinement, and within his absolute power. Hence there is little chance of Syud Barghâsh being able, even were he so disposed, to organize a party in opposition to his brother Majeed, but, judging from appearances, I believe that the young prince has sincerely repented of his folly. I understand that he has lately written a letter to Majeed, couched in the most abject terms, soliciting permission to return, and promising solemnly to conduct himself in future as a loyal subject. No answer has as yet been received from his Highness, and I am inclined to believe that none will be sent. Under these circumstances, it becomes a difficult question how Syud Barghâsh is to be disposed of. A suggestion from the Government, that he might be allowed another trial of his sincerity, with the superadded offer that he should be placed under the surveillance of the resident British consul, would at once ensure his return to Zanzibar; and, as I have already observed, I do not think it probable that he will abuse the indulgence.

#### *Sohar.*

55. As intimately connected with the principal subject of this report, I avail of the present occasion to submit to Government the result of my ulterior inquiries at Zanzibar regarding Sohar. The Honourable the Governor in Council is aware that a claim was set up some months ago in behalf of Syud Toorkee, third surviving son of the late Syud Saeed, entitling him to the independent sovereignty of the Sohar district. The ground on which this claim was based is thus stated by the Under Secretary to the Government of India: "The late Imam divided his kingdom among his three sons, giving Zanzibar to Majeed, Muscat to Thoweynee, and Sohar to Toorkee, with the full understanding that they were to succeed to the full sovereignty of each after his own death."||

|| Letter No. 1120 of 1860, Foreign Department.

56. In my report from Muscat, after carefully examining all the arguments which had been adduced in support of this claim, I came to the conclusion that they were "inconclusive, apart from the reflection that they were, moreover, open to complete refutation if the more general question of the right of the late Syud Saeed to divide his territories is decided in the negative;" and again, that the considerations which had been urged on the opposite side "formed, in my opinion, a mass of evidence decidedly adverse to the claim set forth in behalf of Syud Toorkee."\*

Appendix, No. 8.

\* Muscat Report, paragraphs 30 to 33.

57. Additional research at Zanzibar fully confirms me in the foregoing conclusion. On submitting to Colonel Rigby, for further information, the statements which he had incidentally transmitted to Government in behalf of Syud Toorkee, he replied: "From what I had always been told by Arabs at Zanzibar, and also from what Syud Hilal said, I was under the impression that Syud Toorkee had been placed in possession of Sohar by his father as an independent state, in the same manner as it had been formerly granted by the Imam Ahmed, during his own life, to his son Kees." In paragraph 17 of this report, I have already pointed out the inaptness of the comparison here instituted; but Colonel Rigby subjoins, "My impressions having been formed from the statements of interested persons were probably erroneous."†

† Appendix B, reply to Query 41.

58. Another consideration which led Colonel Rigby to conclude that Sohar was independent of Muscat, he expresses in these words: "I think that Sohar must have been regarded as an independent state, as an engagement was entered into between the British Government and Seif bin Hamood, Chief of Sohar, dated 22nd May 1849, for the prevention of the slave trade, and an Act of the British Parliament, 16 Vict. c. 16, dated 9th May 1853, was passed to give effect to this engagement (*vide* Hertslet's Treatise, vol. IX., page 715).‡ In the year 1849 Sohar had acquired, through the lapse of nearly a century, a nominal independence, though it is extremely improbable that the original concession by Sultan Ahmed involved any such privilege; § but however that may be, Colonel Rigby appears to overlook the fact that Sohar was captured by the late Syud Saeed in 1851, and continued up to his death a dependency of Muscat."||

‡ Appendix B, reply to Query 8.

§ *Vide supra*, paragraph 17.

|| Government Selections, Persian Gulf, page 231.

59. Syud Majeed, when questioned on the subject, frankly admitted that no proof existed to establish Syud Toorkee's pretensions to the independent sovereignty of Sohar; and in his appended written statement, his Highness says, "I do not know what Toorkee's real position is, whether he is independent or subject to the ruler of Muscat. What I only know is, that our late father made over Oman and its dependencies to my brother Thoweynee, in the same way that he made over Zanzibar and its dependencies to our brother Khaled, and on his death he made them over to me."¶

¶ Appendix L, paragraph 5.

60. The foregoing arguments will, I trust, be regarded as decisive against the claims of Syud Toorkee to the independent sovereignty of Sohar. In a political point of view, more especially in its bearings on the future tranquillity of Oman, and the peace of the maritime tribes in the Persian Gulf, it is fortunate that the question admits of no other solution; for Syud Toorkee is represented as being a dangerous intriguer and a most extortionate ruler. In my letter No. 8 of the 27th June, I submitted to Government a general account of his sinister proceedings, and what steps I had taken to arrest them. The letter which I addressed to him on that occasion was so far successful that he subsequently sought an interview with Syud Thoweynee; but his Highness declined any negotiations with him until the final decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General was made known. Syud Toorkee's reply to my letter, which I have since received through Mr. Rassam, is attached in Appendix M.

61. Should the Honourable the Governor in Council concur in the conclusion which I have formed on this subject, it will be most desirable, in justice to the ruler of Muscat, as also in order to put an end to the unsettled state of affairs in Oman, owing to the equivocal position of Syud Toorkee, that his Highness Syud Thoweynee should be officially informed of his recognition by the Government of India as the paramount sovereign of Sohar. It is equally expedient that the same decision should be formally made known to Syud Toorkee; and also that, after due deliberation, his claim to be independent of the Sultan of Muscat has been disallowed. A superadded friendly injunction to both parties to act in concert for the welfare of the country might lead to a permanent reconciliation between them; and I know no person better qualified than Mr. Rassam to make these communications, or more likely to bring about a good understanding between the two brothers. As Mr. Rassam's appointment is only temporary, I venture to suggest that his services may be secured in this matter before his departure from Muscat.

62. I presume that Syud Majeed is, in some measure, prepared for the tenor of the foregoing decision regarding Sohar; nevertheless, considering the relations which have hitherto existed betwixt him and his brother Syud Toorkee (relations which the doubtful position of the latter and his own misunderstanding with Syud Thoweynee may have justified for the time), it appears to me advisable that his Highness should be informed that the Government of India have fully recognised the right of Syud Thoweynee to the sovereignty of Sohar. Such a formal declaration, by putting his Highness on his guard against fostering any future intrigues of Syud Toorkee, may prove an additional security for the peace of Oman.

63. Before bringing this report to a close, I venture to offer one or two suggestions with



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with regard to Muscat and Zanzibar, should the final arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General decide that the latter shall hereafter form a separate kingdom. In the first place, I think it would be expedient, under such circumstances, to conclude separate treaties of commerce and agreements for the suppression of slavery with the rulers of both states, inasmuch as those now in force were entered into between the British Government and the late Syud Saeed as the paramount sovereign of the conjoined provinces. Several important alterations would be required in the wording of those documents, and the occasion might be availed of to introduce any modifications in the existing commercial treaty which the interest of British trade, as well on the east coast of Africa as at Muscat, may render desirable. Moreover, should Her Majesty's Government concur in the recommendations which I submitted in my late report on the slave trade, the same opportunity might be taken to embody them in a formal agreement for the effectual abolition of that traffic on the east coast of Africa, and within the territories dependent on Muscat.

64. My next suggestion is that, in the event of Muscat being permanently severed from Zanzibar, a proper and duly qualified British agent should be accredited to the ruler of the former state. I learn from the "Persian Gulf" Government selections that a British Resident was appointed to Muscat in 1840, who was shortly after created a consul by the Home Government, and subsequently directed to establish his consulate at Zanzibar, where the Imam thenceforth principally resided.\* By the tenor of the original appointment, it would seem that the Resident or Agent at Muscat was placed under the general superintendence of the Resident of the Persian Gulf; but I am not aware how the removal of the former to Zanzibar affected that arrangement. The Government, however, appears thereafter to have been represented at Muscat by a native Jew, a very good man, I understand, in his way, but perfectly unfitted, both from want of social *status* and general capacity, to occupy such a position. This person, I believe, was required to correspond on all matters affecting British interests, as well as on the current political affairs of the country, with the Government of Bombay, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, and with his immediate superior, the British Agent at Zanzibar; nevertheless, the man himself being unable to write, was obliged to employ an Arab to indite his letters. Such was the state of our representative relations with Muscat until a few months ago, when Lieutenant Chester, of the Indian Navy, held the post for a short time, and subsequently Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, one of the Assistant Politicals at Aden, was put in temporary charge of the British Agency at that place.

\* Government Selections, Persian Gulf, page 211.

65. There is valid ground for believing that many of the fierce contests which have arisen between rival parties in Oman, and among the tribes bordering on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, might have been restrained had there been a British representative on the spot with sufficient authority and judgment to exercise a salutary influence over them. The Agent at Muscat, even had he been so qualified, was not empowered to act, and the time which necessarily elapsed before instructions could be received from the Resident at Bushire must have been a serious drawback on his efficiency. I am further of opinion that the late serious misunderstandings between Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed might have been prevented in a great measure had there been a discreet and competent British Agent at Muscat capable of affording timely advice to the former. As it was, his Highness, of course, disdained to consult Hezekiel the Jew; and Captain Jones, the Resident at Bushire, if in every other respect fit and acceptable to the sovereign, was at too great a distance to effect any good. As in some measure a fair proof of the truth of the foregoing remarks, I may instance the fact that, since Mr. Rassam took up his residence at Muscat, no disturbances whatever have occurred among the tribes of Oman, and those which were rife at the period of his arrival have been arrested.

66. Under any circumstances, therefore, it appears to me that an officer of becoming respectability and of proper qualifications should be appointed to the agency at Muscat. But such an arrangement will almost be indispensable in the event of that state being permanently separated from Zanzibar. Muscat will then cease to be what it had virtually become, a mere dependency since the late Syud Saeed fixed his abode at Zanzibar. It will be the residence of an independent sovereign, and the seat of the government of Oman, exercising considerable influence, for good or for evil, over a large portion of Arabia, including the western shores of the Persian Gulf; besides which, our commercial interests in that quarter call for such a provision on the part of the Government. There is a large trading community of British-Indian subjects within the territories of Muscat; that town itself has become a station for the electric telegraph; and it seems highly probable that regular communication by steamers will shortly be established between Bombay and the Persian Gulf, *via* Muscat, which will give an increased stimulus to the trade of those countries.

67. These considerations will, I hope, induce the Honourable the Governor in Council to recommend the appointment here suggested. It is to be regretted that Mr. Rassam, who was originally engaged for Aden, is not available for the post. He respectfully declines to remain permanently at Muscat; and arrangements will, I trust, be made by Government to relieve him as soon as practicable. Moreover, Mr. Rassam is urgently required at Aden, where his services hitherto have been eminently useful; I had almost said indispensable. The difficulty, perhaps, will be to find a competent successor; for the Agent at Muscat should be well acquainted with the Arabic language; have some know-

ledge of Arab laws and customs; and, together with firmness of disposition, should possess a temper calculated to conciliate the natural impetuosity and obstinate puerility of the Arab character.

68. In addition to the foregoing suggestion, it appears to me desirable that the British Agent at Muscat should be independent of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, and under the immediate orders of Government. The greater nearness of Muscat to Bombay is, of itself, an adequate ground for that arrangement; and if a duly qualified officer is appointed to the post, there seems to be no reason whatever why he should be subject to any immediate control. Moreover, judging from experience of the past, I do not think that the system hitherto prevailing has worked satisfactorily. The settlements in the Gulf, which are farmed by the ruler of Muscat from the Persian Government, as also the intimate relations existing between the tribes dependent on Oman and those more or less under Persian domination, undoubtedly call for frequent intercommunication between the British Agent at Muscat and the Resident at Bushire; but whilst his official independency need not interfere in any way with the due discharge of those duties, the Agent at Muscat will be enabled thereby to render more effectual support to British interests, and to exercise a more powerful influence over the sovereign and people of Oman.

69. The range of topics embraced in the foregoing pages, and the important bearing which the final decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General on the main subject discussed will exercise over the future welfare of Arabia and the East Coast of Africa, must be my apology for the length of this report. I cannot conclude, however, without gratefully acknowledging the obligation I am under to the Rev. Mr. Badger, my associate in the Commission. Unaided by his special qualifications, and by the cheerful zeal which he has applied to his laborious task, I should certainly have failed to unravel some important points in the case before me, and my report would have been deficient in that accuracy and completeness which I trust it will now be found to possess. It is not easy for me to say how much I am indebted for his assistance on this, as well as on other occasions of importance, which have already been acknowledged by me in various despatches to your address; but as this is possibly the last service of its kind which the Rev. Mr. Badger will have the opportunity of rendering to the Government of India, I indulge the hope that this accomplished public servant may carry into his retirement a suitable recognition of the ability for which he is so conspicuous, and the generous zeal which has ever prompted the application of that ability to the best interests of the State.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *W. M. Coghlan*, Brigadier,  
In charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

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APPENDICES to LETTER No. 17, dated 4th December 1860.

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MUSCAT-ZANZIBAR COMMISSION.

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(Secret Department.—No. 12 of 1860.)

From Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, in charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, to Lieutenant Colonel *C. P. Rigby*, Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent at Zanzibar.

Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.  
Dated Zanzibar, 1 October 1860.

Sir,

I have the honour to apprise you of my arrival at Zanzibar, accompanied by the Rev. Mr. Badger, commissioned by Her Majesty's Government of Bombay to institute an inquiry into the rival claims of their Highnesses Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed, which is to precede the final arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India.

2. It is perfectly understood that Syud Majeed has accepted that arbitration; nevertheless, in order to guard against any doubt or misunderstanding which might otherwise arise hereafter in a matter of so much importance, it appears to me desirable that his Highness should engage to abide by the decision of the Governor General in the same formal manner as was required of his Highness Syud Thoweynee of Muscat. I append a copy of the bond executed by the latter, and shall feel obliged by your obtaining for me, with as little delay as possible, an engagement of like import from his Highness Syud Majeed.

3. Being, moreover, most desirous of securing your co-operation in the inquiry entrusted to me, and also of profiting by your intimate acquaintance with all the transactions which have transpired between the rival claimants since the death of their father, the late Syud Saeed, I have drawn up the accompanying list of queries (marked A),\* begging that, in your reply,

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\* As these queries, marked A., and a subsequent list marked B., re-appear in Colonel Rigby's replies, I have thought proper to omit them here.

Appendix, No. 8. reply, you will be pleased to afford me all the information in your power on the different points therein submitted.

Several of those points have reference to occurrences and statements which have already formed part of your official correspondence on this subject, and on which I am anxious to obtain further elucidation. Others are proposed with the view of eliciting your opinion on the best means for securing the independence and prosperity of his late Highness's dominions, subsequent to the award of the Right honourable the Governor General in the matter of the dispute now pending between the two brothers. Any suggestions from you on such points will be most acceptable.

5. Having been further directed by the Honourable the Governor of Bombay in Council to make careful inquiries as to the extent of the slave trade on the east coast of Africa, and on the best means for its prevention or suppression, I have drawn up a separate list of queries on that subject (marked B),\* to which I solicit the favour of your reply. Your extensive local knowledge, combined with your strenuous exertions to arrest the nefarious traffic in the territories dependent on Zanzibar will enable you to afford me valuable assistance in my researches, and I shall be most thankful for your co-operation in suggesting any measures likely to effectuate the earnest wishes of Her Majesty's Government for the abolition of slavery on the east coast of Africa. More especially do I request the aid of your counsel as to the feasibility and desirableness of a revision of the existing treaty with the late Imam, and on the probable results of any attempt on our part to obtain the abrogation of the immunity which still permits the free transport of slaves between Lamoo and Kilwa on the mainland, and several of the adjacent islands.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *W. M. Coghlan*, Brigadier,  
In charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

[TRANSLATION of the Arabic Bond whereby Syud Thoweynee engaged to abide by the arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, in the dispute regarding the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its dependencies, now pending between his His Highness and his brother Syud Majeed.]

I, the Syud Thoweynee bin Saeed bin Sultan, declare that, whereas the high Government of India have required of me that I should not proceed against Zanzibar, I, in accordance with their request, have abstained from so doing; and all the claims I have against my brother Majeed, I have submitted for the information of Government by the kind hands of Colonel Russell.

And now, whatever the esteemed award of his Excellency the Governor General may be in his arbitration between me and my brother Majeed; whatever he may decree I shall abide by it. I am quite willing to abide by his decision, whatever that may be; and further, I hereby bind myself that I will do nothing against, and will in no way molest, now or hereafter, my brother Majeed, until I have received the award of his Excellency the Governor General Sahib, and the issue of his arbitration between us.

(Signed by my own hand) *Thoweynee*.

Dated 22nd Suffer, 1276.

Signed by his Highness Syud Thoweynee, in my presence, this 21st day of September 1859.

(signed) *C. J. Cruttenden*, Commander,  
Commanding Her Majesty's Sloop "Ferooz," Indian Navy.

(Secret Department.—No. 53 of 1860.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *C. P. Rigby*, Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent, Zanzibar, to Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*, in charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission at Zanzibar, dated Zanzibar, 5 October 1860.

Sir.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 12 of 1860, Secret Department, dated the 1st instant, relative to the rival claims of their Highnesses Syud Thoweynee of Muscat and Syud Majeed of Zanzibar.

2. As desired in the second paragraph of your letter, I herewith forward you a bond in the Arabic language (annexed, marked A), which was written and sealed in my presence by his Highness Syud Majeed, and in which he engages to abide by the decision of his Lordship the Viceroy and Governor General of India in all matters of dispute between himself and his brother Syud Thoweynee.

3. I also

\* These, together with Colonel Rigby's replies, have already been submitted to Government in my Report on the Slave Trade, No. 14, dated 1st November 1860.

3. I also forward the accompanying list of answers (marked B) to the queries, relative to the disputed claims of their Highnesses, which accompanied your letter. Appendix, No. 3.

4. With reference to the above answers, I beg to remark on the difficulty that exists in procuring any testimony on many points that can be relied on. There is little or no documentary evidence, as the Arabs very seldom keep any written record of even the most important affairs. The records of the British Consulate are also very imperfect. For a considerable period prior to his death, Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton, my predecessor, was generally incapacitated by severe illness from attending to business. With the exception of one Arabic and Persian writer, he had no office establishment whatever. The late Hajee Khaleel, who was the writer alluded to, was also completely worn out by sickness, and died a few months after my arrival here. When I took charge of the Consulate in July 1858, I found no regular files of letters later than 1852, and no index to letters received or forwarded. During the absence of Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton at Muscat, the Consulate here remained closed, and in his last visit to that place he was absent from Zanzibar from the 11th of April 1851 to the 3rd of February 1853.

5. The secretary to his Highness Syud Majeed, a Persian, by name Ahmed bin Naaman, who was for many years the confidential secretary of the late Imam, is now in so feeble a state of mind and body that he is unable to give any information, and from the experience I have acquired of Zanzibar Arabs, I do not think that the slightest reliance can be placed on the statements of any of them.

6. I will prepare the answers to the second series of queries which accompanied your letter, and forward them to you as soon as possible.

I have, &c.,  
(signed) *C. P. Rigby*, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent at Zanzibar.

#### APPENDIX (A.)

[Translation of the foregoing Arabic Bond.]

In the name of God the Most Merciful.

I, the unworthy Majeed bin Saeed, declare, in respect of the dispute and contention which have arisen betwixt me and my brother Thoweynee regarding the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies, that I have referred the settlement of the said dispute, and the termination of the said contention, to his Lordship the Governor General, the Viceroy of Her Exalted Majesty in the Government of India. And whatever the said Governor shall decide, I will accept the same, and I will agree to whatever he may award to me. This I declare on my affirmation, with an upright mind, and binding myself and my actions thereto. Let this be known to all. Salaam.

Written by the hand of the unworthy Majeed bin Saeed.  
Rabiah-el-Awwal, 1277.

L. S.

Written and sealed in my presence, by his Highness Syud Majeed bin Saeed, this 3rd day of October 1860.

(signed) *C. P. Rigby*, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar.

(True Translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger*.

#### APPENDIX (B.)

Lieutenant Colonel *Rigby's* Answer to the List of Queries marked A. in Brigadier *Coghlan's* Letter to his Address, No. 12, of 1860. Appendix (B.)

[The number and date of the letters referred to in the body of the Queries are noted in the margin. They are those addressed by Colonel Rigby to Mr. Secretary Anderson in the Secret Department.]

*Query 1.*—Have you any additional arguments in favour of Syud Majeed to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its dependencies?

*Answer.*—None.

0.116.

Q. 2.—Was

Appendix, No. 8.  
No. 19, of 1859.

Q. 2.—Was any reply received from the Foreign Office to Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton's letter to Lord Clarendon, dated 10th November 1856, wherein he states what the late Syud Saeed's intentions had been prior to his death regarding the succession.

A.—Yes; a reply was received from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated 31st March 1857, together with a letter from Her Majesty Queen Victoria to his highness Prince Majeed bin Saeed. Copies of both these letters are annexed, marked C. and D. respectively.

No. 19, of 1859.

Q. 3.—In Colonel Hamerton's letter just referred to, after stating that Syud Saeed had regarded Syud Majeed in the place of his second son Khaled, since the death of the latter in 1854, he observes, "But it is now difficult to perceive what turn affairs may take." What meaning do you attach to this remark?

A.—I think that it may have had reference to the late Imam not having left any written will of his intentions regarding the future position of his different sons, and also to the conduct of Syud Barghash and the El-Harth tribe of Arabs. The only member of the late Imam's family who was with him at the time of his death was Syud Barghash, and as he cherished ambitious designs, he no doubt destroyed any documents left by his father. The ship of war "Victoria," on board of which the death of the late Imam occurred, and the "Artemise," which was in company, anchored about 5 p.m., five miles south of the harbour, and about midnight Syud Barghash secretly landed, before it was known that his father's death had occurred on board, and endeavoured to obtain possession of the Fort of Zanzibar. The Belooch Jemadar in command refused to admit him. He then secretly purchased arms and ammunition, and endeavoured to collect a party to aid him in seizing the government; but on the following morning, when the death of the Imam became known, the people hailed Syud Majeed as their Sultan. The El-Harth tribe, which had always been disaffected towards the Imam's family, showed signs of rebellion, and the wealthiest chief of the tribe, by name Abdallah bin Salim, called on Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton, and asked him what they should do, as the island was without a ruler. Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton told him that if he attempted to disturb the peace, his head would fall within 24 hours, and turned him out of the Consulate. The expression quoted in the question may probably have referred to these circumstances which had occurred just before.

No. 46, of 1859.

Q. 4.—Syud Saeed's intentions with regard to his sons Khaled and Thoweynee are clearly stated in his own letter to Lord Aberdeen, dated 23rd July 1844. Was any reply to that letter received by his late highness from the British Government?

A.—No reply exists in the records of the Consulate.

No. 46, of 1859.

Q. 5.—Syud Hilal informed you that Syud Saeed had notified to the other foreign Governments in alliance with him, his intention to divide his dominions between the Prince Thoweynee and Khaled. Are you aware whether any replies were received to the notification, and what was the tenor of them?

A. I really do not know whether the notification was made to any other Government. The French Government had no Consul or Agent accredited to the late Imam prior to 1846.

Q. 6.—Syud Majeed's promotion to the position which the late Syud Saeed had intended for Syud Khaled rests at present on the testimony of Colonel Hamerton as to what his highness's intentions were prior to his death, and on your own statement that the succession of Majeed to Khaled was proclaimed, after the decease of the latter, in open durbar. Are you aware whether Syud Saeed notified this appointment to any of the foreign Governments? Do any native records exist attesting it as the act of the late sovereign?

A. I am not aware whether the appointment was notified to any foreign Governments. I believe no native documents or records exist on this or almost any other subject, or, if any such do exist, that no person about his highness Syud Majeed knows where to find them.

No. 46, of 1859.

Q. 7.—You prove satisfactorily that primogeniture has generally been disregarded in the succession to the sovereignty of Oman, but you speak of the late Syud Saeed as having been "elected" to the exclusion of his elder brother. Who elected him? If elected, then his predecessor did not nominate him. Are you aware how Saeed's predecessors attained the sovereignty? The only instance which you adduce of any of the Imaams having exercised the right of nominating a successor is that of Syud Saeed. Do you know of any other instance?

No. 46, of 1859.

Syud Hilal's account of the mode of succession, as reported by you, is as follows:—"Might, coupled with election by the tribe, is the only right;" and again, "The one who had most influence with the tribe was elected." If such had been the rule hitherto, on what ground could Syud Saeed abolish it, and introduce a new mode of succession?

A.—By the term "election" I mean that he was proclaimed and accepted as their ruler by the Arabs of Oman to the exclusion of his elder brother. I do not think there was ever any regular form of voting in practice amongst the Arabs of Oman. The father of Syud Saeed succeeded in 1803 to the sovereignty to the exclusion of his two elder brothers; and the grandfather of Syud Saeed, by name Ahmed bin Saeed, divided his dominions during his own life, having appointed his son Kees to be chief of Sohar, and his seventh and youngest son Mahomed to be chief of Suik.

The late Imam evidently considered that he possessed the right to dispose of his dominions as he pleased, from having, during his own life, disinherited his eldest son Hilal. But if the successor thus nominated were not acceptable to the people, I think they would refuse to accept him.

Q. 8.—You state that Ahmed bin Saeed, grandfather of Syud Saeed, had, during his lifetime

lifetime, given Sohar to Kees and Suik to Mahomed bin Ahmed. Are you certain that those chiefs were not still regarded as feudatories to the suzerain of Oman? Appendix, No. 8.

A. I think that Sohar must have been regarded as an independent state, as an engagement was entered into between the British Government and Seif bin Hamood, chief of Sohar, dated 22nd May 1849, for the prevention of the slave trade, and an Act of the British Parliament, 16 Vict. c. 16, dated 9th May 1853, was passed to give effect to this engagement (*vide* Hertslet's Treaties, vol. IX., page 715). I have no information regarding Suik, except what was told to me by Syud Hilal, who was chief of that territory up to the year 1828, and he stated to me as a proof that he was then an independent prince, that several of the Bedouin tribes paid him tribute. The exact relation of Sohar and Suik to Muscat could probably be ascertained from the records of the Bushire residency.

Q. 9.—You adduce the alleged intention of Syud Saeed to give Zanzibar to his second son Khaled, and Muscat to his third son Thoweynee, as proving that his late highness intended Zanzibar to be independent of Muscat. But does not that argument fail when, on the death of Khaled, Thoweynee became virtually the first son in consequence of Hilal having been disinherited by his father. No. 46, of 1859.

A.—Syud Hilal adduced as a proof of the late Imam's intention to render his African possessions altogether independent of Muscat after his own death, that, after he disinherited his eldest son, he appointed his second son to succeed to the government of his African possessions, and his third son to succeed him at Muscat; so that, supposing such not to have been his intention, the elder son would have been subordinate to the younger. On the death of the second son Khaled, the Imam appointed his fourth surviving son Majeed to occupy the same position which Kaled had held. Majeed was a favourite son, whilst Thoweynee had caused his father great trouble and anxiety by his quarrels with the chiefs and tribes in Oman.

Q. 10. In like manner, does not Syud Hillal's argument fail when he attempts to establish the prospective independency of Zanzibar from the fact that Syud Saeed had taken up his abode at the latter place and appointed his second son Khaled as governor there? I mean, does not the argument lose its force when, by the death of Khaled, Thoweynee became the senior son?

A.—I understood Syud Hilal to mean that, so long as the late Imam made Muscat his permanent residence and seat of government, Zanzibar and the African possessions were considered as dependencies of Muscat; but when the Imam transferred the seat of Government to Zanzibar, and made it his permanent residence, it could no longer be regarded, according to the ideas of Arabs, as a dependency of Muscat, and that consequently, during the life of the late Imam, Zanzibar had ceased to be a dependency, that Zanzibar and Muscat were regarded as two independent territories under one ruler, similar to the connection which existed between Great Britain and Hanover.

Q. 11.—You attempt to show that Thoweynee's claim to Muscat is as questionable as that of Majeed to Zanzibar. Unless the late Syud Saeed had the right of dividing his territories by will, it would undoubtedly be so; but if Thoweynee were to rest his claims on election and the recognition of the tribes, would not such suffrage, according to the custom hitherto prevailing in Oman with regard to the succession, give him a superior right? No. 46, of 1859.

A.—I think it would. I think, if a ruler of Oman were to appoint as his successor a person who was not acceptable to the Arab tribes and chiefs, that they would refuse to acknowledge him, and elect as their ruler a person who was more popular with them.

Q. 12.—To what place and ruler were you accredited on your appointment as British Agent and Her Majesty's Consul?

A.—I was appointed as "British Agent at Zanzibar" by the Bombay Government, and subsequently was appointed as "Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar."

Q. 13.—Are you aware to whom the other foreign Consuls at Zanzibar are accredited?

A.—The French Consul and United States Consul are accredited to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and also to the Sultan of Muscat. The Consul of the Hanseatic Republics of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, is accredited to his Highness Syud Majeed, Sultan of Zanzibar. He is not accredited to the Sultan of Muscat, as the republics have no treaty with that prince.

Q. 14.—What do you believe would be the result if the suffrages of the principal chiefs at Zanzibar were taken; would the majority be in favour of Thoweynee or Majeed?

A.—In favour of Syud Majeed. The only persons at Zanzibar who have shown themselves to be inimical to Syud Majeed are some of the chiefs of the El-Harth tribe. Their rebellion last year was not intended to favour either Syud Thoweynee or Syud Barghash, but with the hope of getting rid of the whole family of the late Imam, and thus obtaining possession of the government.

Q. 15.—You remark that, with the exception of a few of the great slave proprietors of the El-Harth tribe, there is no party at Zanzibar favourable to Thoweynee; and again, that the faction opposed to Majeed is "utterly contemptible." How do you reconcile these statements with the position which the El-Harth maintained on the occasion of the émeute of October 1859, when Majeed was unable to coerce them without the assistance of a British force? No. 46, of 1859.  
No. 45, of 1859.  
No. 103, of 1859.

A.—On the occasion of the rebellion of Syud Barghash, the position which he occupied in the interior of the island was a very strong one. He had secretly prepared it for defence and armed it with cannon. No Arabs or Beloochees would storm such a position; and as it was well provisioned, it might have held out for a long time. Syud Barghash had plenty of

Appendix, No. 8.

of money, his brother Syud Majeed having a few days previously given him 14,000 crowns for his expenses at Muscat. He had also received money from Syud Thoweynee for the purpose of fomenting insurrection here. The possession of so much money enabled him to hire a number of mercenaries, consisting of Soorees and other northern Arabs, and even natives of India. At first only about 200 men of the El-Harth tribe joined him, but the indecision and procrastination of Syud Majeed in taking measures to suppress the rebellion induced many others to join Syud Barghash from day to day, and thus the rebellion became dangerous. However, several of the more respectable of the El-Harth chiefs took no part in the rebellion and remained quiet in the town. Amongst these were Mahomed bin Bashire, Syud bin Salim El-Murghoobee, Hoossam bin Mahomed, and Syud bin Masaood.

No. 46, of 1859.

Q. 16.—You also state that the Sowahili would never acknowledge Syud Thoweynee, associating as they do the foreign slave trade with the Muscat Arabs. Is it to be inferred from this that the Muscat Arabs are more addicted to the traffic than those of Zanzibar, and that the Sowahili are opposed to the slave trade?—The fact that slavery is still carried on to a great extent between Zanzibar and the coast seems to militate against any such conclusion.

A.—When the invasion of the Zanzibar dominions by Syud Thoweynee was expected, the inhabitants of the Sowahili rose *en masse* to support Syud Majeed. Many tribes under their own chiefs came over to Zanzibar; every accessible point on the coast north of Zanzibar was occupied; and when some of the dhows which had Syud Thoweynee's troops on board endeavoured to procure wood and water, they were driven from every point at which they attempted to land, and at length were obliged, in consequence, to surrender to Syud Majeed's ships of war. At Zanzibar, the Sowahili population and the natives of the Comoro Isles were all in arms to support Syud Majeed, and I heard many of them state, as a reason for doing so, that the Muscat Arabs came here to kidnap their children and carry them away as slaves. The northern Arabs are feared and hated at Zanzibar. No doubt a very extensive export of slaves does still take place from Zanzibar and the east coast to the Persian Gulf and the coast of Arabia. I had no idea of the great extent of this traffic until I saw how it was carried on during the last north-east monsoon, nor how impotent the Sultan is to check it. If he employs his troops for the purpose, they are as active as the pirate tribes in kidnapping children and slaves. I estimate that at least 4,000 slaves are still taken north every year, and of these, probably, more than half are stolen from the island of Zanzibar and the villages and plantations on the coast. This is the cause of the animosity the Sowahili bear to the Muscat and other northern Arabs.

No. 40, of 1859.

Q. 17.—On what ground did Syud Majeed pay Abdallah bin Salem, chief of the El-Harth, the yearly sum of 1,200 crowns, and allow all his goods to pass free through the custom house?

A.—Several of the principal chiefs receive annual sums from the Treasury, and enjoy immunity from the payment of customs duties on their goods landed at the custom house. They are as follows; viz. :—

	<i>German Crowns.</i>
Syud Sooliman bin Ahmed	5,000
Abdoolah bin Salem	1,200
Hoosein bin Mahomed	300
Mahomed bin Abdullah Shukshee	1,000
Syud Hamood	2,000
Nassir bin Saeed	500

No. 40, of 1859.

Q. 18.—If the report was true that the El-Harth chiefs corresponded with Thoweynee, and promised him their aid in deposing Majeed, may it not fairly be inferred that they preferred the former to the latter?

A. The design of the E-Harth tribe was to foment dissensions between the sons of the late Imam, hoping to obtain power for themselves. They had always been disaffected, and when the late Imam visited Muscat, he made the wealthiest chief of the tribe, Abdullah bin Salem, accompany him as a hostage.

Q. 19.—What is the number of the El-Harth, and how do you estimate their influence at Zanzibar?

A.—As near as it is possible to form an opinion, the adult males of the tribe probably amount to 800. They have no influence beyond their own tribe. The other chief tribes which inhabit Zanzibar—namely, El-Shakshi, Masakara, and El-Shastri—are not friendly to the El-Harth.

Q. 20.—In a clause of his last will, Syud Saeed bequeathed two ships "to the Treasury of the Mussulmans." What do you understand thereby? What treasury is indicated?

A.—I understand that the two ships referred to are the "Caroline," and "Curlew," which have been retained by Syud Thoweynee as his own property. I feel very doubtful as to the true meaning of the expression. Ahmed bin Naaman, the late Imam's confidential secretary, states that it means "Wakf," or pious foundation.

Q. 21.—Has Majeed been officially recognised by any of the foreign governments? What was the substance of Syud Majeed's letters to the French Government, and what was the tenor of the reply which he received?

A.—Yes; he has been recognised by all the foreign Governments which have Consuls at Zanzibar, namely, Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Hanseatic Republics, as Sultan of Zanzibar. I am not aware of the tenor of Syud Majeed's letters to the French Government. A copy of the letter addressed by the Emperor of the French to Syud Majeed

is

is herewith annexed (marked E.), and also of that of the President of the United States (marked F). Appendix, No. 8.

Q. 22.—Can you state precisely what part of the African coast, and what islands besides Zanzibar, were inherited by the late Syud Saeed when he succeeded to the sovereignty?

A.—Previous to the accession of the late Imam, in 1806, to the government of Oman, the connection of that state with the territories now forming the Zanzibar dominions was little more than nominal. Mombasa, Lamoo, Patta, Kilwa, &c., were separate republics governed by their own elders and chiefs. When a ship of war from Muscat visited their ports, they usually acknowledged the suzeraineté of the Imaum. Mombasa and the Island of Pemba were placed under the British flag in 1823, by a convention concluded with the Sultan of Mombasa.

Q. 23.—You are aware of the feudal service owed by the tribes of Oman to the reigning sovereign. Was it not principally by their aid that Syud Saeed was enabled to extend his conquests and to consolidate his empire in Africa? If so, and if, in addition thereto, Syud Saeed owed his sovereignty to election, may not the said tribes claim some right in the disposal of those territories? No. 46, of 1859.

A.—The late Imam succeeded in establishing his power over the coast of East Africa chiefly through the mutual jealousies and disensions of the petty chiefs, who frequently sent envoys to Muscat to solicit his interference. I do not think that it would ever occur to any Arabs in Oman that they had any voice in the succession to the government of the African possessions on the ground supposed. I think they were regarded as being at the absolute disposal of the Imam, and that the fact that all the property of the State, such as ships of war, arms, &c., were considered as the private estate of the Imam, strengthens this opinion.

Q. 24.—Have you discovered any additional proof of the statement made by Syud Majeed regarding the conditions on which he promised to pay annually to Syud Thoweynee the sum of 40,000 crowns? You are doubtless aware that Syud Thoweynee maintains that the amount was promised as tribute; and he avers that Mahomed bin Salem, who conducted the negotiation on his behalf received the first instalment as such from Syud Majeed. As no documentary evidence is forthcoming with regard to this transaction, do you not conceive it probable that Mahomed bin Salem, for his own private ends, may have represented the matter in that light to Thoweynee, while, in accepting the sum from Majeed, he was willing to regard it as a fraternal gift?

A.—None. I have never been able to obtain a single document relative to the subject, excepting a letter from the Muscat envoy, Mahomed bin Salem, to Luddah Damjee, the Customs master, who was appointed Syud Majeed's agent for the payment of the money, in which he terms it "Masaadeh," *i. e.*, aid or assistance. Also a memorandum in the handwriting of Syud Majeed, addressed to Luddah Damjee, appointing him the agent, in which the same word is used. As I have never seen Mahomed bin Salem, and know nothing of his character, I cannot form an opinion as to whether he may have deceived Syud Thoweynee as to the terms on which Syud Majeed had agreed to pay him the 40,000 crowns annually. Annexed, marked G.

Q. 25.—But if, as is stated, 10,000 crowns of the promised subsidy were to be paid to Syud Toorkee, why did not Majeed remit that amount direct to him? It seems strange that he should not have done so, especially since it appears to be maintained at Zanzibar (*vide* Syud Hilal's testimony) that Toorkee was as independent at Sohar as Thoweynee was at Muscat. Annexed, marked H.

A.—I consider it very unlikely that any stipulation was made relative to one-fourth of the promised subsidy being paid to Syud Toorkee. I have always had great doubts on this point, because Thoweynee and Toorkee were on bad terms with each other at the time the agreement with Mahomed bin Salem was made; and also because I was informed that the allowance made from the Muscat treasury to Sohar during the life of the late Imam was only 1,200 crowns per annum. If the whole of the tribute paid to the Wahabee chief is, and always has been, paid from the Muscat treasury, it is, I consider, a strong confirmation of the doubts I entertain; for Syud Toorkee could have no possible claims to such a payment from the Zanzibar treasury. No. 46, of 1859.

Q. 26.—You state that 5,000 crowns of the instalment of 20,000, paid to Mahomed bin Salem for Thoweynee, was to be given to Toorkee to enable him to pay the tribute to the Wahabees. Are you aware that the whole of the tribute to the Wahabee Ameer is, and always has been, paid by the Muscat treasury? No. 116, of 1859.

A.—I am not. I had always been led to believe that the Sohar state paid tribute to the Wahabee Ameer.

Q. 27.—Thoweynee states that the French and American Consuls, as well as the late Colonel Hamerton, were cognizant of the arrangement whereby Majeed agreed to pay him the 40,000 crowns as tribute. Was any record of the transaction left by Colonel Hamerton in the Consulate?

A.—I have repeatedly been informed that no Consul was present when the arrangement was made with Mahomed bin Salem. No record of the transaction was left by Colonel Hamerton in the Consulate. The persons stated to have been present when the agreement respecting the payment of the 40,000 crowns was made are—1st. Mahomed bin Salem, the Muscat envoy; 2nd. Syud Sooliman bin Hamed; 3rd. Mahomed bin Saeed, the second surviving son of the late Imam; and 4th, the Secretary to Syud Majeed, Ahmed bin Naaman.

Q. 28.—It is repeatedly noted in your correspondence that the Zanzibar treasury was in the 0.116.



Appendix, No. 8. the habit of assisting the treasury of Muscat. Are you aware to what extent, and on what grounds, the subsidy was paid?

A. The Customs master, who always acted as treasurer to the late Imam, informs me that 10,000 crowns were annually sent from Zanzibar to Muscat on account of the tribute to the Wahabee Ameer; that this was as fixed payment. Other sums were sent as required; some years 10,000 crowns, and some years, if hostilities were going on in Oman, considerably more than this. The late Imam was possessed of large estates in Zanzibar. I think the treasuries of Zanzibar and Muscat were considered as one, and at the absolute disposal of the Imam.

Q. 28. (B.)—Will you be good enough to procure for me a statement of the present income and expenditure of the Zanzibar state, and the amount, if any, of its outstanding liabilities?

A.—My letter to the Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 52, of 1860, Secret Department,\* fully answers this and the following question 29. (That query was as follows:—Government have several times suggested some compromise between the two brothers on the basis of the payment of this 40,000 crowns annually to Syud Thoweynee. Have you ever attempted such a compromise, and with what result?)

No. 19, of 1859.

No. 46, of 1859.

Q. 30. You report that "any attempt on the part of Syud Thoweynee to usurp the Government of Zanzibar would give the French an excuse for the occupation of that island." What are your grounds for that opinion? Elsewhere you regard the French as being favourable to Thoweynee's pretensions.

A. It has been thought for several years past that the French meditated forming establishments on the east coast of Africa. The letters of Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton for some years refer to this intention, and show that the late Imam was in constant fear of French usurpation. From conversations with the late French Consul at Zanzibar, I had ascertained that he was fully aware of the intended invasion from Muscat long before it was suspected here; and as he told me he should support Syud Thoweynee immediately on his arrival, I formed the opinion that the French had interested motives, and would take advantage of any opportunity to place the island under the French flag. I considered the French were favourable to Syud Thoweynee's pretensions in consequence of some negotiations which had taken place at Muscat when the French frigate "La Sybille" visited that port; also, because Syud Majeed had firmly rejected every proposal made to him by the French to permit the export of slaves from his dominions.

No. 46, of 1859.

Q. 31.—You say that the French Government have had some secret negotiations with Syud Thoweynee, and will strongly endeavour to have Zanzibar declared a dependency of Muscat, and then obtain the cession of a port on the African coast from Thoweynee. What proof have you of this?

A.—His Highness Syud Majeed one day spoke to me on the subject of his having addressed two letters to the Emperor of the French, announcing his father's death and his own accession, and of his having received no answer. I alluded to the subject one day in conversation with the French Consul, when he informed me that he believed the reason was, that certain negotiations had taken place at Muscat between Syud Thoweynee and the commander of the "La Sybille," and that the French Government did not expect Syud Majeed to retain the government of Zanzibar, and therefore hesitated to acknowledge him. Afterwards, during a discussion I had with the French Commodore Le Vicomte De Langle on board the corvette "La Cordeliere," the French Consul stated that he had already received instructions how he was to act in case of Syud Thoweynee visiting Zanzibar. This proved to me that the French Government was acquainted with Syud Thoweynee's designs. When Syud Thoweynee's ship "Caroline" arrived here shortly after, the two principal demands made by his agent Ahmed bin Salim were the payment of the 40,000 crowns annually, and the cession to him of the port of Mombasa. I therefore had a strong opinion that the cession of this port was demanded in order to make it over to the French as a reward for their support. The aggressive intentions of the French were a frequent topic of conversation amongst all the mercantile classes here at that time, as it is at present.

No. 53, of 1859.

Q. 32.—In a letter to Captain Jones you state that you have reported to Government the strong grounds which you have for believing that Thoweynee is acting under French influence. What are they, apart from any observations which the French Consul may have made on the subject?

A.—The French Consul was known to be carrying on a very active correspondence with Syud Thoweynee. The letters from Muscat to the disaffected Arabs here were sent under cover to the French Consul. Syud Barghash was instigated by the French Consul to rebel and promised French protection. These were my reasons, coupled with what I have already stated regarding the visit of the French frigate "La Sybille" to Muscat.

No. 53, of 1859.

Q. 33.—The French Consul informed you that his Government had not recognised Syud Majeed, owing to what had passed between Syud Thoweynee and the commander of the "La Sybille." Do you implicitly believe that statement, and have you any good authority for knowing what passed on that occasion between the two parties?

A.—From subsequent experience, I had very little faith in anything the French Consul said on any subject. He was a Russian-Pole, and before quitting Zanzibar boasted that his proceedings here had brought him into notice and led to his advancement. I have no knowledge whatever of what passed on the occasion referred to.

No. 59, of 1859.

Q. 34.—You believe that Syud Thoweynee asked Syud Majeed to cede to him the port of Mombasa

\* For facility of reference, a copy of that letter is attached, marked K.

Mombasa in order that he might present it to the French. On what ground is this opinion formed? Syud Thoweynee disclaims it altogether.

A.—This question is answered by my reply to question 31.

Q. 35.—You are doubtless aware that, prior to the notification of the existing treaty between Muscat and France, his late Highness Syud Saeed requested to know the precise import of Article XVII. in the said treaty, which gives to France “liberty to hire or erect houses and warehouses at Zanzibar or elsewhere.” It appears from a memorandum published in the “Persian Gulf” Government Selections, page 71, that his late Highness was satisfied with the explanation given by Commodore Monsieur Romain Desfosses. Nevertheless, as this point may eventually give rise to grave discussions, I shall feel obliged if you would provide me with a copy of any correspondence which may have passed on the subject, either through the Consulate or the Foreign Department of the Government of his late Highness Syud Saeed?

A.—Copies of all correspondence on this subject, which is on the records of the Consulate, is herewith annexed, marked I.\*

Q. 36.—Will you point out in detail any advantages likely to result by the severance of the Zanzibar state from that of Muscat?

A.—I consider that the connection that existed between Oman and a country so remote as East Africa was always an unnatural one, and very prejudicial to the interests of both countries. This I mean with reference to the want of all system and regularity in the government of Arab states, in which everything depends on the personal influence and presence of the ruling chief. The selections from the records of the Bombay Government relating to the Persian Gulf abundantly prove the dangers and disorders which constantly threatened the late Imam's possessions in Oman in consequence of his absence at Zanzibar. On several occasions the threatened danger was only averted by the influence and intervention of the British Government. Had the late Imam continued to reside at Muscat, it is probable that, with his energetic, shrewd character, he would have greatly extended his power, and firmly established it. In 1846 Lieutenant Colonel Hamerton writes to the Secretary to Government as follows: “I brought to the notice of his Highness the injury which was occasioned to his interests in Arabia from his protracted stay at Zanzibar, and that the government at Muscat was but ill administered. His Highness replied that this had been a matter of much distress to him lately.” And in another letter during the same year he writes to the Secretary to Government, Bombay, “I have, in obedience to instructions, most fully communicated to his Highness the Imam the state of his affairs in Arabia, as appears from the copies of the documents inclosed with the letter. His Highness was aware of everything, but did not appear to consider matters so serious as perhaps they are. The Imam has always appeared to me to care but little for his Arabian possessions further than the seaports. His Highness's influence in the interior of Oman is irretrievably lost, from the feeble nature of his government, and he knows and feels it. His Highness last year deputed Sheikh Ali bin Masaood to proceed to Oman from Zanzibar to try to procure men from the different tribes in Oman to assist his Highness in the war he is now carrying on against the people of Sewee, but the Sheikh has returned without being able to procure a single sword from the tribes in Oman.” As an Arab chief, the late Imam was a very superior man; it may be many years before his equal is found amongst his successors. From his personal bravery, his wealth, and his long reign, he had far more influence amongst those by whom he was surrounded than is likely to be possessed by either of his sons. Nevertheless, his absence from Oman destroyed his influence with the tribes, and nearly caused him the loss of all his Arabian possessions. With respect to the Zanzibar dominions, I think its complete severance from Muscat would soon lead to the stoppage of the northern slave-trade. The ruler of Zanzibar would feel independent of the northern Arabs, who every year swarm at Zanzibar during the north-east monsoon to prey upon him. The sums distributed by Syud Majeed amongst these people every year is a serious drain upon the Zanzibar treasury. I imagine the only reason why these Arabs are thus paid is with the idea that their aid may some day be required. If these payments were stopped, and vigorous measures were adopted for one or two seasons by an English gunboat to capture the boats of these piratical tribes when found carrying slaves, I think they would soon discontinue to visit this coast, and probably find some more honest occupation. I think that, if Zanzibar is governed with prudence, it may perform a very important part in the future commerce and civilisation of East Africa. From Port Natal to Cape Guardafui the only state from which any progress or stability can be hoped is Zanzibar. Its commerce has rapidly increased within the last few years, and it bids fair to become the chief emporium of trade on the east coast. Its population possesses valuable elements for commerce in the wealthy and numerous settlers from India, and the enterprising Arabs and Sowahilis who travel over Central Africa, distributing foreign goods in exchange for the products of the country. The Portuguese possessions on the east coast are in a hopeless state of decay, and there is not the slightest probability of the Portuguese ever advancing the civilisation or commerce of the interior. If Zanzibar should be an independent state, the dominions of its ruler would probably soon extend into the interior, and his power would be consolidated, and in time it might form a considerable African kingdom. But supposing that from the non-residence of the ruling chief; from its being continually held as a dependency of Muscat; from neglect or feeble rule, such as Oman has suffered from for

so

\* As this point has no direct bearing on the subject of the present inquiry, the correspondence referred to is omitted from the attached Appendices.

Appendix, No. 8. so many years in consequence of the late Imam being a non-resident, the Zanzibar State were to gradually lose its power over the territories of the mainland, the petty sultans and chiefs would become independent; the treaties for the suppression of the slave-trade would be disregarded; foreign settlements would be established; and all hope of progress would be destroyed.

Q. 37.—Will you further point out the disadvantages of the two states being conjoined as heretofore under one paramount sovereign?

A. This question is answered by the first part of my answer to the last.

Q. 38.—In the event of the Governor General's arbitration awarding absolute independence to the Zanzibar State under the sovereignty of Syud Majeed, how would you propose to provide for the future succession? By election of the people and tribes; by the claims of primogeniture in the Syud family; or by the will of the sovereign?

A.—I think it will be extremely advantageous to the future prosperity of the Zanzibar State, if some arrangements as to the future succession can be made in the event of Syud Majeed being declared its independent chief; for this prince has no male issue, and I think it not likely that he will have any. I think that it might be left to the choice of all the family of the late Imam, or Syud Majeed might nominate one of his brothers to succeed him, subject to the ratification of the principal chiefs at Zanzibar. If the members of the Syud's family could be induced to always, in future, admit the claims of primogeniture, I think it would be a very great advantage. At present the subject is always in doubt, and leads to quarrels and assassinations in the family.

Q. 39.—Should the arbitration decree the union of the two states under the suzerainty of Syud Thoweynee, as they were formerly conjoined under that of the late Syud Saeed, what arrangements would you deem most desirable for the governorship of Zanzibar and its dependencies?

A. That the Government should be administered as at present by Syud Majeed, and that he should not be subject to any interference on the part of his sovereign so long as he continued to pay the Muscat Treasury whatever sum might be agreed upon. At present the finances of the Zanzibar State are very much embarrassed, but with prudence and care the existing liabilities might soon be paid off. Twenty-five years ago the late Imam did not receive more than 50,000 crowns of annual revenue from his African possessions. In 1847 it had increased to 145,000 crowns, and at present the revenue amounts to 206,000 crowns.

Q. 40.—Should the balance of argument on the score of general expediency, involving the future prosperity of the Zanzibar State, be in favour of Syud Majeed, and that of right derived from pre-existing custom, be on the side of Syud Thoweynee, would it not be practicable and desirable to effect a compromise on the basis of the stipulated sum of 40,000 crowns being paid by Syud Majeed to Syud Thoweynee as tribute, the former being allowed to retain the governorship of Zanzibar and its dependencies for life, and the future succession being left to be decided as heretofore?

A.—In this case I think it would be highly desirable to effect a compromise, but the difficulty arises from the embarrassed state of the Zanzibar treasury. Syud Majeed is entirely dependent on the will of his Customs Master for supplies of money, and were he now to bind himself to the payment of an annual sum, and the Customs Master subsequently refused to advance the amount, Syud Majeed might be compelled to break his engagement without any fault of his own. But if his Highness could be prevailed on to establish a small force of disciplined troops with a few light guns, in place of the useless rabble now in his pay, and would also get rid of most of the large ships which he now has, and which are of no use whatever, and in place of them keep two or three small vessels efficiently manned, it would be a great direct saving to him; and knowing that he had troops he could rely on, he would feel more independent of the Arabs from the north and of the chiefs of tribes amongst whom he now squanders so much money. With regard to the succession being left to be decided as heretofore, I think that it would be a very great advantage, and probably avert much future evil, if some arrangement regarding it could be come to at the time the question of present sovereignty is settled.

#### SOHAR.

No. 19, of 1859. Query 41.—Colonel Hamerton, in his letter to Lord Clarendon, dated 7th November 1854, does not allude to any arrangement whereby the late Syud Saeed constituted his son Torkee ruler of Sohar, independent of Muscat. No such arrangement is to be found either in Colonel Hamerton's letter, 31st July 1844, to Lord Aberdeen, or in the letter of his late Highness Syud Saeed to his Lordship, dated 23rd July 1844. On the other hand, you state that "Syud Torkee was put in possession of Sohar by his father," and from the contents it is to be inferred that Sohar was to be as independent of Muscat as Zanzibar. And in another place you adduce Syud Hilal's testimony to the same effect. Will you be good enough to furnish me with any other arguments in favour of the alleged independency of Sohar under Syud Torkee?

Answer.—No document whatever exists in the records of the Consulate on this subject. From what I had always been told by Arabs at Zanzibar, and also from what Syud Hilal said, I was under the impression that Syud Torkee had been placed in possession of Sohar by his father as an independent State, in the same manner as it had formerly been granted by

by the Imam Ahmed, during his own life, to his son Kees. My impressions having been formed from the statements of interested persons, were probably erroneous. Probably the exact position of Syud Toorkee at Sohar, during his father's life, can be ascertained from the records of the Bushire Residency.

Appendix, No. 8.

(signed) C. P. Rigby, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent, Zanzibar.

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APPENDIX (C.)

To his Highness the Prince *Majeed bin Saeed*, Zanzibar.

Appendix (C.)

OUR BELOVED AND ESTEEMED FRIEND,

THE letters which your Highness lately addressed to Viscount Palmerston and to me were in due time received through Colonel Hamerton, the British Consul at Zanzibar. By these letters we have learnt the painful intelligence of the death of your Highness' father, Sultan Syud bin Sultan, Imam of Muscat, which took place at sea, on board his Highness' frigate "Queen Victoria," on the morning of the 19th of October last. We have received this news with great sorrow, knowing the friendship which the late Imam always entertained for the British Government and nation, and his desire to maintain the most intimate relations between his dominions and those of the Queen, our Sovereign. While we assure you of our unfeigned condolence on the bereavement which we have sustained, we cannot but express our full conviction that your Highness will continue to show towards British subjects and commerce the same favour and protection which they always received at the hands of your late father, who thus acquired for himself the sincere friendship and good-will of the Queen and her Government. We request you to accept our earnest wishes for your uninterrupted health and happiness, and so we recommend you to the protection of the Almighty.

Written at London, the 31st day of March 1857.

(signed) Clarendon.

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APPENDIX (D.)

Victoria, by the grace of God, Queen of the United Kingdom of *Great Britain and Ireland*, Defender of the Faith, &c. &c., to his Highness the Prince *Majeed bin Saeed*, of Zanzibar, sendeth greeting:

Appendix (D.)

Our Good and Esteemed Friend,

OUR Consul, Colonel Hamerton, has communicated to us the letter by which your Highness announced to us the melancholy intelligence of the death of your father Sultan Saeed bin Sultan, Imam of Muscat, which took place at sea on board his Highness' frigate "Queen Victoria" on the morning of the 19th of October last. From the friendly feelings which we have ever entertained towards the late Imam, and the attachment which he always manifested for us, our Government, and people, the painful news of his decease has caused us sincere regret. We thank your Highness for your attention in acquainting us with the loss of our departed friend, and while we unfeignedly condole with you on the bereavement with which it has pleased the Most High thus to visit you, we request you to accept our best wishes for your welfare and happiness, and so we recommend you to the protection of the Almighty.

Given at our Court at Buckingham Palace, in London, the 28th day of March 1857, in the twentieth year of our reign.

Your affectionate friend,  
(signed)  
(countersigned)

Victoria, R.  
Clarendon.

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APPENDIX (E.)

Napoleon, par la grace de Dieu et la volonté nationale, Empereur des Français, au glorieux Sultan Majeed, fils de Seid, Imam de Muscate, salut.

Appendix (E.)

Très illustre et magnifique Seigneur, nous avons appris avec un vif intérêt votre avènement au suprême pouvoir, après la mort de votre père bien-aimé, le Sultan Seid, de venerable mémoire, qui s'était toujours montré l'ami fidèle et dévoué de la France. Nous ne doutons pas que votre sagesse et votre prudence n'assure le bonheur des peuples que Dieu a confié à votre sollicitude. Nous nous plaignons, en cette circonstance à vous renouveler les félicitations que nous vous avons déjà fait exprimer par notre ministre des affaires

Appendix, No. 8.

affaires étrangères. La dernière lettre que vous nous avez écrite est une preuve nouvelle des vos sentiments affectueux à notre égard, et du désir que vous animé de rendre de plus en plus intimes les rapports d'amitié établis entre nos deux pays. Nos dispositions sont parfaitement d'accord avec les vôtres, et nous aurons toujours à cœur de favoriser l'heureux développement des relations reciproques, et de vous donner des marques de notre estime et de notre bienveillance sur ce. Très illustre et magnifique Seigneur, nous prions Dieu qu'il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde.

Écrit au Quartier Général de Verceil, le 4me Juin de l'an de grace 1859.

(signed) *Napoleon.*  
*A. Walewski.*

## APPENDIX (F.)

Appendix (F.) *James Buchanan*, President of the United States of America, to our great and good friend the *Sultan of Zanzibar*.

May your days be many, and your reign be prosperous and glorious!

I have received the letter which your Highness was pleased to address to me on the 5th of November last, conveying the sad intelligence of the death of your honoured father, and announcing your own elevation to the exalted position which in life he so worthily occupied.

In tendering to your Highness my sincere condolence on the former event, which has bereaved you of a beloved parent, and your subjects of a monarch whom they obeyed with reverence, I offer to you at the same time my sincere congratulations on your accession to the throne of the sultancy, and my fervent wishes that your reign may be prosperous and happy.

I pray God to have you always, great and good friend, in His safe and holy keeping.

Written at the City of Washington the 16th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1857, and in the 81st year of the independence of the United States of America.

(signed) *James Buchanan*, President.  
*L. Cass*, Secretary of State.

## APPENDIX (G.)

Appendix (G.)

TRANSLATION of a Letter from *Mahomed bin Salem* to *Luddah bin Damjee*.

From Mahomed bin Salem to our beloved friend Luddah bin Damjee, the Banian agent for our friend Ziram bin Sewjee, agent of the Customs of Zanzibar; may God preserve him!

A. C.—Our brother Nasir bin Ali bin Taleb is coming to you on certain business, and we wish you to deliver to him the balance of the money in your hands on account of the draft which our brother Majeed bin Saeed drew on you for the aid (subsidy) to his brother Thoweynee bin Saeed. He is his (Thoweynee's) man, and comes from him. Of the draft for the 40,000 crowns, 14,000 have been paid. Please to settle with him now for the remaining 26,000.

\* \* \* \* \*

From your unworthy friend Mahomed bin Salem with his own hand.

14 Rejeb 1274.

(True Translation.)  
(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

## APPENDIX (H.)

Appendix (H.) TRANSLATION of a Note from his Highness *Syud Majeed* to the *Banian Ziram*, authorising him to pay 40,000 crowns to *Syud Thoweynee* every year.

To our beloved friend Ziram, may God preserve him!

We have granted to our brother Thoweynee bin Saeed a subsidy of 40,000 crowns every year from the beginning of the year 1274, half (to be paid) during the south west monsoon, and the other half during the north east monsoon. You can transmit the amount from Bombay, and our friend Luddah will deduct it from us at Zanzibar.

Written by the unworthy Majeed with his own hand.

(True Translation.)  
(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

## APPENDIX (K.)

To *H. L. Anderson*, Esq., Secretary to Government, *Bombay*, dated *Zanzibar*,  
18 September 1860.

Appendix (K.)

(Secret Department.)—(No. 52 of 1860.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters and enclosures, as per margin,\* relative to the dispute between the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar, and desiring me to ascertain whether his Highness Syud Majeed is still willing to make an annual payment, as he formerly agreed to do, of 40,000 crowns annually as a free gift, not a tribute, to his brother Syud Thoweynee, ruler of Muscat; and stating that the agreement on the part of his Highness Syud Majeed, should constitute the basis of a permanent settlement of the existing dispute between him and his brother Syud Thoweynee.

6. After a long interview with his Highness on this subject yesterday, during which he repeatedly expressed his earnest desire to comply with the wishes of his Lordship the Viceroy, he sent me a letter (a translation of which is herewith enclosed), the contents of which he desired me to communicate to Government for consideration, before giving a positive answer relative to the proposed payment.

7. I was aware that his Highness was indebted to the customs master here to the amount of 327,000 crowns, and as the payment of interest on money is considered by Arabs unlawful, his Highness some months ago raised the import duty on slaves from one dollar per head to two dollars, and also increased the duty on ivory brought here from the mainland, in order to compensate the customs master for the loss of interest on the sum due to him.

The entire revenue of the Zanzibar state amounts to 206,000 crowns per annum, viz. :

	<i>Crowns.</i>
Annual farm of customs at Zanzibar - - - -	100,000
Ditto - ditto for Island of Pemba - - - -	6,000
Tax paid in lieu of carvie by the Mukhadim - - - -	10,000
	<hr/>
German Crowns - - - -	206,000

There is no tax upon land or houses, or any other payment to the state whatsoever.

8. The agent of the customs master acts as treasurer and banker, and scarcely a dollar reaches his Highness or any of his family except through him. Being indebted to him in so large a sum, his Highness is entirely dependent on his goodwill for any money he requires, and the agent here of the customs master has of late frequently told his Highness that he must in future confine his payments to sums absolutely required for the service of the State, and for the household expenses of his Highness and the members of his family.

9. I was also aware that the large sum of ready money left by the late Imam was expended during the disturbances; but Arabs have such a dislike to talk of their family affairs, that I did not know that his Highness owes so large a sum as seven lacs of crowns to his young brothers and sisters on account of their shares of their father's property.

10. On the death of the late Imam, all the property of the state was accounted as forming part of the private estate. The ships of war, guns, stores of every description, even the arms in possession of the troops, were set down at a valuation, and charged against the new ruler as a debt due to his father's estate, and thus it is that his Highness owes so large a sum to his brothers and sisters. The property left by the late Imam was divided amongst the 34 surviving children. The sum apportioned to each son was 57,917 crowns, and to each daughter 28,958 crowns, and a great portion of these sums was debited to his Highness as follows:—

	<i>Rupees.</i>		<i>Crowns.</i>
Price of the Frigate "Shah Allum" - - - -	1,50,000		
" " "Victoria" - - - -	1,55,000		
" " "Piedmontese" - - - -	50,000		
" Corvette "Artemise" - - - -	30,000		
" " "Nazree" - - - -	18,000		
" Brig "Taj" - - - -	10,000		
" " "Gazelle" - - - -	8,500		
	<hr/>		
Rupees - - - -	4,21,000	=	195,814
	<hr/>		
Price of the Trading Ship "Nadir Shah" - - - -			23,256
" " "Saleh" - - - -			1,000
" Plantations and houses - - - -			173,933
" Horses - - - -			6,360
" Arms, jewels, and household property - - - -			25,000
			<hr/>
Total Crowns - - - -			425,363

In

\* The references, and several paragraphs of this letter, not being relevant to the subject of this inquiry, are omitted.  
0.116.

## Appendix, No. 8.

In addition to the above the new corvette "Iskunder Shah," built for his Highness in Bombay, cost him four lacs and thirty thousand rupees; and the debt owing by his Highness to his customs master is mostly on account of advances made in Bombay to the builders of this vessel.

11. His Highness appears to consider that he has been very unfairly treated by his brother Syud Thoweynee, who took possession of all his deceased father's property in Oman of every description, and has not accounted to the estate for any portion of it; and when his Highness sent his ship "Nazree" to Muscat and sold it there for 11,000 crowns, Syud Thoweynee seized the money and appropriated it, although Syud Majeed had paid 18,000 rupees for this vessel to his father's estate.

12. During the disturbances here, money was squandered on the chiefs and their followers in a very lavish manner. I have urged on his Highness the absolute necessity of economy and retrenchment, and he has within the last month reduced the expenditure on his ships and troops from 9,000 to 7,000 crowns per mensem. He is paying the debt due to the customs master by instalments of 5,000 crowns per mensem, and he has 5,000 crowns per mensem left for the expenses of all the branches of his family, and the stipends paid to the chief Arabs, all of whom, though contributing nothing to the State, and many being possessed of private wealth, do not scruple to accept pensions from the Sultan. His Highness is very frugal and abstemious in his own habits, but he has little idea of the value of money, and he is surrounded by a greedy and unprincipled set of people. With the exception of the customs master, there is not a single honest or trustworthy person about him, or any one whose word on oath could be trusted.

I have, &c.  
(signed) C. P. Rigby.

(ENCLOSURE.)

TRANSLATION of a Letter from His Highness *Syud Majeed*, Sultan of Zanzibar, to Lieutenant Colonel *C. P. Rigby*, Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar, dated 2nd of Rabia-el-Awwal. A.H. 1277, corresponding to the 11th September A.D. 1860.

A. C.—We have heard and understood all that you have represented to us relative to the annual payment to our brother Syud Thoweynee of 40,000 crowns, and that the agreement on our part to do so would lead to a termination of the existing disputes between us. We will never depart from the wishes of the British Government; but you are acquainted with our state, and how little money we have at our disposal. All our resources were exhausted during the period of hostilities which our brother Thoweynee commenced against us, and to repel which we were obliged to raise troops and make expensive preparations. And even after the British Government had so kindly interfered and prevented an invasion of our dominions, he continued to aid and abet our brother Syud Barghash and the El-Harth tribes, and furnished them with money to rebel against us, and, in consequence, all the property we possessed was expended in defensive measures; and besides this we have become indebted to our friend Ziram bin Sewjee, the farmer in the customs, in the sum of 327,000 crowns; and, in addition to this, we owe to our orphan brothers and sisters the sum of seven lacs of crowns; and all this is owing to our brother Thoweynee. If we now pay our brother Thoweynee 40,000 crowns per annum, how can we satisfy the claims of Ziram and of our orphan brothers and sisters, and how can we keep up the necessary troops for the preservation of order in our dominions? for the countries of Zanzibar and Africa do not resemble Oman: without troops it is impossible to do so.

Moreover, we desire to complain to the British Government of the conduct of our brother Thoweynee; for he has deprived us of our rights, by keeping to himself all the ships, and horses, and date-trees, and household property, which our late father died possessed of in Oman; and he has appropriated to himself the price of our ship "Nazree," amounting to 11,000 crowns. Nevertheless, whatever the British Government deems advisable for us to do, please God we will agree to, and will not raise any objection.

And for whatever you may wish, the sign is with you.

Dated 2nd of Rabia-el-Awwal A.H. 1277.

[Postscriptum written by his Highness Syud Majeed, with his own hand.]

Please to inform Government that all the property to which I succeeded at Zanzibar on the death of my late father, viz., the ships of war and public stores, &c. &c., I did not take as the heritage of the State, but paid the price of everything in ready money to my father's estate, for the benefit of my brothers and sisters. Salaam.

Written by the humble servant of God,  
(signed) *Majeed bin Saaed*.

(True translated purport.)  
(signed) *C. P. Rigby*, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent, Zanzibar.

(True copies.)  
(signed) *W. M. Coghlan*, Brigadier,  
In charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

## APPENDIX (L.)

TRANSLATION of the Written Statement of his Claims and Grievances presented by his Highness *Syud Majeed* to Brigadier *Coghlan*, at Zanzibar, on the 14th October 1860.

Appendix (L.)

I PURPOSE submitting to his Lordship the Governor General of India a detailed statement of my case, and of the complaints which I have to make against my brother *Thoweynee* for his conduct towards me.

2. I beg then to inform your exalted Excellency that, after the death of my brother *Khaled*, my father appointed me governor in his stead over Zanzibar, the main land of Africa and its islands, and he wrote to that effect to all the chiefs of Africa and the islands, as also to the commandants of troops, directing them to submit to me and to obey my orders. He also notified the same to all the Consuls resident at Zanzibar, and the letter of your [late] respected agent, Colonel *Hamerton*, on the subject is still in my possession; for when my father had made all this known to him, Colonel *Hamerton* replied that he had reported it to the exalted [British] Government, and that the Government had approved thereof, namely, that I should be ruler over the mainland of Africa and its islands, in the same manner as my father had previously ordained with regard to my brother *Khaled*. From that time the Consuls visited me in uniform, and the principal persons of these dominions were aware that I was their ruler; moreover, by the aid of God, the country and people were obedient to me. I continued to occupy that position for two years, when my father the late Sultan *Saeed*, having left Oman on his return to Zanzibar, died at sea.

3. When I heard the report of his death, I called together my brothers and family, and all the people in these parts from *Tink* [Delgado] to *Marbat*, in order that they might recognise me. To this they all agreed, and they accordingly elected me to be ruler over them, and entrusted me with the direction of their affairs. When I was thus installed, I informed all the resident Consuls thereof, and they called on me in uniform, and congratulated me on my accession to the kingdom. I also wrote to the sovereigns of Europe, namely, to Her Majesty Queen *Victoria*, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, also to the Emperor of the French and to the President of the United States, and they accredited their Consuls to me at Zanzibar. Surely, had there been, in their estimation, another ruler over Africa besides myself, they would first have sent them to him. Then, after this my recognition, I dispatched my frigate, the "*Taj*," to *Muscat*, and wrote a letter to my brother *Thoweynee bin Saeed*, apprising him of the death of our father, and how the rule had devolved on me. In the same letter I set him on his guard against our enemies in Oman, bade him to keep a good heart, and always to think well of me, for I would continue to assist him to pay the 10,000 crowns to the *Wahabees* as our father *Saeed bin Sultan* had done. I moreover told him that, in the event of anything serious befalling him, I should be ready to aid him with my power, my money, and my people. I directed the captain of the frigate to land the said letter at one of the ports of Oman called *El-Hadd*, and wrote to the *Sheikh* of that place to carry the letter to my brother *Thoweynee*. The frigate I ordered to proceed from *El-Hadd* to *Bombay*, and I wrote a letter to the Governor of *Bombay*, informing him of all that had happened. I made the above arrangement on *Thoweynee's* behalf, and lest the sudden announcement of our father's death might give rise to disturbances while he was off his guard, when his enemies might take advantage of the occasion to act against him and the kingdom of Oman. Hence I thought it most prudent that the letter should first reach him privately, that he might be put on his guard against his enemies, and that the knowledge of our father's death should not be generally known until proper precautions had been taken. This letter reached him, and in his reply he stated how much he was grieved at our father's death. He also congratulated me on my succession, and told me that he would shortly send to me *Mahomed bin Salem* and *Mahomed bin Saeed*. These accordingly took their departure, and reached Zanzibar in the "*Caroline*." *Mahomed bin Salem* was joint-executor with me; for by his first will, our father appointed as executors after his death his son *Khaled bin Saeed*, *Mahomed bin Salem*, and his wife *Bint Seif*. When *Kaled* died, he altered that will, and appointed me an executor after his death, together with *Mahomed bin Salem*, *Bint Seif*, and *Suleiman bin Hamed*. This will is still in the hands of *Mahomed bin Salem*, and I will write to him to deliver it over to the British Consul at *Jeddah*, that it may be forwarded through *Aden* to *Bombay*.

4. To return: *Mahomed bin Salem* arrived here bringing a letter from my brother *Thoweynee*, wherein he wrote that he had sent *Mahomed bin Salem* and *Mahomed bin Saeed*, who would declare everything to me by word of mouth. Moreover, that I was to consider as from him everything that *Mahomed bin Salem* might say, that he had fully empowered him to act on his behalf, and would abide by whatever he might decide. On reading this letter, I said to *Mahomed bin Salem*, "What is your idea?" He replied, "I think it will be best to divide everything left by our father amongst his children, except the countries and the kingdom, it being known and acknowledged that Oman and its dependencies belong to *Thoweynee bin Saeed*, and Zanzibar and its African dependencies to you." This division was accordingly agreed on, with the omission of the countries and kingdom. Everything was divided, both small and great; all the ships, houses, gardens, furniture, and money; each one receiving his share, and I also my share like one of the rest.



## Appendix, No. 8.

5. But when Mahomed bin Salem was about to depart, he said to me, "Majeed, you know your brother's affairs; what little money he has in hand, and how great his expenditure is? You know, moreover, that the revenues of Oman do not cover its expenses, and I fear that, unless you assist your brother every year with a sum of money, the kingdom of Oman will pass out of your hands, and those who are evil disposed towards you will avail of the opportunity to do mischief. Will you not, therefore, appoint your brother a certain aid and subsidy to enable him to provide as well for himself as for Oman?" To this I replied, "I have already told my brother Thoweynee that I would assist him as our late father had done, namely, in the sum due to the Wahabees; and further, that in any case of emergency I would aid him with my power, my money, and my troops." He rejoined, "Well, but Oman is not now what it once was. Since the death of our father Saeed, the Arabs have become troublesome, and every enemy there is on the alert. This must be set at rest; and it is my opinion, considering the affection which I bear to you, O children of Saeed, that you should consider yourselves as one, and your rule as one, and give your brother an annual subsidy of 40,000 crowns, to enable him to quell the disturbances in Oman." To this I replied, "O, Mahomed, you are on the place of our father, and I will not differ from you in opinion. What you say to be right is right; nevertheless, as you ask of me this subsidy of 40,000 crowns, in behalf of my brother Thoweynee, I must set forth the conditions whereon I will grant it." He rejoined, "State them, and I will guarantee their acceptance by Thoweynee; for has he not already told you by letter that whatever I do or say is as done and said by him?" I replied, "Yes. In the first place, then, I stipulate that I am to be my father's successor, and that Thoweynee must recognise me as such." He said, "Agreed to." Then I said, "He is not to stir up strife against Toorkee, neither is he to injure him in any way; and if Toorkee does wrong, he must apprise me of it, for I consider him under my care. Notwithstanding, I do not know what his real position is; whether he is independent or subject to the ruler of Muscat. What I only know is, that our late father made over Oman and its dependencies to my brother Thoweynee, in the same way that he made over Zanzibar and its dependencies to our brother Khaled, and on the death of Khaled he made them over to me." He replied, "I consent thereto." Then I said, "If my brother Thoweynee observe these two conditions, I will give him an aid and subsidy of 40,000 crowns every year; but if he violate them, he will have no claim on me for a single crown." He replied, "I agree to that also." There were present at this conversation Suleiman bin Hamed, and the Secretary Ahmed bin Naaman, and my brother Mahomed bin Saeed, and Luddah, the Customs Master. After this Mahomed bin Salem said, "On my arrival at Muscat, Thoweynee may not believe that I have asked you to grant him an annual subsidy of 40,000 crowns unless you write him a letter to that effect." Thereupon I directed him to write as follows: "I, Mahomed bin Salem, asked of Majeed bin Saeed an annual subsidy of 40,000 crowns on behalf of his brother Thoweynee bin Saeed." On this I wrote, "This is true. Written by the unworthy Majeed with his own hand."

6. Finally, Mahomed bin Salem left for Muscat, taking with him the portions of my brothers who were in Oman; and after his departure we sent by an American ship 14,000 crowns on account of the 40,000 above referred to. But when Mahomed bin Salem reached Muscat, he found my brother Thoweynee at war with Toorkee. Whereupon he said to him, "How is it that you act thus after what I have stipulated on your behalf? If Majeed should hear of this, he will refuse the subsidy which I asked him to grant you." When Thoweynee heard this he made peace with Toorkee and returned to Muscat, when he received his share of the inheritance which had been brought by Mahomed bin Salem, and also the money on account of the subsidy which had arrived by the American ship. He also sent me a letter by his man Nassir bin Ali bin Taleb, wherein he states, "The money which you were good enough to send has reached me: may your prosperity continue." This letter is still in my possession; and with the letter he sent his man Nassir bin Ali to receive the balance of the money. And Mahomed bin Salem also wrote to me by him, saying, "Thoweynee's man, Nassir bin Ali, comes to you to receive the balance of the money. Be careful to confirm the words which passed between us, and to fulfil the arrangement which I made between you." This letter also is still with me. Mahomed bin Salem also wrote a letter by the same Nassir bin Ali to Luddah, the Customs agent at Zanzibar, wherein he says, "Thoweynee's man, Nassir bin Ali, comes to you to receive the balance of the money which we asked of Majeed as a subsidy to his brother Thoweynee." (This letter also is in existence.) Finally, Nassir bin Ali received the balance of the money, and then went in among the people, secretly corrupting their minds, and promising them all sorts of things from Thooenee. As reported to us moreover, he said, "Barghash will act for Thoweynee, for he is on his side, and do whatever he bids you." After this, Nassir bin Ali went to Muscat, and on his arrival there, Thoweynee rose up against Toorkee. On seeing this, how Thoweynee failed to keep his engagement, Mahomed bin Salem retired from Muscat and went to Mecca, for he was ashamed of such conduct on my account. Nevertheless, I knew nothing of what was transpiring there, but was already collecting the money for the following year, and had intended sending it by my frigate, the "Artemise." Just then, however, I heard of Thoweynee having made war on Toorkee, at which I was much surprised; and a few days after I learned that he was preparing to attack me also, in violation of the agreement which had been made through Mahomed bin Salem. I was then in doubt what to do; and, indeed, had he not made war on me, I should not have withheld the subsidy from him; neither was it ever my intention to deprive the subjects of Oman of the profit which they derive from me; for they come to me every year, and I distribute about 15,000 crowns in gratuities among them.

7. A few days later, certain intelligence arrived that Thoweynee was coming with his men and troops to attack me and to destroy the country. With the aid of God, I prepared to meet and to resist him with all the men and materials of war at my disposal, and I myself went on board one of my frigates for the same purpose, confident that God would cause me to triumph over one who had violated his treaty and sought to do me injury, knowing full well that the wicked cannot prosper; and God did, indeed, thwart his evil designs, and made the [British] Government the instrument of his salvation. On his return to Muscat, he informed the [British] Government that he intended sending Hamed bin Salem to recall his troops from Zanzibar, to which the Government assented. Hamed bin Salem accordingly came in the "Caroline," accompanied by Nassir bin Ali, bringing a letter from Thoweynee, wherein he informed me that he had sent Hamed bin Salem to me, and that whatever arrangement was made by him he would agree to, and that whatever he said would be as from himself. On his arrival, I said to Hamed bin Salem, in the presence of Suleiman bin Hamed, "Wherefore are you come?" He replied, "To effect a reconciliation between you and your brother Thoweynee." This surprised me more than the meditated attack; for it appeared to me most strange that Thoweynee should send Hamed bin Salem to effect a reconciliation, after he had accepted the mediation of the [British] Government; more especially since he had informed that Government that he had sent him to recall the troops, and not to effect a reconciliation. Therefore I said to him, "One who acts in this manner is not to be dealt with. Hence I will enter into no discussion with you on this matter; all I have to say is, that whatever the [British] Government may decide will be incumbent on all parties."

8. During his subsequent stay at Zanzibar, Hamed bin Salem left no means untried to ruin me, and to deprive me of the rule; but God did not prosper him. Much of what he did was reported to me; he bribed several officers to kill me, promising them rewards from Thoweynee. Of this I had many proofs; for when I punished one of them, Hamed bin Salem was importunate with me to release him, after begging me to do so verbally and by letter; but I refused. On perceiving this he next corrupted my brother Barghash, bidding him to compass my ruin, and promising him that Thoweynee would make him ruler of Zanzibar, without asking him to render any account of the government or of the finances. He also intrigued with the El-Harth, the greatest tribe in Zanzibar, and told them to side with Barghash against me; that Thoweynee would not fail to reward them; and that, if they prevailed, they should be lords of Zanzibar, and Barghash its ruler, when they might expel any whom they did not wish to reside at Zanzibar, and would acquire great renown. I heard also (but God knows the truth) that he gave them as much as 40,000 crowns, which Thoweynee had entrusted to him.

9. All this surprised me more and more; for it seemed to me an improbable thing that a tribe at Zanzibar should think of depriving me of the kingdom. But on hearing what Hamed bin Salem had said, they were deceived and led astray, and joined with him in his machinations, and Barghash also conspired with them. When all this came to my knowledge, I seized several of the chiefs of that tribe, one of them being Abdullah bin Salem, and placed them in confinement. Thereon many of the tribe, headed by Barghash, threatened to attack my house and release them. I then gave orders to the soldiers to fire on them if they made the attempt, which deterred them. As a proof that Hamed bin Salem was an accomplice in all this, I may mention that he unceasingly importuned me to liberate the prisoners, which however, I refused to do. To him I said, "These men have attempted to kindle rebellion in the town and to ruin me; they have consequently deserved the punishment inflicted. As to yourself, if, as was stated to the Government, you came here to recall Thoweynee's troops, there being none of them here now, you can return at once; but if, as you say, you have come to effect a reconciliation, know that I will neither confer with you nor with him that sent you on that matter, but with the [British] Government, which deterred him from coming to Zanzibar; hence there is nothing left for you to do but to depart." Thereupon Hamed bin Salem took his departure, and we were eased of his presence.

10. After his departure Barghash began to foment disturbances in the country, trying in every possible way to make mischief to compass my death, and to deprive me of the government; again and again this was proved to me, until at length I ordered him to quit Zanzibar, but he refused. I then directed one of my officers to confine him to his own house until he consented. He was thus confined for one day only, when he agreed to go, but said that he required money for the voyage. I accordingly gave him 10,000 crowns, and had one of my frigates prepared to take him wherever he pleased. On receiving the money, he said that he did not like to go in a ship, but preferred a buggalow. I then chartered for him the buggalow of Mahomed bin Moobarek, and some of his baggage was taken on board, when suddenly I heard that Barghash had fled from his house by night to the gardens where he was fortifying himself in a house which belonged to our late brother Khaled; also, that a number of the chiefs and people of the El-Harth, with their slaves had joined him. On learning this, I sent to inquire of him what he meant by such conduct, after he had promised to quit Zanzibar. He replied that it was still his intention to leave, but he was ashamed of leaving from the town, and preferred embarking from the garden.

I accordingly gave him three days delay; still he had not gone. I therefore sent again, bidding him to depart; but he replied that he would never leave Zanzibar. When I heard this, I prepared my troops to march against him, and all the people joined me, with

## Appendix, No. 8.

the exception of some of the lower classes of the El-Harth. Again we sent a message bidding him to go, but with the same result. Then we sent to him Hamood bin Seif bin Msellin, and Seif bin Khalfan, and Hussein bin Mahomed, the Chief of the El-Harth, and Hashim bin Swelim-el-Harethy, and Seif bin Mahomed-el-Wali, and Mahomed bin Moorbarek, to advise him and those with him to desist, and to warn them of the consequences of their conduct. Nevertheless they would not listen, but declared that they would not abandon Barghash; and Barghash said that he would not quit Zanzibar, adding that if Majeed did not come out against him, he would proceed with his men against me, fight me in the town, and kill those who supported me. About this time we found a note from Barghash addressed to the French Consul Cochet, wherein he writes, "What is your opinion if, in coming to the town to attack Majeed, we meet with any English or other Christians on the road, shall we kill them or not? Give me your reply on this point." We also heard (but God knows the truth) that while Barghash was in the gardens, the French Consul used to supply him with munitions of war, powder, shot, &c. However, when we perceived that matters had reached such a pitch, we determined to act; but as the Government ship "Assaye" was in the harbour, deeming it proper that the [British] Government should be made aware of everything, and also of what I intended to do, I advised with Colonel Rigby (Captain Adams being present), and told them all about Barghash's affair, and that I proposed attacking him. As the house in which Barghash had fortified himself was a very strong one, it was necessary that I should take guns to destroy it; but having no gunners of my own, they were kind enough to supply me with nine Englishmen for the occasion, who accompanied us with our troops to Beiter-Ras, where we remained that night, the house which Barghash occupied being about three hours distant. In the morning our troops advanced, and we bivouacked at a place called Mevera, and in the evening moved towards the position occupied by Barghash and his people. Though it was raining hard I ordered my troops to attack, when such of Barghash's people as were on the outside retreated, leaving the rest, who still continued to maintain their ground. At this time we had no guns sufficiently large to batter the house, and as the rain was falling in torrents, I ordered my troops to retire, intending to send for some larger guns, as swords and muskets alone could do little against the fortified building. Accordingly after spending the night, and then intending to renew the attack on the following day with larger guns, we heard at about 10 o'clock at night that Barghash and his people had evacuated the house, which I then ordered to be occupied by an officer and a party of my soldiers. Next morning Captain Berkeley, with a party of brave British soldiers, joined me, and I informed him of all that had occurred, and how Barghash had fled to the garden of Husein bin Mahomed. His advice was that the fortified position should be destroyed, and he accordingly directed a British officer and some soldiers to level it; this is what took place so far.

11. Barghash, however, had escaped to the tower and entered his house during the night. On hearing this, I sent Saood to ascertain the truth, and to inform Colonel Rigby, whom I had requested to take charge of the town during my absence. Saood accordingly communicated with the Colonel, and it was decided that some of my own soldiers, with a party from the frigate, should surround Barghash's house till the morning, lest he should escape. Colonel Rigby, however, and Saood wished to force the door open and bring the inmates out; but Hamood bin Ahmed bin Seif undertook to effect this without breaking the door; so he called to Barghash to open the door, and not to be afraid. He did so at once, and was brought forthwith to my house; this is what took place in the town.

12. As to myself, on waking I ordered my troops to return, and on reaching the town was met by Colonel Rigby and Saood, who told me all that had happened. So I entered my house accompanied by Colonel Rigby, and met there Captain Adams, and Captain Berkeley, and Sultan bin Hamood, and my brothers, and Barghash. On asking the latter what had induced him to act as he had done, he replied, "It is useless to talk of the past; all I now ask for is my personal safety." I answered, "You shall have it, and all that I require of you is, that you should leave Zanzibar, and here is the Government ship 'Assaye' ready to take you." He then asked for three days' delay to prepare for the voyage, which was granted. He then wrote a paper in the presence of the above named, promising to quit Zanzibar, and never to return without my permission, and the paper was witnessed by the signatures of all present. Three days after he left in the "Assaye" bound for Muscat. It was on account of all this that I cut off the monthly salary which I used to allow Barghash.

13. As to the El-Harth, after God had permitted them to be deluded, they repented of their evil deeds, and came in a body to confess their faults, and to ask forgiveness. This was granted, and they then vowed to be obedient to me, and to take part with me against every opponent. At present they appear to be loyal, but God only knows what is in their hearts.

14. After the departure of the "Assaye," the French Commodore arrived, and requested me to inform him of all that had taken place. I directed Suleiman bin Hamed to do this, and he got Ahmed bin Naaman, the Secretary, to write the whole on a paper, and to take it to the Commodore; but I myself had no conversation with him on the subject.

15. I desire, however, to observe to his Lordship the Governor General, that my brother Thoweynee has been the cause of all these troubles; for he it was who violated the covenant; annulled

annulled what Mahomed bin Salem had done; made war on Toorkee, then prepared to attack me; sent Hamed bin Salem to do all the mischief which has already been described; instigated Barghash to oppose me, and stirred up the El-Harth to do the same, and to create rebellion in the town. Owing to all this I have been obliged to spend large sums of money, and have contracted a debt of 327,000 crowns to the Customs Master, and another of 700,000 crowns to my orphan brothers and sisters. Had it not been for Thoweynee, I should not have been subject to such expenditure and loss; but when he prepared to attack us, and instigated others to do the same, we were obliged to spend so much money.

16. Further, I have also to complain of Thoweynee that he has not divided with me what was left by our father in Oman; whereas I divided with him all that was left at Zanzibar. He has divided neither the property, nor the money, nor the horses, the gardens, the furniture nor the ships, and as if that did not suffice, he actually seized the 11,000 crowns for which my ship the "Nazree" was sold [at Muscat].

17. Finally, I have to apprise your exalted Excellency that those commissioned by you have had some conversation with me about curtailing the limits within which it is still lawful to transport slaves, and also about abolishing the transport altogether, and whether any aid would be required thereto. I replied that I would never oppose the wishes of the high [British] Government; nevertheless your Lordship is not ignorant of the condition of these countries, and you are doubtless aware that the prosperity of the subjects of these territories is derived chiefly from ploughing and sowing, and that such prosperity cannot be maintained here without slaves; but your opinion is best.

Correct. Written by the unworthy Majeed with his own hand.

28th Rabia-el-Awwal 1277.

L. S.

(True Translation.)

(signed) *G. P. Badger.*  
*W. M. Coghlan*, Brigadier,  
in charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

#### APPENDIX (M.)

TRANSLATION of an Arabic Letter addressed to Brigadier *Coghlan* by *Syud Toorkee* of Sohar.

Appendix (M.)

From *Syud Toorkee bin Saeed bin Sultan*, to Brigadier *W. M. Coghlan*.

A. C.—Your honoured letter has arrived, and has delighted and eased our mind, inasmuch as you have shown your friendly compassion towards us, and are not willing to scorn our rights. We entertain great joy in your counsel, which has removed our sadness. We rely upon you because you have come to this country to put it into order, peace, and concord. This is the system of the noble-minded and generous.

In sending you a reply, we find it advisable to entrust the matter to you, and whatever you decide upon we shall not disobey the judgment of the [British] Government, which has, by its equity and justice, exhibited marvellous wisdom.

Whatever you deem beneficial to us, we shall be guided by your opinion, and will follow your injunctions.

Regarding what you have heard about us, it is without foundation. Our desire is prosperity and the general good. We have more compassion for these parts than any other, and we are anxious for their welfare.

We beg you to have confidence in what we have said. We approve of your appointment, and whatever you order we will obey.

2nd Dhu Alhija, 1276 (22 June 1860).

(True Translation.)

(signed) *H. Russam.*

RESOLUTION by the Honourable Board, dated the 4th February 1861.

Resolved,

During the lifetime of *Syud Saeed*, Imam of Muscat and Sultan of Zanzibar, that sovereign appointed his son *Syud Thoweynee* to be Viceroy of Muscat, and his son *Syud Majeed* to be Viceroy of Zanzibar and the African Dependencies. On his death, in 1855, each son assumed in his own person the government which he had formerly administered as his father's lieutenant. *Syud Thoweynee* subsequently put forward a claim to the sovereignty of Zanzibar in addition to that of Muscat, and was prepared to assert it by force

## Appendix, No. 8.

force of arms, when, at the request of the Government of Bombay, he abandoned this intention, and agreed to submit his claim to the arbitration of the Governor General of India.

2. Syud Thoweynee, it would appear from Brigadier Coghlan's first report, rests his claim upon the fact that he is sovereign of Muscat, and that in that character he is *de jure* sovereign of Zanzibar also, as a dependency of Muscat. He does not base his title as ruler of Muscat on any right or custom of primogeniture, but on the fact of his recognition by the tribes of Oman. He denies that his father left any will, or made any clear indication of his wishes in connection with the succession to his dominions. The only will which the late Imam left related to his private personal property; but it contained one provision which Syud Thoweynee contends is opposed to the assumption that he intended to erect Zanzibar into a separate sovereignty. That provision was, that the Imam's two ships, the "Caroline" and the "Feidh Alim," were to be given after his death to the treasury of the Mussulmans as a legacy from him. It is contended by Syud Thoweynee that the treasury of the 'Mussulmans meant the treasury of Muscat, and that therefore the late Imam virtually recognised only one public exchequer.

3. It will be useful to consider and dispose at once of the argument involved in this assertion. The Honourable the Governor in Council has no doubt that, by the treasury of the Mussulmans, the treasury of Muscat was intended; but the deduction drawn from these premises he considers to be too large. He regards the facts in this light; the sovereignty of Muscat is in some degree a hierarchy; a sacred character attaches to the Imam; a bequest to the treasury of Muscat is therefore a pious offering. The late Syud Saeed had long been a resident at Zanzibar; it seems therefore to the Honourable the Governor in Council a natural act, and, for one in the Imam's position, a natural mode of expressing his wishes for him to bequeath a portion of his private property to the land of his birth and the local centre of his religion. He had chosen Zanzibar as his residence, but in the last act of his life he makes a bequest to Muscat, with mingled solemnity and affection, as the treasury of the Mussulmans. The Honourable the Governor in Council does not consider that the fact advanced by Syud Thoweynee, if strained to the utmost, could be regarded as affording a clear indication of the late Imam's wishes, or as outweighing the inferences to be drawn from Syud Saeed's letter to Lord Aberdeen. But as the general tenor of Syud Thoweynee's argument is, that the late Imam possessed no right of regulating the succession, the provision regarding the bequest to the treasury of the Mussulmans is not of material importance in connection with his claim, although it demanded notice from the Honourable the Governor in Council in the present place.

4. But the main argument of Syud Thoweynee, that he was recognised by the tribes of Oman as sovereign of Muscat, and that in that character he is *de jure* sovereign of Zanzibar also, must, in the opinion of the Honourable the Governor in Council, suffice to place the *de facto* ruler of Zanzibar in the position of one who must prove his title. Syud Majeed does not dispute his brother's right to the sovereignty of Muscat; the great question, then, to be decided is, as under the late rulers the sovereignty of their conquests, Zanzibar, &c., was united to that of Muscat, can Syud Majeed establish a valid title to the possession of Zanzibar as a distinct sovereignty? This question leads the Honourable the Governor in Council to the consideration of Brigadier Coghlan's report of the 4th December.

5. Brigadier Coghlan in this elaborate report, after stating the precautionary measure which he had adopted of obtaining from Syud Majeed a formal agreement to abide by the arbitration of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, proceeds to discuss the grounds on which the present ruler of Zanzibar rests his claims to the sovereignty of that portion of his late father's dominions.

6. The grounds are thus stated:—

- I. The will or wishes of his late Highness Syud Saeed.
- II. The recognition of Syud Majeed by foreign Powers.
- III. His virtual recognition by his rival brother Syud Thoweynee of Muscat.
- IV. His election as their sovereign by the chiefs of Zanzibar and its African Dependencies.

7. Of the grounds thus stated, the 2nd and 3rd may be at once disposed of. With respect to the recognition by foreign powers, it will be observed that Her Majesty and the British Government did not allude to Syud Majeed's sovereignty in the replies returned to the letters announcing his father's death, and that there is no reason for supposing that the French and American Governments were ever aware that a claimant to the throne of Zanzibar existed in the person of the elder brother of Syud Majeed. They replied to the *de facto* sovereign; but no argument can be raised upon this circumstance in favour of the assertion that Syud Majeed was the *de jure* sovereign.

8. So with respect to the virtual recognition by Syud Thoweynee. It is clear that an agreement was negotiated, in virtue of which Syud Majeed was to be left in possession of his father's African dominions on payment to his brother, the ruler of Muscat, of an annual sum of 40,000 crowns; but this payment is contended by the one party to have been a tribute, and by the other party to have been a subsidy or gift, implying no inferiority on the part of the donor towards the recipient. There appears great reason to believe that the agent of Syud Thoweynee deceived both parties; and there certainly was

no formal instrument declaratory of the precise nature of the grant. Under these circumstances no decision can be based on the alleged recognition by Syud Thoweynee of his brother's claim.

9. The 2nd and 3rd grounds being thus briefly disposed of, the 1st ground (the will or wishes of the late Syud Saeed) is presented for consideration. Two questions naturally arise: 1st. Did the late Imam clearly manifest his wishes? 2ndly. Would the wishes of the late Imam, if ascertained, constitute a valid title to the succession? To the first of these questions the Honourable the Governor in Council would reply that Syud Saeed did not clearly manifest his wishes, but that there was considerable ground for the inference that they were in accordance with the claims of Syud Majeed. It stands clear upon the evidence, that the late Imam did indicate in his will that on his death his dominions should be divided; that the Arabian portion should be assigned to Syud Thoweynee, and the African portion to Syud Khaled; that he entrusted during his own life the administration of the respective portions to the sons thus named; that on Syud Khaled's death he placed Syud Majeed in authority over the African dominions; that he led the British Agent, Colonel Hamerton, with whom he had long been on terms of friendly intercourse, to believe that he intended the arrangement to remain in force after his own death. The proof of the late Imam's wishes is inadequate, but there are very strong presumptions in favour of the conclusion that, if the claim of Syud Majeed were established on other grounds, the British Government would recognise the claim which had the sympathy and support of Syud Saeed.

10. Next, with respect to the question of whether the wishes of the late Imam, if ascertained, could confer a valid title to the succession. The Honourable the Governor in Council considers it to have been clearly shown by Brigadier Coghlan that succession in the Imam's family has in practice, as generally in Arab chiefships, been regulated by election. The wishes of the late Imam, though they might very naturally exercise a material influence on the opinions of the various chiefs and tribes, could not therefore, from any inherent authority of their own, determine the succession. They might influence the election, and they might still more lend an appearance of legitimacy to pretensions which really owed their success to other causes of a less respectable character, to force or intrigue; but it cannot be doubted that, if the will of the sovereign was in Muscat and Zanzibar decisive as to the succession, there must have been instruments producible which would have put the fact beyond all doubt. In the absence, then, of all satisfactory proof, the Honourable the Governor in Council fully concurs with Brigadier Coghlan in considering that the will or wishes of the late Imam cannot be regarded, even if ascertained, as authoritatively decisive of the dispute. They would in all probability have exercised a material influence on the election, and that is all.

11. The last ground, then, on which Syud Majeed bases his claim remains for consideration, that he was elected by the chiefs and tribes in the late Imam's African dominions to be their ruler. The Honourable the Governor in Council considers it to have been satisfactorily shown that in the Imam's family the succession is determined by election. The question then is, was Syud Majeed elected? On this point there can be no doubt. No opposition appears ever to have been manifested in Zanzibar or Africa until some years after Syud Majeed had commenced his rule, and then the opposition might more correctly be termed disaffection to the existing ruler, excited by the intrigues of a rival claimant. That Syud Thoweynee should have commenced these intrigues was but natural, but the Honourable the Governor in Council is of opinion that the conclusion cannot be resisted, that Syud Majeed was elected to the sovereignty without a murmur from those included within the limits of his government, and that he would have continued to rule without protest or resistance but for the acts of those who were not included within the limits of his rule.

12. But an important point is presented for consideration at this period of the discussion. Had the chiefs and tribes of the African dominions, which were conquered dependencies of Muscat, a right to elect their own sovereign without reference to the desires of the chiefs in Oman? On this point the Honourable the Governor in Council has no difficulty in concurring with Brigadier Coghlan in opinion that the enhanced importance of the African dominions, both in their political and commercial aspects, an importance far surpassing that of Muscat, invested the chiefs of those young and vigorous settlements with a right of exercising a potential voice in the selection of their ruler. The late Imam, by whose courage and administrative ability the dominions had been consolidated and raised to their present prosperity, virtually relieved Zanzibar of its dependent character by making it the seat of government; and he still further indicated his views on this point by his desire, after making the administrations distinct during his life, to continue the arrangement after his death, in favour at least of Syud Khaled, if not of Syud Majeed.

13. The Honourable the Governor in Council then holds that Zanzibar had the right of choosing its own ruler, and that it chose Syud Majeed. But another complication is at this point presented for solution. It may be fairly contended by Syud Thoweynee that the election of Syud Majeed was, stripped of all its accidents, a mere exhibition of force; that Syud Majeed was on the spot when the throne became vacant; that he had all the advantages derivable from his position as viceroy; and that no opposition could safely be organised against this array of circumstances by those who really favoured the pretensions

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of the elder brother; that, after a fruitless attempt to negotiate, Syud Thoweynee prepared to assert his claims by force of arms, and that at this period the British Government intervened. He would therefore contend that the election being merely an exhibition of force, and he being prepared to oppose force by force, it would not be just on the one hand to prevent the employment of force by Muscat, and on the other to recognise a title derived only from force in Zanzibar. The argument is not without its weight; but it may be replied that such or similar fortuitous circumstances as favoured Syud Majeed, influence all elections to sovereignties, and that the time which has elapsed since his accession has, in some degree, legitimated Syud Majeed's pretensions, has given him another title besides that derived from force; and would have impressed on the armed demonstration of Syud Thoweynee, had it been prosecuted, the character of an invasion by a foreign power. But the Honourable the Governor in Council does regard the facts that Syud Thoweynee was prepared to assert his claim by an appeal to arms, and that he relinquished his purpose only in deference to the British Government, as investing him with a claim to compromise when contesting a title which is principally derived from force. In seeking for a basis of compromise, attention is naturally directed to the terms on which it is admitted Syud Thoweynee was willing to resign his claims. Those terms were briefly an annual payment of 40,000 crowns by Zanzibar to Muscat; but whether as tribute or a subsidy is disputed. The Honourable the Governor in Council is very willing to admit that the dispute involves a question of considerable importance, but he is of opinion that the negotiation indicates the nature of the compromise which the British Government should arrange. He thinks then, as an indemnity for abandoning his claims on his father's African dominions, as an adjustment of the balance between the two inheritances, the ruler of Zanzibar should make an annual payment to the ruler of Muscat of 40,000 crowns, and that this payment should be regarded as a subsidy and not as a tribute. It would be unjust to the prosperous state of Zanzibar, exhibiting as it does so much evidence of vitality and such aptitude for self-development, to make it tributary to any foreign sovereign, and especially to one of so effete a state as Muscat. A subsidy, on the other hand, would secure to Syud Thoweynee as much material advantage as he could fairly have expected, under all the circumstances, had he succeeded in dethroning his brother; it being always remembered, as clearly shown by Brigadier Coghlan and Colonel Rigby, that the defeat of Syud Majeed would not, as a matter of course, have secured the recognition of Syud Thoweynee as sovereign of all the African dominions of the late Imam.

14. There are two points to be noticed before the Honourable the Governor in Council commits this important question to the final decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General: 1st. Is the subsidy to be permanent? 2nd. Is it to be paid with arrears? The Honourable the Governor in Council regards the first of these questions as one of peculiar difficulty. The British Government must naturally be reluctant to impose a perpetual burden on Zanzibar, for the purpose of buying off, as it were, a claimant to the sovereignty; but, on a balance of all the considerations which surround the question, this seems the only expedient which can be adopted. Syud Thoweynee can hardly with honour resign the claims of his country, not merely his own claims, for a payment which is to determine with his own life. A temporary assignment from the revenues of Zanzibar would only film over the wound which Muscat sustains by the loss of the African dependencies, and irritation would again break out on Syud Thoweynee's death. By the permanent subsidy, a motive is given to Muscat to abstain from all ambitious movements against its wealthier brother; if that motive was removed, designs on Zanzibar would, from generation to generation, be the great point of honour, the great centre of intrigue, to which would converge all the daring and adventurous spirits in Oman. The subsidy will be well-spent money, if it preserves Zanzibar from those attacks to which it must otherwise be liable from the needy ambition of Muscat.

15. Next as to the arrears. Brigadier Coghlan is of opinion that they should be demanded from Syud Majeed. The Honourable the Governor in Council will not dispute the conclusion that, in strict justice, Syud Majeed is liable to his brother for the arrears, though it is certainly open to question. But as the arrangement under discussion is essentially one of compromise, it should be considered whether the demand is expedient. The Honourable the Governor in Council cannot think that it is. It must be remembered that Zanzibar has its financial difficulties as well as Muscat, and it is of obvious policy not to impose any burthens on Syud Majeed from which he cannot be reasonably expected to free himself by careful and judicious administration. It is probable that, if not overwhelmed at the outset by extraordinary charges and embarrassments, Zanzibar, by the ordinary progress of a state possessing great materials and facilities for commerce, will, at no very distant period, be able to pay the subsidy without any severe strain on its resources to regard it as a mere premium of insurance; but it cannot be doubted that the payment must for some time be regarded as a heavy burthen, and great care must be taken that the vessel is not swamped at once by overloading. To impose a large liability for arrears on Syud Majeed would imperil the stability of the whole arrangement: it would put the heaviest weight on the weakest part; for, as before stated, it is only now and for the next few years that the subsidy will prove an embarrassing burthen to Zanzibar. No pretext should be afforded to either party for breaking the agreement, and under this view the Honourable the Governor in Council would not recommend that Syud Majeed be held liable for more than two years' arrears of subsidy, or 80,000 crowns.

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a sum will be of material benefit to Syud Thoweynee, and its payment will not be an insuperable difficulty to Syud Majeed.

16. The Honourable the Governor in Council, deeming it his duty to submit his opinion on this important discussion, would recommend to the favourable consideration of the Right Honourable the Governor General the following propositions as offering the best solution of the many complications which surround the case:—

- I. That his Highness Syud Majeed be declared ruler of Zanzibar and the African dominions of his late Highness Syud Saeed.
- II. That the ruler of Zanzibar pay annually to the ruler of Muscat a subsidy of 40,000 crowns.
- III. That his Highness Syud Majeed pay to his Highness Syud Thoweynee the arrears of the subsidy for two years, or 80,000 crowns.

17. The Honourable the Governor in Council believes that this arrangement is, under all the circumstances, the most just that can be effected; that it is the best calculated to preserve the future peace of the two states; and that it is the one most consistent with the views of the late Syud Saeed, to whom Muscat and Zanzibar owe so much.

18. Brigadier Coghlan proceeds, in the 50th paragraph of his report, to consider some collateral points connected with the main subject under discussion.

19. The first of these is the propriety, or otherwise, of providing for the succession to the sovereignty of Zanzibar on the death of his Highness Syud Majeed, who at present has no male issue. The Honourable the Governor in Council considers that this is not a question which calls for any expression of opinion by the British Government. It must be left for decision to the chiefs of Zanzibar, who will, without doubt, pay very great respect to any expression of the wishes of Syud Majeed. The more popular the rule of the present Sultan, the greater influence will his wishes exercise on the succession. It is clearly a question which must be left for the future; any present attempt to regulate the succession would be inconsistent with the principle asserted in the course of this discussion, that the sovereigns are elected from the members of the royal family.

20. The second point discussed by Brigadier Coghlan is connected with the claims of the younger children of the late Syud Saeed at Zanzibar. The Honourable the Governor in Council is of opinion that as these younger children are at Zanzibar, and as the property stated to have been left to them by the late Imam is at Zanzibar, the question of their claims must be left to the justice of the ruler of Zanzibar; the children are his subjects; he has acknowledged his obligation to make good to them their inheritance, and, as may be inferred from Brigadier Coghlan's statements in the 51st paragraph, there is at least as much chance of their obtaining justice from Syud Majeed as from Syud Thoweynee. It will be sufficient, in the opinion of the Honourable the Governor in Council, if the Agent at Zanzibar be instructed to intimate to Syud Majeed that the British Government does not deem it necessary to issue any orders on the complaint of Syud Thoweynee relative to the inheritance of the younger brothers, believing that full justice will be rendered to them by the Sultan of Zanzibar.

21. Brigadier Coghlan next offers some suggestions as to the course to be pursued with respect to Syud Barghash, who has now resided for several months in Bombay. The honourable the Governor in Council regards the conduct of this young prince as open to the gravest reprehension. He considers it to be entirely without palliation, and he must also confess that he has very little confidence in the future amendment of the prince, except so far as he may be influenced by his fears. But amidst a choice of difficulties (and there seldom was a case in which, throughout all its turns, the advantages and disadvantages attached to a proposed course of action were so nearly equivalent) the Honourable the Governor in Council believes that the measure suggested by Brigadier Coghlan offers the fairest prospect of success. That officer, in effect, proposes that Syud Barghash, who has in writing made abject submission to his brother, should be permitted to return to Zanzibar and reside there under the surveillance of the British Agent, being at the same time recommended to the forgiveness and protection of Syud Majeed. The Honourable the Governor in Council sees no other course open. It would not be just to impose the maintenance of Syud Barghash upon Syud Thoweynee, but Syud Majeed may fairly be held liable to accept this turbulent prince as a charge on Zanzibar. But, as a part of the arrangement, Syud Barghash should be plainly informed that, in being permitted to return to Zanzibar, and in being recommended to the favourable consideration of the Sultan, it is to be clearly understood, if he again seeks to undermine his brother's authority, the British Government will not interfere to save him from the just reward of his misdeeds, but will leave him to his fate.

22. Brigadier Coghlan, in paragraphs 55 to 62, adverts to a question intimately connected with the main dispute between Muscat and Zanzibar; the claim of Syud Toorkee to the independent sovereignty of Sohar. The Honourable the Governor in Council fully concurs in the opinion expressed by Brigadier Coghlan, that the claim cannot be maintained. Sohar would seem to be in the position of an appanage to Muscat; a provision to a younger brother, and it would neither be just nor politic to dis sever it permanently from the superior power. His Excellency in Council would submit to the Right Honourable



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Honourable the Governor General the propriety of authorising Mr. Rassam to make the communication to Syud Thowenee and Syud Toorkee which Brigadier Coghlan suggests. The announcement of this decision will exercise a very salutary effect on the maritime tribes of Oman.

23. The Honourable the Governor in Council would draw the particular attention of the Right Honourable the Governor General and of the Government of India to the recommendation of Brigadier Coghlan, that a duly qualified British Agent be appointed to Muscat. His Excellency in Council very heartily concurs in all that Brigadier Coghlan has urged upon this subject, with the exception that he is not inclined to think that benefit will arise from the proposed arrangement of making the Agent at Muscat entirely independent of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. But he thinks that for the present the independence now existing should be maintained, and he will hereafter have the honour of submitting comprehensive proposals for the improved arrangement of our several agencies at Aden, Zanzibar, Muscat, and Bushire.

24. Brigadier Coghlan concludes his valuable report with a warm and well-merited expression of his gratitude to the Rev. Mr. Badger. The Honourable the Governor in Council would earnestly commend this accomplished scholar to the protection of the Right Honourable the Governor General. It would be very difficult to over-estimate the solid usefulness of Mr. Badger's services during his long residence in Aden. The requisition for his presence with the Persian Expeditionary Force, and for his association with the Zanzibar Commission, indicate the high opinion of his ability entertained by officers so well qualified to judge as Sir James Outram and Brigadier Coghlan. This Government has recently suggested to Her Majesty's Secretary of State the propriety of encouraging the study of the Arabic language and literature in England, by the establishment of a Professor's chair in one of our seats of learning. The Honourable the Governor in Council would solicit the support of the Right Honourable the Governor General to this recommendation, and his advocacy of the pre-eminent claims of the Rev. Mr. Badger to the distinction of being the first professor.

25. In committing this important case to the final decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General, the Honourable the Governor in Council feels it his duty to submit to his Lordship's favourable consideration the valuable services of Brigadier Coghlan. That officer is about to retire, on account of impaired health, temporarily, it may be permanently, from the important position which he has long held with such conspicuous ability at Aden. The capacity and resource which he has exhibited in many difficult conjunctures have elicited the cordial acknowledgments of the Government of India, and the Honourable the Governor in Council believes that the judgment with which he has dealt with the complications at Muscat and Zanzibar will be regarded as the appropriate close of a distinguished career. The late Lord Elphinstone recommended Brigadier Coghlan's services to the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and the recommendation was supported by the Right Honourable the Governor General. The numerous claims to reward which existed on the other side of India, it may be presumed, prevented the recognition at that time of Brigadier Coghlan's merits; but the Honourable the Governor in Council would now hope that the services of this valuable officer may be submitted to the special consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

(signed)

*G. Clerk.**W. R. Mansfield.**H. W. Reeves.**W. E. Frere.*

4 February 1861.

(No. 1532.)

*Decision of the  
Government of  
India.*

From the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

Foreign Department, Fort William,  
2 April 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 6, dated 15th February, submitting a report by Brigadier Coghlan on the differences existing between his Highness Syud Thoweynee of Muscat and his Highness Syud Majeed of Zanzibar, together with a copy of the resolution recorded thereon by the Bombay Government.

2. In reply, I am directed to state that his Excellency the Governor General in Council agrees to the three conditions of settlement recommended in the resolution of the Bombay Government, paragraph 16.

3. The limitation to 80,000 crowns of the arrears of subsidy to be paid by Zanzibar to Muscat is expedient, because it names a distinct sum. In the opinion of his Excellency in Council, the demand should be made rather in the form of a compromise than as the assertion of a strict right. It is understood, also, that the aggregate amount of the arrears claimable would not much exceed this sum.

4. The three conditions will constitute the decision of the Governor General as arbitrator;

trator; and it should be impressed upon both parties, at the time of delivering to them the Governor General's letters, that, as they have solemnly accepted the arbitration, the Government of India looks to their abiding faithfully by his Excellency's award.

5. The annual payment of 40,000 crowns is not to be understood as a recognition of any dependence of Zanzibar upon Muscat, neither is it to be considered as merely personal between Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed, but as a permanent arrangement, compensating the ruler of Muscat for the abandonment of all claims upon Zanzibar, and adjusting the inequality between the two inheritances, which are to be henceforward separate.

6. The Governor General in Council offers no opinion about the rule of succession in Zanzibar; to do so would, he considers, be travelling beyond the bounds of the question submitted for arbitration.

7. His Excellency in Council agrees with the Bombay Government as to the guardianship of the younger brothers, and requests that the necessary instructions may be issued to Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar.

8. Syud Barghash must, of course, be free to return to Zanzibar if he pleases, and the Consul should be directed to recommend him to the clemency of Syud Majeed. But there is strong objection to putting him under the Consul's surveillance. The Consul may very properly give him good advice on occasion arising, and warn him that he will receive no countenance or protection from the Consulate in the event of his behaving disloyally or turbulently; but the English Consul could not, with any propriety, or without risk of grave embarrassment, undertake to watch the doings of a suspected member of the ruler's family.

9. The opinion of Brigadier Coghlan and of the Bombay Government, negating the claim of Syud Toorkee to the independent sovereignty of Sohar, appears to be perfectly just. The communication which it is proposed to make to that chief will be very proper.

10. The proposal to appoint a duly qualified agent to Muscat is entirely approved, and I am directed to request that the Government of Bombay will lose no time in nominating a duly qualified person, if their suggestions for a new arrangement of the agencies in Arabia, Persia, and Zanzibar, are likely to be delayed.

11. The Supreme Government heartily concurs in the commendation given by the Governor in Council to Brigadier Coghlan. It is rare to see an intricate and difficult subject so completely and clearly dealt with as the one now before his Excellency in Brigadier Coghlan's report, and his Lordship in Council trusts that Her Majesty's Government will not omit to mark their appreciation of this excellent officer's valuable services, past and present.

12. The best thanks of the Governor General in Council should also be conveyed to the Rev. Mr. Badger for the important aid which he has given to Brigadier Coghlan in this matter. His Excellency believes that there is no officer of the Indian service who possesses so familiar and cultivated a knowledge of Arabic as Mr. Badger, and the services which this knowledge and his general ability enabled him to render to the army in Persia under Sir James Outram are well known to and appreciated by the Government of India.

13. The Government of India would be glad to receive any suggestions from the Government of Bombay for encouraging the study of Arabic, more especially among the military servants of Government on that side of India. It is possible that the revival of the pecuniary rewards to be bestowed on those who attain a certificate of high proficiency in the language, with the chances of staff employ, would offer sufficient inducements for the purpose.

14. Letters in English to the address of his Highness Syud Thoweynee and his Highness Syud Majeed, signed by the Governor General, and conveying his Excellency's decision, are herewith forwarded to you for transmission. Copies are also enclosed. From these copies the Governor General in Council requests that Arabic translations may be made, expressing fully and accurately the terms of the letters, each of which is to be delivered with its Arabic translation.

15. If Mr. Badger is still at Bombay, it will be satisfactory that the translations should be made by him.

16. The Governor General in Council leaves it to the Governor of Bombay in Council to determine how the letters shall be sent, observing only that there is no necessity to send again an agent or a ship specially to Zanzibar.

I have, &c.

(signed) G. C. Barnes,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Appendix, No. 8. To His Highness *Syud Thoweynee bin Saeed bin Sultan*, of Muscat.—His Highness *Syud Majeed bin Saeed*, of Zanzibar.

Beloved and esteemed Friend,

I ADDRESS your Highness on the subject of the unhappy differences which have arisen between yourself and your Highness's brother the <sup>Imam of Muscat</sup> Ruler of Zanzibar, and for the settlement of which your Highness has engaged to accept the arbitration of the Viceroy and Governor General of India.

Having regard to the friendly relations which have always subsisted between the Government of Her Majesty the Queen and the Governments of Oman and Zanzibar, and desiring to prevent war between kinsmen, I accepted the charge of arbitrator between you, and in order to obtain the fullest knowledge of all the points in dispute, I directed the Government of Bombay to send an officer to Muscat and Zanzibar to make the necessary inquiries.

Brigadier Coghlan was selected for this purpose,—an officer in whose judgment, intelligence, and impartiality the Government of India reposes the utmost confidence.

Brigadier Coghlan has submitted a full and clear report of all the questions at issue between your Highness and your brother.

I have given my most careful attention to each of these questions.

The terms of my decision are as follows:—

1st. That his Highness Syud Majeed be declared ruler of Zanzibar and the African dominions of his late Highness Syud Saeed.

2nd. That the ruler of Zanzibar pay annually to the ruler of Muscat a subsidy of 40,000 crowns.

3rd. That his Highness Syud Majeed pay to his Highness Syud Thoweynee the arrears of subsidy for two years, or 80,000 crowns.

I am satisfied that these terms are just and honourable to both of you; and as you have deliberately and solemnly accepted my arbitration, I shall expect that you will cheerfully and faithfully abide by them, and that they will be carried out without unnecessary delay.

The annual payment of 40,000 crowns is not to be understood as a recognition of the dependence of Zanzibar upon Muscat, neither is it to be considered as merely personal between your Highness and your brother Syud <sup>Thoweynee:</sup> <sub>Majeed</sub> it is to extend to your respective successors, and is to be held to be a final and permanent arrangement, compensating the ruler of Muscat for the abandonment of all claims upon Zanzibar, and adjusting the inequality between the two inheritances derived from your father, his late Highness Syud Saeed, the venerated friend of the British Government, which two inheritances are to be henceforward distinct and separate.

I am, &c.  
(signed) *Canning.*

(True copy.)

Fort William, 2 April 1861.

(signed) *C. U. Aitchison,*  
Under Secretary to the Government of India.

MEMORANDUM by the Acting Secretary to Government, dated the 15th April 1861, approved by the Honourable Board.

THE Acting Secretary in circulating the accompanying letter and its enclosure, communicating the terms of the Right Honourable the Governor General's arbitrement on the questions in dispute between the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar, begs to propose for consideration the following instructions and arrangements.

2. In accordance with paragraph 15 of the letter from the Supreme Government, Mr. Badger should be requested to prepare correct Arabic translations of the Governor General's arbitration for their Highnesses Syuds Majeed and Thoweynee respectively.

3. A copy of the letter from the Supreme Government, and of its enclosure may be furnished to the Reverend Mr. Badger for this purpose.

4. It appears to the Acting Secretary that it would be a judicious arrangement if the Reverend Mr. Badger proceeded to Muscat with the arbitration for delivery to his Highness Syud Thoweynee, instructions being furnished to that gentleman for his guidance in making known the terms of the arbitrement to his Highness.

5. A letter

5. A letter should also be prepared for the signature of his Excellency the Governor to Syud Toorkee's address, communicating to him the views of the Government of India in his case. A copy of this letter should be sent to his Highness Syud Thoweynee, and Mr. Badger might be instructed to use his discretion, on arriving at Muscat, as to the propriety of delivering the letter in person to Syud Toorkee.

6. With the view of giving effect to the above suggestions, the Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy should be requested to provide a steamer for the conveyance of the Reverend Mr. Badger to Muscat on the proposed duty, as early as practicable.

7. The Acting Secretary would further suggest that a copy of the letter from the Supreme Government, and of its enclosure be furnished to Lieutenant Colonel Rigby, with instructions for giving effect to the terms of the arbitration as regards the ruler of Zanzibar.

8. His Highness Syud Barghash should, at the same time, be officially informed of the views of the Supreme Government in his case, and of the conditions on which it has been decided to recommend him to the clemency of his Highness Syud Majeed, in the event of his return to Zanzibar. As a precaution, however, against his immediate return proving an impediment to the ready acceptance of the Governor General's arbitration by his Highness Syud Majeed, it is not desirable that Syud Barghash should proceed to Zanzibar for the present.

9. A copy of the letter addressed to Syud Barghash should be furnished for the information of Lieutenant Colonel Rigby.

10. As Mr. Rassam's services are urgently required at Aden, the Reverend Mr. Badger may be authorised to relieve him from his present acting appointment, making the best arrangement available on the spot for the conduct of the Muscat Agency, as a temporary measure, until Government shall be able to make a permanent provision for the agency at that place.

11. A copy of the letter from the Supreme Government, and of the Governor General's arbitration should be forwarded for the information of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. The Reverend Mr. Badger may be instructed to inform the Resident what arrangement he shall have effected for the conduct of the Muscat Agency on relieving Mr. Rassam from that duty.

12. In consequence of the Governor General's arbitration, their Highnesses Syuds Thoweynee and Majeed shall henceforth be officially designated Sultan of Muscat, and Sultan of Zanzibar respectively.

13. The question relative to the encouragement of the study of Arabic, on which suggestions are invited in paragraph 13 of the letter from the Government of India, will be hereafter submitted for the consideration of the Honourable Board.

14. Since writing the above, the Acting Secretary has learned that Mr. Pengelley, Naval Assistant to the Auditor General, who has some knowledge of Arabic, might be induced to take up the appointment of Agent at Muscat. The Government of India say that no time should be lost in nominating a duly qualified person to Muscat, and as the presence of such an officer at that place is of importance at the present moment, the Honourable Board may, perhaps, deem it expedient to offer the appointment to Mr. Pengelley.

(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary

Approved.  
(signed)

*G. Clerk.*  
*W. R. Mansfield.*  
*W. H. Reeves.*

Appendix, No. 8.

(No. 112 A of 1861.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Reverend *G. P. Badger*, in charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

Sir,

Secret Department, 27 April 1861.

WITH reference to Brigadier Coghlan's report, No 17, of the 4th December last, and to the Resolution of Government thereon, a copy of which has been furnished to you, I am directed to forward herewith copy of a letter from the Government of India, with enclosure, communicating the terms of the Right Honourable the Governor General's arbitrement on the questions in dispute between his Highness Syud Thoweynee, ruler of Muscat, and his Highness Syud Majeed, ruler of Zanzibar.

2. In forwarding these documents to you, I am desired to state that it appears to his Excellency the Governor in Council it would be a judicious arrangement if you were to proceed to Muscat with the arbitration for delivery to his Highness Syud Thoweynee.

3. With this view, I am instructed to enclose an English letter from his Excellency the Governor to his Highness Syud Thoweynee's address, giving cover to the original letter from the Governor General, containing his Lordship's decision with reference to his Highness's claims. Arabic versions of these letters, prepared by yourself, accompany.

4. The tenor of his Excellency the Governor's letter will guide you generally in the course of the proceedings to be adopted by you on your arrival at Muscat; but the Government trust to your own experience and judgment for giving due effect to the terms of the arbitration.

5. I am also desired to transmit to you an English letter, with Arabic version, from his Excellency the Governor to Syud Toorkee's address, communicating to him the views of the Government of India in his case. You will, on your arrival at Muscat, be in a position to determine the propriety, or otherwise, of delivering these documents in person to Syud Toorkee. A transcript of the Arabic version of his Excellency's letter is enclosed for the information of his Highness Syud Thoweynee.

6. In accordance with the intimation made in the 15th paragraph of the letter from the Supreme Government, arrangements have been made for the appointment of a qualified officer as British Agent at Muscat. Lieutenant Pengelley of the Indian Navy has been offered and has accepted the appointment.

7. The services of Her Majesty's steamer "Zenobia," which vessel is under orders to proceed to Aden, will be made available for conveying you to Muscat. Lieutenant Pengelley will proceed by the same opportunity.

8. In consequence of the Governor General's arbitration, their Highnesses Syuds Thoweynee and Majeed shall henceforth be designated Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar.

9. Orders will be issued to the sub-treasurer for the disbursement to you of such a sum of money as you may deem necessary for the contingent expenses connected with your mission.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes*,  
Acting Secretary to Government.

From His Excellency Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay, to His Highness *Syud Thoweynee bin Saeed bin Sultan*, Sultan of Muscat.

Beloved and esteemed Friend,

A. C.—You will receive by this opportunity the decision of his Excellency the Governor General of India in the unhappy differences which have arisen between yourself and your Highness's brother Syud Majeed. The claims of each have been carefully weighed, and I trust that you will be convinced that the settlement awarded is fair and equitable, and equally honourable to both parties. I have no doubt that your Highness, agreeably with your solemn promise, will faithfully abide by the award, now communicated to you, and I earnestly hope that this adjustment of existing differences may lead to a perfect reconciliation between yourself and your brother Syud Majeed. The future welfare of Oman and Zanzibar will depend on your mutual accord, and if you are united in brotherly affection and wise counsels, the two states will continue to prosper to your own benefit; to the benefit of your respective subjects; and to the honour of your late father's renowned memory. This is my sincere wish on your behalf, and in your efforts to attain such beneficial results you may confidently rely on the good offices of the British Government.

His Excellency the Governor General concurs with me in recognising your Highness's right to the sovereignty of Sohar as forming part of the kingdom of Oman. This decision

I have

I have made known to your brother Syud Toorkee, and have further enjoined him to act accordingly. I sincerely trust that he will listen to these friendly counsels, and that your Highness will treat him in a manner which may tend to secure his loyalty and fraternal affection towards you. Above all things, I hope that your prudence will suffice to prevent any interruption of the peace now prevailing in Oman. I enclose a copy of my communication to Syud Toorkee for your Highness's information.

This letter will be delivered to you by the Reverend Mr. Badger, whom I have commissioned to confer with you personally on these matters. He will confirm to you the sincere wishes of the British Government for the increased prosperity of your kingdom, and what are my own feelings of good-will towards you. I anticipate from him a favourable report of your welfare, and conclude by expressing the hope that your Highness's rule over Oman and its Arabian dependencies may be long, happy, and glorious.

Bombay, 27 April 1861.

(signed) *G. Clerk.*

From His Excellency Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay, to His Highness *Syud Majeed bin Saeed bin Sultan*, Sultan of Zanzibar.

Beloved and esteemed Friend,

A. C.—You will receive by this opportunity the decision of his Excellency the Governor General of India in the unhappy differences which have arisen between yourself and your Highness's brother Syud Thoweynee of Muscat. The claims of each have been carefully weighed, and I trust you will be convinced that the settlement awarded is fair and equitable, and alike honourable to both parties. I have no doubt that your Highness, agreeably with your solemn promise, will abide faithfully by the award now communicated to you, and I earnestly hope that this adjustment of existing differences may lead to a perfect reconciliation between yourself and your brother Syud Thoweynee. The future welfare of Zanzibar and Oman will depend on your mutual accord, and if you are united in brotherly affection and wise counsels, the two states will continue to prosper to your own benefit; to the benefit of your respective subjects; and to the honour of your late father's renowned memory. This is my sincere wish on your behalf, and in your efforts to attain such beneficial results you may confidently rely on the good offices of the British Government.

Syud Barghash having expressed to your Highness and to this Government his deep sorrow for his past rebellious conduct, and solemnly promised to act loyally towards you in future, it has been resolved, with the concurrence of his Excellency the Governor General, that he should be recommended to your Highness's clemency on his return to Zanzibar. He has been distinctly warned, however, that should he hereafter conduct himself turbulently towards your Highness's authority, he will receive no countenance or support from the British Government or its representatives.

This letter will be delivered to you by Colonel Rigby, Her Majesty's consul, who has been commissioned to confer with you personally on these matters. He will confirm to you the sincere wishes of the British Government for the increased prosperity of your kingdom, and what are my own feelings of good-will towards you. I anticipate from him a favourable report of your welfare, and conclude by expressing the hope that your Highness's rule over Zanzibar and its African dependencies may be long, happy, and glorious.

(signed) *G. Clerk.*

Bombay, 27 April 1861.

From His Excellency Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay, to His Highness *Syud Toorkee bin Saeed bin Sultan*, at Sohar.

A. C.—THIS is to inform your Highness that his Excellency the Governor General of India, to whom their Highnesses Syud Thoweynee and Syud Majeed referred the adjustment of the unhappy differences which had arisen between them, has pronounced his final arbitration. By that award, his Highness Syud Thoweynee is confirmed as sovereign over Oman and its Arabian territories, and he will be accordingly recognised as such by the British Government. Your claims to the independent rule over Sohar have also been carefully considered, and his Excellency the Governor General concurs with me in the decision that Sohar, forming as it does an integral part of the sovereignty of Oman, is subordinate to the ruler of that principality. I enjoin you, therefore, in the spirit of friendship, to submit to the supreme authority of his Highness Syud Thoweynee, and to co-operate with him in securing the peace and prosperity of that portion of your late father's territories. Your acquiescence in this advice will dispose your brother Syud Thoweynee to act generously towards you, and I shall be glad to learn that a perfect reconciliation has been effected between you. On the other hand, you are hereby cautioned that any attempt on your part to foment disturbances in Oman, will be regarded with severe displeasure by the British Government. On your wisdom in following these friendly counsels will depend your Highness's future prosperity, and my sincere hope is that such prosperity may never fail you.

(signed) *G. Clerk.*

Bombay, 27 April 1861.

Appendix, No. 8. From His Excellency Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay, to His Highness *Syud Barghash bin Saeed bin Sultan*, at Bombay.

A. C.—I WRITE to inform your Highness that after a careful review of your case, and in consideration of your solemn promise never again to disturb the peace at Zanzibar, I have resolved, with the concurrence of the Government of India, to recommend you to the clemency and kind consideration of his Highness Syud Majeed, the recognised Sultan of Zanzibar. This intervention on your behalf is exercised in the sincere hope that you will hereafter behave yourself loyally towards his Highness Syud Majeed as your brother and sovereign. Should you at any future time disappoint this expectation by stirring up strife at Zanzibar, or by opposing your brother's lawful authority, you are hereby warned not to look for any protection from the British Government or its representatives.

In order that the efforts which are being made in your behalf may not fail with his Highness Syud Majeed, it will be prudent that you should not proceed to Zanzibar for the present. I entertain the sincere hope that your reconciliation with his Highness Syud Majeed may be speedily effected, and that, when once made, it will be lasting, conducive alike to the peace and welfare of the family of your lamented father Syud Saeed, and to the present and future prosperity of the Zanzibar sovereignty. This is my sincere desire, and the sincere desire of the British Government. Salaam.

(signed) *G. Clerk.*

27 April 1861.

(No. 116 A of 1861.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to Captain *F. Jones*, Indian Navy, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Sir,

Secret Department, 30 April 1861.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of the letter from this Department, No. 70, of the 1st March 1860, I am directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council to transmit, for your information, the enclosed copy of a letter to the Rev. G. P. Badger's address, with transcript of its several accompaniments, noted in the margin, containing the decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General on the questions at issue between the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar on the one hand, and Muscat and Sohar on the other.

No. 112A, dated the 27th April 1861, to the Rev. G. P. Badger.

No. 1532, of the 2nd idem, from the Supreme Government, with Enclosure.

Letters from His Excellency the Governor to their Highnesses Syuds Thoweynee and Majeed.

Letter from His Excellency the Governor to His Highness Syud Toorkee of Sohar.

2. In accordance with the intimation made in paragraph 15 of the letter from the Supreme Government (forming Enclosure No. 1 to the letter to Mr. Badger's address), his Excellency the Governor in Council has been pleased to appoint Lieutenant Pengelley, of the Indian Navy, to be British Agent at Muscat, and to vest him with independent authority as the representative of the British Government at that place and its dependencies.

3. In consequence of this result of the Right Honourable the Governor General's arbitration, their Highnesses Syuds Thoweynee and Majeed will henceforth be designated Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar respectively.

I have, &c.

(signed) *A. K. Forbes*,  
Acting Secretary to Government.

(No. 117 of 1861.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to Lieutenant Colonel *C. P. Rigby*, Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent at Zanzibar.

Sir,

Secret Department, 30 April 1861.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department, No. 235, of the 25th August 1860, I am directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council to forward to you the accompanying transcript of a Resolution, recorded by this Government on the report submitted by Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, relative to the matters in dispute between the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar on the one hand, and Muscat and Sohar on the other.

2. I am, at the same time, desired to enclose a copy of a letter from the Supreme Government, communicating the decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India on the questions at issue between the respective rulers.

3. I am also desired to forward to you, for delivery to his Highness Syud Majeed, an English letter, with Arabic version, from the Right Honourable the Governor General, communicating the terms of his Lordship's arbitrement. A letter from his Excellency the Governor to his Highness Syud Majeed's address accompanies.

4. His

4. His Excellency in Council trusts to your discretion and judgment for giving due effect to the terms of the arbitrement as affecting his Highness Syud Majeed.

5. It has been deemed advisable, in the absence of Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, to depute the Rev. G. P. Badger to Muscat for the purpose of delivering the Governor General's arbitration to his Highness Syud Thoweynee and for other purposes. The services of Her Majesty's Indian Navy steamer "Zenobia," which vessel is under orders to proceed to Aden, will be made available for the conveyance of Mr. Badger to Muscat. After his arrival at that place, the Rev. Mr. Badger will use his own discretion as to the propriety of proceeding in person to Sohar, for the purpose of making known to Syud Toorkee the decision of the Government of India in his case. A letter addressed by his Excellency the Governor to the Chief of Sohar is enclosed for your information.

6. In accordance with the intimation made in the 15th paragraph of the letter from the Supreme Government, his Excellency the Governor in Council has been pleased to appoint Lieutenant Pengelley, of the Indian Navy, to be British Agent at Muscat, and to vest him with authority, independent of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, as the representative of the British Government at Muscat and its dependencies.

7. In consequence of this result of the Governor General's arbitration, their Highnesses Syuds Thoweynee and Majeed will henceforth be designed Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar respectively.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. K. Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary to Government.

(No. 1620 of 1861.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes, Esq.,* Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to  
Lieutenant *W. M. Pengelley,* Indian Navy.

Sir,

I AM directed to inform you that the Honourable the Governor in Council has been pleased to appoint you British Agent at Muscat on a salary of 600 rupees per mensem, with an allowance of 100 rupees for a writer and boat-hire.

2. Instructions will be furnished to you in a few days for your guidance in the conduct of your duties at Muscat.

3. You are requested to prepare yourself to proceed to your destination by Her Majesty's steamer "Zenobia," which vessel will call intermediately at Muscat on her way to Aden.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle, 24 April 1861.

(No. 1665 of 1861.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes, Esq.,* Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to  
Lieutenant *W. M. Pengelley,* Indian Navy, British Agent at Muscat.

Sir,

1 May 1861.

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of my letter No. 1620, dated the 24th ultimo, I am directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council to communicate to you the following observations and instructions.

2. In consequence of the disunion of Muscat and Zanzibar after the death of the late Imam Syud Saeed, and the general inefficiency of the late Native Agent during the events which followed, this Government found it necessary, in the early part of 1859, to vest the Resident in the Persian Gulf with the control of our political relations with Muscat.

3. Subsequently, in March 1860, on the appointment of the Commission presided over by Brigadier Coghlan, for the investigation of the questions in dispute between the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar on the one hand, and Muscat and Sohar on the other, Mr. H. Rassam was deputed to Muscat as Acting British Agent, principally with the view of facilitating the important duties entrusted to the Commission.

4. The rival parties having agreed to abide by the arbitrement of the Right Honourable the Governor General, after due inquiry regarding their respective claims had been made, and the Government of India having now communicated the terms of the Governor General's decision, his Excellency the Governor in Council has been pleased to entrust the Rev. Mr. Badger with the delivery to his Highness Syud Thoweynee of the arbitration as affecting his Highness's claims. On the completion of this duty Mr. Badger will determine the propriety of proceeding to Sohar for the purpose of making known to his



Appendix, No. 8. Highness Syud Toorkce the decision of the Government of India with reference to the case of that chief.

5. The Supreme Government having at the same time accorded its sanction to the appointment of a duly qualified officer as the representative of the British Government at Muscat, and this appointment having been conferred on you, you will, as already directed, proceed to Muscat in the suite of the Rev. Mr. Badger, who has been furnished with a letter from his Excellency the Governor, accrediting you to his Highness Syud Thoweynee. On your installation at Muscat, Mr. Badger will communicate to you such instruction and advice as he may deem necessary for ensuring due efficacy to the proceedings which he may adopt in carrying out the objects of his mission.

6. His Excellency the Governor in Council desires that, on your arrival at Muscat, you will confer with Mr. H. Rassam on all points concerning our political relations with his Highness Syud Thoweynee, and with other chiefs of rank, whether dependent on or independent of Muscat. His Excellency in Council feels sure that you will always bear in mind the bond of friendship which has for so long a period existed between the Chiefs of Muscat and the British Government; that you will employ your utmost influence in cultivating between Muscat, Zanzibar, and Sohar those amicable feelings towards the establishment of which so much pains are being taken by the Government of Bombay and the Government of India; that you will keep the Resident at Bushire fully informed on every subject which it may in any way concern the British representative there to be cognizant of; that you will constantly contemplate the prospect of our requiring the cordial and active co-operation of the authorities at Muscat in establishing and protecting (entirely at our cost) a line of electric telegraph thence along the coast of Mekran, obtaining with this view exact information regarding the degree of subjection in which the inhabitants of that coast from the Persian Gulf to Sonmeanee are held by Muscat, or Khelat, or by any other authority; and that you will be courteous and circumspect in your intercourse with French, American, or other European officers of rank visiting the port of Muscat.

7. You will not fail to bear in mind that the suppression of the slave trade is an object which the British Government has very much at heart, and his Excellency the Governor in Council relies on your good temper and tact for enlisting his Highness the Imam of Muscat in aid of it.

8. In the discharge of your ordinary duties, you will be careful, as a general rule, to avoid all needless interference with the claims of traders and others against Arab chiefs and tribes within the limits of your control, and to extend the protection of the British flag to none save British subjects, when such protection is absolutely necessary.

9. Finally, I am desired to request that you will keep a diary of all your proceedings and of such events as you may deem noteworthy, transmitting a copy of it with your reports, whenever opportunities offer, to the Political Department of this Government, to which you must consider yourself directly subordinate.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary to Government.

Bombay Castle, 1 May 1861.

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From Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay, to His Highness *Syud Thoweynee bin Saeed bin Sultan*, Sultan of Muscat.

A. C.—THESE friendly lines are to inform your Highness that we have appointed Lieutenant Walter Murray Pongelley, of the Indian Navy, to be British Agent with your Highness at Muscat, in succession to Mr. Hormuzd Rassam. Confiding in his ability and discretion, we recommend him to your Highness's recognition and favour. He will be the ordinary channel of communication between the two Governments, and we doubt not that your Highness, as heretofore, will co-operate heartily with Lieutenant Pongelley in all matters connected with the interests of the British Government and its subjects within your territories. We regret much, on your account and our own, that it is necessary for Mr. Rassam to return to Aden; but we confidently hope that Lieutenant Pongelley will prove equally acceptable to you, and that he will continue to maintain the same friendly relations with your Highness which have characterised Mr. Rassam's agency at Muscat, and which have gained for him the high approbation of this Government; and so we bid you farewell.

(signed) *G. Clerk.*

Bombay, 29 April 1861.

(Secret Department.—No. 6 of 1861.)

Appendix, No. 8.

From Reverend *George Percy Badger*, in charge Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, to  
*A. K. Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay.

Muscat-Zanzibar Commission, Aden,  
1 June 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council, that I reached Muscat from Bombay on the 11th ultimo.

2. His Highness Syud Thoweynee being absent at one of his country seats at the time, his Vizier immediately proceeded thither to inform him of my arrival. On the return of his Highness to Muscat early the following morning, I paid him a complimentary visit, accompanied by Commander Cruttenden and several officers of Her Majesty's steamer "Zenobia," when I formally introduced Lieutenant Pengeley to his Highness as the newly-appointed British Agent at Muscat.

3. Mr. Rassam had previously delivered to Syud Thoweynee the official letters of which I was the bearer, and I was gratified to perceive from his general demeanour on the occasion that he appeared highly pleased with their contents. At the termination of our visit, his Highness intimated to me that he had ordered all his vessels in the harbour to dress ships in honour of the occasion; and a salute of 101 guns was fired to celebrate the auspicious termination of the long-pending dispute between himself and his brother Syud Majeed.

4. At several subsequent interviews, his Highness frequently reiterated how deeply he felt indebted to the generosity of the British Government for all the trouble and expense which the settlement of this question had involved, and how highly he appreciated the impartiality of the final arbitrement. In reply to his inquiry how and when the awarded arrears of 80,000 crowns, and the yearly subsidy of 40,000 crowns, would be paid, I advised his Highness to come to a friendly understanding with his Highness Syud Majeed on the subject, and to appoint an Agent at Zanzibar to receive the money; urging him at the same time, in consideration of the embarrassed state of his brother's finances, to exercise the greatest forbearance toward him in exacting payment. His Highness then asked whether the British Agent at Zanzibar was empowered to insist upon the terms of the arbitration being fulfilled by Syud Majeed. To this, I replied that the Supreme Government of India had directed the officers who should be charged with communicating the decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General to his Highness and to his Highness's brother, to impress upon them both that they were expected to abide faithfully by his Excellency's award; and that, although the Government was not bound to enforce the conditions of the arbitration by either party, I nevertheless entertained no doubt that the influence of the British Agent at Zanzibar would be used, in a friendly manner, to see that the award was duly carried out. Subject to this qualification, I saw no objection to his Highness' proposition, that the person whom he might authorise to receive the money from Syud Majeed should be recommended to Colonel Rigby's good offices, through the British Agent at Muscat, and I accordingly requested Lieutenant Pengeley to communicate with Colonel Rigby in that sense as soon as his Highness should inform him that he had appointed a deputy to treat with Syud Majeed on the subject at Zanzibar.

5. Syud Thoweynee further inquired of me whether any arrangement had been made by the Government of India for the future succession to the Zanzibar sovereignty. Being aware of the general impression prevailing in these parts that Syud Majeed will not live long, and that it is by no means improbable that the chiefs and people of Zanzibar (many of whom are becoming notoriously disaffected towards him) might, in case of his death, elect Syud Thoweynee as his successor; and suspecting, moreover, that Syud Thoweynee himself was not without some hope of the kind, I deemed it desirable to caution his Highness against fostering anticipations which might never be realised, and the entertainment of which might eventually expose him to the suspicion of attempting to infringe on the authority of the Zanzibar sovereignty. At the same time, however, I did not hesitate to inform his Highness that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council had purposely abstained from offering any opinion on the rule of the succession in Zanzibar, his Excellency having judged that to do so he must have travelled beyond the bounds of the question submitted to his arbitration. His Highness then put the case directly, whether, in the event of Syud Majeed's death, and the people of Zanzibar electing him in his stead, the British Government would oppose his succession? Not feeling authorised to give a decisive answer to this query, I replied in general terms (premising that I expressed my personal opinion merely) that I did not believe the British Government would interfere in such a case against the unanimous wishes of the people; at the same time I did not fail to impress upon his Highness that he would best secure the favourable sympathy of the British Government, now and hereafter, by restricting his aspirations

Appendix, No. 8. aspirations to promoting the prosperity of his own subjects and kingdom, leaving the future in the hands of Providence. The caution was well received, and his Highness expressed himself pleased with my explanation.

6. I had several interviews with his Highness respecting Sohar, and the decision of the Government on the claims of Syud Toorkee was highly satisfactory to him. By all accounts that prince has entirely alienated the affections of the population from him, and a deputation of the principal inhabitants had lately come to Syud Thoweynee entreating him to relieve them from his intolerable oppression. It is notorious that he has become a confirmed drinker, and common report charges him with the most wanton conduct towards the wives and daughters of the townspeople. To arrest, if possible, the progress of his tyranny, Mr. Rassam had intended visiting Syud Toorkee in person, and his Highness did not then object, although he entertained very slender hope that his brother would reform and listen to reason. On the same ground, he recommended me not to proceed to Sohar, urging, as an additional motive against it, that Syud Toorkee would not hesitate to represent my visit as one of sympathy on the part of a special agent of the British Government, and might succeed thereby in confirming his few adherents in their contumacy. Judging that these arguments were not devoid of force, I relinquished the idea of proceeding to Sohar, and dispatched the letter of his Excellency the Governor to Syud Toorkee with an accompaniment from myself, a translation of which is attached to this report. I have further requested Lieutenant Pengelley, on the arrival of the replies, to forward them to Government by the first opportunity.

7. It is possible that on learning the decision of Government, as conveyed to him through Sir George Clerk's letter, Syud Toorkee may submit himself at once to Syud Thoweynee, in which case his Highness has promised to treat him kindly, and to provide for him elsewhere than at Sohar; but should he persist in defying his authority, his Highness will probably proceed to coerce him. He did not distinctly avow such to be his intention, but it will be his only resource; and as his suzerainty over Syud Toorkee has now been fully recognised by Government, I did not feel warranted either in demanding from him what his intentions were with regard to Sohar, or in dissuading him from what I presume is his meditated purpose. Fortunately, the inhabitants of that place are quite estranged from Syud Toorkee, and he has but few adherents either there or elsewhere. On the other hand, most of the Arab tribes in the neighbouring districts, the Wahabees included, are on the most friendly terms with Syud Thoweynee; so that, in the event of hostilities between the two brothers, the conflict will probably be of short duration, and will not be likely to spread beyond the fortress of Sohar.

8. His Highness was much gratified to find that a responsible British officer had been nominated to the agency at Muscat. The arrival of Lieutenant Pengelley, indeed, seemed to relieve him of the apprehension that in losing Mr. Rassam, whose services were highly appreciated by him, his dignity would again be lowered by the appointment of a native Agent to represent our Government at his capital. Another cause of satisfaction to his Highness was that, by this arrangement, he trusts to be relieved in future from what he considers the unwarrantable interference of the Resident at Bushire, and of his native Agents in the Persian Gulf, with his sovereign prerogatives. The post is becoming one of increased importance both in a commercial and political point of view, and I trust that Lieutenant Pengelley will conduct the duties of the agency to the satisfaction of Government. There is a resident Indian population, amounting to many thousand British subjects, within his Highness' territories, who are mostly engaged in trade, and last year upwards of 150 vessels, either under British colours or British protection, entered the port of Muscat alone. I find, moreover, that owing to the constant communication kept up between Muscat, Bunder Abbas, and the coast of Mekran, and to the intimate commercial and social relations existing between those places (there are several hundred Beloochees in the service of his Highness, among whom are some very respectable men), Muscat is most eligibly situated for collecting information respecting the progress of events eastward of the Persian frontier.

9. I transmit herewith the replies of his Highness Syud Thoweynee to the letters addressed to him by the Right Honourable the Governor General and his Excellency the Governor of Bombay. Having been authorised to open his Highness' replies for the purpose of translating them, I attach the English versions in the accompanying Appendices, marked severally 2, 3, and 4.

10. Syud Thoweynee was much gratified with the presents sent to him by the Government, and I feel assured that he will not be backward in reciprocating the courtesy.

11. My inquiries at Muscat and my conferences with his Highness detained me there until the 18th ultimo, on which day the "Zenobia" left for Aden; but owing to strong winds from the south-west she was unable to make a straight course, and did not reach Aden until the evening of the 29th. By next mail steamer to Bombay I shall hope to forward to Government the result of my inquiries at Muscat on the suggested line of electric telegraph along the coast of Mekran, and shall avail myself of the same opportunity to submit to the Honourable the Governor in Council several considerations of importance regarding our past and present policy in the Persian Gulf, and the progress of the Persians in Mekran and Beloochistan, considerations intimately connected with  
the

the independence and future welfare of the Muscat sovereignty, and indirectly involving consequences of serious concernment to our Indian empire, more especially to our frontier westward of the Indus.

Appendix, No. 8.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *George Percy Badger*,  
In charge of Muscat-Zanzibar Commission.

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APPENDIX, No. 1.

From Reverend *George Percy Badger*, Commissioner from the British Government, to His Highness *Syud Toorkee bin Saeed bin Sultan*, at Sohar.

A. C.—WITH these lines your Highness will receive a letter addressed to you by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, which I have been directed to forward to you. It conveys to your Highness the decision of the exalted British Government with regard to your claims, and I sincerely hope that you will act in accordance with the friendly advice which is tendered to you. His Highness Syud Thoweynee is now recognised by the British Government as your sovereign, and it is therefore your duty as well as your interest to obey him as such. Nothing but evil can arise from your persistence in claims which are unfounded; whereas by a timely submission you may secure the goodwill of his Highness Syud Thoweynee. The British Government will be pleased to hear that you have followed this counsel, and I sincerely hope that your reply to the letter addressed to you by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay will be satisfactory on the point. Salaam.

(signed) *George Percy Badger*,  
Commissioner from the British Government.

From Muscat, 13 May 1861 (2 Dhil Kaada 1277).

(True translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger*.

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APPENDIX, No. 2.

In the Name of the Great God!

To His exalted Excellency Lord *Canning*, Governor General of India, &c., &c., &c.

A. C.—AT a most propitious and favourable time we were honoured with the receipt of your esteemed letter, and were highly gratified with its contents. What your Excellency has stated is most satisfactory to us, more especially as regards your award betwixt us and our brother Majeed. We heartily accept the same, and are at a loss how to express our regret for having occasioned you so much trouble, and our appreciation of the kindness which has been manifested towards us in this matter. We thank God for your efforts on our behalf; praying also that your goodwill may be rewarded, and that you may never cease to be our support. We further pray that our sincere affection may always be towards the great (British) Government, and that it may increase continually. Moreover, that your exalted affection and noble solicitude may always be exercised towards us, and that we may never be deprived thereof. As regards our brother Majeed, we pray God that during our lifetime he may never experience anything from us but kindness and hearty goodwill. Furthermore, we rely implicitly on your arbitration between us (being carried out).

What your exalted Excellency may require in any way from your attached friend, a hint alone will suffice for its accomplishment, and we shall feel honoured in executing it. We pray, finally, that you may be preserved to the highest honours, and in the most perfect health. We send you the salutation of peace as the best conclusion.

From your truly sincere friend the servant of God, who confides in Him as the Giver of all good.

(signed) *Thoweynee bin Saeed bin Sultan*.

4th of El-Kaada 1277 (15th May 1861).

(L.S.)

(True translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger*.

## Appendix, No. 8.

## APPENDIX, No. 3.

In the Name of God, the Name above every name!

To His Excellency Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay.

A. C.—WHILST your attached friend was anxiously waiting for welcome news from you, in the most propitious of moments, namely, on the last day of Shawal, your esteemed letter reached us with most gratifying tidings, brought by the steamer "Zenobia," and delivered to us by your Commissioner, the noble and accomplished Mr. George Badger. We were highly delighted at his arrival, and with the informations which he has communicated to us on matters in general, but more-especially as regards the arbitration of the eminent Governor General of India betwixt us and our brother Majeed. We readily accept the same, and are quite satisfied therewith, seeing that the award is impartial. We only regret our inability to compensate you for all the trouble which we have lately occasioned you.

What your Excellency has stated with regard to Toorkee, and on the matter of Sohar is precisely what we had hoped from you. But because we judged that Mr. George Badger's going to Sohar in person might occasion us embarrassment in the affairs of Oman, we begged him to abstain from going, and to send (to Syud Toorkee) the letter of the Government which had been entrusted to him. Mr. Badger yielded to this our request, and dispatched the letter accordingly. When the reply arrives it shall be delivered to Mr. Pengelley, the Agent of the exalted (British) Government at this place. Mr. George Badger has also conferred with us regarding the electric telegraph. All the countries under our jurisdiction are at the disposal of the great (British) Government, and we shall be delighted if they should require any service from us in that behalf, and I shall feel honoured by carrying out their wishes. We pray God that the electric telegraph may be set up throughout our dominions in perfect security.

We have further informed Mr. George Badger of several matters touching our interests and the interests of the great (British) Government in the Persian Gulf, and he will communicate the same to your exalted Excellency, in whose auspices we have full confidence. On account of the importance of these subjects, we have confided them, as above stated, to Mr. George Badger.

Whatever service you may require from us, a hint thereof will suffice for its accomplishment. Finally, we wish you perfect peace and prosperity.

From your truly sincere friend the servant of God, who confides in Him as the Giver of all good.

(signed) *Thoweynee bin Saeed bin Sultan.*

4th of El-Kaada 1277 (15th May 1861).

(L.S.)

(True translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

## APPENDIX, No. 4.

He is the great God!

To His Excellency Sir *George Clerk*, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay.

A. C.—THE object of these affectionate lines is to acknowledge the receipt of your most esteemed letter containing the expression of your favourable sentiments towards us. We have understood perfectly the contents of the same, especially what your Excellency has written respecting Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, and the necessity of his proceeding to Aden. We are grieved at the prospect of this separation more than we are able to describe; for since his residence with us, we have experienced from him nothing but the most kindly interest, and his solicitous endeavours have always been exerted on our behalf. Hence our heart is sad, and we are greatly depressed; nevertheless, your orders are supreme, and must be obeyed. With regard to Mr. Pengelley, whom you have accredited to us as the agent of the great (British) Government, he has been introduced to us, and we pray God that he may never experience anything from your loving friend but kindness and hearty co-operation in all matters. We beg that your Excellency will not cease to keep us informed of your welfare, in which we have a lively interest. And should you require anything at our hands, a hint alone will suffice, by the help of God, for its execution. Accept from

from us the assurance of our highest esteem, and the salutation of peace as the best conclusion. Appendix, No. 8.

From your truly attached friend, the servant of God, who confides in him as the Giver of all good.

(signed) *Thoweynee bin Saeed bin Sultan.*  
(L.S.)

4 El-Kaada 1277 (15 May 1861).

(True translation.)

(signed) *George Percy Badger.*

(No. 580 of 1861.)

SUBSTANCE of a LETTER from His Highness *Syud Barghash bin Saeed* to His Excellency the Governor; dated the 26th Zilkad (Hijree), 1277 [6th June], and received and ordered to be Translated on the 6th June 1861.

Persian Department, 7 June 1861.

A. C.—I HAVE received your Excellency's kind letter of the 12th Zilkad [23rd May], and noted the contents thereof, which have been a source of much gratification to me. I have bound myself to your Excellency not to repeat the acts which have been committed. Your Excellency's order is binding on me, and if it pleases God, no acts contrary to it will ever again be committed by me in any respect. May your Excellency prosper!

(signed) *Venayek Wassoodeo,*  
Oriental Translator to Government.

(No. 48 of 1861.)

(Office No. 170.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Fort William.

Sir,

Secret Department, 19 June 1861.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of the Officiating Secretary's letter, No. 1532, of 2nd April last, with accompaniments, and to report, for the information of the Government of India, the measures which have been adopted by this Government for carrying out the decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General, in regard to the questions at issue between their Highnesses *Syud Thoweynee*, of Muscat, and *Syud Majeed*, of Zanzibar.

2. The Rev. Mr. Badger, having been commissioned to deliver to his Highness *Syud Thoweynee* the Viceroy's letter, and a suitable present from this Government, sailed for that purpose for Muscat in Her Majesty's steamer "Zenobia," then under orders for Aden. Mr. Badger was accompanied by Lieutenant Pengelley, of the India Navy, who has been selected for the office of British Agent at Muscat, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in paragraph 10 of the letter under acknowledgment.

3. The proceedings adopted by Mr. Badger at Muscat are detailed in a report forwarded by him from Aden, and dated the 1st instant, a copy of which is attached to this letter. It will be observed that his Highness *Syud Thoweynee* accepted the Right Honourable the Governor General's decision with cordiality, and proclaimed his satisfaction by the public compliments with which he celebrated the occasion of his first interview with Mr. Badger.

4. I am directed to enclose a translation of a letter addressed to his Highness *Syud Thoweynee*, announcing the appointment of Lieutenant Pengelley. I am also desired to forward a copy of the instructions with which Lieutenant Pengelley has been furnished, and to inform you that the salary of the British Agent at Muscat has been fixed at 600 rupees per mensem, and that it has been determined to allow him 100 rupees per mensem for the pay of a writer, and for boat-hire.

5. In consequence of the receipt of private intelligence from Zanzibar to the effect that Lieutenant Colonel Rigby was suffering from indisposition, and would probably be compelled to quit his post, the Honourable the Governor in Council found it necessary to forward the Viceroy's letter to his Highness *Syud Majeed* without loss of time, in order to secure the delivery of it by Colonel Rigby. Her Majesty's steamer "Semiramis" was accordingly dispatched to Zanzibar with the letter, and the requisite presents for his Highness

Appendix, No. 8. Highness Syud Majeed. Since her departure, a communication has been received from Colonel Rigby containing an application for leave on sick certificate, but expressing his intention of remaining at Zanzibar until relieved.

6. With reference to paragraph 8 of the letter under acknowledgment, I am desired to enclose a translation of a letter which has been addressed to his Highness Syud Barghash, and of his Highness' reply thereto. Syud Barghash is still residing at Bombay, where, for several reasons, his Excellency in Council considers it to be expedient that he should remain until September or October.

7. I am directed to mention that the reports which Mr. Badger promises at the close of his letter will be forwarded, for the information of the Government of India, as soon as they are received.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary to Government.

(No. 171 of 1861.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Reverend *G. P. Badger*, Aden.

Sir,

Secret Department, 19 June 1861.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 6, dated the 1st instant, reporting the proceedings adopted by you in carrying out the decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General, as affecting his Highness Syud Thoweynee, on the occasion of your visit to Muscat.

2. In reply, I am desired to inform you that the Honourable the Governor in Council fully approves of your proceedings, and considers that you have treated the question which forms the subject of paragraph 8 of your letter, and which is one of much delicacy, with the utmost propriety and discretion.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary to Government.

(No. 40 of 1861.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *C. P. Rigby*, Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent, Zanzibar, to *A. K. Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay.

Sir,

Secret Department, British Consulate, Zanzibar,  
29 June 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 117 of 1861, Secret

1. Resolution by the Honourable Board, dated 4th February 1861.
2. From Officiating Secretary to Government of India to the Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay (No. 1532, Foreign Department), dated 2nd April 1861.
3. Copy of letters from his Excellency Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay, to their Highnesses Syud Majeed bin Saeed, at Zanzibar, and Syud Toorkee, at Sohar.

Department, dated 30th April 1861, with accompaniments as per margin, relative to the decision of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India on the disputes between the rulers of Muscat and Zanzibar on the one hand, and Muscat and Sohar on the other.

2. The above letter arrived here on the 14th instant, per Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Semiramis," and at the same time I received two letters to the address of his Highness the Sultan Syud Majeed bin Saeed, of which one was from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, and the other from his Excellency the Honourable Sir George Clerk, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay.

3. I presented these letters to his Highness, at a durbar, on the 16th instant. After he had perused them, I conferred with his Highness on the conditions of the arbitration, and I pointed out to him the promising future in prospect for his dominions by the removal of all apprehension of invasion or hostilities from Muscat. I also impressed on him to take this opportunity of regulating his expenditure with more regard to economy, and to no longer squander money he can so ill afford upon the northern Arabs, who are the cause of so much apprehension and insecurity every year to the inhabitants of this island. On taking leave of his Highness, I informed him that Her Majesty's steam-vessel would remain here a few days for the purpose of conveying any replies his Highness might wish to make to the letters which I had delivered to him.

4. His

4. His Highness expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with the terms of the arbitration, but said that he feared he might have some difficulty in procuring the sum of 80,000 crowns for the payment of the two years' arrears to Muscat. I stated to him that if he paid the amount within a reasonable period, it would carry out the terms of the arbitration. I told him that if he would consent to liberate the three chiefs of the El-Harth tribe, by name Abdallah bin Salim, Mahomed bin Salim, and Mahomed bin Nassir, who are now in very rigorous confinement at Lamoo, they and their tribe are quite willing to pay the amount of 80,000 crowns as a fine for their rebellion, and that the release of these prisoners, who have been for two years confined in irons, would not only be a humane act, but also tend to reconcile the El-Harth tribe to his family.

5. His Highness begged that the steamer might remain here a few days as the Eed-i-Koorban, or Buckree Eed, was just commencing, and his time would therefore be so much occupied with public ceremonies that he would have no opportunity to write. On the 21st instant I again paid a visit to his Highness, when he informed me that he agreed to the terms of the arbitration, and that all the members of his family were highly gratified at the termination of the dispute with Syud Thoweynee; and he expressed himself under deep obligations for the assistance afforded him by the British Government, and for the mediation of his Excellency the Viceroy in arranging his disputes with Syud Thoweynee.

6. The following day his Highness was taken ill, and for three or four days his life was in danger. He has long been suffering from a complication of diseases brought on by indulgence in sexual desires, which have greatly impaired his constitution, and he frequently suffers from attacks of fever. In consequence of his state of health I have not been able to again have an interview with his Highness, and only received this day the answers to the letters of their Excellencies the Governor General of India and the Governor of Bombay.

7. His Highness has also addressed me a letter, a translation of which is herewith enclosed (Appendix No. 1), accepting the terms of the arbitration of his Excellency the Governor General of India. The desire which his Highness expresses, that the annual payment of 40,000 crowns should be held to be payable in two half-yearly instalments at "Monsim" (April) and "Damani" (September-October) is because the revenue from the Customs is paid here at these seasons, and the dhows and other vessels only leave at these times for Muscat and ports to the north; and when he before agreed to pay the sum of 40,000 crowns per annum to Muscat, it was to have been paid at the above seasons.

8. I spoke to his Highness on the subject of Syud Barghash's return to Zanzibar. He appears to have little faith in his promise of future good behaviour, but said he is at liberty to return here, and that if he again endeavours to foment disturbances, the British consul will be aware of it, and can give him advice. The private secretary of his Highness has to-day called on me on behalf of his Highness on this subject. He says that he desires to forget all the past, and to treat Syud Barghash as a brother; that if he lives here in a peaceable manner, he will not be interfered with in any way. I replied that I do not think Syud Barghash will again offend; even if he wished to create a rebellion he would find no party to support him; that the power of the El-Harth tribe—the only one which was hostile to Syud Majeed—is completely broken, and all classes of the people here are too anxious for peace; and that, as his Highness is aware from letters intercepted, the former rebellion of Syud Barghash was instigated by the French consul, who has since been removed.

9. I have also informed his Highness of the sentiments of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General relative to the guardianship of his younger brothers and sisters, the orphan children of his Highness the late Imam, and he promises that their heritage shall be faithfully secured to them.

10. All the Arabs with whom I have conversed since the terms of the arbitration became publicly known, have expressed great gratification at the peaceful termination of the disputes between the sons of the late Imam, and all classes of the inhabitants feel grateful to the British Government for having preserved these dominions from anarchy and ruin.

I have, &c.  
(signed) C. P. Rigby, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent, Zanzibar.

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APPENDIX, No. 1.

[Translation of an Arabic Letter.]

From His Highness *Syud Majeed bin Saeed*, Sultan of Zanzibar, to Lieutenant Colonel *C. P. Rigby*, Her Majesty's Consul, Zanzibar; dated Zanzibar, 19th day of the Month of Zilhuz, in the Year 1277 of the Hegira, corresponding to the 29th June 1861.

After Compliments,  
I DESIRE to inform you that I have been very much gratified by the receipt of the letters  
0.116. from



Appendix, No. 8.

from his Lordship the Governor General of India and his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, conveying to me the intelligence of the settlement of the disputes which existed between myself and my brother Thoweynee bin Saeed, and regarding the decision that I shall pay to my brother Thoweynee the sum of 40,000 crowns annually, and also the sum of 80,000 crowns on account of arrears for two years. I agree to pay these sums, and I accept and am satisfied with the terms of the decision, and they are binding on me. And it is the desire of the British Government (Janab el Sirkar) that each of us, that is, myself and my brother Thoweynee, shall be independent of each other in his own dominions, and sultan over his own subjects; that is to say, that Zanzibar and the islands (Pemba and Moufea) and the dominions on the continent of Africa dependent upon it shall be subject to me, and that Muscat and its dependencies, with the land of Oman, shall be subject to my brother Thoweynee bin Saeed; and that we shall dwell in peace and friendly alliance the one with the other, as is customary between brothers. I pray that it may be so, if it please God. I feel very much obliged to the British Government for all its kindness and favour, and for having averted from my dominions disorders and hostilities. During my lifetime I shall never forget the kindness which it has shown to me.

And now what I desire from you is this, that you will mention to his Lordship the Governor General of India that he should kindly determine that the payment of the 40,000 crowns per annum to my brother Thoweynee shall be settled as follows, viz., that 20,000 crowns shall be due and payable each year at the "Mousim" (about April, when the south-west monsoon sets in), and that the other 20,000 crowns shall be due and payable each year at the Damani" (about September-October, when the annual accounts are made up, and the revenue from the customs is paid), in like manner as I before agreed to do when I made the arrangement through my cousin Mahomed bin Salim to pay 40,000 crowns annually to Muscat.

And respecting the 80,000 crowns arrears for two years, that it shall be paid as soon as I can possibly do so.

This I desire, in order that there may be no grounds of dispute hereafter.

This is what I wish for from the friendship of the Government.

And for whatsoever you may desire from me the sign is with you.

From the confiding slave in God's mercy—

(signed) *Majeed bin Saeed.*

Written on the 19th day of the month of Zilhuz, in the year 1277 of the Hegira, corresponding to the 29th June A.D. 1861.

(True translation.)

(signed) *C. P. Rigby*, Lieutenant Colonel,  
Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent, Zanzibar.

British Consulate, Zanzibar, 29 June 1861.

(No. 60 of 1861.)

(Office No. 196.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Fort William.

Secret Department, Bombay Castle,  
24 July 1861.

Sir,

IN continuation of the letter from this Department, dated the 19th ultimo, No. 48, I am directed to forward to you, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council the accompanying copy of a letter, with enclosure, dated the 29th idem, from Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Rigby, Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent at Zanzibar, announcing that his Highness Syud Majeed had accepted the terms of his Excellency the Viceroy's arbitration relative to the matters in dispute with his Highness' brother Syud Thooweyee bin Saeed, the ruler of Muscat.

2. In transmitting this Despatch, I am desired to express the satisfaction of the Honourable the Governor in Council at the cordial spirit in which the Viceroy's arbitration of the long-pending differences between these powerful chiefs on the east coast of Africa and Arabia has been received.

3. As it appears desirable on the approaching departure of Captain Lewis Pelly for Zanzibar that he should be made the bearer of a communication to the Sultan, it is proposed to address his Highness, conveying a general approval of his very becoming letter to Lieutenant Colonel Rigby, and expressing the assurance of this Government that they will soon have the pleasure of transmitting the Viceroy's favourable notice of his Highness' frank acceptance of the arbitration, and of the reasonable accommodation which he has solicited.

4. It

4. It is also proposed to address Lieutenant Colonel Rigby by the same opportunity, communicating to him the approval of his Excellency in Council of the judicious advice offered by him to his Highness Syud Majeed, especially in respect to the liberation of the chiefs of the El-Harth tribe, which would, in the opinion of this Government, not only be productive of the very great advantage of enabling him to dispose, without further embarrassment, of the Muscat claim upon him for arrears, but would also, it is hoped, tend to perpetuate the tranquillity of the Zanzibar territory by burying former disputes in oblivion.

5. Permission for the return of his Highness Syud Barghash to Zanzibar having been conceded by the Sultan, it appears to Government that it would be well that this young chief should accompany Captain Lewis Pelly, who has been appointed to act for Lieutenant Colonel Rigby; arrangements will accordingly be made to enable Syud Barghash to accompany Captain Pelly to Zanzibar.

6. I am desired to add an expression of the regret with which this Government has received the unfavourable intelligence conveyed by Colonel Rigby in regard to his Highness Syud Majeed's state of health.

7. A khureeta from his Highness to the address of the Right Honourable the Governor General accompanies.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary to Government.

(No. 197 of 1861.)

From *A. Kinloch Forbes, Esq.,* Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to Lieutenant Colonel *C. P. Rigby,* Her Majesty's Consul and British Agent at Zanzibar.

Secret Department, Bombay Castle,  
24 July 1861.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, with enclosure, dated the 29th June last, No. 40, reporting the acceptance by his Highness Syud Majeed of the terms of the Right Honourable the Governor General's arbitration relative to the matters in dispute with his Highness's brother Syud Thoweynee bin Saeed of Muscat.

2. In reply, I am desired to observe that the Honourable the Governor in Council considers your communications to his Highness Syud Majeed to be very judicious, and he especially approves of the advice offered to the Sultan in respect to the liberation of the chiefs of the El-Harth tribe, which would not only be productive of the very great advantage of enabling him to dispose, without further embarrassment, of the Muscat claim upon him for arrears, but would also, it is hoped, tend to perpetuate the tranquillity of the Zanzibar territory by burying former disputes in oblivion.

3. I am at the same time desired to state that Government are gratified to find that the arbitration of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General has been received in so satisfactory a spirit by the Arab community of Zanzibar as well as by his Highness Syud Majeed.

4. His Excellency in Council trusts that his Highness's proposal to pay the annual subsidy to Muscat in two instalments will be favourably received by the Government of India. The arrangement could not, Government think, be objected to by the Sultan of Muscat, as it is believed to have formed part of the original scheme.

5. Permission for the return of his Highness Syud Barghash to Zanzibar having been conceded by the Sultan, it appears to Government that it would be well that this young chief should accompany Captain Lewis Pelly, who has been appointed to act for you: arrangements will accordingly be made to enable Syud Barghash to accompany Captain Pelly to Zanzibar.

6. I am desired to add an expression of the regret with which this Government has received the unfavourable intelligence in regard to his Highness Syud Majeed's state of health.

I have, &c.  
(signed) *A. Kinloch Forbes,*  
Acting Secretary to Government.



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I N D E X.

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ANALYSIS OF INDEX.

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### 1. *As to existing Treaties :*

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## Z.

## ZANZIBAR:

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2. *Question of relieving the Sultan of Zanzibar of the Subsidy paid to Muscat upon condition of his suppressing the Slave Trade.*
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